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

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THE
ARMY QUARTERLY

With which is incorporated

The United Service Magazine

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

Edited by

Major-General G. P. DAWNAY
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

and

Lieut.-Colonel T. A. HEADLAM
late East Yorkshire Regiment

VOLUME XVIII

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men may fairly be regarded as an irreducible minimum. As regards the reduction in our military expenditure Sir Laming Worthington-Evans was able to show that the cost of the effective services of the Army has been decreased by eleven per cent. in the last five years, whilst other countries, such as the United States of America, France and Soviet Russia, are spending more every year. No sensible man would wish to push this comparison too far, for each country has its own problems of defence and its own methods of solving them: but the figures must acquit us, at any rate, of all dreams of military aggrandizement or desire for war. It is not our fault if our policy has failed to influence that of other Powers: in this matter of land armaments it would seem that example, instead of being better than precept, is just as ineffective.

In the Estimates for this year there is an actual reduction of 3,000 men in the Regular Forces. This saving is the result of withdrawing Indian troops from Aden; of disbanding the West India Regiment; and of certain adjustments to be made in the establishments of the Royal Artillery and Royal Army Service Corps as the process of mechanization in these two branches of the Service proceeds. Thus, although every soldier will regret the disappearance of a unit with so fine a record as the West India Regiment, whose reason for existence seems to have disappeared with the withdrawal of the garrison from Sierra Leone, there is involved no actual decrease in fighting-power. The total sum which Parliament is asked to provide for the Army this year is £40,545,000, £505,000 less than last year, and represents a practical saving in the course of administration and routine. The Secretary of State, it should be noted, gives due credit to the soldiers for this result. "I should not be able to produce those reduced Estimates," remarked Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, "unless I had the whole-hearted support from the Army Council and the officers under them in the War Office, in the Commands and in the Army itself. They have combined to cut out waste and to preserve what is essential by sacrificing everything in the nature of a luxury and by postponing all expenditure not immediately necessary and urgent."

* * * * *

The mechanization of the Army, which, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans reminded the House of Commons, only began in 1921, is being steadily continued. As Sir George Milne is to continue in his appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff for an extra two years—that is, until 1932—a continuance of the present policy should be assured. The reorganization is systematic and steady,

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being strictly governed, it may be presumed, by the limited amount of money available.

Every cavalry regiment now has a mechanized machine-gun squadron, and the mobility of the horsed squadrons has been increased by transferring some of the load from the horse to the mechanical transport of the regiment. The mechanization of the infantry machine-gun companies is being carried out gradually. The five existing medium artillery brigades are all now mechanized on various scales. As regards the field artillery, two brigades are already motor-drawn and another is to be converted this year. The year's programme provides for the mechanization of four light artillery batteries, and these will be exercised experimentally with other troops. A new type of transport has been evolved for the new pontoon with which the Royal Engineers has been equipped.

In the important matter of signal communication, which presents a particular and difficult problem where motor units with largely increased mobility are concerned, it is satisfactory to note that the mechanization of the Royal Corps of Signals is keeping pace with that of the other arms. It should also be noted that the two mechanized brigades of field artillery have been supplied with wireless telephone equipment, and that four more field artillery brigades will be similarly provided for during the year.

Essential as it is to keep abreast of modern research and invention, it would hardly be a sound policy to take the risk of putting into the field units of the same arm equipped with heterogeneous types of motor vehicle. The problems of manœuvre, maintenance and replacement would be harassing in the extreme. It is, therefore, satisfactory to learn that of the five mechanized medium artillery brigades two are to be equipped on a standardized scale. Doubtless further experiments will allow this principle to operate gradually in the case of all mechanized formations, no matter to what branch of the Service they may belong.

The Royal Army Service Corps has itself produced a type of six-wheeled tractor which has not only been adopted by the War Office, but has found favour in the sight of civilian firms. One ardent economist in the House of Commons was quick to see here an opportunity to reduce the military establishment of these vehicles, suggesting that the Government might be able to levy upon the civil supply in time of emergency.

As regards the development of tanks, the Secretary of State was able to assure the House that Great Britain still leads the world both as regards the types of machine and the strategy and tactics

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employed. Experimental exercises are to be carried out this year in which the lighter armoured units will work in combination with infantry, when various forms of battalion and brigade organization will receive a trial. Machine guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars and light howitzers will all be carried in armoured vehicles, and light tanks will be tried as a unit in the infantry brigade. "We anticipate," said the Secretary of State, "that this organization of light and medium armoured brigades [i.e. tanks and armoured cars], when combined suitably with cavalry and infantry formations, should provide us with a force suited for every type of country and for every form of manœuvre that may be necessary, from the passive defence to the attack, the wide turning movement, or the headlong pursuit."

* * * * *

An important step is foreshadowed by the announcement that the General Staff is about to prepare draft war establishments for "modernized and armoured formations." Instructions are also to be issued for the administration and technical handling of the new units. These tables and instructions will, of course, need periodical and systematic revision as the result of new inventions and experimental exercises, but their first appearance may be said to mark the definite emergence of our mechanized forces from the purely experimental stage to a condition approaching practical organization for active service. An increased efficiency in the *personnel* of mechanized units should be forthcoming when the period of pure theory and experiment is passed and basic principles can be definitely adopted.

* * * * *

It is encouraging to find that 6,200 more recruits joined the Territorial Army last year than in the previous year, but, as the net increase in strength only amounts to 108 officers and 121 "other ranks" it is clear that these figures must be improved upon if our second line of defence is to be brought up to establishment. The problem is a difficult one. In view of the need for economy, it would seem that little can be done to attract more of the right type of man, and modern life offers an increasing number of diversions which compete with the attractions of military training. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans is of opinion that quality at this juncture is of more importance than quantity, as it is the future leaders who must be trained. Yet, if formations are always much below strength, training must suffer, and this is even more the case in this era of mechanized units and of specialists than it was in the days before the war. Moreover, the question of expansion, should the need

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arise, has become much more difficult. Men of spirit and goodwill are now more than ever useless if they have received none of the highly specialized training which makes the modern soldier. For these reasons, and because the organization and training of the Territorial Army can only be brought into line with that of the Regular forces by a more liberal expenditure, more money could very profitably be spent upon our Second Line. As the Secretary of State acknowledged, the tax-payer owes much to its existence: he would also be the gainer by its increased efficiency. And the best way of encouraging the County Territorial Associations in their admirable work would be to ensure that it is as fruitful as possible. It would be wise to give this question of a larger appropriation for the Territorial Army very careful consideration.

* * * * *

The shortage of candidates for Commissions in the Regular Army was attributed by Sir Laming Worthington-Evans chiefly to the uncertainty as to the future. There is no doubt that although the "axe" has ceased to operate the effect of its activities is still remembered. Sir Laming is probably right in believing that the Army offers as good a career as it ever did; but times change, and to-day there may be a greater choice of lucrative and congenial careers in civil life than there was formerly. It has even been said—and with a certain amount of truth—that in time of peace more adventure is to be sought and found outside the Army than in it. Probably, too, the new mechanized Army has less attraction for many of the old type of candidates, and, if this be so, it may ultimately be found necessary to draw our officers from a larger and slightly different class of the community.

The Secretary of State's speculation that "exaggerated references to promotion by merit might have created a sense of insecurity," was hardly in his happiest vein. And even if "practically every officer who made himself reasonably efficient could count on rising, in the normal course, to the rank of major," it is not unlikely that to retire with that rank in the prime of life does not appeal to keen young men, or to their parents, as an inducement to join the Army. There is no vocational training for officers, and no special outlet, in this highly competitive age, for their activities on retirement at the age of forty—at a time in life when it may well be that domestic responsibilities demand that their pensions should be augmented by their own efforts.

* * * * *

The Regular recruit continues to be selected with great care and

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discrimination. Perhaps the reduction of the height standard for infantry is a recognition of the fact that, provided his general health be good, brain and not brawn is the first *desideratum* in the modern soldier. We have certainly passed the stage when acute unemployment in the country sent up the recruiting returns as a matter of course, although one member of the House of Commons does not appear to think that this is the case. Education in the Army now approaches a high standard, and its value is seen in the influence it has on training. There is no place for the comparatively illiterate soldier. Every year there pass into civil life some 30,000 men who are healthier, better educated, and in every way better citizens, as the result of their service in the Army. In the course of his speech the Secretary of State called the attention of employers of labour to this annual contingent which passes to the Reserve, but the absorption of these men into the industrial ranks of the nation is a difficult problem which, strictly speaking, is not the Army's problem at all. It is a national one. Of course all these Reservists are not skilled workmen. The figures given show 1,600 men as having gone through the Army vocational training centres last year, a small proportion which it may confidently be expected to increase. But to this number may be added the men who, as the result of their service in a technical unit, are skilled in some trade or other. The prospects of the reservist finding employment on his return to civil life depend very largely on the state of the prosperity of the country, on the attitude of employers of labour, and on the trade unions. The Army can hardly do more for its men than it is doing at the present time.

* * * * *

The Air Estimates show the result of a sustained effort to effect economies. The net total of £16,200,000 represents a saving of £50,000 over last year, which, considering that the Royal Air Force is pursuing a policy of expansion so far as its means allow, was hardly to be looked for. As a matter of fact, one Regular squadron, one cadre squadron, three Auxiliary Air squadrons, two flights for the Fleet Air Arm, and a unit of flying boats are to be added to the Force during the current year. The two new airships should also be ready.

Sir Samuel Hoare, in his Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates, issues a timely warning in which he points out that the progressive reduction of the Air Estimates cannot be expected to continue. Considering that, apart from its essential duties in cooperation with the Army and the Navy, the Royal Air Force has

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a large sphere of independent activity—it now takes a considerable part in policing the Empire overseas and in the mandated territories —it would appear that the country is getting extremely good value for its money. The total of 70 active air squadrons which we shall possess before the end of the current year is as large an air force as can be expected unless fresh schemes of expansion are sanctioned and the necessary money voted by Parliament to carry them into effect. Here the interests and efficiency of the Army are involved, for the process of mechanization may result in a greater call for air cooperation. How far our air strength can be consolidated by a greater Government interest in the development of civil aviation is another aspect of the question, which requires the most earnest attention of those in authority.

* * * * *

When, a little more than a month ago, Colonel D. C. Cameron, R.A.S.C., lectured at the Royal United Service Institution upon the problems of supplying mechanized forces in the field, the subject did not seem to provoke as lively a discussion as it might have done. Colonel Cameron emphasized the necessity of " getting forward " petrol—the life-blood of mechanized units—in quantities hitherto undreamed of, and contended that these supplies must be scattered over the countryside and not concentrated in tanks at bases and railheads where they could easily be destroyed in bulk by raiding aircraft. He anticipated that railways—which constitute vulnerable lines of communication and the inflexibility of which would limit to an unthinkable extent the mobile range of mechanized forces—will be superseded by motor transport; and he advocated that supplies should be so distributed over the country in *petits paquets* that it would not be worth while for the enemy to undertake their systematic destruction by aeroplanes and raiding tanks scattered over a wide area.

One speaker in the discussion which followed the lecture very reasonably pointed out that railways would continue to be the dominating factor in countries where roads were few and bad; but Colonel Cameron was obviously considering the case of operations in a civilized country with a good road system. He also took for granted that such a war would be an exclusively mobile war, and one of short duration, doing away with the necessity of accumulating vast reserves of ammunition at depôts and bases. He confined himself, therefore, to the problem of how best to ensure the delivery of petrol and spare parts to the armoured fighting units, and how to effect the replacement of vehicles as required.

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The subject is such a complicated one that many other important points demand consideration. How can we be so sure that some form of siege warfare will not supervene at various points in any theatre of operations? Must we eliminate the possibility of periods of static warfare alternating with the war of manœuvre? Is one really justified in assuming that hostilities will be of short duration? Those who are primarily concerned with the supply of our mechanized Army in the field might also consider the shipping problem, for it is to be presumed that the scene of the contemplated struggle is to be over-seas. The sea-transit of mechanical vehicles in great numbers is going to make a heavy demand upon the suitable tonnage available. Tonnage, and the quantities of petrol at our disposal, are important factors in estimating the size of the mechanized force which we should be able to keep supplied in the field.

A system of dissemination of supplies over a large area in order to avoid a well-defined and therefore particularly vulnerable line of communication, would probably be found to present many difficulties of its own. Ample wireless communication, as was pointed out by the Quartermaster-General, who presided at the Lecture, would be an absolute necessity; and the prompt replenishment of the fighting units from so many scattered sources would be no easy task. It might have been suggested that there are possibilities in the motor-transport column of petrol supplies and travelling workshops moving under the escort of armoured cars, tanks, and air squadrons—the equivalent of a convoy at sea. In any case, the implication of the lecturer that we shall win, and win quickly, by the expenditure of motor-spirit rather than of high-explosive is hardly in accordance with official doctrine, which is imbued with the importance of greater mobility without the sacrifice of hitting power.

* * * * *

The champions of the Channel Tunnel, who have suddenly sprung into new life, are at great pains to show how easily the tunnel could be temporarily blocked or partially destroyed in the event of war with some Continental Power. It does not seem to have occurred to them that in such an event it might be of vital importance to us to keep such a line of communication open for traffic. Why should not the same ingenuity which has devised so many methods of destruction now be concentrated upon the problem of protection? Let it be accepted as an axiom that command of the narrow seas is vital to us; otherwise the tunnel might be wrecked

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by depth charges exploded on the sea floor, where the volume and weight of water above would provide ideal tamping for the demolition. Let us also remember that to any Power whose fleet is in control of the Straits of Dover and the Channel, the possession of a Channel tunnel is only of minor value. Such a " pin-point " of communication between France and England might be convenient —its ends would probably require elaborate protection from air raids—but could never be of paramount importance.

It is not so easy to assess the national benefits in time of peace which would follow the establishment of through railway communication between England and the Continent. There is the question of the respective costs of sea-freight and rail-freight. As regards passenger traffic, before we can count upon masses of Continental holiday-makers using the tunnel route in order to spend their money in England, we might well make certain that we have made England fit for foreigners to make holiday in. And many progressive minds look forward to the time when travel by aeroplane will be within the means of most of us. The attractions of the air-route would certainly seem to be greater than those of a submarine " tube," to which, indeed, many people might even prefer the old sea passage.

* * * * *

It has been decided that, in the event of war, the cavalry of the United States of America shall take the field at peace establishment. The contention is that to bring cavalry units up to war strength on mobilization would mean the introduction of imperfectly trained men and horses whose numbers would not compensate for their lack of efficiency. As trained reinforcements became available, formations would be brought up to their war establishments, which in the case of a cavalry division means an increase from 5,000 to 9,800 men and a corresponding augmentation of artillery, machine guns and other units. Seeing that these trained reinforcements would also have to replace war wastage, the possibility of the cavalry ever attaining the numbers laid down in war establishments appears to be rather remote.

Unlike our military authorities, the American experts seem to be by no means wholly converted to the mechanization of their forces. The trooper and the infantryman are still looked upon as the backbone of the Army, and it is interesting to note that in the American Army there is only one armoured car unit in being at the present time.

* * * * *

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The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich of Russia, who died in January at the age of seventy-two, although he was Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies for the first year only of the war, was one of the most outstanding personalities of the great conflict. Grandson of the Tzar Nicholas I, he entered the cavalry, and definitely adopted, like our own Duke of Connaught, the Army as a career, being the only member of the Imperial family to graduate at the Russian Staff College. He was employed on the General Staff in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878, and then held a series of high cavalry commands, becoming in 1895 Inspector-General of Cavalry. He did not serve in the Manchurian War, and in 1905 was appointed to command the St. Petersburg Military District, a post which he held until the outbreak of the Great War. Thrust rather on one side by the War Minister, General Sukhomlinov, and the reformers drawn from the General Staff, it came somewhat as a surprise to the officers of the Russian Army when, on the 1st of August, 1914, the Tzar having decided not to assume personal command, appointed him to be Commander-in-Chief, rather than Sukhomlinov. The Grand Duke, without special preparation for a great command in the field, found himself confronted with a ready-made plan of operation, and one not approved of by the War Minister and military advisers of the Russian Government. For, instead of making the principal effort against Germany and bringing the best aid possible to France by threatening Berlin, it had been decided for political reasons to send the bulk of the Russian forces against the Austrians, with a view to reaching the Balkans and Constantinople. In excuse for the total lack of cooperation between the two Armies (those of Samsonov and Rennenkampf) of the North-West Front, under General Jilinski, which resulted in Tannenberg, it has been stated that the Grand Duke was absent from his headquarters on a visit to the Armies of the South-West Group, which under General Ivanov were not advancing as they should have done. With the very indifferent communications of the Russian Empire, the task of commanding and manœuvring its unwieldy hosts was no doubt most difficult; but, as the Army possessed and used wireless—the Germans picked up at the period messages of the highest importance containing orders and situations of the troops—wireless communication between Great Headquarters and the headquarters of the two great Groups of Armies cannot have been lacking, even if land telegraph lines were not available. The Grand Duke's absence from G.H.Q. hardly absolves him from responsibility. Failure to occupy East Prussia wrecked the Russian

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plan ; for it meant the impossibility of a successful Russian advance from Poland. Every attempt to press westward was exposed to, and actually was brought to a stop by, German enveloping attacks from East Prussia. Defeat on the northern wing not only counterbalanced success against the Austrians, but brought operations in Galicia to a standstill. Great credit must, however, be given to the Grand Duke for the energy he infused into the Russian Armies ; for the manner in which he extricated his troops from difficult positions ; and for the way in which he held them together against the great Austro-German attack of 1915, although short of arms, munitions and every requisite of modern Armies, and brought them back with their line still intact. The influences surrounding the Tzar decided on his removal, and on the 21st of August, 1915, he was sent as Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief to the Caucasus. There success attended him, and his troops made a great advance into Armenia and occupied Trebizond and Erzeroum. The Tzar when he abdicated re-appointed the Grand Duke Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies, but the Provisional Government cancelled this, and the Grand Duke returned to the Crimea, where he remained until March, 1919, when he, with the Dowager Tzaritza, took refuge on a British warship. He ended his days living a retired life in France.

The extraordinary difficulties which the Grand Duke encountered in commanding the Russian Armies have been described in the two books of General Danilov which have been reviewed in " Notes on Foreign War Books," the second one in the current number. Assisted by his great personal popularity and high birth, he certainly obtained greater efforts from his troops than any of the leaders who succeeded him, and his defeat of the Austrians in the early days before they were stiffened by German divisions was unquestionable and very nearly decisive. Apart from Brussilov, he is the only one of the Russian military leaders whose name goes down to history with success attached to it.

* * * * *

General Right Hon. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell, who died in February at the age of sixty-nine, will be long remembered as one of Lord Kitchener's most trusted lieutenants in the reorganization of Egypt. He joined the 42nd, now the 1st Battalion The Black Watch, in 1879, but, after being engaged with it in the Tel-el-Kebir Campaign of 1882, he accepted service with the Egyptian Army, and remained with it, taking part in all its campaigns until early in 1900, when Lord Kitchener, whose A.D.C. and A.M.S.

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he had been, summoned him to South Africa. After commanding an infantry brigade, he was appointed Military Governor of Pretoria and the Western Transvaal, a post which he held until nearly the close of the war, when Lord Kitchener, finding him a little too kind-hearted for a military governor, sent him to command on the Western Line. After the war he was for eighteen months Chief Staff Officer in Ireland, a country with which, like Egypt, he was to renew acquaintance. From 1904 to 1908 he was Staff Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Inspector-General to the Forces, and later Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. From 1908 to 1912 he was G.O.C. the British Forces in Egypt, and, soon after the outbreak of war in 1914, was sent back there in the same capacity. Under him were made the arrangements for the defence of Egypt both on the Suez Canal and the Tripoli side; but he rendered even greater service in his loyal support of the forces operating in Gallipoli under Sir Ian Hamilton and towards Palestine under Sir Archibald Murray. When in March, 1916, the triple organization of command which had existed in Egypt was brought to an end, Murray was given sole command of the troops in Egypt and Palestine, and Maxwell returned home. On reaching London he was dispatched to Ireland as Military Governor, with the task, most uncongenial to his kindly temperament, of suppressing the Sinn Fein forces which had declared an independent Irish republic. In a week he had restored order, and by shooting a dozen of the disturbers of the peace, made it clear that, with a war on her hands, Britain would not brook any attempt to upset her authority.

For his services Sir John was promoted to G.C.B. and appointed in November, 1916, to the Northern Command at York. He retired as a full General in 1922.

Few men have enjoyed greater personal popularity than "Conky" Maxwell; a thorough soldier of determination and courage, both physical and moral, with the strongest sense of discipline on service. He had a kindly heart, and did much in an unobtrusive way to help those whose lot in life was less fortunate than his own.

* * * * *

Major-General Sir Gerald Moore Heath, Engineer-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force from the winter of 1917 until the end of the war, died in January at Mentone, at the age of sixty-five. He had retired in 1919 on account of a breakdown in health, brought about by a shell wound received in 1916 when he was Chief Engineer of the First Army, and his subsequent exertions in the high

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post of Engineer-in-Chief, in which he was tireless in visiting all parts of the front. Of slight and to the last almost boyish figure, a magnificent horseman, a Staff College graduate, he had a long record of war service, and immense experience as a field engineer, never being employed on what is known to the Army as "Royal Engineering."

Gazetted to the Royal Engineers from Woolwich in February, 1882, he served in the Bechuanaland Expedition of 1884–1885, and, after duty with the Bengal Sappers and Miners and two years at the Staff College, Camberley, in the Chitral Campaign of 1895. He was in the field during the whole period of the South African War, 1899–1903. He had during his early days at Chatham adventured in balloons, for which his light weight and his daring singularly fitted him. In the siege of Ladysmith he was in charge of a balloon section: it is a curious coincidence that all three officers who were successively Engineers-in-Chief in France, General Sir G. H. Fowke, Sir S. R. Rice and Sir G. M. Heath, were together in Ladysmith. For his services in South Africa he received a D.S.O. and the brevet of Lieut.-Colonel. His experience was made use of by his being appointed, in 1902, Chief Instructor in Field Fortification at the School of Military Engineering. In 1906 he returned to India, but from March, 1912, to the outbreak of war in 1914 he was Brigadier-General, General Staff, South Africa. Ordered home, he was from September, 1914, to May, 1915, Inspector of Royal Engineers in the United Kingdom, and, as such, charged with the inspection and training of the new units. On the latter date he was sent to France as Chief Engineer, II Corps, being promoted to Chief Engineer, First Army, in November, 1915, and two years later Engineer-in-Chief.

In his distinguished and varied career, "Jerry Heath," as he was best known, never said an unkind thing, or made an enemy; his happy disposition, devotion to work and sport, utter loyalty, unassuming gallantry and absolute straightness—he never could be got to believe that any British officer could do a mean or petty action—brought him not only the lasting friendship but the real affection of all who served over, with, or under, him. Had he spared himself he might still have been with us, but like his great Commander-in-Chief, with whom he had so much in common, devotion to duty came first in his thoughts.

12th of March, 1929.

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THE CAMPAIGNS IN PALESTINE AND EGYPT, 1914–1918, IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR*

By Major-General Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B.

For the first time since de Lesseps joined the waters of the Mediterranean to those of the Red Sea the British Empire was, in the years 1914–1918, engaged in a great war. The Suez Canal is commonly spoken of as the vital artery of the Empire. Events proved that this language is exaggerated, for late in the war when the submarine campaign was at its height, traffic from the East was diverted to the Cape Route owing to the dangers of passage through the Mediterranean, and for several months the Canal ceased to be an artery of communication, but the British Empire survived. Still, the importance of the Canal as a means of expediting the concentration of the scattered forces of the Empire, East or West, in the first year of the war needs no emphasis and its protection was from the first an important factor in British strategy. This factor produced what is incorrectly termed a "side show." A nodding acquaintance with British military history is sufficient to make it clear that "side shows" have been a feature of all our great struggles from the days of Queen Elizabeth onwards, and it would seem that we have not given to their conduct sufficient study, for, as in the Great War, they have not infrequently involved us in an expenditure of force which has proved to be extravagant. In the Great War this was, to my mind, mainly due to the fact that we forgot Napoleon's very sound advice and did not confine ourselves to one main military object at a time, which does not mean that the object need always have been the same. Our sea power and our scattered responsibilities make us peculiarly liable to commit this mistake, but to condemn, for that reason, what experience has shown to be inevitable is merely foolish. I propose, then, to preface a study of Allenby's campaigns in Palestine with some consideration of the relation of the operations in Egypt and Palestine to the general strategy of the war.

* A lecture delivered in the University of London, December, 1928.

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Turkey began a leisurely mobilization on the 3rd of August, 1914. While we had no definite information of the conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and Germany, the reception of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at Constantinople on the 11th of August was a sufficient indication of the way the wind was blowing. Our mobilization plans provided for the early withdrawal of the regular garrison of Egypt to form part of the 7th Division, and its replacement by a Territorial Division, the 42nd. By the time when these movements were completed it was learned that the Turks were assembling their VII and VIII Corps in Palestine and Syria, which would give them a force estimated at 65,000 men and 100 guns. Therefore, when the first Indian expeditionary force was on its way through the Canal to France, the 9th (Sirhind) Brigade was dropped in Egypt, to be relieved later by the 11th Indian Division. Further, the first Australian and New Zealand contingents were halted in Egypt to complete their training.

War with Turkey became a fact on the 31st of October. The Egyptian police posts on the Sinai frontier of Egypt were at once withdrawn and the Turks promptly occupied El Arish, but before they could complete any threatening concentration on the Egyptian frontier, Sir John Maxwell, who commanded in Egypt, had at his disposal some 70,000 men. Considering the state of training of the bulk of the troops, this was not an excessive force for the protection of a Canal a hundred miles in length, for the maintenance of internal order in Egypt and for the security of her western frontier, bordered by the Senoussi tribes. Valuable additional protection was also provided by British and French naval flotillas. This is an interesting and striking example of the kind of burden which the adequate protection of Imperial communications involves.

Heavy rains in January, 1915, which filled the wells and tanks of the Sinai desert, induced Kress von Kressenstein, the driving force in the Fourth Turkish Army, into which the VII and VIII Corps had been formed, to make an attempt on the Canal. An attack starting from Beersheba across the Sinai desert was a desperate enterprise, justifiable only if it were accompanied by a general rising in Egypt. The rising did not take place and the attack was repulsed on the 3rd of February and, on the 19th of February, the Dardanelles campaign opened with our first naval attack on the forts. Throughout 1915 the Turks on the western theatre of war were fully occupied with the defence of the Dardanelles and the eastern frontier of Egypt was left in peace.

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On the evacuation of the Dardanelles, at the end of 1915, the weary divisions from that theatre were brought to Egypt to be rested and refitted. Thus early in 1916 there were in Egypt, 12 divisions, 2 Indian infantry brigades, 3 dismounted yeomanry brigades and 5 mounted brigades, the total strength amounting to over 374,000 men. Sir Archibald Murray arrived to command and reorganize this large Army, out of which Sir William Robertson, then C.I.G.S., desired to form what he termed a strategic reserve for the Empire. In Egypt this reserve was admirably placed, seeing that we were at the time conducting campaigns in France, Salonika and Mesopotamia. The first use of this reserve was to dispatch the 13th Division under General Maude to Mesopotamia, where the ill-advised advance to Baghdad had ended in the siege of Kut-el-Amara.

The failure of the Dardanelles campaign had released large Turkish forces; the Turks were reported to be extending their railways in Southern Palestine and were believed to be preparing for a more methodical advance across the Sinai desert than that which they had attempted early in 1915. The defence of the Canal therefore again became a matter of prime importance, more particularly as it was becoming clear that the resources of India were insufficient to meet the demands of the Mesopotamian campaign, which would to an increasing extent have to be supplied from home. It was agreed that, if the Canal was to be secured, the lines of defence must be pushed 1,000 yards out into the desert, and it was estimated that to defend its one hundred miles of length against such force as the Turks might now bring against it, eight divisions and a considerable force of mounted troops would be required.

It was obviously unsatisfactory to lock up so large an Army in passive defence, and in February, 1916, Sir Archibald Murray made a proposal which had far-reaching consequences. He said that if he were to advance into the Sinai desert and occupy the wells along the coast route up to and including El Arish, that is the historic route along which all invasions from Egypt of Syria and from Syria of Egypt have taken place, he would secure Egypt and the Canal with a much smaller force than would be needed for the passive defence of the Canal lines. He very wisely stipulated that this advance should be accompanied by and be *pro rata* with the construction of a broad-gauge railway along the coast. This plan was approved at home and Sir Archibald at once began to put it into execution. Almost simultaneously Kress von Kressenstein had moved the Turkish

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Commander, Djemal Pasha, to make another and more deliberate attempt upon Egypt. The result was a collision at Katia on the 23rd of April in which a force of our yeomanry was surprised and worsted during a sea mist. But Murray's railway gave him a far better line of communication than the Turks possessed, and they, hampered by lack of water, were unable to follow up the advantage they had won. Murray pushed deliberately forward into the desert and on the 11th of August was able to take at Romani an ample revenge for Katia. The railway progressed steadily and on the 21st of December El Arish was occupied, while, on the 8th of January, 1917, a mounted force under Sir Philip Chetwode routed a Turkish detachment near Rafa and thus cleared the Sinai desert of Turks.

The conquest of the Sinai desert had involved little fighting, but it was a brilliant feat of organization and engineering. It had early been discovered that the water of the coast wells was brackish and unsuited for British stomachs. Sir Archibald Murray had, therefore, decided to lay a pipe line to bring water from Egypt to the frontier of Palestine. By the end of 1916, three hundred miles of water piping had been laid, huge pumping stations had been erected, filters capable of dealing with 1,500,000 gallons of water a day and reservoirs with a content of 3,500,000 gallons had been erected, three hundred and eighty-eight miles of railway and more than two hundred miles of metalled road had been constructed, and Kantara on the Canal had been turned into a large and well-equipped base. All this work had involved the creation of an Egyptian labour corps, which numbered 50,000 men. Had these vast works been completed in time of peace, they would doubtless have been considered worthy of a Royal inauguration and the press of the world would have produced columns of glowing description. As it was, they were lost to the public sight in the maze of the war and little has been heard of the men who were responsible for them. The railway construction was directed by Sir George Macaulay, and the other engineering works by Major-General Wright and Colonel Paul, Sir Archibald Murray's Chief Engineer and Director of Works respectively. The strategic result of the occupation of El Arish was an ample justification of Sir Archibald Murray's plan. Early in 1916 the force about that place for the defence of Egypt and the Canal was reduced to three divisions and two mounted divisions, while by that time nine complete divisions and a number of other troops, amounting in all to 232,000 men, had been reorganized, re-equipped and dispatched to other theatres of

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war. The veriest pedant in strategy would be put to it to find a better example of economy of force.

Meantime, a change of Government had taken place at home, the results of the battle of the Somme had been a grievous disappointment and Rumania had been overrun. The new Government, looking for some compensation in the East for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the West, instructed the General Staff to inquire of General Murray what were his plans for operations beyond El Arish. Sir Archibald replied that for an invasion of Palestine he would need two more divisions and, if possible, some additional mounted troops. Early in 1917 we were committed to support wholeheartedly General Nivelle's campaign on the Western Front and it was impossible to provide the reinforcements for which Sir Archibald asked. Accordingly, on the 11th of January, he was instructed that an offensive campaign in Palestine would be deferred until the autumn and that in the meantime he was to do everything possible to prepare for such a campaign.

Now, during the later stages of our advance towards the frontier of Palestine the Turks had retired before us and it appeared to be at the least possible that they would continue to do so. Between El Arish and Gaza ran the Wadi Ghuzzeh, a wide river-bed with steep banks, which would have to be bridged if the railway were to go forward into Palestine. Obviously one of the most effective preparations for the proposed autumn campaign would be the bridging of the Wadi Ghuzzeh, and to cover the construction of the bridge it would be desirable to secure Gaza. Further, the occupation of Gaza would give the troops a much pleasanter place for preparation, during the summer months, than the arid desert afforded. The Turkish defences of Gaza did not at this time appear to be formidable and Sir Archibald believed that he could carry them. He would engage 32,000 men and the Turkish force was estimated not to exceed 20,000. Its strength was actually about 15,000. These were in brief the reasons for undertaking the first battle of Gaza. The attack on Gaza failed on the 26th of March. The supply of water available, even with the very elaborate preparations which had been made, was limited, for it had to be carried a distance of one hundred and fifty miles from Egypt, and this in turn put a limit upon the time within which the operations had to be concluded. Unfortunately a heavy sea fog on the morning of the battle delayed movement and made combination difficult, so, though Gaza was entered and the Turks there were on the point of withdrawing, the time limit had run out before this was known at headquarters.

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Our troops were, therefore, called off just when they were on the verge of complete success.

Still, one of the main objects of the enterprise, the Wadi Ghuzzeh, had been secured, 900 prisoners and two guns had been captured, and these included the commander and staff of the 53rd Turkish Division. So Sir Archibald considered that the battle had been amply justified and he sent home a somewhat optimistic telegram recounting his success, but making no mention of the failure at Gaza, nor of the fact that he had intended to capture that place. It happened that on the 11th of March Maude had brought his first brilliant campaign to a happy conclusion by the occupation of Baghdad, and this event had been followed by a promise from the Grand Duke Nicholas, then in command on the Caucasian front, to advance on Mosul as soon as the snows of the mountains of Kurdistan had melted. The news of Murray's victory therefore delighted the War Cabinet. The power of the Turks seemed to be crumbling and the time for pressing them as hard as possible to have come. Murray was, therefore, directed to follow up with his success by defeating the Turks in Southern Palestine, with a view to the occupation of Jerusalem.

This sudden extension of his rôle naturally surprised Murray, who replied adhering to his original estimate that he required for an advance into Palestine two more complete divisions and drafts to bring his existing divisions up to strength. While some reinforcements were available the bulk of Murray's demands could not be met, and he was directed, instead of aiming at Jerusalem, to follow up his recent success to the full extent of his power. The result was the second battle of Gaza, which began on the 17th of April and ended in a complete failure The Turks, warned by the first attack and encouraged by its results, had strengthened their position and brought up reinforcements In the circumstances the attack had little chance of victory. Undoubtedly this second battle of Gaza was a blunder, due to mutual misunderstandings between the commander on the spot and the authorities at home. The latter then reverted to their original plan of preparation for an autumn campaign.

In June, 1917, General Allenby arrived in Egypt to take over the command from General Murray and prepare for this campaign. By this time a great change had taken place in the general situation. Nivelle's campaign on the Western Front had failed, and political opinion at home was tending to the view that the situation on that front was one of complete deadlock and that Great Britain must

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look to the East for compensation for her sacrifices in the war. In any event an outstanding success in Palestine such as the capture of Jerusalem was politically very desirable. The War Cabinet, therefore, told General Allenby to make that his aim and to ask for such reinforcements as he needed for the purpose.

From the purely military point of view an autumn offensive in Palestine was equally desirable. The Russian revolution was in full swing and this destroyed any prospect of Russian cooperation with Maude in Mesopotamia. It was known that the Turkish Government was eager to recapture Baghdad, and reports came in of extensive preparations for that purpose. The Turks and Germans were said to be planning an enterprise which they called the Yilderim campaign to drive Maude back. Von Falkenhayn went to Syria to superintend this campaign, and news arrived of a Turkish concentration round Aleppo. The direct reinforcement of Maude at the end of a line of land communications five hundred miles in length, terminating in a remote base, Basra, would be slow and costly, and would use up a great deal of shipping at a time when shipping was becoming very precious. It was calculated that von Falkenhayn would not venture upon the long march from Syria to Baghdad, while he was under threat of attack from Palestine; so strategically it appeared to be much the soundest and most economical course to defend Baghdad by reinforcing Allenby and enabling him to invade Palestine. The political object of Allenby's first campaign in Palestine was then the occupation of Jerusalem; the strategic object was to break up the Yilderim Army. A subsidiary object which was both political and military was to encourage the Arab movement, then in full progress under the direction of Lawrence. All these objects were achieved by the battle of Gaza—Beersheba which began on the 31st of October, by Allenby's brilliant pursuit after that battle and by the surrender of Jerusalem on the 9th of December, 1917.

It may be asked why we, a Sea-Power with a dominant Navy, did not use that power to out-manœuvre the Turks, instead of making a direct attack on them by land. The Turkish communications ran for a long way through Palestine and Syria within striking distance from the coast, and it would appear at first sight to have been possible to have cut off, by a judicious landing, the Turks in Southern Palestine. This was a problem which was carefully considered by the General Staff and the Admiralty, and it became clear on examination that the nature of the coast of Palestine was such as to preclude landing operations. A more ambitious proposal,

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previously considered by Lord Kitchener, a landing at Alexandretta, which would at one blow sever the Turkish communication both with Palestine and with Mesopotamia, was re-examined. It was found that this would involve operations comparable in scale to the Dardanelles campaign, with the added risk of the presence of numerous hostile submarines in the Mediterranean, and it was abandoned as involving too great a strain on our resources both naval and military.

There followed upon the occupation of Jerusalem the only serious controversy which occurred in relation to the campaigns in Palestine. In the summer of 1917 a conference of the allied chiefs of staff and commanders-in-chief had met in Paris to consider the situation which might arise in the very probable event of the complete collapse of the Russian Armies. A calculation was then made as to the rate at which German divisions might be brought across from the Russian to the Western Front, and as to the rate at which American divisions might be expected to arrive. This calculation showed that the period of danger on the Western Front would be from February to July, 1918, and it was agreed between the military chiefs that, in principle, from the winter of 1917 onwards the policy in all other theatres of war should be, in general, defensive with object of economizing force for the benefit of the Western Front. Accordingly, Sir W. Robertson recommended a strictly defensive attitude in Palestine and proposed, by transferring two Indian divisions from Mesopotamia to Palestine, to release two British divisions for the Western Front and to obtain some forty-eight British battalions for that front by substituting Indian battalions, made available owing to Sir C. Monro's expansion of the Indian Army, for British battalions in the divisions of the Palestine and Salonika Armies. This programme was strenuously opposed by Mr. Lloyd George, who, believing that the safety of the Western Front was sufficiently ensured, desired to give the nation the moral fillip of further success in Palestine, as some compensation for a period of stress in France.

The British Prime Minister carried his point against the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the Versailles conference of January, 1918, and, in February, 1918, sent General Smuts to Palestine to concert with General Allenby plans for driving the Turks out of Palestine and Syria. It was agreed that the two Indian divisions should be brought across from Mesopotamia, the Indian cavalry transferred from France and certain other reinforcements be provided for Palestine. Before these arrangements could be com-

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pleted the Germans had struck in the West, and the crisis in that theatre of war made it necessary to carry out all the arrangements which Sir William Robertson had recommended to be completed before that event. The 52nd and 74th Divisions were transferred from Palestine to France complete, and besides 24 British battalions 9 yeomanry regiments, 5½ heavy batteries and 5 machine-gun companies were released for the Western Front. This involved an extensive reorganization of the Army in Palestine and a period of careful training of the new Indian troops which had been substituted for British units.

In July, 1918, it became clear that the Germans had shot their bolt in the West, but the general opinion of the authorities at home was that they would not be completely defeated before 1919. With his eye on a future peace conference and with the desire to have as much as possible in hand when it came to bargaining, the Prime Minister reverted to his proposal for driving the Turks out of Palestine and Syria, and suggested that during the winter of 1918–1919 divisions should be sent from France to Palestine to be brought back to France in the spring.

A few calculations of time and space sufficed to show that this would not be possible, and General Allenby was then left to make the best of his existing resources. How good that best was he showed in the battles of Megiddo and in the dramatic pursuit through Damascus to Aleppo. Whether it be regarded as a contribution to the ending of the war in 1918 or as a prelude to that consummation in 1919, the view taken of it at home when it began, Allenby's final campaign was in consonance with the general strategy of the war. For if the war were to go on into 1919, force for the benefit of the campaign of that year would obviously be economized by disposing of the Turks as quickly as possible. We had in August, 1918, more than 270,000 British soldiers in Palestine and Mesopotamia and our resources in man-power were getting low.

I hope that I have said enough to make it clear that every operation undertaken on the Eastern Egyptian Front and in Palestine had a direct connection with the general military problem of the war as a whole and was undertaken for good strategic reasons. Even the second battle of Gaza, though tactically unjustifiable, was not a strategic mistake. It may be, I think, argued with reason that we expended an excessive amount of force upon overcoming the Turk, who was for the greater part of the time also engaged with a large Russian Army. Our mistakes at the beginning of the Dardanelles campaign are notorious and few will deny that the

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advance to Baghdad in 1915 was a blunder. That blunder led to the siege of Kut-el-Amara, which in turn led us into an exhausting campaign to retrieve the fame of our arms. The occupation of Baghdad by Maude aroused the Turks to make preparations for its recovery, and that led to Allenby's first campaign and to the capture of Jerusalem. Whether we have gained politically and materially by defeating the Turk is a matter of opinion and of speculation. From the purely military point of view we would have secured all that was vital to us by the occupation of Basra and the valley of the Karun on the one side and of El Arish on the other. Having been led beyond Basra up the Tigris, it was, I think, inevitable that we should go beyond El Arish. I suggest, then, that strategically the campaigns in Palestine have a clean sheet, with the solitary exception of the belated transfer of troops to the Western Front in 1918, and that their story can only be understood when it is regarded as part of a great whole.

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THE WAR DIARY OF CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT OF BAVARIA *

FROM the British point of view, the war diary of Field-Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria is probably the most important book which has yet been published by any of our adversaries in the great war. We were opposed to General von Kluck for a few weeks; but for over four years, from the time when the II and III Corps under Generals Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and Sir W. Pulteney arrived in Flanders in October, 1914, until the end of the war, the Prince, first as commander of the German Sixth Army, and from August, 1916, as commander of a Group of Armies, was our chief opponent. From August, 1916, until shortly before the March, 1918, offensive, he was in command of all the troops opposite the B.E.F. His daily record of events, of information received, of his thoughts, of his discussions with the Supreme Command and his staff, and of his decisions, is an authentic and unique commentary on the British leading and the effect of the British fighting qualities. It deserves, therefore, and will repay, the closest study.

The editor states that the original diary in the Prince's handwriting covered over 4,000 folio sheets, and would, if printed, have taken up ten volumes of the size of the present three. The appendices and maps belonging to this MS. fill four fairly large cupboards. Nearly half of the diary, however, consisted of appreciations of events and deductions to be drawn from the experience gained, written up in quiet times. By omitting these and a certain amount of repetition, particularly as regards political events, it was found possible to give the entries in the diary which deal with the periods of military activity almost unabbreviated. Nothing has been changed; only certain cuts have been made. Two of the present volumes contain the diary, the third is devoted to the appendices. There are a number of excellent photographs and sufficient sketch-maps. The editor was assisted by the Prince's two Chiefs of the

* "*Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. Mein Kriegstagebuch,*" *Herausgegeben von Eugen von Frauenholz.* 3 volumes. Munich: *Deutscher National Verlag.* 63 marks.

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Staff, Generals Krafft von Dellmensingen and von Kuhl, who have added footnotes where the Prince's diary does not agree with entries in their own, and support it at other places by quotations from the official documents. He must be congratulated on his work, for he has provided a story of intense interest to military students. But it is only for students; it will be of little use to general readers not thoroughly in touch with the operations of the French and British.

The Prince was forty-five years of age at the outbreak of war, and, judging by his portrait, of medium height, slim figure and soldierly appearance. The general impression left by his diary is that he was a man of kindly feeling, a good judge of men and hard-working; who estimated with his own eyes the conditions of affairs and of his troops, and was also ready to sink self for the good of the cause—he records on the 21st of August, 1916, that he has had no leave since the opening of hostilities and is badly in need of rest.

How far he was master in his Army and Group of Armies is not patent. It would seem that as long as General von Krafft—who was also a Bavarian and in time of peace Chief of the General Staff of the Bavarian Army—was with him, he actually commanded. But on the 19th of May, 1915, after loss of ground by the Sixth Army to the French and British at the second battle of Artois and the battle of Festubert—there seems to have been two ways of looking at these combats—Krafft was, against the Prince's wish, transferred by Falkenhayn's orders to command the Alpine Corps, and replaced by a Prussian named Lambsdorff. Perhaps this was the beginning of the rift between Rupprecht and Falkenhayn, which becomes more and more apparent as the diary proceeds. Lambsdorff on the 24th of November, 1915, disappeared, and was succeeded by the redoubtable General von Kuhl, the Chief of the Staff of the First (Kluck's) Army. His reputation for carrying on without consulting his chief is notorious now the inner history of the battle of the Marne is known; and he remained with Crown Prince Rupprecht until the end. There are only two hints in the diary as to the matter. On the 8th of September, 1916, when Hindenburg and Ludendorff, having taken over command, arrive to pay the Prince (then in command of a Group of Armies) a visit at Cambrai, his headquarters, where the Army commanders and their Chiefs of the Staff were assembled to meet them, we learn that Hindenburg gave a short summary of the situation, and "after this exposition the Field-Marshal with Ludendorff withdrew into the offices of my command to discuss detail questions with the Chiefs of the Staff of the Armies."

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On the 9th of August, 1918, after the "black day," the Prince complains that

"there is too much telephone conversation, and the commanders of the Groups of Armies and Armies are nearly entirely short-circuited by direct conversations between the Supreme Command and their Chiefs of the Staff. Just recently an Army commander said to me, 'I don't really know why I am here, as everything is always already settled before I am asked.'"

This of course confirms what we already know from the captured archives of the Fourth Army (in the Prince's Group),* wherein are recorded the conversations between Ludendorff, Kuhl, Lossberg and other General staff officers, when grave decisions were made without any reference whatever to their nominal masters. They did not even go through the form of consulting them, using Moltke the Elder's celebrated phrase, when, after explaining briefly the situation, he said to the old King in his iciest manner, "Your Majesty will no doubt order so and so."

On the other hand, the Prince was, and the German Crown Prince was not, present at the momentous conference of the 11th of November, 1917, assembled by Ludendorff to decide at what place the great March offensive should be made.

We will now go through the diary, making a selection of extracts of entries of interest.

Events at the beginning of the war, when the Prince commanded the Sixth Army, with the Seventh attached, in Alsace, possess no special importance for us, except for showing the curious views of the German Supreme Command.† The original instructions given to the Prince were to fall back if the French advanced and draw them on into a "sack." As he was also told that the main object of his command was to detain as many French troops as possible on his front, so as to keep them from the other and decisive wing, he pointed out that he could only ensure this by attacking. The Supreme Command agreed, but would not give him an order, and told him that he must do it on his own responsibility. The Prince records it as curious that no French aviators were seen; on the other hand, the German infantry shot down its own aeroplanes, and an order had to be issued that fire was not to be opened on aeroplanes—or motor cars—without the order of an officer. On the 17th of August he was informed that "no British had yet landed on

* *See Army Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 1, p. 157.

† This period, too, is covered by the book of General von Krafft, *Die Führung des Kronprinzen Rupprecht von Bayern in August*, 1914. See *Army Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 411.

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the Continent, owing to their slow mobilization "—three days before, on the 14th, the B.E.F., which had commenced embarcation on the 9th, had begun moving by train from the ports of disembarcation to its concentration area. Other equally valuable information supplied to the Prince was that Joffre had been superseded by General Pau, and that two-thirds of the French troops were drunk.

Deceived by the apparent success in the first encounters in Alsace, as in the Ardennes, the Supreme Command ordered a pursuit by the Sixth Army through the Trouée des Charmes; and then, in spite of the Prince's protests, that the French fortress line at Nancy and along the Meuse should be stormed. Here Liége and Namur were of service by misleading the Supreme Command as to the value of fortifications—they expected the French ones would be taken in three days! Moltke, after telling the Prince verbally to continue the attack deliberately, almost simultaneously, on the 9th of September, the last day of the Marne, sent him a written order to withdraw, to occupy a defensive position with his Reserve, *Ersatz* and *Landwehr* corps, and to prepare the Active ones for transfer to the western wing! The same day the Prince was informed that the French were breaking through between Metz and Verdun. He records, " Evidently the Supreme Command has completely lost control of its nerves."

On the 11th of September is the entry of the O.H.L. information that " the difficult position of the First Army (Kluck) did not arise from being enveloped, but because some British divisions were pushed into the gap between the First and Second Armies." He adds on the 16th, when in Metz on his way from the left to the right flank to take charge of the operations there :

" Of the proceedings which led to the defeat on the northern wing, we heard that General von Kluck with the First Army, in spite of warnings from O.H.L., pushed on too far, and that O.H.L. could not hold him back any more, as wireless communication broke down."

He learned, too, from the Bavarian representative at O.H.L. that Admiral von Tirpitz wanted to attack with the whole Fleet, but that

" the Chancellor represented to the Kaiser that this must not happen. After the enemy has been defeated on land, we must as regards England be in possession of an intact Fleet."

In the Prince's diary the " Race to the Sea " assumes quite a new aspect. General von Lauenstein, the Chief of the Staff of the Second Army, told him that Falkenhayn

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" only sent fresh forces to the outer flank when a new opponent had appeared there; thus he always left the enemy the first move, and, besides, was always too late with his counter-measures."

The Prince fully agrees with him. Hitherto we have been told that the French were always twenty-four hours too late and a corps too weak.

On the 13th of October the Prince, who had shifted his headquarters northward to Cambrai, first hears of British troops—at Merville and Lacouture—and stops the attack of his right wing. The first German plan on finding the B.E.F. in Flanders was for the Prince's (Sixth) Army—which extended up to the Lys with the Fourth Army coming up on its right—to stand on the defensive, the III Reserve Corps on the coast to push on, whilst the rest of of the Fourth Army hung back, so as to form a " sack," like the proposed trap for the French in Alsace. The Prince's view was that it was best for his Army to attack, to get Kemmel and the hill range beyond, and so to divide the enemy's forces and then drive them to the north into the sea. The next suggestion of Falkenhayn was for a double envelopment: the Fourth Army was to envelop from the north, whilst the Sixth broke through at Arras—where it had already failed. The Prince proposed Béthune instead of Arras, and the attempt was made, against Smith-Dorrien's Corps, and did not succeed.

The breaking-in point was then shifted northward to the south-east of Ypres, and Fabeck's Group, under the Prince, formed for the purpose. Meantime the envelopment from the coast having also failed, the German forces engaged there drifted south, and the struggle became concentrated about Ypres. Thus do great plans diminish in scope. It is recorded on the 4th of November that General von Deimling, commanding the XV Corps in Fabeck's Group, shelled the Cloth Hall of Ypres against the express wishes of the Prince. "' Falkenhayn agreed with me that the shelling had no military object, could be avoided and should be avoided." Later on we find the Prince objecting to the bombing of undefended towns, the use of gas, deportations and senseless destruction.

On the 12th of November, Falkenhayn told the Prince's Chief of the Staff, at a conference at O.H.L:

" The situation in the West is such that rapid progress is out of the question, for the enemy is digging one defence line behind the other, and artillery ammunition is very short. For instance, no heavy field howitzer [5.9-inch] ammunition can be provided until further notice. The original intention to press forward along the coast to Calais must be abandoned,

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as even a victory in battle could not be exploited on account of lack of ammunition. In consequence, only the enterprise against Ypres is now to be carried through, for the eyes of the whole world are directed on the battles there."

The Prince comments: "How the Sixth Army is to continue the attack on Ypres is a puzzle to me. The available forces for it have already proved insufficient." And he says next day: "The strengths of the divisions are mostly down to half-establishment." And the attack fizzled out, and the great plan was further reduced to the Fourth Army being detailed for the "siege" of Ypres, and directed to try to advance by methods of siege warfare. The Prince records a month later, on the 9th of December: "Our [German] infantry is still very clumsy over digging and does it very unwillingly. Its inclination to leave all work to the engineers must be combated." He repeats much the same thing a fortnight afterwards. So the British infantryman was not singular in his dislike of spade work.

At this period the most desperate attempts were made to keep Italy out of the war. Among other things, £30,000 was paid monthly from the Imperial Exchequer to the Italian press to influence opinion.

Wild ideas seem to have struck the Supreme Command; in January, 1915, it expected "very soon" three great attacks. The first by the British "reinforced by 40,000 Canadians" in Belgium; a second near Reims, and a third near Belfort. Falkenhayn, therefore, ordered a second position to be built behind the first. This the Prince opposed, first, because there was not enough man-power, and, secondly, because, "according to experience the forward line is usually less energetically defended when there is a prospect of renewing the defence on another line behind it."

When Falkenhayn arrived with Dr Haber to discuss the first use of gas, the Prince was

> "not only unsympathetic to the use of cloud gas, but thought it a mistake, as it is certain that if it proves effective, the enemy will use the same means, and, as the prevailing direction of the wind is west–east, he will be able to release gas ten times more often than we against him."

To which he got the reply that the Allied chemical industry "was utterly incompetent to produce gas in the required quantity"! After the gas attack had taken place, it is stated that "by a mistake the gas cylinders on the right were not opened" or there would have been a greater success.

On the 14th of March, 1915, all available butchers at the front and on the L. of C. were ordered home, "to carry out the mass-

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slaughter of pigs, because the potatoes allotted for pig-food must now be used for human nourishment."

The Prince got into trouble with the Supreme Command for the failure of and heavy losses in the counter-attack at Neuve Chapelle (March, 1915)—his report is among the appendices—so there are two ways of looking at this fight. He states that the German losses were 8,600, which, in view of the custom of not counting the lightly wounded dealt with in corps areas—probably 2,000–3,000—makes them little less than the British, which were 11,652. The Supreme Command held that the counter-attack had no prospect of success, and he ought to have stopped it. The Prince holds the view that it failed because the Supreme Command sent him odd battalions from various parts of the front instead of good complete divisions.

On the morning of the battle of Aubers, a bomb was dropped in the garden of the house the Prince had lived in outside Lille, but left because it was " too easily found." He judged the attack of the British premature: " They would have done better to postpone the execution of their plans until the full number of the troops of the Kitchener Army had arrived." He did not know of the French pressure on their Allies to force them to take action.

Festubert is recorded as " a partially successful attack." Warned by the Supreme Command of a combined Franco-British attack on a front of twelve miles, it was made on one of thirty miles. The Prince records that Falkenhayn himself was responsible for the " unfortunate " losses of ground, as, in spite of protests, he had reduced the number of troops, withdrawing an infantry regiment from each of four divisions in the sector in order to form new divisions. However, it was the Prince's Chief of the Staff, General von Krafft, who was punished by being sent away to command a corps, as already mentioned. The Prince gives the German losses in the May fighting as 30,000—the German casualty lists, complete for this period, which include the lightly wounded, add up to 49,446.

Coming to the Loos period, from the 3rd of September onwards the attack was expected; there were evident signs: great activity in digging attack trenches and saps, and artillery registration. On the 20th a foreign neutral sympathiser sent definite news. But Falkenhayn on the same day was of opinion that " the French were no longer capable of any offensive," and on the 25th of September itself, two hours before the French attacks in Arras and Champagne were begun, " told the Kaiser that the Sixth and Third Armies see

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things too black ; the French are at the end of their powers and not in a condition to attack." On the front attacked by the British at Loos the situation became " highly critical," and in Champagne, according to Falkenhayn, it was " for a time nearly desperate. They were the critical hours of the campaign, as 100 guns were lost, and there were no reserves available." Falkenhayn was of opinion that the long duration of the war was an advantage to Germany, as her enemies would tire first. As punishment for the loss of ground at Loos, the Prince's Chief of the Staff was again removed, and on the 24th of November, 1915, General von Kuhl arrived to take the post.

Discussing the fighting on the 4th of February, 1916, with his corps commanders, the Prince said :

" Actually the French in Champagne and the British at Loos succeeded in getting through to our second position. If they had possessed stronger reserves and had brought them up in time, they would have made a complete break-through."

The Prince had no faith in a success at Verdun. On the 24th of January he writes :

" If it really succeeds in gradually overcoming the five strong positions, one behind the other, the enemy will not be decisively beaten. The capture of Verdun would at most increase the world's opinion of us ; if it does not come off, we shall have made a sacrifice in vain, and shall suffer a heavy loss of prestige."

By Falkenhayn's orders the business of the Sixth Army in the last week of January, 1916, was to hold the Allies to their ground by pretending an attack, and prevent them from sending reinforcements to Verdun. These attacks, useless in their nature, were made prematurely, as the Supreme Command forgot to inform the Prince that, owing to the difficulty of getting 150 heavy batteries into position, the date of attack had been postponed. On the 8th of February the Crown Prince demanded more demonstrations, as the attack on Verdun was to begin on the 12th. " So all the demonstrations in the last week in January were in vain," says the Prince. The very next day Falkenhayn became alarmed and expected that if the Verdun attack was successful the French would reply by an offensive north of the Somme. " The British cannot leave the French in the lurch in this," and he promised Rupprecht a reinforcement of eight divisions as soon as possible. Poor strategy not to put them in at Verdun, thinks the Prince, and the counter-offensive might come in Champagne or at the Aisne, and the Supreme Command would have nothing left to meet it with.

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On the 27th of February Falkenhayn was very satisfied with Verdun, and demanded plans from Rupprecht for a break-through battle in his sector. The latter suggested south of Arras. He records that since Sir D. Haig had replaced Lord French, the British infantry had become more enterprising. On the 8th of March Falkenhayn arrived to discuss " a great offensive against the British " with reinforcements of " two divisions from the East, perhaps others from Serbia ; but he is fearful of weakening other parts of the Western Front for the purpose of collecting a mass of troops against the British." Finally, on the 20th of March, Falkenhayn decided that he could not find the men for the offensive. On the 31st of March Falkenhayn telephoned that the British have some enterprise on hand, " probably a landing." A landing in Holland behind the German front was ever in his mind. In view of the date the Prince thinks Falkenhayn is being made an April fool.

On the 6th of May, 1916, it is recorded that an Australian prisoner said : " It went much more cheerfully at Gallipoli ; then we had an arrangement with the Turks not to worry each other." The Prince finds that his own men are getting war-weary : the reduction of the ration has told on their spirits, and there are openly expressed threats of surrendering at next attack or deserting. The censors examine letters to discover their state of mind—the Prince does not like this, but it cannot be helped.

One letter is quoted :

" The British treat us [VII Corps] like children : one evening lately they crowded unhindered into our third trenches with clubs, knocked down our people and carried them off. The rest of our men bolted. Yesterday they came over again, the sentry crawled into the dugout, and they beat him on the backside. They killed a number of men, and took the sentry with them. If a rat happens to shake the wire entanglement, everybody hides himself."

The Prince points out a serious falling off in the officer class :

" Many people have become officers who would never have done so in peace time on their qualifications, people who lack the necessary preliminary education, and what is worse, tact and devotion to duty ; they look after themselves first, then their subordinates. Experienced company commanders with long peace training in internal economy, which is of inestimable value in the field, are entirely lacking. I am thinking of such things as care of health, looking after clothing and boots, and the proper combination and proportion of food. It is unfortunate that officers and men know each other much less than in peace time : changes come quickly owing to the heavy casualties, and the transfer to other units occasioned thereby. Not one regimental commander knows all his officers, and

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trench warfare has made it difficult even for battalion commanders to know their officers and influence them. In these circumstances *esprit de corps* and mutual understanding and confidence suffer."

The Prince records the attacks on the British at the Hohenzollern, Hulluch, Vimy, etc., in the early part of 1916, without giving any reason for them. They were evidently local affairs. Thus on the 21st of May (Vimy) there is only the record :

" IX Reserve Corps. At 6 a.m. the bombardment of the enemy trenches by the combined fire of 13 heavy field howitzer batteries. The enemy's artillery group at Berthoval Farm was prevented from firing by a gas barrage. Also otherwise the reply to our artillery was slight. . . . On the 22nd, I learned that the enterprise of yesterday ran according to plan, and 220 prisoners in all were taken."

The gradual assemblage of information pointing to the British Somme offensive appears in the pages of the diary. On the 10th of June is the first indication, derived from the speech of the British Minister of Labour, Henderson, on the 2nd of June, to an assemblage of owners and workers of munition factories :

" I am asked why the Whitsuntide Holidays should be put off until the end of July. How curious we all are ! It should suffice that we only ask for a postponement of the holidays, and in fact to the end of July. That fact alone should speak volumes."

The Prince notes that this means there will be a great British offensive in a few weeks. On the front of the Second Army (which the British attacked), however, " there are no longer signs of a hostile offensive." Falkenhayn, during a visit with the Kaiser on the 15th of June, thinks : " The French and British will undertake an offensive against Alsace-Lorraine."

On the same day, however, the Supreme Command circulated an agent's report from The Hague, according to which " the British Military Attaché has said that the offensive in the West would commence at the beginning of next week." Then signs at the front are noticed, and, on the 19th, it is recorded : " There can no longer be any doubt that a great French offensive awaits the Second Army." On the 21st, an agent reports that the great offensive is no longer likely to take place " as all the threads of this giant plan were in Kitchener's hands, and on his death everything in progress came to a stop." The Prince thinks this is foolish nonsense. On the 24th a prisoner states that the attack will begin on the 26th with a five days' bombardment. On the 25th, the bombardment shows that the northern flank of the attack will extend to Gommecourt,

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and the southern will be in the French area south of the Somme. Falkenhayn and his operations officer, Tappen, professed to believe that the attack will come farther north; and not until the 5th of July does the Supreme Command give in and admit that "the decision may probably fall on the Somme, and reserves as strong as possible must be drawn from fronts not attacked." Yet on the 26th of June the German Military Attaché at Madrid and a reliable agent had reported that the hostile offensive would begin on the 1st of July.

On the 20th of August, when the German situation had become really alarming, the Prince finally decided that Falkenhayn must go, and wrote an official letter to the Chief of the Military Cabinet, General von Lyncker, in which he "enumerated the various sins of the Supreme Command and expressed the opinion that things could not go on as they were, and that General Falkenhayn no longer possessed the confidence of the Army." On the 23rd the Prince was informed that he would be appointed to command the Group containing the First, Second and Sixth Armies; but, on the 27th, Lyncker told him that Falkenhayn's great services in 1914 still outweighed everything, and no change of Chief of the General Staff was intended. On the same day, the 27th, Rumania declared war on Germany, and on the 28th Hindenburg-Ludendorff were sent for, so it would appear that Rumania coming into the war was the determining cause of Falkenhayn's dismissal.

(To be continued.)

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MORE MARNE THROUGH GERMAN SPECTACLES

THE ACTIONS OF THE GUARD CORPS AND OF THE RIGHT WING OF THE THIRD ARMY FROM THE 5TH TO THE 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1914

(With two Maps)

THE third of the monographs on the battle of the Marne, 1914, issued by the German *Reichsarchiv* * deals in great detail with the fighting of the Guard Corps, the left wing of the Second Army, and the Saxon 32nd and 23rd Reserve Divisions, the right wing of the Third Army, from the 5th to the 8th of September. The book is below the usual high standard of German military historical works; it is a patriotic production, impeccably correct in its detail of the movements of battalions and in its stories of the heroic deeds of individuals, but woefully lacking in copies of orders and reports, and simply absurd in its comments and claims. It has an evident bias against the Saxons, but is inconsistent as regards the French, exhibiting them sometimes as cowards who flee at the sight of a spiked helmet and sometimes as the bravest of adversaries worthy of the steel of the Prussian Guard. Its illogical nature can be demonstrated at once by giving a short outline of the events as narrated by the author: the Guard Corps and Saxons cannot make any progress on the 6th and 7th owing to the fire of the French artillery. To escape its devastating effects a dawn attack on the 8th is suggested by General von Hausen, commanding the Saxons. This is carried out, the French outposts are overrun and a small gain of ground is made. But after 10 a.m. nobody does anything more of importance and various excuses are offered for this inaction. The affair is summed up as a great victory, and for the Guard "a second St. Privat had been fought," yet on the last page the situation is depicted in a totally different manner:

* *See Das Marnedrama*, 1914. 1 *Abschnitt des* 3 *Teiles*. Oldenburg, Stalling, 5 marks. The two earlier parts were reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*: Part I in July, 1928, and Part II in January, 1929.

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the " victory " is merely a prelude to the loss of the battle. There is the startling admission :

" On the evening of the 8th of September the fateful word 'Retreat' is mentioned for the first time. . . . Unanimously the two corps commanders (VII and X Reserve) maintained that a bending back of the whole right wing of the Army is necessary, and communicated this proposal to the Army commander by telephone. General von Bülow declared that he was in agreement with it, and between 8 and 9 p.m. ordered the retirement of the 13th Division [VII Corps, the 14th Division was detached on the left] and the X Reserve Corps to the line Margny—Le Thoult." The X and Guard Corps, however, provided the Saxons secured their outer flank, were to advance southward, " if the enemy had not crossed the Marne in force."

It will be observed from these orders that nothing is said about a decisive victory won or in sight, or even an attack. They merely direct the right to wheel back and the left, if possible, to wheel forward in a south-west direction. This would bring the Second Army facing Paris in accordance with the last orders received, on the 5th of September, from the Supreme Command. There is not the slightest sign that the situation was understood ; for Bülow ordered moves which would bring his Army at right angles to the French main line. (*See* Map 1.)

Having thus prejudiced the reader, we may examine the monograph in detail. It requires considerable patience and hard reading to master it, as it is written in diary form, day by day, and formation by formation on each day. It is not assisted by the one map, which is a single sheet 2 feet by 3 feet on the 1/80,000 scale, without troops, and the ten sketch-maps of the fighting printed on the back, most unhandy for reference and quite insufficient for following the text.

By the 5th of September, the Third Army (General von Hausen) was reduced to the XII and XIX Corps and 23rd Reserve Division (the 24th of the XII Reserve Corps being left behind besieging Givet). It was much exhausted by the heat and marching, and given a rest day. Not until the afternoon were any signs noticed of the French halting, air reports indicated that their columns were still going south, and Hausen ordered the continuation of the march next day. The compiler comments :

" The rest day of the Third Army on the 5th worked as a drag on the movements of the Second Army, and even made impossible any cooperation of the Third with the Fourth. On the 6th, the drifting apart of the units of the front line and the great distance behind them of the divisions of the XII Reserve Corps prevented the massed engagement of the Third Army."

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So he also prejudices the reader—against the Saxons—before he comes to the events of the 6th. The fact that Bülow had given the Second Army a rest day on the 1st of September is not recalled.

The Guard Corps on the 5th of September reached its halting places at midday without seeing anything of the enemy except stragglers. Information, however, indicated that strong hostile bodies were at hand, and in the evening the bivouacs of the 1st Guard Division, which was carrying on as at peace manœuvres, were bombed. Two cavalry regiments with some guns were sent on to seize a village, Vert la Gravelle, three miles in front of the outpost line, and one and a half miles north of the Marshes of St. Gond, as an advanced post. (*See* Map 2.) They found the enemy in the village, occupied a moated farm a mile short of it, and at 10 p.m. clamoured for assistance from the outposts. " Leaders and troops had a vague feeling that the situation had become acute and that the relentless pursuit would soon be at an end."

On the 6th, Bülow meant to continue the wheel to face Paris ordered by the Supreme Command, and the Guard Corps on the outer wing, having the farthest distance to go, was given a very long march. It was to send mobile detachments ahead to interfere with the French retirement. As there were no vehicles available for this operation, it was not carried out. The ground over which the further action took place is a great rolling plain, dotted with numerous small woods and crossed by the upper course of the Somme, a fordable stream, along which are dotted at equal intervals the villages of Sommesous, Haussimont, Vassimont, Lenharrée, Normée and Ecury (at the bend), beyond which in the same line is Morains le Petit at the eastern end of the Marshes of St. Gond.

The Guard as it advanced, the 1st Division towards the Marshes of St. Gond, the 2nd east of it, came on various bodies of French troops, received heavy artillery fire, and gradually deployed. French columns were seen hurrying away over the roads through the marshes, leaving rear-guards. The commander of the Guard Corps at once demanded help from the Saxons on his left " against a superior enemy," and ordered the 1st Guard Division to halt, whilst the 2nd turned the marshes from the east. The 2nd Division found the first villages which it came to, Clamanges and Ecury, unoccupied, but had small fights for Morains le Petit, and later for Normée. But any further advance was stopped by heavy artillery fire, although nothing could be seen.

The situation remained obscure, the French right had evidently not been found, for when the Germans extended eastward in order

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to envelop, they were still outflanked. At 5.15 p.m. the first air report came in to the Guard Corps. It disclosed that there were strong reserves behind the French front. General von Plettenberg thereupon stopped all attacks until the Saxons on his left came up. "The result of this order was that there was no further forward movement, for the condition for it was absent: the attack of the 32nd Division made no progress." To avoid forcing the passages of the Marshes of St. Gond, Plettenberg decided to side slip his divisions to the east, which entailed a sleepless night for them. The day had been entirely wasted. "The rest day of the Third Army on the 5th of September had limited the cooperation of the Saxons with the Guard Corps to the late appearance of the 32nd Division."

The remark suggests itself that had General von Hutier, commanding the 1st Guard Division, discovered before his Division stumbled on the Marshes of St. Gond, that they were impassable except by the causeways, the Guard Corps might have been directed east of the Marshes, a day would have been saved, and Saxon assistance would not have been so urgently needed. It seems questionable also whether the Second Army had any right to ask for assistance from the Third Army, for it had been ordered to face Paris as a flank-guard, whilst the Armies east of it were to play the major rôle and attack and surround the mass of the French Armies in the open.

The aspersions cast on the Saxons seem unjustified; in addition to suffering greatly from the heat and dust and want of food, for the German supply system had completely broken down, many were sick owing to filling their empty stomachs with raw fruit and vegetables, and they had already marched twenty-one to twenty-five miles. Nevertheless, the 32nd Division at 3.25 p.m. tried to get on. It deployed and attacked Lenharrée—Normée, only to be held to the ground by artillery fire, and could not reach the Somme. Its flank was open, covered only by the divisional cavalry, as the 23rd Division (its sister division in the XII Corps) had been sent eastward to help the XIX Corps engaged alongside the Fourth Army.

The 7th of September was not a glorious day for the Prussian Guard. Plettenberg ordered it to be ready to attack at 6 a.m., eventually directing it to advance at 8 a.m. But before this hour the French artillery opened fire again and a strong reconnoitring party came into action. Mistaking this for a general French attack, Plettenberg sent orders to stop the advance, postponing it until the Saxon 23rd Reserve Division as well as the 32nd Division

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could take part. Some battalions which had started to advance before the counter-orders reached them suffered heavily. The 32nd Division, waiting on the Guard, also incurred serious casualties. A half-hearted advance was made again about 1 p.m. by some units, but both the Guard and the Saxons were stopped by the French guns.

"The French artillery had an unexpected effect, and remained uncontested victor. The intended attack was everywhere nipped in the bud. In places even the starting positions could not be held. . . . The 7th of September was the worst day in the War so far for the troops."

Meantime the Saxon 23rd Reserve Division, starting at 4 a.m., was making desperate endeavours to get up to fill the gap between the 32nd and 23rd Divisions. It had literally to be driven on by its commander and a third or more of the men fell out; but by evening it had come abreast of the 32nd Division, north of Sommesous, the gap between them being held by the 100th Grenadiers of the 32nd Division.

The day had brought "bitter disappointment. The hope of compensating for the wheel back of the right wing of the Second Army by a simultaneous concentric attack of the 32nd Division, Guard Corps and X Corps in the general direction of Sezanne had not been fulfilled." There was no chance of success except by attack, and this had already failed in face of the French artillery. Plettenberg's orders to the Guard were to hold on to the positions gained.

The 8th of September witnessed a most extraordinary manœuvre. As a counsel of despair and as the only way of evading the French artillery fire, General von Hausen—Third (Saxon) Army—proposed "an assault in the grey of the morning" with the bayonet. There were great gaps in the German line, the troops were dead tired in "a leaden sleep," there was no idea where the enemy's position was, and no time for preparation. On hearing of the views of the Saxon general, the G.O.C. of the Guard Corps went off in the middle of the night to protest; he eventually agreed to the scheme, the only concession he obtained being that the attack should begin at 4.30 a.m. instead of 4 a.m.

This new advance, for it was an advance rather than an attack, was carried out in a somewhat disjointed way. The troops were to cross the Somme and deploy on its far bank, and then advance into the blue, or rather into the half light of the early morning and a maze of small woods.

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The operation was, however, apparently successful: the outposts of the French XI Corps of the Ninth Army which it struck were completely surprised, and, with the exception of a few brave parties, they retired. Foch's orders for the 8th had been only for reconnaissances to be sent out to find out if the enemy was retiring. These reconnaissances could not have been made early enough, or the enemy met them. Until the French account is published, we shall not know what actually happened. The Germans did not go very far, as on reaching the railway embankment most of them halted; and as soon as it was fully light the French artillery again stopped progress, for the German guns were slow in coming up and did very little to assist the infantry, so it is said. On the other hand the artillery assert that they were not informed of the situation. In any case, after 7.30 a.m. no further advance was made for many hours.

That the Germans did not penetrate far into the French position is proved by the fact that they never reached the line of the tormenting French guns, which they set forth to capture. The monograph only claims that "at least" 30 French guns were captured, but only three batteries are mentioned in the narrative, and the compiler admits that this may be an overstatement, as the same battery may have been claimed more than once by different units which passed it.

At 12.35 p.m. the commander of the Guard Corps ordered a further short advance. But it did not take place! Various excuses are offered for this failure to take advantage of the "victory": The artillery of the 1st Guard Division (Hutier) did not come up, "this had as a consequence that a further advance of the infantry of the 1st Guard Division did not take place." In the 2nd Guard Division,

> "General von Winckler could not yet order the movement, because it was quite impossible that the troops could have reached their assembly position. The great nerve tension in the assault, the close country, the mix-up of units and their dispersion from north of Fère Champenoise to Connantray, besides the great loss of officers, must cause very considerable delay."

Some units did, however, go forward and Fère Champenoise was entered without fighting. There a halt was made. "It is unexplained," says the monograph, "why no attempt was made by the 2nd Guard Division to advance farther on Corroy (four miles S.S.W. of Fère. Champenoise). . . . In any case, soon after 6.30 p.m. it halted for the night."

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Such is the great victory of the Guard Corps, "the second St. Privat."

Soon after the first halt, the commanders of the Guard Corps and the 2nd Guard Division and their staffs, who had motored up to Fère Champenoise, were caught under fire there and, as a witness reports, made an "accelerated retreat. . . . I found myself alone." Two French divisions made a show of a counter-attack on a two-mile front west of Fère Champenoise and then disappeared; but by their fire they occasioned a panic in the Guard near the village "It was 9.15 p.m. before complete order was restored." The compiler claims the complete "victory consciousness of the troops."

After this he turns to the Saxons and blames them for not doing more. The 32nd Division got to the railway embankment, as the Guard did, and then the brigade commanders ordered the sorting out and assembly of the units, "but not a pursuit." The divisional commander, after order had been restored, moved the brigades south of the embankment and waited for the 23rd Reserve Division to appear. The compiler gives the losses of the four Saxon regiments of the 32nd Division, from the 6th to the 8th of September inclusive, viz. officers 14, 35, 20 and 20; and other ranks, 721, 683, 592, 518, sufficiently heavy for units whose strength, after these casualties, was down from 3,000 to 1,353, 1,685, 1,509 and 1,480. He does not give the Guard losses, except of one battalion, II Augusta, the strength of which was 16 officers and 603 men, and losses, 11 and 205.

Grenadier Regiment No. 100, keeping connection between the 32nd Division and 23rd Reserve Division, entered Vassimont, and then, getting no orders, did nothing, and that night the colonel moved it to the west to rejoin its division.

The Saxon 23rd Reserve Division (only seven battalions strong, owing to detachments) on the extreme east flank, encountered some resistance in Sommesous, and, like the others, reached the railway embankment. But just beyond this, it was stopped by fire, and "a long halt ensued, the men being worn out by fighting and want of sleep." General von Kirchbach ordered it forward at 2.15 p.m. to help the 32nd Division by an enveloping attack; but the divisional commander did not issue his orders for the movement until 4.45 p.m. "Unfortunately the order did not come fully to execution," three battalions only pushed a short distance south without encountering any enemy. At 7.45 p.m. the division was ordered to halt and cease operations. By the enterprise of a brigadier, an infantry company was sent to

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Montépreux, to which the division should have got in carrying out its task to help the 32nd. The village was entered without opposition. "Nothing was to be seen of the foe. . . . What Colonel Hartinghausen's detachment had not done was accomplished in the middle of the night by a weak company." The chapter ends with the claim "that the 23rd Reserve Division had won a complete victory is incontestable. The enemy had completely vanished from its front."

The final chapter is full of such claims. The attackers "had by no means come upon a weak hostile front, but had struck superior forces in a good position. The incomparable brave regiments of the four attacking divisions had overrun the enemy on a frontage of twelve miles, overthrown the French infantry and carried the assault over the enemy artillery position." [This they distinctly had not.] "But the break-through was not complete," we are told. So far from pæans of victory reaching General von Bülow, he received little but reports of "extreme exhaustion" of the troops, and the general information was far from reassuring. Nobody knew where the enemy was. Orders could not be given to the 13th Division for its retirement, as it was in confusion, "in consequence of the entry of French troops into a gap in its front." The 14th Division at the Marshes of St. Gond reported that there was "not a sign on its front of any effect of the Guard Corps operation." "There is no doubt that the fighting power of the Second Army was greatly reduced owing to numerous detachments and casualties," and finally "three strong columns of the enemy were on the march into the gap between the First and Second Armies." It will hardly be believed that there is not a word in the monograph about the visit of Colonel Hentsch, the emissary of the Supreme Command who arrived at Bülow's headquarters on the 8th of September, or about the pessimistic report he received, or about the doleful condition in which he found Bülow and his staff.

There is only the hint, already mentioned, that all was not so satisfactory as the compiler would have us believe: "On the evening of the 8th of September for the first time the fateful word 'Retreat' was let fall."

It should be noted that in spite of the fine weather aeroplane reconnaissance brought no news of importance, none of strategic importance, to either belligerent. Both were fighting absolutely blind. Further both armies were so tired with the previous fighting and marches, that neither was really in a position to achieve any serious success.

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

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SOME OF WELLINGTON'S STRATEGICAL PROBLEMS, 1812*

By Major-General Sir W. D. Bird, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*With Two Maps.*)

II

As soon as the news of Hill's success at Almaraz on the 19th of May was received by Wellington, Graham's force was brought back to the neighbourhood of Villa Velha, and by the 3rd of June those troops of the British, Portuguese and Spanish forces with whom Wellington was to take the field that were not already on or beyond the Agueda were marching towards the plain in which that river flows; and there they were all concentrated on the 11th of the month. Two days later the Army,† 52,000 strong with 60 guns, crossed the river in three Anglo-Portuguese columns and one Spanish column, and moved forward towards Salamanca over cultivated, undulating ground resembling, but more wooded than, Salisbury Plain. It was then known that King Joseph had directed Soult to move one-third of his group across the Tagus; that Marmont's headquarters were at Salamanca, that the strength of his field Army, which was still widely dispersed, was not more than about 44,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 98 guns, but the latter were badly provided with horses, and that 6,000 of the troops, who were in the Asturias, had been ordered to rejoin the main body, and might, it was thought, reach the Tormes about the 20th of June. The French made little or no resistance, and, by the 17th, had evacuated

* Part I appeared in *The Army Quarterly*, January, 1929.

† The Army was organized in seven Anglo-Portuguese divisions, five of which comprised two British infantry brigades and one Portuguese brigade, one was composed of two British infantry brigades and one King's German Legion brigade, and one of two British infantry brigades and one Portuguese battalion; and the strength of the divisions varied from 6,500 to 4,500 men. There were also two unattached Portuguese brigades each about 2,000 strong, Carlos de Espana's Spanish division, 3,500 men with 6 guns, and 4 Anglo-Portuguese cavalry brigades (excluding D'Urban's), two being 1,000 strong and the others 700 strong. The Anglo-Portuguese artillery consisted of three 4-gun and seven 6-gun batteries, and of these one battery was in reserve and the others with formations.

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Salamanca, leaving a garrison of 800 men in fortifications, commanding the bridge over the Tormes, which had been erected on the ruins of colleges and convents that had been demolished by them. These forts were then invested by a division while the rest of the allied troops crossed the river by two fords, and moving a few miles over a waste of ilex and cistus followed the French, who it was thought would concentrate the troops of the Army of Portugal on the Douro between Toro and Zamora. It was now ascertained from intercepted correspondence that King Joseph intended to mass a force on the Tagus so as to create a diversion in favour of the Army of Portugal, and Wellington in consequence again requested the Spaniards to exert pressure on the enemy both in the north and centre and south—Ballesteros had in fact been defeated on the 1st of June—so as to delay or to prevent the movements of the troops of the Armies of the Centre and South and also those of the division from the Asturias.

Speaking generally, the rivers of the Peninsula flow, as does the Wye near Chepstow and the Avon below Bristol, between rocky, wood-grown cliffs, and they are in consequence only passable in a few localities. Wellington, then, could not operate in safety far beyond the Tormes until the forts had been captured and free movement secured over the bridge that spanned the river at Salamanca. And the garrisons of these forts did their duty so well and made such an effective resistance that they were still holding out when Marmont had collected the whole of his field Army, with the exception of Bonnet's division from the Asturias, near Fuente el Sauco. On the 20th of June he advanced, for the purpose of helping the garrisons, into close contact with Wellington's troops, who were standing in the area between Villares and Moriscos for the purpose of covering the siege. (Map 2.) Some skilful manœuvring took place between the 20th and 22nd, when Wellington wrote:

"I had a favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy, of which, however, I did not think it proper to avail myself, for the following reasons: First: it was probable that he had advanced with an intention to attack us, and in the position which we occupied I considered it advantageous to be attacked, and that the action would be attended by less loss on our side. Secondly: the operations against the forts at Salamanca took up the attention of some of our troops; and although I believe the superiority of numbers in the field was on our side, the superiority was not so great as to render the action decisive of the result of the campaign, in which we should sustain great loss. Thirdly: in case of failure the passage of the Tormes would have been difficult, the enemy continuing in the possession of the forts and commanding the bridge of Salamanca."

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Wellington was also aware that, in consequence of the defeat of Ballesteros, Soult had been able to send Drouet forward with a considerable force towards Hill, who had moved to Albuera to oppose the French, a development that caused him a good deal of concern. He knew in addition that, although the Galicians, who were now under the command of General Santocildes, had invested a French garrison at Astorga, this action had probably not affected the movements of the force under Bonnet.

The forts at Salamanca were at last captured on the 27th of June, and Marmont then retired northwards, for the purpose of picking up, as it seemed to the British, reinforcements; for from intercepted correspondence Wellington had now ascertained that Marmont was expecting a division from the Army of the North—owing to the operations of the Navy and guerillas it was not actually sent southward—as well as Bonnet's force. The bulk * of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, however, followed the French, but there was no fighting except a short action on the 2nd of July with a French rearguard when the enemy crossed the Douro. They then took up a position with their right on the wooded heights opposite to Pollos, the centre at Tordesillas, where the bridge was intact—that at Toro had been broken—and their left at Simancas on the Pisuerga. Wellington now placed his troops opposite to the French—the left, 16,000 strong, being near Pollos; the right, 24,000, opposite to Tordesillas, and the reserve, 14,000, in the wheat-growing area of Medina del Campo. And having done so he caused the fords over the Douro to be reconnoitred, but found that at the moment they were too deep to be practicable. At the same time, in order to stop communication between King Joseph and Marmont, the guerillas of Castile were closed in on the roads through Segovia, by which Marmont could best communicate with Madrid.

There were no developments for some time after the retreat of the French, but on the 8th of July Wellington had heard that Bonnet's division had rejoined Marmont's Army, and that Marmont had also called on a force of Italians, about 4,000 in number, who were serving in the Army of the North, to come to him. A few days later he wrote, therefore, that "the enemy's numbers are equal if not superior to ours; they have in their position twice the amount of artillery which we have, and we are superior in cavalry alone." He also remarked that "it is obvious that we could not cross the

* The cavalry brigade under D'Urban had, after interposing between Marmont's Army and the French garrison of Zamora, recrossed the Douro and, moving first along the northern bank to Toro, had then gone northward towards Castromonte and later advanced almost to Valladolid.

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river without sustaining great loss, and could not fight a general action under circumstances of greater disadvantage than those which would attend the attack on the enemy's positions on the Douro." On the other hand, it seemed that an offensive by the French was not unlikely for, as Wellington wrote on the 12th, work by them in repairing the bridge at Toro was proceeding slowly, but that " all the intelligence and the enemy's movements lead to the belief that their intention is to cross the Douro at that place." And when he heard, on the 14th, that Lord William Bentinck's force might not land on the eastern coast of the Peninsula until the success of a plan of operations on the coast of Italy had been tried, he felt bound to express his disappointment to the Government, who were told : " I am apprehensive that this determination may bring upon us an additional force of the Army of Aragon (Suchet's group), but I still hope I shall be able to retain at the close of the campaign those acquisitions which we made at its commencement."

On the 16th of July Wellington, who had recalled D'Urban's brigade—he rejoined on the 18th with news that practically the whole of the French had crossed the Douro—was aware that Marmont had collected his troops near Toro, a measure that he thought might be due either to the south-eastward movements of the Spanish forces from Galicia. Or, as was less likely, for Wellington was doubtful whether any news from Madrid was reaching Marmont, that the French were threatening the British left in order to prevent them from interfering with the concentration of 12,000 men of the Army of the Centre at Madrid ; who could then be used to assist Marmont directly by advancing northward or to do so indirectly by marching on Lisbon. At any rate no movement was made by Wellington's Army until in the evening he heard that two French divisions had actually crossed the Douro at Toro. The allied troops were then brought westward during the night so as to cover the line of communication to Salamanca, the reserve marching first to Alaejos and then to the Guarena, the left to Castrillo, part of the right on Canizal, the remainder, two divisions and a cavalry brigade, about 10,000 troops, to Castrejon. The French, however, recrossed the Douro on the night of the 16th, and marching fast eastward not only again passed the river at and near Tordesillas on the 17th, but concentrated to the south of it at Nava del Rey. On the 18th the movement was continued, for the allied troops at Castrejon were attacked and at the same time their right flank was turned by the enemy. The detachment, however, " retired in admirable order " to the Guarena, and there rejoined the rest of the Army. On

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the 19th and 20th the French still kept moving round the allied right and, on the evening of the 21st, Wellington was obliged to bring the whole of his Army, except one division and D'Urban's cavalry, into the area to the south of the Tormes and to the south-east of Salamanca; so as "to cover Salamanca as long as I can and above all not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; the want of which," he said, "would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castile, and even if we had the money, we could not procure anything from the country." He also decided "not to fight an action, unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary"; for it was believed that Marmont's Army was about to be joined by the force of 10,000 to 12,000 men from Madrid, that troops were still expected from the Army of the North, and that reinforcements had been ordered to move towards Badajoz from that of the South, although Drouet so far had not even crossed the Guadiana.

On the 22nd Marmont's Army was standing generally in the area lying to the south-east of Salamanca and to the south and west of the Tormes, which had been forded by the French at and near Huerta; and the only bridge behind the Army, that at Alba, was, so far as Wellington knew, closed by a battalion of Carlos de Espana's group, which had been placed in the castle commanding the bridge. Also the left of the French was at first to the south of the right of the Allies, and consequently as near in point of distance to Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Anglo-Portuguese right had, therefore, been bent back westward. Such being the situation, Wellington had thought it judicious to send his baggage off at dawn from Salamanca towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and he had also concealed the larger proportion of his troops in the woods and hollows of the downs so that only a few of them were visible to the enemy. It seems that, at about noon, Marmont saw from a hilltop the dust raised by the march of the baggage animals, and by that of the division and D'Urban's brigade, which were then being brought from the British left to the right; and concluding that Wellington was again about to retreat, resolved to try and hit the Allies hard by enveloping what he took to be the rearguard, the few troops that were visible. The movement, however, was not well carried out, for the division sent out for this purpose from the French left became separated from the division on its right which was itself not in close touch with the centre. Wellington, who could overlook the enemy's manœuvres from the summit of a down, at once seized the happy chance that had been offered to him, and broke the French left after hard fighting in which

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several generals on both sides became casualties, including Marmont, who was severely wounded. The Allies would also probably have captured much of the French Army, for it was then farther from the fords at and near Huerta than Wellington's force, had the bridge at Alba—the castle had without his knowledge been evacuated by the Spaniards—been denied to the retreating troops.

Victory solves the problems of the moment, and many of those of the immediate past, but it raises at once problems that are as numerous and as pressing, and those of the morrow of Salamanca were not less difficult than those that preceded it.

Every one knows that, unless the enemy is surrounded, the best fruits of victory are gathered in the pursuit, for if not effectively pursued a disciplined force will soon both regain its stability and recover its stragglers. In spite, therefore, of his disappointment regarding Alba and a blow on the thigh that he had received from a spent bullet at the end of the battle, Wellington caused the pursuit to be pressed with energy on the 23rd, when a short action took place. Although the French were joined by a cavalry brigade from the Army of the North on the evening of the 23rd, which took up the work of covering the retreat, the allied cavalry followed after them on the 24th. But on the next day Wellington was obliged to admit, " I find the troops so much fatigued by the battle and their previous and subsequent marches that I halted this day and have sent the light cavalry and guerillas in pursuit." It is, however, also said that delay was now necessary in order to enable the trains and supply columns, which had been sent towards Ciudad Rodrigo, again to get contact with the Army. At any rate, on the 25th, Wellington for practical purposes abandoned the attempt completely to break up the Army of Portugal, and only cavalry was in touch with it when Valladolid was occupied on the 30th and the French Army continued its retreat towards Burgos over the open well-cultivated country, leaving garrisons in Zamora, Toro and Tordesillas. Meanwhile, another small group of Wellington's force had followed the French troops that had come from Madrid, who on hearing the news of Salamanca had turned back from Segovia to the Guadarrama pass, which was clear of the enemy on the 4th of August. On that day Wellington was aware that King Joseph, who had marched with the group from Madrid, had gone towards the capital, he knew that Drouet had been ordered to cross the Tagus and join the King, but had not done so, although the French forces in Estremadura had received reinforcements from the south, and he knew that part of the Army of the Centre was still near Madrid. He had also received

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the news that Ballesteros, after attacking Malaga, had been defeated by the French; that another Spanish force had been beaten by Suchet's troops near Alicante; that a small Anglo-Sicilian group, under General Maitland, had in the end been sent from Sicily and had reached Majorca, but that Lord William Bentinck did not expect any successful result from the operations on the eastern coast of Spain, and proposed only to keep the troops there until October. It was also believed that "Suchet felt great uneasiness respecting a fleet (they were transports that had been sent by Wellington from Lisbon for the movement of Spanish troops from Alicante and Majorca) that had appeared off the coast of Cullera," that a division of his Army had probably been despatched to the Army of the North, and some troops also to the King. The information from the north was, however, even better, for the naval operations on the coast had been successful in attracting the attention of the French and several towns had been taken from them. On the other hand, Astorga had not yet been captured by the Gallicians, but 8,000 of them under General Santocildes had, on Wellington's suggestion, moved towards Tordesillas and then to Valladolid, and Zamora was still being blockaded by the Portuguese force under Silveira. (Map 3.)

On the whole, then, it might be inferred that it was now unlikely that Soult would attempt a diversion towards Lisbon so as to check Wellington's operations; but that it was likely that the French would try to concentrate a large force against him by bringing round to the Army of Portugal "Suchet's Army or the Army of the South, or both," which in the military sense would be a secure manœuvre, that is one with which Wellington could not easily interfere. Or they might unite the Armies of the Centre and the South near Toledo, which could be effected more quickly but would be more hazardous, for Wellington, who had concentrated practically the whole of the Army that fought at Salamanca in the neighbourhood of Cuellar, in a position between the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, was well situated for striking with the help of the group under Hill at the latter if it remained near Madrid while holding off the former.

As regards the European situation, Napoleon's invasion of Russia had now begun, and some information as to his progress had reached Wellington; for on the 25th of July he had written to Lord Bathurst, "I am much obliged to you for the intelligence from the north. If the Emperor of Russia has any resources, and is prudent, and his Russians really fight, Buonaparte will not succeed."

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Wellington's object, therefore, was as before to do as much harm in the Peninsula to the French as possible, in the hope that success there would react favourably to the Allies on the general situation.

In order to carry out this policy it was necessary to gain time by striking before the enemy could concentrate, and there were at the moment only two alternative methods of doing so. One was to use part of the Anglo-Portuguese Army to watch and contain with the help of the Spaniards, the Armies of the Centre, South and Aragon, and with the remainder to continue to press hard on that of Portugal; the other was to attack the Army of the Centre while taking measures to hold off the other Armies; for an advance into Andalusia, although it would almost certainly have freed Southern Spain, would have left the French first at liberty to concentrate their Armies in Castile, where the harvest was now practically ripe, and then perhaps to force on a battle in which they might regain all that had been abandoned. There were, of course, advantages and drawbacks to each of these policies. If Wellington advanced northwards and gained another victory the French would probably be obliged to abandon Southern Spain, if they had not already done so, and to collect their forces in the north-eastern half of the country to oppose the Allies, who might otherwise transfer the war into South-Western France. But if he failed to bring the Army of Portugal (estimated to be now about 24,000 strong) to battle, he would only be pushing it back on the Army of the North and forming a big pocket in the French front where maintenance would be difficult, and from all sides of which they could close in on the Anglo-Portuguese Army. The Allies in fact, as Wellington put it, could not quit the river Douro in pursuit of the Army of Portugal without incurring great inconveniences and exposing the rear and communications of the Army to the operations of the Army of the Centre. On the other hand, the situation of the Armies of the North and of Portugal was such that they were unlikely for some time to cause serious trouble to the Anglo-Portuguese Army; but King Joseph, who had under his immediate orders the Army of the Centre, might, if he were joined by the troops of the Army of the South that had been summoned to him, and perhaps by some of those of Suchet's Army, be induced to fight a battle for the possession of Madrid if the British advanced towards it; since the abandonment of the capital without a struggle would be a confession to the world of weakness. If the French then fought for the possession of Madrid, and if the Allies, including Hill's group,

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were victorious, Southern Spain at any rate would be free; and even if the Allies were defeated part of Southern Spain would for a time probably have been relieved of the enemy. Alternatively, if the French refused battle until the greater part of the Armies of the Centre, South and Aragon had been concentrated, Southern Spain would for the moment have been freed, and Madrid and its arsenal would also, even though temporarily, have been abandoned by the enemy; the first being to some extent a political advantage, the second definitely a military one. On the whole, then, to turn against the Army of the Centre was now the better plan, measures similar to those that had previously been concerted being taken to occupy the attention of the other Armies. This was the policy that was adopted by Wellington, and his arrangements were as follows.

The 6th Division and other troops, about 7,000 in all, were left at Cuellar under General Clinton to support the force under General Santocildes, which was at Valladolid covered by a British cavalry brigade, and in front of this three bands of guerillas closely watched and worried the Army of Portugal. A small French force, which was still holding Toro (Tordesillas had surrendered on the 5th of August), was to be blockaded by Spaniards, Silveira was to continue to invest Zamora, and the siege of Astorga was to be prosecuted. And all these troops were also told how to act both if the French Armies of Portugal and the North tried to rescue the garrisons, and if they moved in force southward so as indirectly to assist the Army of the Centre. Popham, the commander of the squadron on the northern coast, had, meanwhile, been asked to continue his important and successful operations in conjunction with the Spanish guerillas. On the other coast the Spanish commanders near Alicante were requested "not to be defeated again; and to accomplish this object you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain. Threaten as much as you can but do not engage in serious affairs." A suggestion as to delivering an attack on Tarragona had already been made to General Maitland and to Admiral Pellew commanding on the east coast. And Hill, in the area to the south of the Tagus, had a month earlier been told that "if you should find that Drouet separates his troops, or if he pretends to hold you in check with a smaller body of men than you think you can get the better of, fall on him. . . ."

Having then again done all that was possible to ensure security and cooperation, Wellington advanced on Madrid on the 6th of August, and, after a short action on the 11th, entered it on the 12th, the citadel being taken two days later with 1,800 prisoners, 189 guns,

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20,000 muskets and a quantity of powder According to the information now received by the British, King Joseph had meanwhile moved first across the Tagus and then towards Valencia with from 17,000 to 20,000 troops. But Maitland, after having sailed to the coast of Catalonia and interviewed the local leaders whose reports were not encouraging, had, partly for this reason partly because Alicante was said to be in danger, decided to go there; and he began on the 7th of August to disembark his force, 6,000 Anglo-Sicilians and a brigade of 4,000 Spanish from the Balearic Islands under Whittingham. Nothing of importance had happened in the south, where the garrison of Cadiz had been asked to make an attack on the investing force, but in the north a detachment of the Army of Portugal had advanced towards Valladolid, and Clinton consequently was sent to Olmedo.

At the end of August Wellington was definitely aware that King Joseph was marching on Valencia; he knew also that the Army of Portugal, now under General Clausel, was again showing considerable activity, had driven off the force under General Santocildes, and was moving to or over the Douro; that an attempt had been made to relieve the garrison of Astorga, which had, however, surrendered before the arrival of the relieving force; and that the garrisons of Toro and Zamora had been relieved and removed by the French. There were also strong reports, which were soon confirmed, that the enemy had given up the blockade of Cadiz and was about to vacate Andalusia. Since it would be of little use in these circumstances to follow the Army of the Centre into the pocket at Valencia towards which it was thought that the Army of the South would move, and since the Army of Portugal was now the nearest and most menacing French group, Wellington decided to drive it off. As he wrote to a correspondent, his plan, while waiting both for those of the enemy to develop, for Hill's force to move up from Estremadura, and for the Spanish Armies to get together, was to "hunt away the elements of Marmont's Army from the Douro. I shall push them as far as I can, I shall try to establish proper cooperation between the Anglo-Portuguese detachment which I must leave on this side and the Galician Army, and so I shall secure my left flank when I shall be engaged on the Valencian side." Instructions, therefore, were sent to Maitland (he resigned the command to General Mackenzie towards the end of September), who had now been placed under his orders, to secure Alicante in conjunction with the small British force from Cartagena and two Spanish groups under Generals Roche and Whittingham, a total of about 16,000

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troops; Bassecourt, Villa Campa, and Elio were asked to move into La Mancha; but General O'Donnell's Murcian force of 5,500 (he was soon afterwards replaced by Elio, but became Captain-General of Andalusia instead of Ballesteros, who was degraded by the Government for intriguing), which had gone to Hellin, was recommended to communicate with the British group near Madrid, and to retire on it if threatened by Soult's army. This group was at first to consist of two divisions and a cavalry brigade, and for the purpose of avoiding the heat in Madrid and of keeping touch between the troops there and the force that was to move northward, one additional division, instead of being in the capital, was to be placed in the foothills of the mountains at Escurial. Carlos de Espana's division, except one battalion which remained in Madrid, was to be at Segovia, and D'Urban's cavalry, which had been roughly handled by the French during the advance to Madrid, was also to be near Segovia. And Alten, the temporary commander of the group round Madrid, was told what action to take if Soult marched on the Spanish capital and not, as was expected, on Valencia. Castanos, who was in Galicia, was asked to move on Valladolid in force. Hill had already been given directions to march to Zalamea if the French left the Guadiana, so as to be in a position either to follow Soult or to join Wellington; and that if Drouet's detachment, which fell back on the 26th of August, moved north-eastwards towards the Tagus he was then to proceed on a line parallel to its march. But he now received instructions to march with his Anglo-Portuguese troops, and about 3,500 Spaniards under Morillo and Penne Villamur, by Almaraz, where the bridge had been repaired, to Oropesa, and then to Toledo and Aranjuez, sending his cavalry forward on to the flats of La Mancha; and he was also on arrival to take command of all the forces near Madrid, about 30,000 troops. In addition, the British detachment from Cadiz, under General Skerrett, about 4,000 strong, which in conjunction with a Spanish force under Cruz Murgeon had attacked a French rearguard at Seville, was ordered to join Hill. As an additional belt of security round Madrid there were also the guerillas in the mountains of Toledo who were in communication with those in the Iberian mountains, and these were in touch with the guerillas in Aragon, who communicated with the bands in Navarre.

In making these arrangements Wellington certainly disregarded the principle of concentration, for his operating forces were to be almost equally distributed in the area round Madrid and in that to the north of the Douro; and, as events actually shaped themselves,

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this distribution proved to be unfavourable, for the Allies were not strong enough either to drive the French hard in the northern theatre or to hold them off in the southern. On the other hand, if two more divisions had been taken in August from Madrid Soult might have moved the Army of the South there and not to Valencia as he did; that is, the enemy's concentration in the south might have been towards the capital, and if so their advance northward might have been put forward a fortnight or more. With a larger force in the north Wellington could certainly have pressed and perhaps hurt the enemy more than he did, but, if his object was to fight a battle, it can be argued that a recently defeated army might be more inclined to risk one against a smaller group.

Having, however, made these decisions Wellington left Madrid on the 1st of September to join the force of four divisions, two Portuguese brigades, and three cavalry brigades, which had been ordered to concentrate at Arevalo; but owing to sickness their numbers did not exceed 28,000 men, and because of the heavy casualties that had occurred at Salamanca there was also a dearth of experienced leaders in the higher ranks. He then drove the French, some of whom were now to the south of Zamora, back at first over the open sandy plain to the north of the Douro, and then across open cornlands; but not "very vigorously" as he himself wrote, perhaps because the troops were sickly, perhaps because he was waiting for the Army of Galicia—12,000 men came up under Castanos on the 16th at Pampliega—possibly in order to tempt Clausel to fight. On the 17th the French retired to Burgos, and, having placed a garrison in the castle, fell back on the next day over the dreary plains to Briviesca, the bulk of the Allies only following them as far as Monasterio. An attack was then begun on the castle, which commanded all the bridges over the Arlanzon at Burgos, probably for much the same reasons as the attack had been made on the forts at Salamanca; although Wellington even at that time wrote: "I am a little afraid that I have not the means to take the castle, which the French have strengthened to the utmost of their power." He may, however, have hoped by attacking to induce the enemy at once to advance again to the relief of the garrison and give him the opportunity of winning another battle. At any rate, merely to have continued to drive the French northward would have lengthened Wellington's communications and the distance separating his group from Madrid without compensating advantage; but, if the Army of Portugal had been forced over the Ebro and any magazines that had been collected by the French in the area to the south of the river

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destroyed, the subsequent mobility of the Army would, of course, have been lowered, but not apparently to a great extent, for the valleys of the Pisuerga and Arlanzon were "replete with corn, wine and oil."

On the 20th of September it was known that the French Army of the South had probably concentrated at Grenada, and it was thought that in these circumstances the troops under Ballesteros, from 12,000 to 15,000 strong, who were to be joined by from 4,000 to 5,000 men from Cadiz, would be harassing Soult's left. On the other flank Popham had been asked to try and remain with his squadron and marines on the northern coast during the winter, so as to continue his successful operations in supporting the Spaniards and helping them to hold fast a large part of the Army of the North. Wellington, however, was now naturally somewhat anxious in regard to the situation, for the Army of Portugal had not again been beaten and might be reinforced by troops from the Army of the North, and it was evident that the concentration of the Armies of the South, Centre and Suchet's force would soon be effected. As he wrote on the 21st:

"the worst of our situation is that the Spaniards can do nothing by themselves. . . . The guerillas are almost useless in serious operations even when with our troops, and we have not enough for the extent of ground we are obliged to occupy, and the system of our operations."

It seems that for once Wellington's foresight failed and his administrative arrangements broke down at Burgos, for he was obliged to borrow both guns, which did not arrive in time, and powder for guns and muskets, from Popham. Partly for this reason, and partly according to his own account owing to the inexperience of the troops who were carrying on the attack, the Allies were unable to capture the castle; and Wellington may have persisted in trying to do so because he thought that until the castle had been taken his plan of making a detachment to hold off the French with the help of the Galicians, while he moved with the remainder of his forces southward, would have no chance of success. Another reason for continuing the siege was perhaps that the weather was now inclement, and the conditions unfavourable in consequence for rapid movements such as he had contemplated on interior lines; and, if so, it might be best to try to strengthen the northern flank before going southwards, for the weather would probably also delay the operations of the French troops who had moved to Valencia. However this may be, in actual fact time had now been lost by the Allies and gained by the French, and by the 20th of October a considerable

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force under General Souham, who had replaced Clausel, estimated to comprise 30,000 troops of the Army of Portugal, including 6,000 drafts, and perhaps 10,000 men of the Army of the North, had advanced and was in close touch with the allied troops who were covering the siege. Meanwhile, on the 9th of October, Wellington had heard from Hill, whose troops were now to the south and south-east of Madrid, that the Army of the South had joined that of the Centre; but he considered that the French were not likely to march on Madrid until they had taken the various fortresses in the south-east, such as Cartagena, Chinchilla and Alicante, and also that their movements of whatever kind, would be retarded by bad weather. He thought it worth while, however, to tell Mackenzie that, if the French advanced to the Tagus, an attack must be made on Valencia, and to request Ballesteros to advance to Alcaraz so as to support the troops in Chinchilla. But Ballesteros was now busy with political intrigues, and in any case Chinchilla had been captured even before Wellington made his request. The news from Hill soon afterwards became more unsatisfactory, but Wellington did not change his plans until, on the 21st, he heard from him that French forces in Valencia drawn from the united Armies of the South, Centre and from Suchet's group, were thought to be 70,000 strong, and that some or all of these were moving towards the Tagus, but might not attempt to force their way to Madrid.

Although Hill had been ordered to retire if unable to maintain his position, the two principal allied groups would for some time evidently be too far apart to enable the bulk to be brought against either of the French concentrations if the Allies remained near Burgos. Wellington, therefore, now came to the conclusion that he must bring his fighting forces together—about 4,500 reinforcements had been received during the progress of the attack on Burgos or were close at hand, but about 2,000 casualties had occurred there—the siege was raised on the 21st, and the Allies then fell back closely followed by the French, with whom some fighting soon took place. On the 26th, accompanied by the Galicians some 12,000 strong, Wellington's group crossed the lower Pisuerga; and, on the 27th, Hill was ordered to move his Anglo-Portuguese force and also Carlos de Espana's, Morillo's and Penne Villamur's Spaniards to Arevalo, unless Wellington, who now estimated that he was opposed by very superior numbers, was unable to hold the line of the Douro. Hill was also told to ask Generals Elio, Bassecourt and Villa Campa to cross the Tagus by the bridge at Arzobispo and move round to join the force, supposed to be under Ballesteros, in the area to the

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south of the river; so that a considerable nunber of troops might be available either to harass the enemy if he advanced on Lisbon, or again to menace Madrid if he marched northward. In addition, a request was to be made to the Empecinado to go to Guadalaxara. Actually, however, the Spaniards under Elio, Bassecourt and the Empecinado first collected together at Sacedon. Elio then went to La Mancha, Bassecourt to Cuenca, and the Empecinado occupied Madrid, which was not garrisoned by the French, for three weeks.

On the 29th of October Wellington moved over the Douro at Puente de Douro and Tudela, and at the same time caused the bridges at Toro and Tordesillas to be blown up. Up to the 5th of November only a few of the French crossed the river, and Hill was at Villacastin on the 4th. Although the French group following Hill had not yet passed the mountains, Wellington's troops were, however, between and within striking distance of the two French forces. But he did not think it judicious to concentrate against the southern group for fear that the northern—the French had seized and repaired the bridge at Toro—might get between him and his advanced base at Salamanca; nor to bring the bulk of his forces to the Douro, behind which the northern group would, he thought, probably stay, for such a concentration would also leave the southern force free to march against the allied communications. Rightly or wrongly, then, Wellington did not care to take the risk that would be involved in seeking an early decision, and perhaps the condition and quality of his troops and the situation in Europe were among the reasons that prevented him from doing so. Hill, in consequence, was ordered on the 5th to move towards Flores de Avila, and on the 8th he reached Alba. Wellington himself also fell back in this direction without hindrance, halting on the ground to the north-east of Salamanca on the same day; and an Army amounting to about 52,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards had, therefore, now been brought together in this neighbourhood. As regards the enemy, it was thought that Suchet with 22,000 men was still near Alicante, which was held by the combined Anglo-Sicilian-Spanish troops, that about 40,000 men under Soult had followed Hill, but without being harassed by the Spaniards, and that 36,000 men of the Army of Portugal and 10,000 men of the Army of the North had pushed back the force under Wellington. It seems also that in these retirements some of the allied troops behaved so badly that, on the 28th of November, Wellington issued an indiscriminate and apparently exaggerated censure on the whole Anglo-Portuguese Army, much

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THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM

By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Franklyn, D.S.O., M.C.

Many articles have appeared in Service magazines during the last few months on various aspects of the Territorial Army. This is a healthy sign: it shows that the Regular Army, to which the writers generally belong, is groping after a more intimate knowledge of Territorial problems. No apology, therefore, seems necessary for an attempt to strike while the iron is still hot.

I. The Purpose of the Territorial Army

Before the war the problem of the Territorial Army was comparatively simple and straightforward. Peace establishments and war establishments were practically identical, and, after mobilization, the only concern was to train formations and units up to as high a state of efficiency as possible.

The problem to-day is different and altogether more complicated. In the case of a war of the first magnitude, it is assumed that the existing fourteen Territorial divisions will form the basis of expansion of a National Army, and that each of these divisions will be required to give birth to a new one. Since 1920 the peace establishment has been fixed at 60 per cent. of the war establishment, and, unfortunately, there are very few units the actual strength of which is up to peace establishment. In order to produce two units at war strength each existing unit will have to be expanded by 300 per cent.: this is not expansion, it is explosion. Every old unit will disintegrate in giving birth to two new ones. There is little doubt that there will be excellent material available to fill these new units, but the material will be wasted unless the cadres have been prepared in peace time.

At present there appears to be a somewhat dangerous dispersion of effort between units, men and leaders. It must, surely, be waste of time to perfect units as such, when these units will disintegrate directly war breaks out. The men actually serving in the ranks are, for similar reasons, of little importance, except as potential leaders:

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on mobilization, these men will form 30 per cent. of the material required to produce twenty-eight divisions at war strength.

It appears to be common sense to put every effort in peace time into the training of leaders and specialists and to eliminate ruthlessly every form of training which does not contribute directly to this main object.

Assuming that this is the correct solution, can the Territorial Army, as the result of its peace training, produce sufficient individuals, who will be able on mobilization to receive, to organize, to administer and to train the thousands of raw recruits required to make up the *personnel* of twenty-eight divisions?

Some consider that this constitutes an unattainable ideal, and produce the alternative solution that these cadres should be composed of *personnel* of the Regular Army and Reserve, assuming this *personnel* to be available. If this be the only reasonable solution, then it would appear that the Territorial Army serves no really useful purpose in time of peace, and that the money expended on it annually might be more profitably employed elsewhere. We may, however, safely assume that Regular *personnel* will not be available in sufficient numbers to solve the problem, and that the Territorial Army will have to work out its own salvation with very little outside assistance.

If war—a European war—broke out to-morrow, are the present leaders up to the standard necessary for the task required of them on mobilization? It is probable that the majority of Territorial officers and of Regular officers with a real knowledge of the Territorial Army, would answer this question in the negative. If this be so, what steps, if any, can and should be taken to improve matters?

(i) The first step is that the Territorial Army should concentrate its efforts on the one essential, i.e. the training of leaders and specialists. At present it is too much at the mercy of the "faddist" with a partiality towards some particular form of training; it may be drill, it may be ceremonial or musketry, etc.; it is, of course, impossible to contest the fact that each of these forms of training has a definite value: there is, however, one infallible test—to what extent does each contribute directly towards the main end, i.e. the training of leaders?

(ii) Training, generally speaking, requires better organization.

(iii) The Regular Army must help, even more than it does at present.

(ii) and (iii) are discussed in detail later in this article.

It may be maintained that these steps would not suffice to put

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matters right. The chief reason for hope lies in the fact that there are some units which have already reached the required standard. It is true that this efficiency is partly, perhaps largely, due to the personality of a few individual commanders; but this is not the only reason: some units have maintained their high standard for several years and under different commanders. Even so it may be argued that the objective is out of reach of the majority of units. If this be so, and it may be so, what then?

If the Territorial Army, in its present form, is not going to give us the means of expansion for a National Army, it is failing in its main purpose. In such case it is imperative to change the form, if another can be found, which, without involving extra expense, can produce the required results.

(i) The number of Territorial divisions might be reduced, so as to make available more money and Regular *personnel* to be distributed among fewer formations: there appears to be no particular virtue in the figures 14 and 28.

In order to put this policy into effect it would be necessary to destroy the whole Territorial Army and to build it up afresh. It is not a feasible proposition to wipe some of the existing divisions off the slate, leaving a number of counties unrepresented in the Territorial Army. It would be necessary to re-cast all the recruiting areas and so impair divisional, brigade and unit *esprit de corps*.

The reduction of divisions is a drastic step: if change of form there must be, this is probably not the best change.

(ii) Another suggestion is to reduce units to cadres of leaders and specialists and so to concentrate every effort on what really matters. On the face of it this proposal is a tempting one, but there are certain drawbacks. In the first place it is difficult to judge whether a potential recruit is likely to make a non-commissioned officer or specialist, although it might, perhaps, be possible to enlist recruits on probation for one year. Again, it is impossible to train leaders without giving them practical experience in leadership: in time of peace, collective training provides the only means for practice in leadership; collective training is even more difficult under a cadre system than with half-filled units. Lastly, cadres are somewhat soulless bodies; their adoption would probably lessen *esprit de corps* and might drive away an excellent type of officer who takes a real pride in commanding a live unit.

This proposal probably forms the best alternative to the Territorial Army, as it exists to-day. It is, however, maintained that the necessity of any change in form has not yet been proved, and cannot

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be proved until greater efforts have been made to raise the general standard of efficiency.

So far the problem has only been discussed from the point of view of a war of the first magnitude, whereas wars of secondary importance are more likely in the immediate future. In a war where a National Army is not required, there will be no question of expanding the Territorial Army, though even in a minor war each unit would have to increase its *personnel* about 100 per cent, in order to pass from a peace to a war footing, and the necessity of leaders, trainers and specialists, who had been prepared for their tasks beforehand, would still be very great.

It is true that, with a view to a war of secondary importance, a case can be made out for concentrating efforts on the unit, as such, in times of peace; but in order to be ready for either type of war it is wiser to look on the Territorial Army as a school for producing leaders and specialists; moreover, although a small war may be more likely, it is only a first-class war which can constitute a real threat against the Empire.

II. Training of the Territorial Army

Broadly speaking, there are two main schools of thought in the Territorial Army, viz.: (i) the "Spade and bucket school"; and (ii) the "Serious soldiering school."

The "Spade and bucket school" presupposes that all training must be dull, and that, therefore, counter attractions are necessary. The policy of this school, even if it is not actually declared, is to get men to join by the promise of seaside holidays, games, clubs, etc., and then to slip in a little work between bathes. Such work as is done is usually light and showy; drill, particularly ceremonial, being a favourite pastime. Any field days, which may be arranged, are usually carried out to the accompaniment of tanks, aeroplanes, etc.; in fact, all the "fun of the fair," so as to keep the men amused.

The "Serious soldiering school," on the other hand, maintain that training for war should form the main inducement, and that it can do so provided that it is made really interesting. It must not be forgotten that most of the officers and many of the non-commissioned officers and men regard their Territorial work as a hobby.

Should a hobby be interesting or merely amusing?

There is, of course, nothing against the seaside camp as such, provided that there is a really good training area. An example,

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perhaps, will best illustrate the two points of view. Let us imagine a suitable training ground four miles from the coast: is the camp site selected close to the training or close to the bathing?

It is surely a psychological error to sugar the pill; the obvious presence of the sugar infers that the pill is nasty.

The Territorial Army rejoices in many misnomers; its very name implies something quite separate from the Regular Army; i.e. two Armies, not one Army: its interests are closely connected with drill-halls, which are places where drill is not, or at any rate should not, be carried out; it draws proficiency pay, which does not entirely depend on proficiency but more on a number of drills, which should not be drills; we hear much about its annual training, which gives the impression that it only trains on one occasion each year. It is now proposed to examine some of these mysteries.

One has painful memories of large and dimly lit drill-halls; in one corner is an optimistic instructor with a Lewis gun, gathered round him are two gentlemen, one in khaki trousers and a mufti coat and the other in mufti trousers and a khaki coat; in another corner is a squad at musketry, its numbers being continually augmented by late arrivals to the distraction of the non-commissioned officer in charge; in a third are buglers practising (there are few more distressing noises than a bugle badly played). Of what value is work of this sort? It cannot be denied that many precious "drills" are frittered away in this manner. If this be serious soldiering then there is much to be said for the "spade and bucket" enthusiast.

The Sunday *char-à-banc* outing should, in time, kill the drill-hall farce. The *char-à-banc* affords the opportunity for taking men to good ground where either individual or collective training can be carried out: it is only on a Sunday that all the men of a sub-unit can be relied upon to attend together, thereby simplifying instruction. Three hours' continuous work out of doors are worth much more, from the training point of view, than three separate hours spent in a drill-hall, when the men are tired after their day's work and when an undue proportion of each hour is usually spent in drawing and returning arms and equipment. These *char-à-banc* outings have been proved to be of definite value by some Territorial units during the past five years; it is curious that the idea has not been more universally adopted.

Time is important in the Regular Army; it is absolutely vital in the Territorial Army. If time is not to be wasted it is essential that training should be organized on the right lines. It is not every Territorial officer who understands what forms of training are best

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calculated to achieve the end in view; it is not every Regular officer who realizes that Territorial training cannot be organized on the same lines as Regular training; the two Armies are aiming at different objects, and the same system of training cannot be right for both.

In considering a system of training for Territorials the main object, i.e. the production of leaders and specialists, must be kept well in view. Perhaps the hardest thing to teach in a short time is leadership; the only practical means of teaching leadership in peace is at collective training. At annual camp there are only eleven days available for work; eleven days per year are not sufficient for teaching leadership, but the *char-à-banc* system, described above, provides a means of carrying out collective training prior to camp. If four or five Sunday *char-à-banc* parades are devoted to collective training, and if three hours' work counting as three drills be carried out on each of these Sundays, then the number of drills which non-commissioned officers and men have to perform to earn proficiency pay will be almost exhausted. If individual training is to be carried out thoroughly, the bulk of it will have to be done during voluntary attendances, and the majority of non-commissioned officers and some of the men will attend voluntarily if, but only if, the instruction given by their officers is both sound and interesting. So much, then, depends on the efficiency of the officers as instructors, that the importance of good officers is even greater in the Territorial than in the Regular Army; Regular non-commissioned officers and men cannot stay away if they are bored by their instructors.

A large percentage, perhaps as high as 60 per cent., of the men in the ranks of the Territorial Army to-day would never make non-commissioned officers or specialists under any circumstances. Time spent on promoting the individual efficiency of these men is so much time wasted, because it contributes nothing towards the main object; such men should be merely regarded as a means of supplying instruction for the non-commissioned officers. It may be argued that it is in promoting the individual efficiency of the men that the non-commissioned officer learns how to instruct in all the subjects which he will have to teach after mobilization; this is true to a limited extent, provided that it is really the instruction of the non-commissioned officers which is made the main principle; direct instruction of the men by permanent staff non-commissioned officers obviously violates this principle, yet it is a common occurrence. Again, is it really necessary for every man in an infantry battalion to fire ball ammunition in order to teach non-commissioned officers how to conduct range practices?

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A great deal of money is spent annually on weapon-training courses; money for ammunition, musketry camps and for proficiency pay, which depends on an extremely low standard of qualification. It is suggested that this expenditure only contributes indirectly towards the main object, and that the money might be better spent on rewards for real proficiency among non-commissioned officers and specialists, and, incidentally, the time now spent on the ranges would be available for more profitable forms of training. Even if it were possible to make out a case in favour of all ranks firing on the long range, really thorough preliminary training is essential to justify the cost.

Such preliminary training cannot be carried out thoroughly without allotting to it an undue proportion of the total time available for training, time which can be better expended on subjects of direct value. Properly conducted tests of elementary training, including practice on the miniature range, would perhaps form a suitable substitute.

There is little doubt that, apart from collective training, all efforts should be concentrated on the individual training of the officers, the non-commissioned officers (including the potential non-commissioned officers) and the specialists. The principal means available are:

(i) Attachments to training centres: it is difficult for any, except those out of employment, to attend.

(ii) Evening courses: either technical or tactical. The sand table can form an excellent medium for instruction.

(iii) Week-end courses.

These week-end courses are of very definite value and are well worth the small amount of money expended on them. They can be held in barracks, drill-halls, hotels or under canvas; in the latter case volunteers from among the men should attend to carry out all camp duties. Tactical exercises on the ground, lectures and discussions can be held during these courses. It is advisable that they should take place in the winter or the spring, so as not to interfere with the collective training.

Perhaps the hardest and yet the most important of all problems in the Territorial Army is the instruction of the officers. Not only have they got to learn a great deal in a short time, but they also have to learn how to pass on their instruction; it has already been pointed out that it depends on their capacity as teachers as to whether their non-commissioned officers and men will present themselves to be taught or not. It is a generally accepted principle in the Regular

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Army that a commanding officer should teach his own officers. This principle cannot be strictly applied to the Territorial Army, as of those commanding officers who have the capacity, few have the time or opportunity. Many brigade commanders are diffident about interfering in what they have been brought up to regard as the special concern of commanding officers, but unless they do so the officers are not taught. Some divisional staff officers attempt the task with a fair measure of success, but this results in over-centralization of instruction: it seems far better that brigade commanders, most of whom have recently commanded units and who are, therefore, well used to this work, should instruct their own officers.

Relations between Regular and Territorial Armies

Much has been done since the war to make Territorial units feel that they really do form an integral part of the regiment or the corps. Some colonels of regiments have done a great deal to improve this feeling. It is all to the good that depôts are now looked upon as regimental training centres, rather than as sausage machines for turning out recruits. The eventual result of the attachment of Staff College students at annual camps will be that all staff officers will have some knowledge of Territorial Army problems. The above constitutes the bright side of the picture; unfortunately, there is also a more gloomy side.

In the first place the ignorance of the Regular Army generally about the Territorial Army is extraordinary; in consequence officers take up Territorial appointments without any real knowledge of the problems which will confront them. Some of them set to work on "half-baked" theories, others take advice from senior Territorial officers; and it is very curious, but none the less true, that the majority of senior Territorial officers are not experts on Territorial Army problems. They know all the difficulties, but their remedies are nearly all different, and, as a rule, have little relation to the true purpose of the Territorial Army. One often hears the expression that so-and-so is temperamentally unsuited for service with Territorials: there is only one type of officer who is really unsuitable, and that is the indifferent soldier. Granted a sound military knowledge, any Regular officer can make a success of a Territorial appointment provided he works to a sound policy which is universally understood and adopted. It has been the endeavour of this article to suggest the outline of such a policy and the means whereby it may be put into effect.

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THE OPERATIONS IN THE BRUCHE VALLEY, AUGUST, 1914, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ACTION OF THE FRENCH 13TH DIVISION

(*With Three Maps*)

BY "BENWELD" AND "CHRISLARKE"

IN the middle of the Vosges and overlooking the thriving Bruche valley is a prominent and picturesque hill feature known as Le Donon. It is situated close to the old frontier line, and from it, in 1914, the Germans looked westward down to the plateau of Lorraine. On the summit, which is narrow, rocky and bare of trees, there is a Roman temple built by the Germans for reasons best known to themselves. One of the rocks near by has been smoothed, and roughly cut in the stone are the words—"LE PRISE DU DONON 14me AOÛT, 1914." Next to this is another slab, more skilfully engraved, with the numbers of the German regiments who recaptured the Donon a few days later, and ending with the remark—"This hill is for ever Germany." Roughly scratched across the corner of this stone, and dated November, 1918, are the words—"*On les a eu.*"

The fighting in this neighbourhood during the first weeks of the war is of considerable interest, and some valuable lessons may be extracted from it. In order to follow these operations and to realize their importance it is necessary to consider the general situation, and to revert to it from time to time.

Action of the French.—The French First and Second Armies concentrated in the area Toul—Nancy—Belfort—Epinal,* whence they were to advance in cooperation with the Third and Fifth Armies and to attack south of Metz. The intention was for the right of the First Army to rest on the Vosges whilst a detachment was to advance through the gap of Belfort on Colmar. On the 2nd of August, General Joffre decided to extend his left farther north and to interpolate the Fourth, or Reserve Army, between the Third and Fifth Armies. Although concentration would not be completed until the 18th of August, G.Q.G. instructions provided

* *See* Sketch-map 1.

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for Armies gaining ground as soon as they were ready to move forward. Meanwhile, on the 6th of August, the detachment from the First Army on the extreme right advanced into Alsace; it was repulsed at Mulhouse and withdrew. This detachment was then reinforced and became the Army of Alsace under General Pau.

On the 11th of August, G.Q.G. issued instructions for the First and Second Armies as well as the Army of Alsace to commence the advance on the 14th of August. The First Army was given the line Obersteigen—Sarrebourg as its objective, and was ordered to seize and hold the Col du Donon to protect the right flank of the advancing Armies. The Second Army's objective was the line Dieuze—Château Salins. Both Armies were already covered by detachments pushed into the Vosges. The task of the Army of Alsace was to recapture the ground lost at Mulhouse and to contain the German forces in Upper Alsace.

Action of the Germans.—On the German side, the Sixth and Seventh Armies, under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, deployed on the line Metz—Saverne—Strasbourg—Mulhouse. The rôle of this Army Group was the protection of the left flank of Germany's main forces. The instructions to this Group contemplated an advance to the rivers Meurthe and Moselle, but, if the French advanced into Lorraine in superior numbers, both Armies were to fall back in such a manner as to prevent the envelopment of the Nied position which extended from Metz to Merzig on the River Sarre. On the 11th of August, after the action at Mulhouse, Rupprecht ordered the Seventh Army to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Saverne and Strasbourg with a view to taking the offensive with both Armies. But, by the night of the 13th–14th of August, O.H.L. came to the conclusion that a French offensive in Lorraine was imminent, and Moltke ordered Rupprecht to fall back and to attempt to draw the French into the salient Metz—Sarrelouis—Phalsbourg—Col du Donon. Meanwhile, the northward move of the corps of the Seventh Army had begun, and only *Landwehr* detachments were left in Upper Alsace. To cover this move the 30th (R) Division,* forming part of the Strasbourg reserve, was moved on the 12th of August to Triembach, north-west of Selestat, whilst a strong detachment of the same Division took up a defensive position astride the Bruche valley about Plaine.†

Topographical Features of the Vosges.—It has been seen that the general plan provided for the right of the First Army to advance

* This Division had seventeen battalions, organized in three brigades.
† The village of Plaine is shown on Sketch-map 2.

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along the crest of the Vosges. These mountains rise abruptly from the wide Rhine valley and run parallel with that river from the gap of Belfort to the Hardt Mountains in the Palatinate. The southern portion is the highest and was considered by both sides too difficult for operations on a large scale. In the centre, between the Schlucht pass and Saverne, are the Middle Vosges, and it was into this area that the right of the First Army was to advance. In this part of the Vosges the slopes are generally covered with tall trees, mostly coniferous, but the crests of the higher hills are often clear, and occasional open plateaux are to be found at a lower altitude. Though the main valleys are sometimes of considerable width, there are defiles in which road, river, and sometimes a railway, are confined in a space of a few hundred yards. In some valleys, particularly the minor ones, the trees run down almost to the watercourse and make observation and movement most difficult. The narrow roads and steep gradients render the movement of horse or mechanical transport in large quantities a problem of considerable difficulty.

The Bruche valley is a marked feature in the Middle Vosges, where it forms a north and south corridor. From Saales it runs in a northerly direction to Schirmeck, whence it bends north-east and joins the Rhine valley about Molsheim. The routes from the Rhine valley across this part of the Vosges may be summarized as follows :

i. Colmar via the Col du Bonhomme to Fraize and St. Die.
ii. Selestat via the Col de St. Marie to St. Die.
iii. Selestat via Urbeis to St. Die.
iv. Selestat via Stiege to Saales and Bourg Bruche at the head of the Bruche valley.
v. Selestat via Stiege to St. Blaise, thence via the Col du Hantz to Raon L'Etape.
vi. Barr via Hohwald to Stiege or into the Bruche valley at Fouday.
vii. Molsheim via Grendelbruch into the Bruche valley near Lutzelhausen.
viii. From the Bruche at Schirmeck via the Col du Donon to Raon L'Etape and Sarrebourg.
ix. From Strasbourg and Molsheim via the Obersteigen pass to Sarrebourg.

All the above, except the last, are connected by the road Fraize—Saales and the main road in the Bruche valley. It should be noted that between the Col du Donon and Saverne, a distance of about thirty kilometres in a direct line, the Obersteigen pass is the only practicable route from east to west.

Initial Moves of the First Army.—General Dubail, commanding the First Army, formed up his corps on the line of the river Meurthe

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between St. Die and Frambois. At St. Die was the XIV Corps, whilst between Raon L'Etape and Frambois were the XIII and VIII Corps; echeloned in rear was the XXI Corps, detachments of which had seized the passes of Bonhomme and St. Marie as early as the 8th of August. On the 12th of August, the XIV Corps relieved the XXI Corps and the latter moved forward into the Saales area preparatory to advancing down the Bruche valley. General Dubail's orders for the advance on the 14th of August contained the following:*

XXI Corps.—To move down the Bruche valley and block it about Wisches and Lutzelhausen. The Donon to be organized as a strong defensive position.

XIV Corps.—To hold the passes from the Bonhomme to Breitenbach and the important feature Champ du Feu. To gain touch with the Army of Alsace.

That General Dubail recognized the importance of the Bruche valley and the Donon is clearly shown by the following extract from an operation instruction issued to XXI Corps: †

"You will occupy the Donon as soon as possible and will at once organize it as a great defensive position extending it in the direction of the Bruche valley, which position it must command.

"I count upon you absolutely for the protection of my right flank. The success of this operation is vital and you will devote to it all your energy."

*The Advance down the Bruche valley.**—To carry out the Army Commander's orders, the XXI Corps formed a special detachment as under, mostly from the 13th Division: 25th Infantry Brigade (less 17th Infantry Regiment); three battalions of chasseurs (Corps Troops); two groups of artillery (13th Division). On the 14th of August, this column advanced up the valley of the Plaine via Luvigny and occupied the Donon without much opposition. The remainder of the Corps advanced on the same day as follows:

43*rd Division.*—*Right Flank Guard* moving via Ranrupt—Belmont on Natzweiller, keeping to the high ground.

Main Body, moving down the right of the Bruche valley on St. Blaise.

13*th Division* (*less Donon detachment*).—21st Infantry Regiment moving down the Bruche valley. The 17th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Brigade was still in the Plaine valley west of the Col du Hantz.

Left Flank Guard, 109th Infantry Regiment, and one group of artillery. To move along the high ground west of the Bruche valley via Plaine.

* *See* Sketch-map 2.

† Operation Instruction No. 4 to XXI Corps, 17.30 hours, 13th of August.

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The advance of the 43rd Division went according to plan, but the 13th Division met with considerable opposition.

The advance down the Bruche valley is an example of the method employed by the French in a mountainous country. We are apt to think of hill warfare only as carried out under the conditions which obtain on the North-West Frontier of India, where the ground and type of enemy impose a static form of flank protection. In the Vosges, the numerous forest tracks, which are found even on the heights, permit of the use of moving flank guards accompanied by light artillery. The French usually pushed their flank guards well ahead of the main bodies moving in the valley; they rightly considered it essential to secure the high ground on either flank well in advance of the forces operating in the valley itself. Moreover, turning movements are thereby facilitated. The application of this method to retirements, and the result of failure to secure the high ground to cover troops moving in the valley will be remarked upon later in this article.

*The Action at Plaine.**—The left flank guard of the 13th Division advanced from Saulxures on the morning of the 14th of August with one battalion acting as advanced guard. The head of this battalion, on reaching the road St. Blaise—Col du Hantz, came under fire from the enemy in position about Plaine.

The village of Plaine stands on a plateau between two small tributaries of the Bruche, astride of, and commanding, the line of approach of the French. The southern of these two streams is known as the Champenay and runs in a well-defined depression. To the north-west the tree-clad heights of the Côte De Plaine rise abruptly from the plateau and dominate the scene of action. North and east of the village are the Bambois and Diespach spurs which command the village and its approaches as well as the main road in the Bruche valley. These spurs are covered with heather and broom, but the Plaine plateau is open and cultivated, as is the ground between the Champenay depression and the Col du Hantz road. To the west of the plateau the Champenay valley splits into two, one branch running north towards the slopes of the Côte de Plaine. West of this fork the ground becomes more broken and is dotted with clumps of trees.

The Germans opposing the French in the Bruche valley consisted of the 60th (R) Infantry Brigade with some field and medium artillery attached. The 90th (R) Infantry Regiment held the heights east of St. Blaise, whilst the 60th (R) Infantry Regiment, with two

* *See* Sketch-map 2 and Panorama.

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and a half field and one medium battery in support, held the Plaine plateau. The position was organized with its forward defences—held by two battalions and two machine guns—on the plateau, with some rear defences on the Bambois and Diespach spurs; the Germans did not hold the Côte de Plaine. The artillery was located in the vicinity of Diespach spur, the field guns being sited for direct fire.

The French advanced guard commander, faced with an obscure situation, and quite failing to appreciate the possibilities of the ground, decided to attack at once from the south. Moving his battalion straight across the open into the Champenay depression with little or no covering fire, he formed it up there, and attacked *à la bayonette*. As the French emerged from the depression they again came under heavy fire from the village and also from the spurs to the north of it. The attack broke down with heavy loss and the battalion withdrew to the shelter of the Champenay depression, where it held its ground.

After this failure, the divisional commander took control and prepared a coordinated attack to be preceded by a bombardment. For this purpose he obtained the support of a group of the 43rd Division in addition to his own.* The plan was for the 109th Infantry Regiment to contain the enemy in Plaine with one battalion, whilst attacking the plateau from both flanks with the other two. The 21st Infantry Regiment to prolong the left flank and take the dominating heights of Côte de Plaine.

The bombardment lasted three hours, and by 15.00 hours many houses had been demolished and the German guns silenced. One battalion of the 109th Infantry Regiment moved into the Bruche valley and then turned inwards to assault Plaine. The original advanced guard battalion cooperated by containing the enemy to its front, whilst the third battalion moving by covered approaches gained the northern branch of the Champenay depression and also turned inwards on Plaine. At the same time the 21st Infantry Regiment, moving farther to the flank, took the Côte de Plaine; its inner battalion wheeled inwards on Bambois, cooperating with and protecting the left flank of the 109th. Thus, at 15.00 hours, the Germans were in a precarious situation; their artillery had been silenced and the position was being assaulted from both flanks. The commander had to make a decision: he made up his mind to withdraw, and at 15.15 hours issued orders to this effect. But it

* The other two groups belonging to the 13th Division were with the Donon detachment.

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was too late, the French had arrived within assaulting distance on both flanks; Plaine was captured, and the defenders either killed or captured. The Germans in rear of the plateau retreated rapidly, and only managed to save one of their guns. They passed rapidly through Schirmeck and halted at Lutzelhausen; large numbers of discarded rifles were found by the French on the line of retreat. It is probable that the right flank guard of the 43rd Division on the heights east of the Bruche contributed to the panic which seems to have ensued.

The German losses were thirty-two officers and seventeen hundred other ranks, of whom a thousand were captured. The French had about six hundred killed, the largest proportion of casualties being sustained by the advanced guard battalion.

Comments on the Combat of Plaine.—This was the first action fought in the mountainous Vosges country, and several lessons may be learnt from the action of both sides. The right and wrong methods of attacking the position are completely demonstrated by the French. First, the hasty frontal attack made by the advanced guard battalion without artillery support, which resulted in failure and heavy loss. Then, the final attack, well prepared by artillery, in which the enemy was held frontally and attacked on both flanks. The attackers this time made the best use of ground and fire to cover movement, but, nevertheless, the quick and complete success of the attack must to some extent be attributed to mistakes in the German dispositions for defence. The action of the advanced guard commander is of course open to criticism. The commander of such a detachment is naturally anxious not to delay the march of his main body, but he should not in consequence commit his troops to an attack without adequate preparation. Not only did he commit his whole battalion before ascertaining what was in front of him, but he chose the most exposed piece of ground across which to make a frontal attack without artillery support on a defended village. The following extract from "Infantry Training" might almost have been written as a result of a study of this action: *

"To attempt movement, inadequately prepared and insufficiently supported by fire, is to risk a premature check.

"It is therefore essential to the success of an offensive operation that every commander shall organize the whole of his available fire resources to the best effect and so dispose his command that once fire superiority has been obtained, he may be enabled to close rapidly with the enemy and complete his overthrow."

* *See* Infantry Training, vol. ii, Section 4 (1).

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According to modern ideas, the frontage held by the German 60th (R) Infantry Regiment was extremely small and the troops very thick on the ground. The plateau provides an ideal field of fire and could be very lightly held by riflemen; in fact, owing to the open nature of the ground and the narrow limits of the village, the massing of infantry only courted casualties. Moreover, the German machine guns were placed in the church tower, which was a conspicuous object and where they were at a height not calculated to increase their fire effect. It is suggested that the right flank should have rested on the Côte de Plaine, and here infantry would be required to be thicker on the ground; in addition, cooperation with the regiment on the left flank should have been arranged. It is probable that the Germans could have maintained their positions until nightfall if the Côte de Plaine had been held, or at least, have avoided double envelopment. The importance of holding the heights dominating a valley which it is desired to block appear to have been overlooked by them, though fully realized by the French.

The French Advance Continued.—On the following days the 13th Division (less the Donon detachment and the 17th Infantry Regiment) advanced slowly down the Bruche valley, whilst the 43rd Division refused the flank on the right. Farther south the XIV Corps continued to hold the passes. Schirmeck was occupied on the 16th of August and the French line that evening ran astride the Bruche from Russ to the high ground just west of Wisches, with the Germans facing them on the line Schwartzbach—Wisches. No advance was made on the 17th of August.

The XXI Corps was now ordered to close to the left, and, on the night of the 17th–18th of August, the 43rd Division and the corps troops marched across the rear of the 13th Division via the Col du Donon. The XIV Corps extended its left to join up with the 13th Division, and the 17th Infantry Regiment was brought up from the Col du Hantz to rejoin its division. On the 18th of August the 13th Division came under the command of the XIV Corps.

Events of the 18th of August.—The 13th Division (less the Donon detachment) * advanced again on the 18th of August as follows:

Right Flank Guard.—17th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion) moving well up in the hills on Grendelbruch and Schwartzbach.

Centre.—21st Infantry Regiment moving down the valley, but with its main strength on the lower hills south of the Bruche.

* This detachment now consisted of: H.Q. 25th Brigade two groups of artillery and five battalions of chasseurs; 17th, 20th and 21st Battalions belonging to the Brigade and 57th and 60th Battalions Corps Troops.

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Left Flank Guard.—109th Infantry Regiment, and one battalion of the 17th, moving along the hills north of the Bruche on Wisches and Lutzelhausen.

The left flank guard gained ground during the day, driving the Germans from the high ground west of Lutzelhausen whilst detachments succeeded in gaining the outskirts of the village. On the right, however, the 17th failed to capture Schwartzbach; a second attempt was made in which the battalion of the 17th on the left of the valley cooperated, but this attack was also unsuccessful. To the south, the XIV Corps was attacked by the German 30th (R) Division and forced back from Ville and Breitenbach on to Urbeis and Steige. During the evening the 109th was driven from Lutzelhausen, and it now became evident that fresh German troops were advancing. The situation of the right of the First Army on the evening of the 18th of August was as follows:

XIV Corps—
27th Division.—Bonhomme Pass—St. Croix—Urbeis—Steige.
28th Division.—Bellefosse—Waldersbach—Rothau.
13th Division.—High ground east of Russ—Wisches.
Donon detachment.—Kelberg—Petit Donon—Grosmann.
Corps Reserve.—115 (R) Brigade, Fraize. The 71st (R) Division was also behind the right of the Corps front, but was not at the disposal of the corps commander.

XXI Corps—
43rd Division.—Right at St. Leon, fourteen kilometres north of the Donon.

A detachment of the Army of Alsace had reached Munster. The XIV Corps was very much strung out and with practically no reserves, especially the 27th Division, which was holding four passes. The result of this premature dispersion will become evident later.

First Army orders for the 19th of August contained the following for the XIV Corps:

(1) Enemy counter-offensive imminent in the Bruche valley; (2) air reports timed 17.00 hours to-day indicate one battalion and one battery marching from Obersteigen on Sarrebourg. Several batteries parked Obersteigen. No movement seen on roads from Rhine valley to Obersteigen; (3) XIV Corps will concentrate in the Bruche valley. The 13th Division to advance on Obersteigen, leaving sufficient forces to hold the Donon and Grosmann; (4) the 71st Division to remain in the area Courcieux * and not to be employed far from Epinal. Detachments 27th Division in the passes of Bonhomme and St. Marie to be relieved by the 115th (R) Brigade.

* About ten kilometres west of Fraize.

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On receipt of these orders the corps commander ordered the 115th (R) Brigade to carry out the Bonhomme and St. Marie reliefs. He warned the 13th Division about the Obersteigen mission, but since an attack in the Bruche valley seemed imminent, and the Donon position was all important, he told the divisional commander not to take any action for the moment. He reported this to the First Army, and represented that it was essential for him to have a call on the 71st Division, which he requested should be moved up at once to the area Coinchies—Mandray. General Dubail agreed to this.

The First Army commander was now trying to get the XIV Corps more concentrated, but it must be admitted that the order for the retention of the 71st Division about Epinal was a half measure. It was also too late to order the blocking of the Obersteigen pass, particularly as the task was given to the 13th Division, which was already committed to the defence of the important Donon position. From a small-scale map, or when viewed from a distance, the ridge from the Donon to Obersteigen looks continuous and easy; in fact, it is some nineteen kilometres of most difficult roadless country, consisting of forest-clad and boulder-strewn slopes. The XXI Corps, having passed behind the 13th Division on the night of the 17th–18th of August, was surely in a position to undertake this task on the 18th. It is not clear why this course was not adopted.

The Events of the 19th of August.—On the morning of the 19th of August the Germans advanced from Lutzelhausen and Schwartzbach and drove the 26th Brigade of the 13th Division back to Schirmeck. At 11.45 hours, General Bourderiat, commanding the 13th Division, ordered this Brigade to evacuate Schirmeck and to retire to the Donon. The 60th Chasseurs, from the Donon detachment, took up a position at Grandfontaine astride the main road from Schirmeck to the Donon, and the 26th Brigade retired through them and concentrated in rear of the Platforme du Donon. The troops of this Brigade seem to have been tired and much disorganized; they had made the mistake during their retirement on Schirmeck of withdrawing entirely along the valley instead of the high ground. Their flank guards had faced the Germans on the hills above Russ and Wisches, but, when withdrawing, had come down into the valley instead of moving along the heights, the result being that the main body was unnecessarily exposed and heavy casualties were incurred.

Farther south, another hostile column debouched into the Bruche, took Rothau, advanced to the line Fouday—Waldersbach and captured the Champ du Feu. But a French counter-attack drove the enemy out of these two villages on to the high ground to

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the north of them, where they spent the night of the 19th–20th of August.

During the morning, the French 27th Division reported that its detachment at Steige was being heavily attacked. The corps commander immediately cancelled the move of the 115th (R) Brigade to Bonhomme and St. Marie and ordered the 27th Division to send up all available reserves to Urbeis. The detachment at Steige soon after reported that it had easily repulsed the attack, whereupon the corps commander decided to carry out his orders and concentrate in the Bruche valley. He therefore ordered the 115th (R) Brigade to reach the Saales area that night. Later, he sent another order for this Brigade to send one regiment to relieve the detachment of the 27th Division at Steige.* Whilst this relief was in progress, the pass was attacked by the Germans and the French were driven back on the hamlet of La Salcée, one and a half kilometres west of the pass. The final event of the 19th was the relief of four battalions of the 27th Division at the Bonhomme and St. Croix. The troops relieved were ordered to march to the Saales—Bourg Bruche area, involving a night march of thirty-four kilometres.

It has been seen that the Germans had succeeded in driving a wedge between the 13th Division and the rest of the XIV Corps in the Bruche, as a result of which they were in a position to protect the left flank and rear of the troops with which they proposed to attack the Donon. The French, strung out on a wide front, were unable to counter this move. Whilst it must be admitted that the XIV Corps had a difficult task to perform, it is evident that the command on this day was weak and vacillating. The action of this Corps is a good example of failure to observe the principle of economy of forces which Colonel Foch had so much emphasized in his teaching at the *École de Guerre*,† and to apply the doctrine laid down in our own regulations for forces in similar circumstances.‡ The best use of the available means of reconnaissance was not made; at least six cavalry squadrons were with the corps, but there is no mention of these troops either gaining information or delaying the advance of the German columns in the narrow valleys up which they advanced.

The General Situation up to the 19th of August.—It is now necessary to turn to the general situation. On the 16th of August, G.Q.G. had decided to make the principal attack with the Third and Fourth Armies through Luxembourg; in support of this, the

* The 115th (R) Brigade had three infantry regiments.
† *See* "The Principles of War," Chapter III.
‡ *See* Field Service Regulations, vol. ii, Section 90 (1).

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First and Second Armies were to carry out a secondary offensive between Metz and the Vosges, the latter Army giving up three divisions. The general advance was timed to take place on the 21st of August. The First and Second Armies advanced slowly, and by the 18th of August were in touch with the Germans along their whole front. During the 18th, General Dubail came to the conclusion that he was likely to be counter-attacked on the 19th, and, in order to improve the position on the Army front, ordered his left corps to advance across the river Sarre next morning. This attack failed, nevertheless Dubail decided to renew the attack in the early hours of the 20th of August.

Turning to the German side, we find that by the 16th of August Moltke had again changed his mind and decided to abandon the attempt to draw the French into the salient Metz—Sarrelouis—Phalsbourg—Vosges. The withdrawal was countermanded and the Sixth Army faced about and prepared for an early advance. Rupprecht's plan for the offensive was to hold the French by attacking with the Sixth Army towards the line Château Salins—Blamont, whilst the Seventh Army was to envelop their flank about Sarrebourg and through the Vosges. The Seventh Army, with a corps of the Sixth attached, was to concentrate in the Saverne gap, with strong detachments in the Bruche valley, whilst smaller detachments elsewhere in the Vosges were to advance so as to mislead the enemy. For the success of the enveloping movement it was necessary that the Seventh Army should be given time to advance through the passes; but as early as the 17th of August there were indications that the French were about to withdraw troops from the front of the Sixth Army. It was considered essential to prevent this, and Rupprecht therefore decided that the main attack should take place on the 20th of August. He hoped that the Vosges detachments, by advancing on the 18th of August, would prove a decisive factor by this date. On the night of the 17th–18th of August, Von Heeringen, commanding the Seventh Army, issued orders for the preliminary movements of his corps detailed for the envelopment as follows:

XV Corps.—To commence an advance early on the 18th of August from Romanswiller via the Obersteigen pass.

XIV (R) Corps (with 30th (R) Division and 19th *Ersatz* Division attached).—To advance on the 18th of August from the line Molsheim—Triembach. To cross the Bruche between Lutzelhausen and Fouday, and to intervene in the battle by advancing in a north-westerly direction over the Donon.

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In addition the Bavarian *Ersatz* Division was available in the Rhine valley to protect the left flank of the Army. The XIV (R) Corps commenced the advance early on the 18th, as follows :

28th (R) Division—up the Bruche valley.
26th (R) Division—via Grendelbruch.
30th (R) Division—up the Ville valley.
19th (E) Division—moved to Barr preparatory to advancing over the Hohwald.

On the 19th of August, the XV Corps debouched from the Obersteigen pass and gained touch with the XIV Corps on its right. Farther south, the XIV (R) Corps continued to advance in the Bruche and drove back the French, as has been described above. The Bavarian *Ersatz* Division, now placed under the orders of the XIV (R) Corps, arrived at Selestat. Thus, on the evening of the 19th of August, the French were preparing to resume their limited offensive whilst the Germans were about to launch an attack on a front of sixty miles.

It has been said that the success of Rupprecht's plan of envelopment depended on the advance of the XV and XIV (R) Corps. The French failure to hold the Obersteigen pass had facilitated the advance of these corps, but the Donon still remained to be captured before the envelopment could become decisive.

Events in the Bruche on the 20th of August.—First Army orders for the 20th of August contained the following for the XIV Corps :

(i) Bonhomme and St. Croix to be held at all costs ; (ii) Blocks to be re-established at Ville and Breitenbach, and the Champ du Feu reoccupied ; (iii) the Bruche valley to be blocked as far east as possible ; (iv) the Donon and Grosmann positions to be strengthened by field works.

By 23.00 hours on the 19th, XIV Corps had issued a long and complicated order for the concentration of the 27th Division, an attack at sunrise on the Champ du Feu, and a counter-attack astride the Bruche to regain Schirmeck.

The concentration of the 27th Division by the time ordered was impossible, as some units had to march thirty-four kilometres during the night; it was, however, completed at 12.30 hours—four hours late. Although the troops were very tired, the 27th Division moved forward, and by 14.30 hours the 27th and 28th Divisions, less some small detachments, were formed up on the line Bellefosse—Fouday—Plaine. In the meantime, the isolated attack on the Champ du Feu had failed with heavy loss. In the absence of any coordination by the XIV Corps, after the initial timings had proved impossible, the

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two divisional commanders, realizing the importance of taking the ground lost in the Bruche valley and regaining touch with the 13th Division, arranged the time of counter-attack between themselves. The attack was launched at 15.00 hours, partial success being gained at first, but the Germans, who were also advancing in the Bruche valley and via the Hohwald, stopped the attack on the line Waldersbach—Bambois. Considering the great difficulties, the exhaustion of the troops—partly due to bad orders—and the lack of coordination by the XIV Corps, it is a great tribute to Generals Baret and Putz that their divisions were able to form up or attack at all.

The Defence of the Donon.—On the 20th of August the Donon position was held by five chasseur battalions, four deployed on the line Donon—Kelberg—Petit Donon, with detachments on Le Noll and Grosmann ; the other battalion was holding a position astride the main road at Grandfontaine. The 17th Infantry Regiment held the Platforme, in the neighbourhood of which most of the artillery of the division was in position. The 26th Infantry Brigade was reorganizing and resting on the slopes west of the Platforme, but had one battalion on a feature known as Tête Mathis, just south of the Platforme.

The main road from the Bruche valley at Schirmeck to the Col du Donon winds up a narrow valley among tree-clad slopes in which the only clearing of any size was at Grandfontaine, where a valley branches off to the south. There is another clearing at the Platforme itself, north of which the highest slopes of the Donon rise abruptly. One road branches off at the Platforme and runs down the River Plaine valley to Raon L'Etape, whilst the main road continues round the western shoulders of the Donon before it forks to descend into the Blanc Rupt and St. Quirin valleys, leading to Blamont and Sarrebourg respectively. From both Wisches and Hersbach in the Bruche, a valley with a track runs up to the lower slopes of the Donon ; seen from the Petit Donon or Kelberg, these valleys appear to be a sea of trees. The slopes of the Donon and Petit Donon are very steep, strewn with large boulders and covered with tall pines, whilst parts of the Kelberg are impracticable to infantry in any formation owing to the slopes and to thickets of young fir trees.

The commander of the German XIV (R) Corps decided to attack the Donon from the north-east and south with the 28th (R) Division, keeping part of the 26th (R) Division in reserve on the high ground south-east of Schirmeck. The remainder of this Division was in touch with the French north of Fouday—Waldersbach and was to

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gain those villages during the day. The 28th (R) Division formed up on either side of Schirmeck, and the artillery, including some medium guns from Strasbourg, was with great difficulty got into action about Wisches and on the plateau of Freconrupt. At 13.00 hours on the 20th of August the artillery opened fire on suspected French positions on the Donon and the heights to the north-east. The right group of the division, consisting of the 40th, 110th and 111th (R) Infantry Regiments, advanced from a line north-west of Wisches—Hersbach at 15.00 hours; about the same time the left group, consisting of the 109th (R) Infantry Regiment, attacked Grandfontaine. It was soon found that the coordinated control of formations was impossible and that the artillery could not render effective support.* In spite of these difficulties and of the great heat the foot of Kelberg and the lower slopes of the Petit Donon were reached by 18.00 hours. Soon after this the right group advanced to the assault up the almost vertical slopes and by 22.00 hours succeeded in taking the Petit Donon and Kelberg, but the corps reserve, a brigade of the 26th (R) Division, had to be put into the fight before this was achieved. The left group did not cooperate, having failed to drive the 60th Chasseurs from Grandfontaine and the surrounding clearings. Thus the attack, on which so much depended, had definitely failed. Reorganization was found most difficult and in the confusion and darkness the Germans evacuated the Petit Donon and Kelberg.†

The French position was intact, except that during the evening some of the isolated detachments on the hills north-east of the Donon, apparently fearing envelopment, retired to the Donon. The 17th Infantry Regiment had not been in action, and the attack of eighteen battalions had been stopped by five chasseur battalions. But there was no counter-attack and the withdrawal of the detachments on the left was a serious error which should have been rectified as soon as possible.

Comments.—The German failure to take the Donon may be put down to five main reasons:

(i) Physical exhaustion due to the steep slopes and the heat; (ii) loss of direction due to the tall trees; (iii) lack of artillery support at the decisive time, due to lack of observation. The artillery at Freconrupt could only see the Platforme and the south sides of the Petit Donon and Kelberg; (iv) the extreme difficulty of inter-communication and cooperation between units in this type of country; (v) the skill with which certain

* The XIV (R) Corps had no howitzers.

† One is reminded of the confusion and skulking in the woods said to have existed during the battles of Woerth and Spicheren in August, 1870.

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French units conducted the defence; and (vi) faulty tactics. It is considered that the Germans should have made more use of infiltration. The defenders had a very restricted view and the shape of the hills is convex, so that the attacking troops could pass between the densely wooded hill features and not be seen. Advantage was not taken of the retirement of the detachments from the hills north-east of the Donon or of the isolated position of the 60th Chasseurs. The latter had the best field of fire in the whole position, but had the attackers made skilful use of ground, they could have surrounded them and probably infiltrated into the position about the Platforme. The inference is that skill and training rather than weight of numbers are the decisive factors in such country.

General Situation on the 20th of August.—Elsewhere, except in the Bruche, the German attack had been successful; especially was this the case on their right flank, where the French Second Army had been driven back with heavy loss. In the Upper Bruche and farther south the Germans were not so successful. The advanced guard of the 19th *Ersatz* Division which was moving over the Hohwald became involved in the French counter-attacks about Bellefosse. Owing to this fact, and to a rumour that the XIV (R) Corps was about to withdraw on Strasbourg, the divisional commander considered his formation to be in grave danger and decided to fall back. By noon next day the division, less stragglers and lost units, was back at Barr. The 30th (R) Division, however, succeeded in reaching the line Ranrupt—Weinberg during the day, whilst, farther south, the advanced guard of the Bavarian *Ersatz* Division reached the outskirts of St. Croix.

On the evening of the 20th of August, General Dubail ordered the First Army to stand and fight, but during the night was compelled to order a retreat to the river Vezouse because of the situation on his left. It was essential that the right flank should be secure or nothing short of disaster would result. The orders to XIV Corps were:

(i) The Donon position to be held at all costs. In the event of loss the head of the River Plaine valley to be held and touch kept with the 43rd Division XXI Corps; (ii) on the rest of the Corps front the present line to be held. In the event of loss the Corps will occupy the line Bonhomme—St. Marie—Urbeis—Climont—Champ du Feu—Rothau—head of the Rabodeau valley.

But the XIV Corps had already moved back and had ordered the following line to be consolidated:

28th Division.—Climont—Stampoumont—St. Blaise.
27th Division.—To block the passes of Col du Hantz and Prayee, with outposts on the line Plaine—Salm.

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The Stampoumont was lost early on the morning of the 21st, otherwise the positions as ordered by the Corps were held during the day. Farther south the 71st (R) Division held the passes of Bonhomme and St. Marie.

The Defence of the Donon.—On the morning of the 21st of August the 13th Division prepared to counter-attack for Freconrupt and the Petit Donon and the artillery preparation was commenced. Later, the counter-attacks were cancelled owing, it is said, to the French guns being neutralized by the German artillery. One company of chasseurs, however, not receiving the counter-order, occupied the Petit Donon and was practically destroyed by its own artillery. There does not seem to have been much efficient patrolling during the night.

On the German side, XIV (R) Corps orders for the 21st were as follows:

28th (R) Division.—To take the Donon and then move along the road to Raon sur Plaine.
26th (R) Division.—Objective Fouday—St. Blaise.
19th (E) Division.—To cooperate with 26th (R) Division.
30th (R) Division.—To advance in the general direction of Saulxures.

At 05.00 hours the attack of the 28th (R) Division commenced, but soon became disjointed in the thick woods; moreover, the attackers seem to have run into the French artillery preparation on the Petit Donon and suffered heavy casualties. By 11.00 hours, however, they had taken the Grosmann and Petit Donon and had driven the French back to the lower slopes of the Donon itself. Here the attack stopped; the whole corps was deployed on a wide front with no reserves. The left group again failed to take Grandfontaine, and farther south, except at the Stampoumont, no progress was made.

Comments.—The Germans had not succeeded in concentrating sufficient force at the vital point—the Donon. Although they had eighteen battalions against fourteen French, of which only five or six had been in action, their superiority does not appear to have been sufficient to compensate for the difficulties of the country and their lack of skill and training for such warfare.* The result was that the Germans were brought to a standstill, and though they were aware that the success of the battle depended on the advance in this area, failed to carry it through. The German Official Account says—"the enemy resistance in front of the XIV (R) Corps was stronger

* *See* F.S.R., vol. ii, Section 23 (1), last sentence.

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than the will power of the German leaders and equal to all the efforts of the brave troops." *

The Evacuation of the Donon.—Turning to the French 13th Division, we find similar influences at work. At 11.30 hours, the divisional commander, realizing that his forward troops had abandoned part of the position, which was now in danger of being turned from the north, issued an order for a retreat to the Plaine valley. It appears that at this time the Division, possibly as a result of the cancelled counter-attack, was very much mixed up and congested behind the Donon. The real reason for the decision to evacuate the Donon at this juncture is not apparent, nor does what we know of the situation seem to justify it. The state of the bulk of the 13th Division, the failure to hold the positions on the ridge north-east of the Donon, and the effect of the general situation on the moral of the commanders may have been contributory causes. Two reasons have been advanced: †

(i) The need to keep touch with the retreat of the remainder of the First Army; and (ii) the evacuation by the troops of part of the position, which led the divisional commander to confirm the move by an order making (i) his aim.

The brigades retired slowly on either side of the Plaine valley and by nightfall had reached Raon les Leau and Raon sur Plaine. A rearguard was left to hold the Donon position until after dark, when it withdrew without difficulty. The Germans made no attempt to advance during the afternoon, consequently neither side held the Donon during the night of the 21st–22nd of August. Had the Germans been more enterprising the result might have been most serious, as the right of the main body of the French First Army would not reach the river Vezouse until that evening and, moreover, General Dubail was proposing to make a stand on this line during the 22nd. Actually, owing to the situation on the left, the Army withdrew farther, and, by the evening of the 22nd, was back with its right flank on Badonviller.

Events of the 22nd of August.—During the night of the 21st–22nd of August the 71st (R) Division lost the St. Marie pass. During the 22nd, the pass was regained; otherwise the XIV Corps stood fast, whilst the 13th Division withdrew slowly down the Plaine valley. The Germans appear to have had considerable administrative

* *See Der Weltkreig, Erster Band*, p. 288; also F.S.R., vol. ii, Section 11 (4).
† *See Etapes de Guerre d'une Division d'Infantrie 13e Division*, by Colonel Laure, p. 13.

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trouble on this day which, considering the nature of the country, is not to be wondered at. Nevertheless, the 28th (R) Division occupied the Donon after a bombardment, which must have caused the 13th Division some amusement, and about mid-day began to advance into the Plaine valley. The 13th Division had gained forty-eight hours by its defence of the Donon, largely owing to the splendid resistance put up by the chasseurs, especially the 60th Battalion.

The Retirement of the 13th Division.—Retirements in these valleys present the same main features experienced in our campaigns on the North-West Frontier, only on a different scale. That is to say, owing to the presence of artillery, bounds are bigger, whilst the flank guards on the hills must retain their positions longer and retreat along the crests. The method employed by the 13th Division for the retirement is of considerable interest. The 109th Infantry Regiment was ordered to leave one battalion at Raon sur Plaine, whilst the remainder of the regiment made a block across the valley at Luvigny supported by one group of artillery. The 17th Infantry Regiment left one battalion at Vexaincourt, whilst the remainder, supported by two groups of artillery, made a second block at Allarmont. The 21st Infantry Regiment made a third block at Celles, where divisional headquarters were established. At each block the neighbourhood of the village was lightly held and strengthened, the bulk of the troops holding the heights on either side of the valley. The flank guards retired along the hills after each village was evacuated and the whole detachment retired through the next block, which was by then already occupied. In addition, the 20th and 21st Chasseurs were sent to La Chapelotte and gained touch with the 43rd Division, the 57th and 60th Chasseurs moved out to Noir Brochard and gained touch with the 27th Division.

The Germans made determined attempts to advance down the valley during the afternoon of the 22nd, but were successfully delayed. The 17th Infantry Regiment held the Allarmont block during the night of the 22nd–23rd of August, by which time the right of the main body of the Army had reached Badonviller. It is noticeable that the divisional commander took successful steps to establish liaison with formations on his flanks to ensure an intact front, although the XIV Corps had once more failed to coordinate.

Conclusion.—No attempt has been made in this article to suggest, in the light of present knowledge, what either side ought to have done to achieve success, though some comments on the action taken in various circumstances have been made. The combat of Plaine, a good example of the right and wrong way of conducting an advanced

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guard attack, has been considered in detail, as have certain aspects of hill and wood fighting. The actions in the Vosges bring out very clearly the value of well-trained infantry under modern conditions in a type of country by no means uncommon on the Franco-German frontiers. In commenting on the failure of the Seventh Army on the 20th of August the German Official Account supports this statement with the following remarks :

" In the limitless forest areas, in which there was no field of view and where the influence of the leaders ceased to exist, the struggle finally became a matter of one man against another. . . . French skirmishers, cleverly concealed in numerous small groups in the ravines and on the slopes, were able to meet the Germans who were groping their way forward from tree to tree, with a devastating fire from front and flank, and often from the rear." *

Any one who has seen the Donon position, and particularly the area held by the 60th Chasseurs about Grandfontaine, will agree with the German estimate of their difficulties, but it must be remembered that such country is not all plain sailing for the defenders. Had the Germans been able to employ a proportion of specially trained and equipped troops, the result might have been very different. It is noteworthy that in the present-day German Army certain detachments are especially trained and equipped for mountain warfare.

These forest and mountainous areas may in future become known as " infantry country," for in them mechanical devices lose much of their power. Even in operations with forces as organized to-day there will possibly be a tendency for the bulk of the infantry to make use of difficult or enclosed country whenever available. If infantry tends more and more to fight in difficult areas where mechanical devices are at a disadvantage, success will depend on training and moral. Mere " barrage followers " are of little value in such fighting ; highly trained " skirmishers," to use an old-fashioned expression, skilled in the use of the rifle and bayonet will have an immense advantage over half-trained troops, and be a priceless asset to a commander seeking to apply the principle of economy of force.

It is said that history always repeats itself. On the Western Front, during a period of the last war, the rifle was largely forsaken for the bomb with disastrous results. In these days much importance is attached to machine guns ; let us maintain a sense of proportion and not lose sight of the necessity for skill with rifle and bayonet and in " skirmishing."

* *See Der Weltkrieg, Erster Band*, p. 279.

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AMBITION IN THE SOLDIER

By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Beadon, C.B.E., R.A.S.C.

Most in their schooldays have been called upon to write essays on the subject of "Ambition," while discussions as to whether it constituted a vice or a virtue form a favourite theme for debating societies. Even in its generalities, the topic is no unfruitful one, opening up, as it does, avenues of thought leading to questions of morality that are susceptible of no dogmatic solution. It is only the very simple, or, more accurately, the very fortunate, who under all and any circumstances can determine what is right and justifiable. Were it otherwise existence would cease to be the complex affair that it is.

Like many other abstract problems, the morality of ambition cannot be answered in any comprehensive manner, but can only be resolved in accordance with the particular case. That aspect which bears on the profession of arms is one that gives rise to no little confusion of thought. It would seem, therefore, not without purpose to present some considerations on the subject, which is necessarily of importance, underlying as it does the whole conception of the soldier's duty and service. With the certain definite conclusions that have been reached there must be room for a large measure of disagreement, for every rule of life or conduct admits of varied interpretations. Yet, to examine and to define grounds of faith is at no time a purely sterile occupation, and is the more useful when there is the likelihood of misapplication of principles.

The fact that the soldier's is above all a practical profession in no way absolves him from the necessity to sit down and consider at times the why and the wherefore of its moral factors. The material side normally receives ample attention.

That ambition is for the generality of mankind the most potent of all driving forces is evident. The desires for fame, power or wealth are not, perhaps, the only spurs to effort, but they are certainly the most common. Love of humanity and love of country have

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inspired great saints and great patriots, to whom may be attributed an entire abnegation of self. But such mortals are rare. It is mankind with all its mixtures of weakness and strength, cowardice and courage, selfishness and sacrifice, that forms the overwhelming proportion of humanity. And it is the welding of such material on one common anvil of purpose that is the cardinal and vital necessity for the organism that is an army, wherein the cooperation and not the competition of its individual members must be the paramount principle.

Since ambition is normally the desire for personal advancement, and since personal advancement must almost of necessity be at the expense of others, the motives underlying such desire are directly antagonistic to a common purpose and aim, or, in other words, are directly antagonistic to discipline—the agency through which unified effort is obtained.

And it is well proven that under the heaviest strain to which humanity can be subjected that lies in the fear of mutilation or death, discipline is the surest anchor. If, then, organized subordination of self is the foundation of all military virtue, how can there be room for the seekers of power and place? Carried to its logical conclusion this argument might appear to render the emergence of leaders impossible, since contentment to service would wholly dominate the desire to lead. But no argument on human morals will admit of being carried to its logical conclusion, for it would then far outstrip what is practicable or possible for mankind to attain. There can only be set what must be indefinitely termed "reasonable limits" which must vary according to the circumstances of each case. It will be attempted here to define what these "reasonable limits" are, and that by no nebulous theorizing but by the more practical method of the appeal to history—man's experience of man.

It is common knowledge that the methods of warfare introduced by Napoleon revolutionized the military art. But it was not only the military art upon which the French Emperor left his mark. It was also upon the whole conception of the soldier's profession. Himself the super-adventurer, so far as his own personal distinction and power were concerned, he encouraged a host of similar ambitions in those who surrounded him. Where every private "carried the baton in his haversack" every private might aspire to become duke, prince or king. The military career was no mere dedication to the honour and vital interests of the State but a feverish aspiring to "glory" and conquest, and flamboyant incitements to such ends

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were considered the normal and appropriate means of creating and maintaining the *morale* of the Imperial armies.

That a genius such as Napoleon's was unable to perceive where the welfare of France lay is beyond all reasonable doubt—the success of his efforts when directed into the channels of peace suffices to show it.

But it was as though some fearsome disease would never allow him to repose. The results of his conquests were purely ephemeral and did not even survive his own day. They left France exhausted and wasted to an extent that a century scarcely served to repair. It was at too high a price that he " glorified " her history. In spite of the stir and tumult he made in his life, the enduring traces of his warlike activities are negligible even one hundred years after his death. For no deep moral forces or purposes underlay them.

In his " War and Peace " Tolstoy purports to give a comprehensive *exposé* of the Napoleonic mentality, and though few will be able to subscribe to the opinions that are given as to his military competency, the weaknesses are laid bare with all the great Russian writer's sincerity and power.

Something of these considerations must have been in the mind of Wellington when he closed a discussion on Napoleon with these words, " After all, the fellow was never a gentleman."

Such an assertion is no unjust epitaph, for it denies nothing of the genius that was the Emperor's.

It would seem, then, that in the cult of the great soldier lies serious germs of danger for all soldiers. It is impossible to dissociate a man's work from the motives that inspired it or the aims towards which it was directed. While we may admire the brilliant strategical processes that resulted in the destruction of the Prussian Army at Jena or the swift decision that seized the village of Austerlitz, one may equally deplore the unsoldierly abandonment of the retreating Army at Smolensk or the frequent childish inability to estimate the enemy at his true worth.

The intention of the present writer is rather to emphasize that Napoleon's career is not, as is often assumed, an inspiring or fruitful one for the soldier because it exemplifies, beyond that of all other leaders, the weakness and vice of personal ambition and the consequent sterility of the work accomplished. Yet the instance of Napoleon has been dwelt upon not only because it furnished the supreme example of unbridled personal ambition in the soldier, but because of the standard set by such outlook and conduct which is false and immoral when applied to a calling in which service and

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sacrifice should be the leading influences. It was only in a somewhat exaggerated form that Ruskin defines this last idea when he wrote that " the soldier's profession was to die."

It may be argued with some show of logic that the devotion and confidence inspired by Napoleon in his Armies constituted in themselves a high expression of the soldier's duty. But can it be supposed that the incentives that lay behind campaigns to pillage the Italian plains or to foist the brothers or favourites of the Emperor on alien thrones were on the same moral plane as the sentiments that inspired the Armies of Gustavus Adolphus or of Cromwell or of Washington ? Napoleon in sooth played on the vanities and weaknesses of the human nature, using them with a remarkable dexterity. " It is wonderful what men will do to gain a piece of ribbon."

The appeal made by other and, within their own sphere, equally successful commanders, has been of quite another nature. It was not the personal hold of Gustavus Adolphus over his troops, great as it was, that brought them in triumph from Sweden to the banks of the Rhine, but the spirit of a crusade in a noble cause. It was not the personal characteristics or aims of the Parliamentarian leaders, not even excepting Cromwell, that made their Armies so formidable, but rather the belief that they were defending the liberties of England.

The motives and character of the leader are as in the course of nature bound to influence those whom they lead. A high conception of soldierly duty and honour permeates the whole military hierarchy when the leader notoriously stands for no selfish aim or personal aggrandizement. Nor is it easy to hide such motives when they exist. For mass opinion has a very unerring instinct in the matter.

The present age has no congenial atmosphere for the development of the military virtues. In the first place because of the exaltation of individualism and in the second owing to the growth of materialism—two directly hostile factors to cooperation and efficiency for its own sake. It is the fashion to say hard things about the German Army, especially since its overthrow, but no opinion can deny its formidable character. And among the chief contributing factors were a discipline that left little room for individual opinions or the competitive spirit, while, as regards the consecration of its members to the service of the State, it was probably the least materialistic element in the German Empire.

To meet modern tendencies, a system of military rewards has been designed far beyond anything of the nature that was known in the past. These are justified by the alleged necessity to stimulate ambition, and the curious statement is sometimes offered that an

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army will work and fight the better for them—which under the circumstances is a very poor compliment to our ancestors who fought under Marlborough and Wellington.

The profession of arms is an honourable one in that it serves the nation without offering more than the most modest of pecuniary recompense. No man ambitious for wealth would choose the soldier's calling. Soldiers are normally subject to discomforts, risks and sacrifices out of all proportion to any material gain accruing to them. Were it otherwise a wholly new professional standard would be set up and would inevitably lead to a definite lowering of the status. Any such lowering would re-act to undermine the moral forces that are the first condition for the strength of an army and without which it must wither away.

The seeker after wealth having been, then, eliminated as aspiring to a military career, there remains the position of those who desire fame or power, for which men are often prepared to pay a high price in respect of other good things of the world. This is best examined in the light of the soldier's duty. For the rank and file that duty lies in making themselves efficient in order to be able to cooperate with their comrades in a common response to the commands of their leaders. For the officers the same holds good, but there is the additional and more responsible burden that lies in the acquisition of the superior knowledge, the judgment and the character which will enable them to impress themselves on the men and thus to impart confidence in their training and leadership.

No elaboration of these very general definitions is required to indicate why " ambition " as ordinarily understood is incompatible with these duties. Where the goal to be attained, whether in company, battalion, brigade or division, or in any higher formation whatever, can only be attained through unified effort, individuality must content itself with a minor and limited sphere. The outlook must, in fact, be in the nature of that which has been so happily expressed as " each for all and all for each." Fundamental to the achievement of this is the military rule of obedience—the subordination of the will to superior authority under all and any circumstances—which cannot commend itself to the spirit of ambition.

At this stage of the argument it may be well to meet the contention that the attitude described leaves no room for imagination or independence of thought; and that the gates are, therefore, opened wide for routine or even apathy to prevail. And were the argument indeed pushed to its logical conclusion the contention would have to be admitted. But, as in most worldly affairs, the

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workable way lies in some compromise between conflicting demands and then adjustment in accordance with each situation.

How far such compromise should be permitted in this instance requires some elucidation.

It is evident that some originality, enterprise and initiative are valuable qualities and cannot summarily be dismissed as hostile to discipline. Their value, however, may be assessed in proportion to rank in the military hierarchy.

It is obviously more important for the supreme commander to be endowed with capacity to give full play to them than it would be for an officer of comparatively junior rank.

At the same time, should a soldier rise to high command without possessing them, it will then be too late to acquire them. It may, therefore, be asserted that the cultivation and fostering of these desirable attributes should be a continuous process, widening and extending to deal with greater needs and opportunities as they may arise. It is wise to keep a well-balanced sense of proportion in the matter. At the bottom rung of the ladder obedience, tempered with intelligent interpretation of orders, comprehends the major part of the military duty, and enables the individual efficiently to fulfil his rôle. The higher the ladder is mounted the less is this emphasized, since there are fewer to obey and more to lead and no leader can perform his functions as such without capacity to originate and to inspire.

The duty of the soldier, therefore, comprehends to a greater or less degree the exertion of the mental powers.

A mere herd instinct far from suffices. But for the individual to make full use of all his faculties by no means implies that he should employ them to his own personal advantage, nor can the cynical view, that such advantage can alone provide the necessary stimulus, be admitted. If it were, then valiant and self-sacrificing deeds, with which the history, not only of war but of all life, abounds, would go far to have their merits discounted. It is as a contribution to the welfare of the whole that the individual should strive to develop and to use his gifts, and no man who considers what he can get rather than what he can give, has any right to aspire to the public service and, above all, that portion of the public service which must necessarily demand the greatest sacrifices—that is the Army.

Some indications have been attempted above as to the sterility of military accomplishments dictated merely by personal ambition. A few examples may now be usefully cited of soldiers actuated by

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public and not private motives whose work has blossomed and borne fruit a thousandfold.

In 1861 Robert Edward Lee was admittedly among the leading soldiers in the Army of the United States. Throughout his career he had certainly striven with all his powers to make himself efficient, and it was then no mere haphazard choice that indicated him as the potential leader against the seceding States.

He preferred to uphold the cause of the Confederacy because he deemed it just, and the example he then gave, and his subsequent conduct, went far towards the ultimate reconciliation of North and South. For to-day his name is honoured by all Americans.

The character of Charles Gordon has been subject to divers interpretations, but his voluntary sacrifice at Khartoum was among the chief determining factors that freed the Soudan from slavery and barbarism.

Farther back in history there is the shining example of William the Silent, who abandoned his great and assured position and possessions to embrace the desperate cause of the Netherlands.

The examples of these, and of countless others, serve as a wholesome contradiction to the superficial new view often expressed that the hope of material rewards is essential if men are to exert themselves beyond their duties. Such a doctrine is untenable as far as the profession of arms is concerned and should in no circumstances be permitted to receive encouragement.

The truth of this assertion is not to be determined by the more obvious and outstanding examples afforded by history, but rather by the unnumbered multitude whose deeds will never be known, except by the sum total of their achievements. The English term "soldiers' battles" is in this sense a happy one since it throws into its true perspective the collective as opposed to the individual accomplishment. And in all the long history of England, with its almost continuous record of military success, but few soldiers of outstanding genius have been produced—certainly few who are recognized outside their own country. This fact, which is made a sort of reproach, is in reality high eulogy, for it implies that our country owes her conquests and her place in the world more to the character and effort of the average man than to individual genius. The Napoleonic dictum regarding "the army of lions led by a stag" can never be accepted without qualifications.

In the light of the experiences that have been adduced above, certain conclusions have been reached. Commonplaces are to an extent inevitable in dealing with a subject of this nature, but the

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justification of their repetition is sought in the fact that they are apt to be overlaid by modern conditions and tendencies. And an army as part of the modern world cannot remain untouched by the movements and mentalities surrounding it.

Of these movements and mentalities it is the competitive spirit in the individual that is most to be deprecated.

" Business methods," lauded to the skies as a model for soldiers by the amateur and superficial mind during the late war, cannot be too strongly condemned within the sphere of the Army in so far as the impulses and motives underlying them are concerned. It may be good and legitimate " business " for one firm to cut the throat of the other engaged in similar enterprise, while it is quite a laudable ambition for what is loosely known as a professional man to push himself at the expense of his fellows. But for a soldier to adopt such an attitude *vis-à-vis* his comrades is opposed to all the interests of the State. For it means the introduction of disruptive elements where cohesive elements are above all essential. He who has before his eyes beyond all else the advancement of his own " military career " may truly enough accomplish work that is definitely in the interests of the public service, but the merits of such work are discounted by the fact that it is almost necessarily in the nature of an isolated incident. It lacks the durability and consistency of collective effort, and is without the " team spirit." It is, too, an undoubted fact that individual effort needs almost invariably to be fed by recognition and reward or else it is liable to flag and to exhaust itself. It is only in the exceptional case that selfish aims can be pursued patiently, inexorably and valiantly in the face of discouragement.

No army should be the congenial soil for the " climber," the *carrieriste*, or the place hunter, any more than it should be for noisy, self-advertising and pushing individuals who seek the limelight. Such aspirations may reap their reward elsewhere, but there is one place in which they should never reap any reward and that is in the profession of arms.

Ambition as a means to personal advancement, therefore, should be uncompromisingly condemned in the soldier.

Yet there is ambition of another kind that is worthy and justifiable. It is that which lies in the desire to develop the faculties to their fullest extent in order that the individual may bring to bear all the best that is in him to the task appointed : an ambition that neither comrades nor subordinates nor superiors shall suffer from his idleness and ignorance. Nor do such aspirations limit the existence of

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the individual to that of a mere automaton, for they leave ample scope for the exercise of all the natural powers. And it is moreover contended that they would furnish a far surer foundation for the real art of leadership which a true mental and physical discipline has never failed to produce.

The personally ambitious man is essentially undisciplined because he is selfish, and occasions are rare when pure genius can make good the lack of sense of discipline in a commander.

In a state of society in which the arrogant too often push aside the humble, the vulgar overcome the refined, and the ignorant the erudite, qualities of self-assertion and egoism are frequently misnamed " push and go " and " personality " and are consequently lauded as such. A great philosopher of these days has written that it has not been the clamour of those in the public eye, but the thoughts and work of those in obscurity, which have changed the face of the world.

The idea may well be applied to the forces which make and keep the Army efficient and formidable.

An idealism in the profession of arms such as that expounded by Ruskin in the " Crown of Wild Olive " is a far surer and safer guide to conduct than any hopes or lures of " glittering prizes " for those who can outstrip their comrades by the false standard set by worldly values.

It may be contended that to attain to such idealism is too high for all but the few. So far as the fullness of perfection is concerned that contention may be admitted, but to rule it out as impracticable is to run counter to the influences and forces that above all others have contributed to make armies and nations great.

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THE FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SALONIKA CAMPAIGN *

I

In the first volume of their narrative of the campaigns in the Near East the Historical Section of the French General Staff takes the operations based on Salonika as far as August, 1916: that is to say, up to the moment when Rumania was about to enter the field on the side of the Allies. As is usual in the French official histories of the Great War, the text is supported by an exhaustive range of documents: here some four hundred pages of narrative are reinforced by two large volumes of "Annexes." There are forty-six maps and three panoramic views.

The fortunes and misfortunes of Serbia in 1914, her subsequent attitude when called upon to cooperate with the Russians and then with the Italians, and the difficulties of her situation in 1915 are lucidly and impartially described in the opening chapter. After the repulse of the first Austro-Hungarian invasion the Serbs, in spite of their success, found themselves in a far from enviable position, with greatly reduced effectives, an epidemic of typhus, and a great shortage of rifles, guns, and ammunition. France sent what war material she could spare, some medical aid, an air squadron, and a naval detachment with heavy guns to assist in the defence of Belgrade. Serbia, having lost contact with the enemy at the beginning of the winter of 1914–1915, remained on the defensive; she made no effort to respond to the Russian call for cooperation in April, 1915, or to that of the Italians in the following month, although the latter is regarded by the French as not unreasonable. In truth the Serbs were uneasy as to the attitude of their Balkan neighbours and distrustful of the Balkan policy of the Entente.

* See *Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome viii. La Campagne d'Orient—Dardanelles et Salonique.* Vol. I. Paris, *Imprimerie Nationale.* Published 1928 but dated 1923. The Dardanelles portion of this volume was the subject of an article in the *Army Quarterly* of January, 1929.

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This was well understood by General Joffre, and, in a letter to the French Minister of War dated the 27th of June, he urged that diplomatic action should be taken to reassure Serbia. He was anxious to coordinate the efforts of all the Allies, but, as we know, the conference at Chantilly on the 7th of July effected little. Of the attitude of Serbia at this time it is said : " *L'avenir était sombre pour la Serbie C'est pourquoi elle semblait oublier momentanément la cause commune et voulait garder son armée intacte, prête à servir ses propres intérêts.*"

And thus is introduced the menace of Bulgaria in the early days of September, 1915. Serbia was under no illusions as to the intention of her old antagonist, and the mobilization of Bulgaria at length forced the Allies to consider anew the question of active intervention in the Balkans. It is affirmed that Sir Edward Grey's speech which proclaimed Great Britain's sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of all the Balkan states jeopardized the delicate negotiations in progress at the end of September for the disembarkation of Allied troops upon the neutral soil of Greece.

As regards the rôle of the Franco-British force which it was proposed to send to Serbia's assistance divergence of views existed between General Sarrail, nominated to command the *Armée d'Orient*, and General Joffre. The former aimed at the complete overthrow of Bulgaria, to be followed either by the invasion of Hungary or an advance on Constantinople, and he calculated that he would require three French corps and 30,000 British troops. The latter, holding as always that the Western front was the decisive theatre, reported on the 3rd of October that such success as he had achieved in the Champagne battle was an assurance of ultimate victory. But he could only spare a limited number of troops from France : Great Britain, with her large reserves of men and material, should bear the major part in the new campaign ; and he suggested that a maximum of two French divisions taken from the Western front, combined with the French troops from Gallipoli, would serve to represent France in the Balkans. The Allied troops sent to that theatre should attempt no more than the occupation of Salonika, the safeguarding of the Salonika–Uskub railway, and the prevention of enemy access to southern Serbia. Such action would in itself constitute a threat to Sofia. Joffre estimated that 150,000 men would suffice and suggested that the Gallipoli forces—British and French—should supply as many of these as possible, for the Dardanelles operations would have to be abandoned.

But the evacuation of the Peninsula had yet to be decided

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upon by the British Government. Meanwhile Bailloud's division from Gallipoli together with Joffre's contribution amounted to 64,000 men. Details concerning the British contingent were settled at the conference at Calais on the 5th of October—the day before the Austro-Germans crossed the Danube and the Save—and at Chantilly three days later when Joffre consented to the withdrawal of seasoned British divisions from France on condition that they were replaced by new formations from England. It was then agreed, apparently, that the British and French commands should be independent, and each should receive the directives of the Serbian General Staff.

The negotiations, conferences, and decisions which eventually resulted in the despatch of the promised British contingent are given in detail. After the resignation of M. Venizelos on the 7th of October there was no hope that Greece would depart from her neutral attitude. The newly constituted War Committee of the British Cabinet were disposed to re-examine the Salonika project after the Bulgarians, on the 22nd of October, had occupied Uskub and cut off the Serbian army from Salonika. As the result of the Bulgarian and Austro-German successes an altered and still more urgent problem was presented, but to official French eyes the attitude of the British General Staff appears to have been obstructive in the extreme. "*En réalité l'expédition rencontrait, chez toutes les autorités militaires britanniques, une opposition que les premières nouvelles venues de Serbie ne firent qu'aggraver.*" This view is almost identical with those of other French writers: no attempt is made to understand the weighty considerations which made us reluctant to embark upon a big Balkan adventure. One can only hope that a British official history of the Salonika expedition will eventually present our side of the picture.

It is stated that definite measures were only agreed upon after Joffre had crossed to London on the 28th of October. He recommended that the French troops should advance to, and hold, the railway from Veles to Krivolak, and the British—our 10th Division from the Dardanelles—be responsible for the line Krivolak–Salonika. Thus communication with the Serbian army might be re-established and its right flank protected from the Bulgarian thrust into southern Serbia. British consent to this course was obtained, but Joffre failed in his attempts to enlist the cooperation of Russia and Italy.

We now turn back to follow the course of events at Salonika and in Serbia from the time when Bailloud's 156th Division began

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to disembark. The first troops were landed on the 8th of October, and a week later General Sarrail arrived with the leading formations of the 57th Division from France. Our 10th Division also landed during the month. The Entente was not at war with Bulgaria until the middle of October, and during the ensuing fortnight the French were only able to occupy the sector Lake Doiran—Demir Kapou with their 156th Division and the Tikvech with their 114th Brigade. The movements of these troops are traced in detail and the difficulties of their task made manifest: the rugged country rendered pack transport a necessity; the railway crossed and recrossed the river Vardar and bridging material was not available in sufficient quantities; the region south-west of Strumitza lay very near the Bulgarian frontier. But there was no heavy fighting during this period, and up to the 2nd of November the French losses amounted to less than 350.

The Serbs had pressed for an advance on Nish, an operation which both Sarrail and the French Government rightly deemed to be too hazardous considering the number of troops available and the difficulties of maintaining them so far from their base. Nothing, it seems, could have prevented the French detachments from losing touch with the Serbian troops which they relieved.

It is pointed out that our 10th Division at Salonika still remained under the commander of the Dardanelles Army. Actually it belonged to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which certainly did not facilitate cooperation with Sarrail's troops, and the plan for a divided command agreed upon at Chantilly obviously could not work. However, General Galliéni, Minister of War in the new Briand Government, telegraphed to Sarrail on the 2nd of November informing him that the British had definitely promised reinforcements and that, as suggested by Joffre, they would cover the railway from Salonika to Krivolak. Sarrail could therefore act towards Veles, thus extending a helping hand to the Serbs in their projected attempt to recover Uskub and re-establish communication with Salonika.

Sarrail had already prepared his plans for such an offensive. The arrival of the French 122nd Division gave him three divisions, but in his view this force was totally inadequate. He again represented to his Government the necessity of increasing his command to four complete corps, but Paris ignored the request for reinforcement and merely told him that he had complete liberty of action. Our 10th Division now relieved the French on the line from Lake Doiran to Valandova—near the Bulgarian frontier and almost

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due south of Strumitza—and our 22nd Division began to land at Salonika.

The two offensives launched by our Allies between the 3rd and 12th of November are described in some detail. The advance north-westward across the river Tcherna interrupted the Bulgarian advance upon Prilep from the direction of Ishtib, but it did not succeed in effecting a junction with the Serbs. The attack upon the Strumitza front was much impeded by bad weather. Sarrail's force was certainly not strong enough to accomplish more, considering the difficult nature of the country and the lack of sufficient mountain artillery and pack transport. It is acknowledged that the situation of the Allied forces in mid-November was by no means satisfactory, justifying, one may say, the apprehensions of the British General Staff that the utter defeat of the Serbian forces would place the Salonika contingents in jeopardy. The growing hostility of Greece was a very disturbing factor.

Sarrail was all for attacking again towards Veles whilst directing our 22nd Division on Monastir, but more prudent counsels now prevailed. He was ordered to stand fast in the positions he had won. This he was able to do, maintaining an active defence until the 20th of November, by which time the total losses of the *Armée d'Orient* amounted to 2,500 officers and men.

Next comes the question of the retirement of the Allied forces from Serbia. By this time it was obvious that the resistance of the Serbian army was coming to an end, and that the most that could be hoped for was that its remnants would be able to gain the Adriatic coast. The Austro-German forces and the Bulgars would soon be free to act in concert against the Allied troops based on Salonika, and by the 21st of November the hope of effecting a junction with the Serbs was finally relinquished.

The retreat of the French forces into Greek territory was begun on the 3rd of December, and ten days later the three divisions, with our troops, were assembled west and south of Lake Doiran. During the operation—there is a separate map to illustrate each successive stage—some Bulgarian attacks were repulsed, but the chief difficulties were the wretched roads and tracks, and the severe weather. There was frost and thaw, then frost and thaw again, with much rain and snow. One may conclude that the withdrawal constituted a considerable achievement on the part of the French staffs and troops: no material or stores were abandoned, and casualties during the period only totalled 2,300. The Bulgars, of course, did not cross the Greek frontier.

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As is to be expected, a special chapter is devoted to the attitude of Greece at this time. M. Zaïmis, who succeeded Venizelos in October, held the view that his country's obligations to come to Serbia's assistance only applied to a purely Balkan conflict. We are told that the fear of Germany prevented Greece joining the Allies: although her cooperation might have been secured in October, 1915, if France and Britain could then have sent 200,000 men to Salonika, the enemy successes against Serbia confirmed her belief in the invincibility of the Central Powers. The situation at Salonika and on the lines of communication was most unsatisfactory from the outset, for the Greeks obstructed and hampered the activities of the Allies in a variety of ways. By November, with the Greek army mobilized, the question had actually been raised as to whether French and British troops retiring into Greek territory should be disarmed and interned. To the Allies, of course, such an idea was unthinkable and made inevitable the coercion of the Greek Government. So the situation was cleared by degrees, and measures were pressed forward for the defence of the Salonika region.

In recounting the progress of the negotiations with Greece at this time there is no more than a hint of any difference between France and Great Britain. But much space is devoted to the divergence of views on the question of retaining the Allied troops at Salonika. Lord Kitchener is credited with fears of a Turco-German invasion of Egypt; our General Staff is stated to have favoured a maximum effort on the Western front, limiting operations in the East to the defence of the British possessions. So the British Government, to the "consternation" of the French, was for the evacuation of Salonika, and the outcome was the Allied conference at Calais on the 4th of December. The arguments of the representatives of the Allied Powers, both here and at Chantilly on the 5th of December, are given at length. Eventually it was agreed that defensive preparations at Salonika should be put in hand at once, without prejudice to the question of evacuation which would be for future discussion. It does not appear to have been raised again.

By this time, of course, the Gallipoli chapter was closed, so far as the French were concerned, and, unlike Great Britain, she had no particular preoccupations or responsibilities farther East. It seems that, while trying to convince us of the importance of the Balkan front, she had to remind Russia that this was not the chief theatre of operations. General Alexieff, virtual commander-in-

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chief of the Russian armies, urged that a Franco-British force of ten corps, based on Salonika, should strike north with Budapest as its ultimate objective, whilst the Russians, in similar strength, also advanced upon the Hungarian capital.

Anticipating that the Bulgars might cross the Greek frontier and advance on Salonika at any moment Joffre, now Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, recommended Sarrail to accelerate his defensive measures. General de Castelnau, sent from France to supervise, spent barely a week at Salonika. He modified some of the Allies' dispositions, and came to the conclusion that the Anglo-French forces would be able to hold their own against attack without the despatch of reinforcements. Nevertheless Sarrail made another attempt to obtain more men. He asked Joffre for two divisions, a cavalry regiment, and two *groupes* of 75's, but was only given the cavalry and the guns. General Mahon, now by agreement acting under the French commander, forwarded through him a request for another division.

By the end of January, 1916, Sarrail's defensive preparations were tolerably complete, in spite of recurring difficulties with the Greeks. He had been obliged to take over the civil administration of the town. The 17th Colonial Division—regarded as available because many of its units had only served at Gallipoli and therefore did not constitute a drain upon the forces in France—arrived early in February.

Rumania had now become an important factor in the calculations of the French Government and the French General Staff. There was a proposal to augment the Salonika force in order to support her if she could be induced to come in on the side of the Allies; but Sarrail's next operation was rendered necessary by the German offensive against Verdun. It was considered that some effort should be made to detain on the Balkan front enemy forces which might otherwise be transferred to reinforce the Germans in the west. Joffre approved of an advance, which began in March and, by the end of May, carried the French troops without serious fighting to the line of the Struma on the east; about Lake Doiran in the centre; and westward along the Serbian frontier where, due south of Monastir, the left flank was in touch with detachments of the newly constituted Serbian army farther still to the west. It is not pretended that this simulation of an offensive succeeded in its object: indeed, we are told that the two last German divisions had been withdrawn from the Balkan front and only a few small formations now remained.

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A separate chapter describes the final stages of the retreat of the Serbian army to the Adriatic; its reorganization at Corfu; and its reappearance in the field. France armed, munitioned and instructed the new Serbian army which began to arrive in the Salonika area about the middle of April. The first detachment went into the line before the end of May. In the work of rendering the Serbian troops mobile and ready to take the field it appears that the British authorities were again at fault: 4,000 pack-animals and a train of motor lorries were promised but failed to materialize. However, six Serbian infantry divisions and one of dismounted cavalry were ready by the middle of July, and constituted a valuable reinforcement.

Meanwhile Joffre had counselled a serious offensive by the 222,000 Allied troops based on Salonika, supported by the 100,000 Serbs and by 80,000 Italians who, it was hoped, would advance from Vallona on the Adriatic. One gathers from a later page that these figures included lines-of-communication troops as well as combatants, but the French Commander-in-Chief thought that such an operation was calculated to bring Rumania, and perhaps even Greece, into line against the Central Powers. Sarrail, who is said to have overrated the numbers of Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians and Turks who would, or might, be opposed to him, promptly asked for large reinforcements. He claimed that his was the only front where manœuvre, and consequently a decisive enveloping movement, was possible. He wanted time for his preparations, and wished to avoid the summer heat, so suggested that the advance take place in the autumn. Joffre overruled him, and early in May Sarrail presented his plan.

Now it appears that British cooperation was refused on the grounds that nothing must be done which would hamper or stint the preparations for the great summer offensive in France. Other reasons are mentioned as having been given later: the impossibility of equipping our divisions for mountain warfare before the end of September and of providing the necessary heavy artillery until November. The successes of the Russians soon reopened the question by creating a favourable opportunity for Rumania to march with the Allies; and the expected entry into the War of Rumania is said to have removed British objections to a Balkan offensive. In the middle of July, 1916, Joffre called on Sarrail for a new plan of operations: first to cover the concentration of the Rumanians, secondly to combine with a Russo-Rumanian army and strike a decisive blow.

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In June Sarrail had made some modifications in his dispositions. Four of our five divisions were still in the entrenched camp of Salonika, the consent of the British Government to active operations having yet to be obtained. These divisions took over a defensive front along the line of the river Struma, and, as soon as the French commander could count upon the full cooperation of the British he prepared his new plan accordingly. West of the Vardar the Serbs would strike north supported by a French detachment near the river; our troops, which were to take over the region between the Vardar and Lake Doiran, would make a demonstration; farther east the French would remain upon the defensive, but would engage the enemy in the valley of the Struma. This should permit the main French attack to be launched at will either in the Doiran region or up the left bank of the Vardar. On the 22nd of July Joffre approved of the plan in principle, but was of opinion that something more than a demonstration would be required of the British if the main attack was to succeed. The date was fixed for the 1st of August, but the necessary concentrations and inter-reliefs of troops required an extra three days.

One can understand the difficulty of arriving at an accurate estimate of the numbers of the opposing forces. By the middle of August it is reckoned that the French, British and Serbians had each 75,000 combatants, and that by the end of the month the Russian brigade and the Italian contingent brought the total figure to 250,000. There were 700 field and mountain guns and 293 heavy pieces. The German-Bulgarian forces in Macedonia are variously estimated, but seem to have amounted to rather less than the Allied armies. They had about 800 field guns and 100 heavies. In addition there were about 100,000 Bulgars on the Rumanian frontier.

On account of Rumanian hesitation action was even now delayed, but in a few days the activity of the enemy on various parts of the front called for some counter-measure, and the 17th Colonial Division attacked and occupied Doiran.

The precise conditions under which Sarrail exercised chief command are now defined. General Milne and General Boyovitch, commander of the Serbs, received the directives of Sarrail and each was free as to his choice of means to carry them out; the Italian general, whose division began to disembark at Salonika on the 11th of August, was on the same footing; the Russian brigade and an Albanian contingent were directly under the French. General Cordonnier was placed in command of the French divisions.

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The negotiations with Rumania are shown to have been "long and difficult," and the Salonika army had still to wait for the cooperation of M. Bratiano's Government to be secured. The treaty was signed on the 17th of August and next day Joffre named the 20th of August for the commencement of the operations. Sarrail's forces had not been altogether idle. Slight advances had been made on the right bank of the Vardar, to the south-west of Lake Doiran—by our 26th Division—and also to the north-east of the lake. Reconnaissances north of Seres beyond the river Struma had reached the Bulgarian frontier.

But during the 17th and 18th of August the Bulgars invaded Greek Macedonia on both wings of Sarrail's force. In the west they made progress down the railway from Monastir and attacked, without much success, along the whole Serbian line. In the east they moved towards Demir Hissar and Seres. Despite the activity of the Allies, which proceeded along the lines laid down, the Bulgarian right continued to drive in the Serbs, and this enemy offensive caused Sarrail to modify his plan of campaign. He now resolved to remain on the defensive both on his right and in his centre, concentrating on his left for a counter-offensive which would develop into an advance upon Monastir. This "*manœuvre de Monastir*" will be described in the next volume.

Up to the end of August, 1916, the French forces based on Salonika lost rather more than 30,000 men either in battle or from disease. Enough has been said to show that the first eleven months of hostilities in the Balkans provided little opportunity for glory so far as troops or commanders, British and French, were concerned. The official French narrative has for its chief interest the tracing of the tortuous paths of politico-strategy.

(*To be continued.*)

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UMPIRES AND UMPIRING

By Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel S. T. Lucey, M.C.

To act as the referee is ever a thankless task, and there are few who will say that it is not a difficult one, for it demands expert knowledge and judgment—qualities which can only be acquired in the school of past practical experience and hard training.

If this be true in sport, is it not so in that other, more scientific game, Training for War? But how much more difficult, because that essential "Passed practical experience" may be lacking and, in spite of his "hard training," the referee or umpire has no definite clear-cut rules to help him. Battles are fought on principles, not on rules.

Every year more and more officers who have themselves never seen a shot fired in anger are being called upon to undertake the duties of umpire. Their mental picture of a battle is based on heresay and literature, with perhaps a touch of local colour provided by the cinema.

No fault of theirs this inexperience, nor is there any adequate substitute in Peace Training, for, however realistic and advanced our schemes may be—what a wide gulf there is, and ever will be, between a real battle and a sham battle!

True, it is possible in peace to approach the conditions of war where the opposing sides are at a distance; in the plans, orders and preliminary movements of the troops pretence need play only a small part, but once the forces come into contact and we endeavour to simulate the conditions of battle it is a very different affair, and it is here that the umpire comes in. Let him turn to his Manuals and Training Memoranda for enlightenment, for these are his Bible—his only sure guide midst this present turmoil of men *versus* machines, armour *versus* bullets, protection *versus* the unknown!

In Infantry Training, Vol II, Chapter I, Section 6, under the heading "Phases of the Battle," it is written:

"In battle, dispositions are governed principally by the intensity and nature of the enemy's fire and the ground. *Fire* is the dominant

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factor in modern war; the attack is based on *fire* which makes movement possible, the defence on *fire* which prohibits it."

Again, in the latest memoranda he is reminded that:

"It is the duty of every leader to make full use of the Fire at his disposal."

"The maximum possible Fire must be brought to bear on the enemy."

"In the attacking a succession of Fire plans has to be made."

"It is Fire that wins battles."

That very factor which is all-dominant in war is entirely absent in peace. The reason, of course, is obvious, but what is the substitute?

There is only one, and that is imagination. There are many devices such as blank ammunition, smoke puffs, word-pictures, blue helios, red screens, etc., but these are only aids and are worthless except for the purpose of conveying a situation to the mind. A situation concerning fire and fire effect.

Now, imagination such as we are considering here demands effort, a definite mental effort from every one, umpires, leaders, and troops alike, and it cannot be acquired without knowledge and cultivation. The most lively imagination on the part of the narrator will avail little unless it is in part reflected by his audience. However great an artist an umpire may be, his word-pictures will be colourless, flat and unprofitable unless the leaders and the troops to whom he presents it respond intelligently and attempt to meet him half way.

Cooperation between the umpire and the troops is the bed-rock of sound umpiring, and many of the suggestions in this article have been made with the express purpose of assisting that cooperation. They are not theories; all have been given practical trial during training and have proved their worth.

The manner in which the troops can cooperate will be dealt with when these suggestions are being discussed; for the moment it is the umpire himself we want to consider.

Selection of Umpires.—That they should be selected for this duty is evident from the opening remarks, but whether it is wise to lay down that none but the best are to be chosen is open to question. There is a tendency to stipulate this condition when asking for officers for other purposes: none but the best are to be sent on courses, only the best may sit for the Staff College, and so on. Are we, then, also going to deprive a commanding officer of his two best officers —say on the eve of battalion training, just when he most requires them and just when they themselves most require to be present to

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acquire the power of command and leadership in the field which that particular training sets out to teach? Important and instructive as they are, the duties of umpiring do not afford practice in the actual command of troops, and there are occasions (especially in the case of a company commander) where the interests of the individual and his unit come first. Once the selection has been made, however, the officers should remain as umpires for the whole of that collective training. They should attend a short course in umpiring, working out schemes without troops and practising their hand when company training is in progress—all this under the direction of the chief umpire, who thus ensures a common doctrine throughout the brigade, division, etc. Out-door work is essential here—one scheme in the country is worth twenty on the sand-table. As to the qualities of our umpire, they could not be more admirably summarized than as given in Training and Manœuvre Regulations, Section 77, Para. (2): Energy; sound military knowledge and judgment; an understanding of the lessons to be taught; a cultivated imagination; a practical power of expression, and finally tact.

Duties of Umpires.—The duties can quite conveniently be considered under two main headings, though the regulations prefer to divide them into four.

(1) Their duty in supplying information.

(2) Their duty in giving decisions and exercising control. The endeavour to place these two in their correct relative importance has given rise to much confusion of thought and on occasions in the field to a misconception of the umpire's rôle. To maintain one's sense of proportion is desirable in all things but particularly so in the supervision of training. A small operation is for the "Small" commander and his men, a large operation is for the "Large" commander and his units. The rôle of the umpire corresponds exactly.

An analysis of the duties referred to above will make this clear:

Under (1) the umpire is present to estimate the relative fire effect of the opposing sides and to inform the leaders and troops concerned. He does this by description or what is known as a "word-picture," telling nothing but what the bullets, shells, gas, bombs, etc. would tell in war. In this manner the umpire represents the missing factor—fire.

It will be evident, however, that his activities will be almost entirely with the forward troops and will be constant for as long as the fire fight continues.

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At once an exacting task both mentally and physically, and one which demands time. Time to seek out the fire unit commanders and time to acquaint them with the various fire situations as they occur.

Such procedure is perfectly feasible where small forces are concerned. In platoon and company training two umpires or even one working with a company can deal in detail with the progress of the fight, keeping the fire unit commanders constantly alive to the fire situation confronting them and watching not only their action but also the consequent action of units in rear. Here the umpire works hand-in-glove with the squadron, company or battalion commander assisting in the training of his subordinates. His presence is vital in early collective training where the junior commanders and their men receive instruction and practice in the minor tactical problems of the battle-field.

The Necessity for Exercising Control.—Let us go a stage or two further, however—inter-battalion or brigade training with armoured-fighting-vehicles, artillery and aeroplanes in cooperation; can the umpires here devote their energies solely to the junior leaders of the forward elements? If they do, what is to happen to the working out of the general scheme? Very soon, within a few minutes of contact being gained, on certain portions of the field the opposing troops will be approaching so rapidly that intervention of some sort is essential in order to keep the battle in hand.

The multiplication of umpires as operations increase in size does not meet the difficulty, and in any case the supply is limited.

It is unwise to count on a larger scale than, say, three or, at the most, four umpires per regiment or battalion, and this is only just sufficient to cope with the general movement as deployment develops and units become mixed up. The first thoughts of the umpires must now be for the scheme as a whole so that it may work out to the best advantage and in accordance with the wishes of the director. This implies control, the second duty referred to above, which now takes priority over the first duty.

How quickly operations can develop from a semblance of reality to complete absurdity!

How soon a carefully worked out scheme can be ruined by a too rapid advance heedless of the fire power of the defence, or by the early capture of a position which in reality would have taken hours to neutralize!

Poor cooperation, little imagination, no *control*—and who is

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to blame? First the system, then the umpires, and lastly the troops.

The necessity for this control is apparent also from another point of view. Brigade training comes once a year, a period all too brief for that practice in command which the exercises are intended to bring out. It is the only real opportunity given to the brigadier and his battalion commanders to handle their own units in the field in cooperation with other Arms and with real and not always skeleton forces in opposition; surely, then, it is their turn; they and not their juniors should have first consideration. Umpires cannot concentrate on both, and it must therefore be recognized that as operations increase in magnitude so will the umpire's rôle tend more and more towards control even at the expense of other considerations.

Their object is always, and at any cost, to keep the battle in hand.

Now how is this control carried out? Certainly not by giving executive orders to the troops. An umpire only resorts to orders on such occasions as after an assault or sometimes when dealing with the defence, where the intervention of a neutral authority to give a decision becomes necessary. The Regulations provide for this, including it as one of the umpire's four duties, and there is no need therefore to enlarge on the matter here.

Neither does an umpire influence the development of operations by means of advice to commanders, because this would be introducing a factor not met with in war. An umpire's neutrality is absolute, a fact which must be recognized from the outset. This being so, the umpire can only exercise his control over the battle through the medium of fire effect.

In peace the moral factor being absent the umpire has to deal with movement which is real and fire which is imaginary. By playing fire against movement he at once has the power to control the battle in the most realistic manner possible, the only thing required being a ready method by which he can communicate to the troops quickly, clearly and over an extended area.

Coloured Screens—Their Importance and Uses.—We have the means in the use of the screens, which, when properly understood and employed intelligently, are the salvation of umpiring. Very artificial? Of course they are artificial, but what harm is there in that, provided every one understands? The whole battle in peace is based on artifice—all is really pretence, but the more simple that pretence be the better.

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The screens constitute nothing more than a code between the umpire and the troops, not between one side and the other, as is sometimes imagined.

Further, a screen does not necessarily imply a percentage of casualties—its meaning is far more general, and can best be described as the stopping effect on the troops.

Let us for a moment refer back to the quotation already given from the phases of the battle: "Fire is the dominant factor in modern war; the attack is based on fire which makes movement possible, the defence on fire which prohibits it." Now whereas all fighting eventually resolves itself into attack and defence, the umpire's attention will naturally be focussed on the assailant, because it is here that he finds movement, and movement (i.e. forward movement) implies progress and, ultimately, success.

This is inevitable in training, because without the influence of moral we are prone to estimate victory or defeat by the measure of ground gained or lost.

Again, the power of the defender is reflected in the progress of the attacker. The umpire who is the agent of that power can permit movement, delay movement, or stop movement according to his own representation of the fire effect. If the advance is allowed to continue without check or hindrance, he implies that the fire of the defender is negligible or completely neutralized—(No screen). If the advance is delayed ("Slowed up" we call it) and units have to fight to gain ground, the fire of the defence is telling but not wholly effective—(Blue screen). If the attack is stopped ("Held up") the fire of the defence is adequate—(Red screen).

Suggested Abolition of Screens in the Defence.—These are the principles governing the use of the screens, and it will be noticed at once that by showing screens in the attack we are not only umpiring for that side but simultaneously for the defence. This is as it should be; we are umpiring the battle; the fire power of the defender is made manifest by its effect on the attacker, and there is therefore no need whatever to use screens in the defence—they only confuse the issue.

Who benefits by making it known visibly that the fire power of a platoon or a machine-gun sub-section in the defence has been decreased by 50 per cent.—(which is the meaning given to the blue screen in Training and Manœuvre Regulations)?

It cannot be to assist the troops, because, as has already been pointed out, the screens are not designed for the purpose of communication between one side and the other.

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In any case no action is demanded from any one, the unit ordered to display its blue screen being stationary.

Is it, then, to help the umpires?

One umpire watching the defence wishes to convey to another umpire coming forward with the attack that the fire power of a certain locality which has been holding up the advance is reduced by 50 per cent. What happens? The weakening of the defence is such that either the attack can press on or it cannot—the estimation of the relative fire effect rests with the umpires—why not therefore let them convey their decisions in a realistic manner as it would become known to both sides in war, namely, by further progress or further delay in the advance.

The hypothesis that one umpire works for the defence while another for the attack is, however, so opposed to the whole principle of umpiring that the mere idea of two umpires wishing to communicate by means of screens implies a false conception of their rôle.

The umpire who decided to show blue screens in the defence could not have done so without a knowledge of the nature and volume of the fire being produced by the attack.

Similarly, the other umpire should only have held up the advance after he had ascertained the power of resistance offered by the defence. This implies personal liaison between the two umpires —the necessity of which is emphasized later under the heading "Pool System"—all umpires know both sides and by controlling one they automatically umpire for the two.

Let us continue the example given above and change the blue screen for a red one. At once we publish the fact that the garrison of that particular locality has been reduced by 100 per cent.—or, in other words, silenced (*vide* Training Manœuvres Regulation, Section 78).

Presumably in the umpire's imagination the post has been battered by fire, run short of ammunition, and the survivors, if any, are both morally and physically exhausted—but can he induce the men to visualize the same pathetic picture merely by the erection of a red screen? They are all present, alive, hearty and full of their own prowess in the fight, with probably still a few rounds of blank ammunition in their pouches.

There are only two ways of dealing with these situations in practice: Paint the picture carefully, explain to the men that they are out of action, form them up and allow the attack to sweep over them as it would in reality.

Or, and the sole reason for this alternative is to prevent men

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being placed out of action too early in the day, arrange for the majority of the garrison to be withdrawn in anticipation of such a situation occurring, leaving one or two men to stand fast and be overrun.

Now this is essentially the umpire's duty, and it must be recognized that in dealing with troops in the defence he has the power to influence their movement to this extent. It is done for the purpose stated above and because in a peace battle one cannot disregard the human factor.

Men get bored and men get excited and no coloured screen can ever take the place of the umpire's own words in such a situation as cited above.

At present each screen has two meanings, one for the attackers and another for the defenders—but how is it possible to draw so rigid a line between offence and defence in battle? During training (as in war) the troops will often be in doubt whether their side is attacking or defending. Let each screen have one meaning only, then every one will understand what to do under whatever circumstances it be raised, e.g. an umpire decides that a counter-attack fails; he orders the defenders (who have now suddenly appeared as attackers) to show the red screen and thereby stops the movement. It is immaterial whether the original attackers are themselves "red screened." A deadlock ensues which is not unreal, and the umpire, with the situation thus entirely in hand, awaits some further action by one side or the other to free the deadlock.

By abolishing the use of screens in the defence we not only enhance their scope in the attack and in the battle generally, but simplify the whole procedure of training.

When Chapter V, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, was written (after the war), Section 78 introduced a yellow screen besides the blue and the red. Fortunately, it was later realized that the meaning of this screen could be more easily conveyed to the troops by the umpires verbally, since it only concerned the early stages of deployment. The screen here became an unnecessary complication and was abolished.

The cancellation of screens in defence is a further endeavour at simplification on the grounds that the theory that prompted them has not been justified in practice.

Revised Conditions in the Use of Screens.—If this is agreed to, we have only to consider two definitions instead of four. These are laid down in Training and Manœuvre Regulations, but it is considered that the spirit of the wording of these Regulations could

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be improved by adding two new conditions and a rule in the case of the red screen only.

Blue Screen means that the attacking troops are under fire and suffering loss, but, with the aid of their own and other covering fire, they can still advance (i.e. attack by fire and movement).

Red Screen means that the attacking troops are under such a heavy and well-directed fire that further progress to their immediate front is for the time being impracticable (i.e. attack is held up).

In addition the presence of a red screen implies that the *troops on a front of* 50 *yards on either side of it* are held up—except, of course, on any portion of the 100 yards front which is obviously covered from view of the Defence.

The above conditions demand that *no troops may overrun a red screen within the frontage stated.*

To further emphasize the proposed new conditions, which are shown above in italics, the definition of the red screen as given in Training and Manœuvre Regulations is now quoted:

Red Screen (for attacking troops):—"Under fire of such intensity that further movement is impossible."

Suggestions to Assist Cooperation.—Now it is vital that the troops should thoroughly understand these definitions and conditions, otherwise that cooperation which has already been emphasized cannot be obtained.

To assist them in this, and in order to establish constant liaison between the umpire and the troops, the following suggestions are strongly advocated:

(1) In the Infantry, screens to be maintained on the scale of one red and one blue screen per section and machine-gun section. In weak battalions two screens per platoon.

(2) These screens to be carried by one man—specially chosen for this duty—who will not carry a rifle. He will be called the Screen Man and will be trained always to be on the look-out for an umpire's order or signal. He will inform his section commander when told to show the red screen and will help to enforce the rule as to the overrunning. He is in every other respect one of the fighting men of his section and is not to be regarded as a neutral.

(3) Screens must be stuck in the ground or held up by the Screen Man and will always be furled when on the move. They should measure 18 inches by 12 inches.

(4) Umpires will carry two small flags (about 1 foot square)—one red and other blue, so that in an emergency or when they are

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unable to reach the troops they can signal to them the particular coloured screen to be raised.

This last device has proved to be of the greatest value, since it enables an umpire to retain control single-handed over an extended area without the inevitable dashing to and fro and across the front of an attack ordering the screens by word of mouth.

The signals are taken up by the Screen Man, who indicates to the section commander what the umpire wants, and the section is halted under the nearest available cover with either the red or the blue screen showing. The power of control which this gives to the umpire is enormous, and it is most helpful in other ways, since it allows him to remain in one locality (where perhaps a particular situation is developing which requires his presence) and at the same time ensure that troops farther afield are not moving too quickly.

As in every case with the use of the screens, the umpire must ever try to colour the situation verbally and search for those unit commanders immediately concerned, watching for action on their part and from those in rear. The screens alone, however, whether displayed by order direct or by a signal from the umpire, represent a perfectly clear fire situation on which any leader of troops can act. That is their great value, because it is out of the question to expect the umpire always to complete the picture verbally. He will use his flags then and signal his wishes to the troops when, owing to the nature of the ground, the development of the attack or the extent of area left to him, the umpire is unable to control the movement by any other means.

The little flags save his horse, his lungs and his temper—three very important factors, the economy of which is essential to efficient umpiring.

Illustration of Umpires' Rôle.—To illustrate the full value and at the same time the limitations of the screens it is now proposed to follow briefly the umpires' rôle through the course of an encounter battle—during, say, brigade training with the battalions, etc., arranged unequally as opposing forces. What has brought the two sides into conflict is immaterial, and, the first encounters over, we find the commander of one side, having seized the initiative and made his plan, setting his troops in motion towards their objectives.

During this preliminary period the umpires have been busy with the two commanders, listening to their fire plans, watching the execution of their orders, and learning their dispositions. Primed with information of both sides (acquired by the pool system described

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below) the first consideration of the umpires is the fire effect from artillery and from the air. (A method of artillery umpiring is also dealt with later.)

Then as the advance proceeds they automatically take station with the forward units and deal with the first openings of fire of the defence. This stage is always somewhat vague, even when the supply of blank is plentiful, but the umpire can help by description to keep the troops in the picture and thereby avoid absurd movements and concentrations in full view of the enemy.

The work of the umpires here is light and consists mainly in observation and noting how information filters back and what action is taken upon it, the general forward movement being allowed to develop on its own. We are, however, approaching that period which occurs in every battle where serious opposition is encountered. Men begin to fall and turn back wounded; whole sections rush to the welcome cover of a ditch or clump of trees to avoid the sudden and deadly sweep of a machine gun firing out of the "blue"; men lie flat as bullets flick around them, and their leaders look anxious and bow their heads to that nasty tearing sound of shrapnel whistling overhead.

Here again is the umpire's opportunity for a word-picture; there is no other way of conveying the situation to the troops; blank ammunition certainly will not do it.

Are the men to open fire? If so, at what? They can probably discern nothing in front of them. Have the machine guns found a target yet?

All experience shows that speed is the best antidote to loss in this phase of the battle, the umpire (who is in part an instructor) must therefore do nothing to discourage a rapid and continuous onward movement with the object of crossing the fire-swept zone in the shortest time possible.

The real fire power of the defence, however, has not yet made itself felt, and the above is really only the preliminary to that more intense period of battle where the attacking troops themselves must fight to get forward, a phase which is really the machine-gun duel and is tersely expressed in the Training Manuals as "The Attack by Fire and Movement."

In the umpire's vocabulary it is even more concise—"The blue screen period," but when and where to open this period demands great nicety of judgment on his part. By ordering the blue screen too early he is teaching false lessons:

"Infantry should not stop to open fire with its own weapons

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unless forced to do so to establish the fire superiority necessary to maintain its mobility" (I.T., Vol. II, Sec. 14 (5)). To open the period too late is equally wrong, because it is unrealistic and does not take into account the full power of machine guns in the defence.

It is deplorable to see umpires to-day—and umpires who have probably themselves attacked machine guns and been held up (perhaps even wounded) by their fire, allowing our young infantry to advance in formations and in such a manner as could only spell annihilation in reality.

Much responsibility rests on the umpires here, and it is not an easy task because machine gun *versus* machine gun is a very difficult combat to referee.

Provided the defenders stand firm, and of course subject to the nature of the country, the blue screen period, once opened, must continue until such time as the advance is arrested in spite of the covering fire of the attack. We now say the attack is "held up," but what we really mean is that the forward troops have reached the limit; they have arrived at that state which many of us have experienced in war when, do what one will, the troops "go to ground" as it were and temporarily acknowledge the superiority of the enemy. It may be physical exhaustion or it may be moral—generally, both—but it does not for a moment imply that the particular unit concerned has suffered heavy casualties, but rather that it will suffer very heavily should it attempt to advance unaided from the shelter of its present cover.

That is what the red screen indicates and why screens generally have been referred to above as the "Stopping Effect" on the troops.

The blue screen delays—the red screen stops the forward movement.

Now all experience and training teaches that when troops are unable to advance in one direction they must at once endeavour to get on in another. The condition added to the meaning of the red screen that an advance to the immediate front is held up will instinctively encourage the fire unit commanders to seek for approaches and opportunities on their flanks. For the same reason it is expedient to give the red screen a frontage—50 yards on either side is easily estimated, and in any case it need only be very approximate. The rule *re* overrunning the red screen springs from these two conditions; it is a matter of discipline, and is introduced chiefly for the purposes of control, otherwise units coming up from the rear, having been "blue screened" all the way, are apt to run through

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a line of red screens, at once creating an absurd situation and putting the umpire in a false position.

There is a failing in the red screen which soon becomes evident in practice. It can be overcome only by an intelligent appreciation of the meaning of the screen (*a*) by the umpire, (*b*) by the troops, especially the section leaders. For a unit to halt, lie down and show its red screen within a few yards of cover is palpably wrong. It is absurd from the point of view of the definition of the screen, and it is bad training. There will, of course, be occasions when troops must be stopped in the open where cover is unavailable, but as a general rule they should be allowed to reach some kind of protection from fire or from view before the red screen is displayed. Umpires must give latitude to the fire unit leaders in this respect, permitting them to get their men under the nearest available cover before actually showing the red screen which they have ordered to be raised. Rarely does a tactical exercise take place where it is not vital to hold up certain portions of the front to allow for the scheme to develop on others, to create situations which demand a fresh fire plan, and to force the commander and his subordinates to employ their reserves.

We thus get at various places in the attack frontages where red screens will be ordered alternately with blue screens, because it is certain that when troops who have been held up are subsequently able to make ground, they will in all probability still have to fight for it. The conclusion is, therefore, that once the blue screen period has been opened there will always be some screens visible along the general front of the attack for as long as the fire fight lasts. They will either be blue or red according as the troops are advancing or not, and naturally as the attack develops both colours will be seen in different portions of the battle area.

It may be argued that this conception is most artificial and gives to the defence gratuitous information of the whole progress of the attack since the screens cannot but be visible to every one. (It is for this reason that a smaller-sized screen has been recommended.)

These are disadvantages, but they are not so grave in practice as would appear in theory, and in any case they only apply to the defence which comprises less than 25 per cent. of our training for war. Further, it should be remembered that since quite half of our schemes are framed with a skeleton force on one side, the above objections largely disappear, and the scope of the umpire, in his capacity as assisting the director, is enormously increased. The fire effect of a force represented by a line of yellow flags, a few

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blue helios for machine guns and one or two red ones for the artillery, rests entirely with the imagination of the umpire. He knows the wishes of the director, and it is most emphatically his duty to incline the battle to meet those wishes. He is vested with considerable power and influence on the training of the troops, and we must help him to employ these to the best advantage.

The screens are a very valuable aid if used as described above.

The Working of the Pool System.—That the umpire is neutral should be an understood fact, and yet we still hear officers declaring that they are umpiring for one side while some one else is umpiring for the other.

"Major X is an Eastland umpire—I don't know him—I am umpiring for the Westland Force."

Of course it is realized that on manœuvres officers must be attached to units for accommodation, etc., but that should be the limit of their attachment.

There can be no question of umpires taking sides, it must be all umpires for both sides working from a pool under the direction of the chief umpire. He allots them according to the situation, dispersing and collecting them as and when he thinks fit, so that there are always sufficient to deal with each successive phase as the scheme unfolds, with others in hand to maintain touch with the main headquarters and for special duties. The chief umpire himself gains nothing in a big operation by riding here, there and everywhere. He should move by bounds along a general axis (known to all his umpires beforehand) and from suitable points obtain a general survey of the operations. Together with the director he must be in possession as early as possible of the plans of both commanders, and this information is best obtained by personal visits to their headquarters. Every chief umpire should have an assistant umpire acting in the capacity of a staff officer who can take his place on occasions when he leaves the axis of communication referred to above. All umpires should know one another by name at least, and they must maintain a constant interchange of information amongst themselves and through the medium of the chief umpire.

To refer for a moment to the example given above. Those umpires sent off to ascertain the plans and dispositions of the defence would ride back and, meeting the umpires coming forward with the attack, discuss the information thus available from both sides.

To help this liaison amongst the umpires they should be easily recognizable, and a white polo jacket makes a far better distinguishing

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mark than the white brassards. The latter should be reserved for neutral horseholders and orderlies only. The benefits of the pool system are not only evident in the field but later when the chief umpire holds his conference. Having observed the activities of both sides equally, umpires are in a position to offer criticism useful and remarks enabling their chief to submit to the director not merely a summary of the operations but a constructive report.

Artillery Umpiring.—Although every umpire concerns himself with the effect of artillery fire at all times, officers specially detailed as artillery umpires are also required in any big operation.

They watch the artillery of both sides on behalf of the director and at the same time inform the troops when they are under fire and the nature and the intensity of the shelling. The following method has been tried with considerable success: an umpire at the O.P. learns from the battery commander the nature and location of the target he is engaging or is about to take on. He signals this by means of a special flag carried by his orderly to his fellow-umpire with the opposing side, who at once rides off, paints the picture as vividly as possible to the troops concerned and imposes such penalty as he thinks will meet the case. A very simple code is used conveying the nature of the fire, the type and map reference of the target. (A red and yellow diagonal flag about 3 feet by 2 feet is suitable.)

This method is only in amplification of those already in use, namely, the firing of blank rounds and the red helio.

In addition, however, it is also suggested that all umpires should carry a Very pistol and a supply of special cartridges designed so as to explode in the air with a loud report and eject a shower of smoke streamers over the heads of the troops. The limitation of a word-picture is that it can only be given to the commander and those who may be within earshot, while the suggested fire-work would bring the situation home to every one present besides introducing the element of surprise.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, a word of explanation is perhaps called for in view of the fact that infantry and infantry only have formed the basis for all the argument. The reason has been primarily to avoid complication and an unduly long article, and also because in the mind of the writer the burden of the battle will still be borne by that arm for many years to come.

As tanks and other modern inventions continue to take an ever-increasing share in the fire-fight, and cooperate more and more in our training, the task of the umpires will become more complex

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and fresh devices to ensure control will have to be considered. The modernized army is not yet in being, however, and it is still the infantry with the aid of the other arms who confirm the victory.

To umpire for the infantry is therefore to umpire for all, and the object of this article will have been achieved if the foregoing remarks in any way simplify this task and help officers in the performance of a duty which is the mainspring of sound and interesting training.

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A YEOMANRY ARTILLERY BRIGADE ON MANŒUVRES

By Colonel H. I. Powell Edwards

At last it seems that the much-argued question of horse *versus* machine is being got down to the point where it is agreed that the question so stated is wrongly put.

A temperate and well-reasoned article in the January number of the *Army Quarterly* * takes the view that machine and horse are not irreconcilable.

The question is not whether the machine is to supersede the horse, but merely how horse and machine can best cooperate. Cooperation and not antagonism should be the desire of both horseman and mechanic.

The experience of a Yeomanry artillery brigade on the last year's Aldershot Command Exercise may perhaps be worth quoting, not merely from the point of view of the unit itself, but because in that particular formation horse and machine are inevitably brought into close contact within one unit.

Units of the Territorial Army normally go into camp for annual training with transport which is not sufficient to meet the requirements of mobile operations.

Within the last two years the substitution of 6-wheel Morris tractors for gun teams has been very general.

When therefore the brigade in question had to contemplate taking part in this Exercise there arose the question of providing for manœuvres transport which normally would not be required in camp. Further, the situation was complicated by two facts which are always the curse of mounted units of the Territorial Army—namely, the impossibility of knowing with certainty until the last moment what number of men will actually report in camp and what number of draught animals will prove to be both willing and able

* *See* "Impressions of the Armoured Force Training," by "Otac," *Army Quarterly*, January, 1929.

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to draw. The unit had one clear week in camp before moving out to the concentration area.

The vehicles in camp comprised:

Each battery.—4 6-wheel Morris lorries for pulling guns, 1 field kitchen, 1 water cart, 1 officers' mess cart, 2 G.S. wagons, 1 motor cycle, and 1 bicycle.

Brigade H.Q.—1 mess cart, 1 spare 6-wheel Morris, and 1 spare 6-wheel Morris chassis.

Signal Section.—1 cable cart, and 1 G.S. limbered wagon; while there were a number of private cars belonging to officers and other ranks available.

The *personnel*, as usual, in the cold light of actual fact turned out to amount to about sixty to seventy-five actually present for the second week's training in each battery.

A trial run in the shape of a night out from camp indicated very clearly that, as usual, the draught animals could not be relied upon to draw under any but the easiest conditions. There was obviously no time in which to school them.

The decision was at once made, therefore, that the only thing to do was to restrict batteries to two guns each, to "mechanize" all transport possible, and to retain officers, Nos. 1 and coverers, and the battery staffs mounted. The reduction to 2 guns per battery gave us two 6-wheelers per battery spare. The small number of *personnel* present enabled one field kitchen and one water cart to serve two batteries. The officers' mess cart had to remain horsed.

The signal section cable carts remained horsed, but, as at the last moment the team of the signal G.S. limbered wagon became obdurate, the limber was attached to the spare 6-wheeler with brigade headquarters, which also served as a mobile "office." On the day, therefore, there turned out a somewhat motley crew of horsemen, 6-wheelers towing guns, 6-wheelers towing field kitchens and water carts, horsed mess carts and private cars.

Manifestly the firing battery composed of horsemen and 6-wheelers towing guns was capable of much faster movement than the field kitchens and water carts, especially as the horsed mess carts accompanied the formation.

It was, therefore, decided to form the field kitchen, water carts and mess carts into one "B Echelon" under an officer who was to bring it along at his own pace if left by the increased pace of the brigade, and to leave with batteries one 6-wheeler, besides the two towing guns, to carry the Lewis gunners and also to be utilized

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for fetching food and forage from "Echelon B" where the food would be cooked.*

The following table shows the *personnel* (together with the vehicles and animals) who marched with the various units of the brigade in the field.

These numbers left a considerable number of draught horses to be disposed of, and these were turned out to grass by the courtesy of a neighbouring farmer.

A limited number of *personnel* was left in camp as guard, and allowing for sick and light-duty men unfit to go on manœuvres the numbers shown, small as they appear, were in fact as much as batteries could find.

It must be remembered that in the Territorial Army it is never the case that 90 per cent. of a unit's establishment is in camp for the whole period of fourteen days, and in all but very few cases a 75 per cent. attendance in each week represents the maximum present. It is well, therefore, not to be too optimistic as to numbers actually available, a point which in the Territorial Army in time of peace, as so often with the regimental soldier in time of war, undiscerning staff officers sometimes fail to appreciate.

So much for the administrative side of the organization for this exercise.

As regards the practical work of the brigade so organized. The experience was most eagerly anticipated by all ranks, and the private soldiers as a whole were most interested in the whole proceedings. Not a few of them wished it might occur every year.

The proceedings opened from the unit's point of view with a march of some ten miles by road to a point where the main column was joined and thence some fifteen miles more to a position of concealment in a dense and badly rided wood.

This was a tedious business, aggravated or enlivened by the fact that a formation of tanks insisted on "bounding" at frequent intervals past our own column, a proceeding at first rather resented by horses unaccustomed to tanks.

The march, however, was duly completed with only one temporary stoppage of a 6-wheeler, but as the unit had to conform throughout to infantry pace the consumption of petrol by the 6-wheelers was very heavy—about four miles to the gallon. The

* In order to keep the food hot, "hay boxes" were made and carried in this vehicle, which was also available as a "spare" in the event of the breakdown of a gun lorry.

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IMPROVISED MANŒUVRE "ESTABLISHMENT" OF A FIELD BRIGADE WITH MECHANICAL DRAUGHT (TERRITORIAL ARMY).

	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses. R.	Horses. LD.	6-wheelers.	Motor cars.	Motor cycles.	Bicycles.	Mess carts.	Field kitchen.	Water carts.	Remarks.
Brigade H.Q.—												
Lieut.-Colonel ..												
Adjutant	5	—	2		—	2	—	—	—	—	—	
Orderly officer ..												
M.O. and V.O. ..												
Trumpeter.. ..	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Batmen	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Drivers (mech.) ..	—	2	—		1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Clerk	—	1	—		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
R.A.F. operator ..	—	1	—		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Orderly	—	1	—		—	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Total Brigade H.Q.	5	8	3	—	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	
Signal Section—												
Sig. officer.. ..	1	—	1		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Signallers	—	7	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
D. riders mounted	—	4*	4*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	* Attached from batteries.
motor cyclist	—	1	—		—	—	1	—	—	—	—	
bicycle ..	—	2	—		—	—	—	2	—	—	—	
Drivers (horse) ..	—	2	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total Signal Section	1	16	10	4	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	
Batteries (each)—												
Major												Battery staff—P.S.I., B.S.M., G.P.O.A., B.C.A., N.C.O., Sigs., farrier, rangetaker and one mounted despatch rider, another being with brigade H.Q.
Captain	5	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
3 Subalterns ..												

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Battery Staff—	—	8	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Horseholders—
A group signallers	—	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 for B.C.A. and NC.O. Signals
B group signallers	—	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 for G.P.O. and G.P.O.A.
Trumpeters ..	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 for farrier.
Horseholders ..	—	13	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 for P.S.I. and B.S.M.
Batmen	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2 for A group and B group.
Despatch rider ..	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2 for section commanders.
Clerk	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1 for rangetaker.
Gunners	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 for Nos. 1.
Drivers (mech.)	—	6	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 for coverers.
Lewis gunners ..	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	5	55	36 —	3	1	1	1	—	—	—	
Total 4 batteries ..	20	220	144 —	12	4	4	4	—	—	—	
B Echelon—											
Officer in command	1	—	1 —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
R.S.M.	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	
Horseholder ..	—	1	1 —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
M.O. orderly ..	—	1	1 —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Drivers (horse) ..	—	5	— 5	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	
Drivers (mech.)	—	8	—	4	—	—	—	—	2	2	Spare chassis and repair-outfit. Contractors' civilian drivers.
Drivers (civilian)	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Spare horseholder	—	1	1 2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
B.Q.M.S.	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Cooks	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Batmen	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Attached R.A.S.C. Supply lorries	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total B Echelon ..	1	34	4 7	5	1	—	—	5	2	2	
BRIGADE TOTAL ..	27	278	161 11	18	7	5	7	5	2	2	

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first stage of the march was in the dark, down a very bad hill on a tarmac road, and three or four horses came down, but no serious casualty resulted.

Echelon B, which in the columns was separated from the brigade, duly arrived in bivouac without accident.

The brigade was ordered to move out of this wood during the very early hours of the morning, and to proceed some nine miles over a rise of 400 feet on a bad road, reporting to the officer commanding the Regular brigade at the end of the march.

These orders necessitated saddling up in the wood in darkness, putting the tracks on 6-wheelers to traverse the boggy places in rides and then removing them on emerging on to sound ground. Those of us who remember the early attempts at this sort of thing when turned out at night from bivouac in 1914 were a little apprehensive as to the result, but, thanks to the sprinkling of men with war experience throughout all ranks, the brigade extricated itself from the wood without difficulty, was at the official starting-point exactly on time and completed the nine-mile move in well under the two hours, with no distress to horses and with only one temporary stop to a vehicle, owing to sooted plugs due to the " slow-motion " march of the previous day and the neglect of that particular driver to clean up plugs thereafter.

The next few hours were spent in watering and feeding horses and men, and whilst this was going on B Echelon arrived from the last bivouac. In the afternoon of that day the brigade was moved into action. The signal section had to run out over five miles of wire in order to link up batteries and H.Q. and, owing to a shortage elsewhere, another one and three-quarters miles in an endeavour to make communication rearwards to group H.Q.

Despite the exiguous *personnel*, which necessitated every man remaining on duty without relief, the task of maintaining communication to all batteries was carried out without interruption for fourteen hours. The strain on their four cable-wagon horses was heavy and at the end of operations these horses were very tired.

The subsequent operations were from the brigade's point of view rather lacking in interest or excitement until the following morning, when two batteries were ordered to make a move forward of some four miles to support advancing infantry.

This move was made at a pace infinitely faster than anything which could have been done with the untrained gun teams of the days before the 6-wheeler.

Partly by road and partly by field-tracks the batteries proceeded

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at a pace which was sufficiently fast to enable them to meet the battery commander at his rendezvous at the moment when he returned from a reconnaissance which he had conducted at the gallop from the original position four miles back.

Just as the guns came into action the " Cease Fire " sounded, to the ill-concealed disgust of gunners bursting for a " show " ! The brigade then concentrated and had the prospects of a thirty-mile march back to camp.

This, for men only lately out of offices and mostly unaccustomed to much riding in civil life, and for horses not in the fittest condition, was something of an effort.

It was decided to send on at once all guns with the 6-wheelers direct to camp, and B. Echelon was sent to a rendezvous halfway for mid-day water and feed.

All nosebags, battery staff equipment and other " clubber " were loaded on to the 6-wheelers, the machines thus relieving horses of much weight and men of much encumbrance, and the horsed portion of the brigade followed the mechanical vehicles.

To those of us who remembered the old cavalry days that march will long remain a happy memory. We traversed some miles of weald and water meadow and had our luncheon in a perfect stretch of English park. Then we climbed up to the summit of the downs and rode for several miles across a great sward of downland turf alternating with green aisles of beech and thorn, the trunks all mellowed in the slowly setting sun. There was no sound but the clink of bit and stirrup, no vile machines, no reek of petrol. It was a march to soothe the heart of every ex-cavalryman there. And on arrival in camp, the gunners and drivers as one man turned out to take over and do the horses of the mounted men while the latter washed and fed.

To summarize one's conclusions as to these operations it may be said that : (1) the 6-wheeler is a far better instrument of traction than the type of draught horse available for Territorial training ; (2) the adoption of these vehicles enables one to concentrate in the battery staffs and as horseholders men who can really be termed useful horsemen, thus greatly increasing the mobility across country of the staffs ; (3) the signal section cable cart ought probably to be " mechanized " as the guns have been ; (4) a vehicle is required as a water cart and field kitchen combined, and some form of mechanical mess cart is required ; (5) the horse is still the best form of vehicle for the single man ; (6) it was a matter of controversy as to whether or no it was necessary for Nos. 1 to be mounted. Some of us

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even were doubtful as to the necessity for the section officer to be mounted. We found it most advantageous to have the Nos. 1 mounted especially when getting guns into position independently and when reconnoitring difficult places, such as thick woods, before coming out of cover; and (7) the civilian contractors' staff was most valuable in the matter of quick repairs to minor breakdowns. So long as the Territorial driver (mech.) has so little experience of 6-wheelers, it is absolutely vital to have in camp skilled civilian mechanics—at least one to two batteries if not one per battery.

This was the first instance of a Yeomanry artillery brigade taking part in operations with Regular troops.

It may be that our experience in the matter of improvizations may be of use to others in the future.

It was, in the opinion of the writer, a most valuable experience, first because of the necessity for improvization, and, perhaps hardly less important, because it gave to the young soldier a brief opportunity of learning something of the art of looking after himself.

Lastly, all ranks had a real opportunity of seeing at work the different arms of the Army of to-day, horse, foot, guns, lorries, tanks and aeroplanes, and of working with the infantry, an opportunity as rare as it was welcome.

As always the officers and staffs of the Regular Army did all they could to help, a fact for which we felt the greatest gratitude in that the Command concerned was not that under which the brigade normally serves.

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THE ECONOMICS OF WAR

By Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Maude, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., Army Educational Corps

In the January, 1929, number of the *Army Quarterly*, "Festina Lente" contributes an article on "Why are Nations armed?" Why should they disarm? Why do not they?

Briefly summarized, the reasons he advances are as follows:

(*a*) Nations, like animals, are armed for their own preservation.

(*b*) There are strong economic and humanitarian reasons in favour of disarmament.

(*c*) Nations do not disarm, owing to mutual distrust, and through fear of the uncivilized and semi-civilized nations of the world.

It is perhaps worth while to examine a little more closely the principles underlying the first and third of these reasons. It is not proposed in this short article to touch on what may be called the "emotional" causes of war, religion and nationalism. These causes have in the past contributed their share to human conflict, and they remain as possible factors in future wars. But it seems in the highest degree improbable that they will ever again figure as the sole motives for a war between civilized nations.

What, then, is it that nations are so anxious to preserve from foreign aggression, and is there any underlying reason why men and animals fight amongst themselves? The answer is to be found in the relationship between war and economics. What are economics? Broadly speaking, they are the struggle of all living organisms to exist materially; in the case of man they are his struggle to win from nature a reasonable "standard of living" * and to improve it. Animals do not ensure their existence primarily by killing and maiming other animals, except in so far as the vanquished provides

* This expression "standard of living" is used in its broadest sense to include not only the prime necessities of life, like food, clothing and shelter, but also the subsidiary necessities and luxuries, and the leisure which makes culture in all its aspects possible.

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a meal for the victor. The killing is only a means to an end. They fight each other usually in order to obtain the necessities for their own life, and occasionally to obtain mates to ensure the life of the species. In the former case, the greater the shortage of food, etc., the fiercer the struggle. We can trace this underlying cause throughout the recorded history of mankind. The men from the barren places of the earth, the peoples of the steppes, the deserts and the mountains, are always breaking in on the dwellers on the fat plains, attracted by the lure of a higher standard of living. It was the problem of Sumeria five thousand years ago ; it was the urge behind Attila and his Huns ; it is the problem of the North-West Frontier of India to-day. Rome fell, less because she became internally rotten than because the barbarians of the bleak outer marches coveted her riches.

From the dawn of history to the nineteenth century of our era there was a definite shortage of goods and services in comparison to the population of the world. Consequently, those who had less envied those who had more, and when opportunity offered, the former took from the latter.

If we admit that these economic reasons have directly or indirectly been the cause of past wars, our next step is to inquire to what extent they are likely to promote future ones. To judge by much that is written on the subject at the present time, one might suppose that the scramble for the essentials of life is just as keen in 1929 as it was when the first band of nomads raided the first neolithic village for its crops and herds. Statesmen and newspapers vie with each other in portentous warnings on the subject of overseas markets, spheres of influence, export trade, production and economy. To understand these things a little more clearly, it is necessary again to look to the past. Up to, roughly, the beginning of the nineteenth century, man, throughout the ages, had conducted his struggle with nature at a disadvantage. Means of production were primitive, economic organization was conspicuous by its absence, and communications were poor. Consequently, as we have noted, there were not enough necessities or luxuries for everybody. Then came an economic revolution. Using what " Festina Lente " describes as his best weapon—his brain—man achieved an almost complete economic victory over the forces of nature. In a short period of one hundred years, steam, electricity, machines and the other inventions and organizations connected with them, converted a world of material shortage into a world of material plenty. This is the cardinal economic fact of the present day : there is no longer a

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world shortage of goods and services. Enough goods are or can be produced to give everybody a reasonable standard of living, and, as always, the demand for the good things of life remains.

If, then, production is ample and consumers eager to consume, why have we got a seeming paradox in poverty and want, even in the civilized and highly industrialized nations of the West? The answer is to be found in the third of the economic trinity, distribution. Our system of distribution has not kept pace with our improvements in production or our need for consumption. The chief agent for distribution is of course "money," or, to be more exact, "purchasing power"—which means money in relation to prices. It is obvious that if the peoples of the world are crying out for goods, there can be only two reasons why they cannot get them: either because the goods do not exist, or because they (the consumers) have not the wherewithal to purchase these goods. But we have seen that there is now no world shortage of goods, and therefore it is the lack of purchasing power which stands between the consumer and his desires. To employ a homely simile, the present situation is as though there was a train standing on a first-class railway system, and enough passengers to fill the train wished to make the journey; only there are not enough tickets for all the passengers.

What do we mean by money? Not, of course, gold or silver or even bank notes; these are merely the small change of modern industrial civilization. By money is meant "credit," and modern industry is carried on almost entirely on credit. Financial credit, it is most important to understand, is a creation of the banking system, and is repayable out of money collected from consumers through prices. This affects the whole community, but the banking system, which controls it, is responsible to nobody except itself. In other words, the loan credit on which modern industry runs is originated by figures written in a ledger, but its recall in money as the property of the banks involves us all. The amount of credit created, which ultimately determines the amount of purchasing power at the disposal of the consumer, is determined by the banks and by them only. The method upon which the financial system works is too complicated to explain in detail in an article of this length, but it is sufficient to say that under the present system there is never sufficient money available in consumers' hands to purchase the amount of goods and services which are produced, and a constant check is thus exercised upon expansion of production to meet real human needs. In consequence an artificial shortage of goods is created by the restrictive money system to meet an artificially

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restricted demand; and this restraint upon production results in unemployment of capital and of men, with the consequent train of evils with which we are only too clearly faced—poverty, disputes between capital and labour, and most serious of all, a frantic competition between industrial nations for foreign markets (in which to sell goods which cannot be bought by the home consumer) with an ever-increasing danger of war. We can see the truth of this statement in the emphasis which is constantly being placed upon the importance to England of more exports. Now this export question, as it affects this country, is not wholly clear to many people, chiefly because a certain proportion of our exports are an absolute necessity, in exchange for the food and raw material which we require from abroad. What is not generally understood, however, is that a large part of our exports are only necessary because we cannot, under our present financial system, find enough consumers at home with the money to pay for these goods. Before the war of 1914–1918, this was not so serious a question, as we had an almost unlimited field of oversea markets, but since the war the other industrial nations of the world have entered into fierce competition with us for these markets, which are as vital to their existence as to our own, so long as the existing financial technique remains in operation.

The present situation, therefore, is that both our home markets and our foreign markets are shrinking, whilst our capacity for production is growing. And, moreover, all industrial nations are in the same plight. America has found a temporary alleviation to the problem of under-consumption by her vast system of instalment buying, which is in fact a partial form of "consumer credit," but the banks are now limiting this system, and in proportion as it is broken down she will be in the same condition as the other industrial nations of the world, and will have materially to enlarge her foreign markets. In fact, the recent expansionist policy in the United States of America is the direct result of this change. To sum up briefly what has been written above:

(*a*) War has always been a means for preserving or improving the economic life of the group.

(*b*) Whilst there was a definite world shortage of goods and services, war was perhaps inevitable.

(*c*) There is now no longer a world shortage of goods.

(*d*) The vital factor connecting production and consumption is distribution.

(*e*) Distribution is now very largely dependent on loan credit.

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This loan credit is entirely in the hands of the Banking system, which thus has almost complete power over the economic life of the community.

(*f*) Under the present financial system we are increasing our productive capacity, but the purchasing power of the consumer is gradually shrinking.

(*g*) This inability of the consumer at home to buy the commodities which he wants and which are available is the chief cause of our internal ills (unemployment, labour disputes, poverty, etc.) and the most potent danger of war.

The object of this article is not to suggest a remedy—though in the opinion of the writer such a remedy exists—but to state shortly and concisely the present economic situation, and its connection with war—a matter of some concern to all soldiers.

"Festina Lente" suggests that war is still innate in human nature, and that we should tread delicately in our attempts to eradicate the tendency. Leaving human nature aside, however, war is most certainly innate in our present financial system, and it seems most probable that unless this system is modified at no distant date, the world will be (to quote Mr. Bernard Shaw) "wrecked back into barbarism," where even a possible return to a primitive system of barter may not wholly compensate us for the loss of our present amenities.

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MORE METHOD

By Captain C. R. Major, The York and Lancaster Regt.

In a previous article * the writer stated as an axiom that method was the essence of successful Intelligence, and he is still confident that this assertion can be accepted without any hesitation. The reasons for this second article are identical with those which prompted him to write his former one. In business broad principles and wide ideas are excellent, but it is in the method of execution—the way of putting it into effect—that any big conception proves either a success or a failure. What is true in business is equally true in Intelligence work which can also be compared with that of a detective. A detective builds up methodically, possibly from a single clue, a whole structure of evidence. If his conclusions prove incorrect, he ruthlessly pulls down that which he has built and starts again, with equal patience and method.

The methodical piecing together of the odd scraps and bits of information is the work of most Intelligence Officers. The marvellous coups of journalism, and the sudden and plentiful inspirations of fiction do not come the way of the average officer called upon to carry out military Intelligence duties in the field. His work will largely consist of doing something methodically. And, in the words of the book, that something is to " collect, collate and disseminate information." It is to consider the best method of carrying out at least some of these duties that this short article has been written. The writer feels that those most qualified to instruct in the subject of military Intelligence have not the time to go into minute details of systems and methods, and that consequently these notes may be of some help in this respect. They will at least provide that oft-quoted and useful thing, a " cock-shy," for any who may not have fixed their own methods.

The suggestions offered are mostly for those who have to perform Intelligence duties in the lower formations, and are concerned principally with " more methods " of dealing with and recording information. Only such are mentioned as are considered to be the most helpful.

* *See* " To Paint the Picture," *Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.

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A name.—Before proceeding, it is necessary to say a few words regarding the *personnel* in a battalion whose special duty it is to obtain information.

Perhaps unfortunately, in the " Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field, 1922," these men are called " Battalion Scouts," and the officer a " Battalion Scout Officer." The word scout, as someone has very aptly put it, conjures up the picture of " a man crawling about on his belly " seeking information. The word is a misnomer as applied to the present-day battalion scouts, and very often leads to a misconception of their duties. Broadly speaking, battalion scouts are an organization for observation superimposed on the ordinary observation work of the companies—" Every soldier is a potential intelligence agent."

It has been suggested that in order to make their name fit the work they have to do, it would be better to call them " Battalion Intelligence *Personnel.*"* For the purpose of this article they will be referred to as such. It must be remembered that when fully trained they are valuable men not to be frittered away on work that can be equally well performed by any man in a platoon with very little preliminary training. It being presumed that in the attack, a section, once it is extended (normally because it has come under effective small arms fire) does not need scouts. Before that point is gained it will probably be necessary to have men as scouts out in front, working in pairs, by bounds. But they can be found by the ordinary company *personnel.* This work approximates more nearly to the usually accepted meaning of the term. Whereas the battalion intelligence *personnel* are only scouts in the old sense, in so far as they should be able " to see without being seen."

Training.—The writer understands that in most Commands the training of brigade and battalion intelligence *personnel* now finds a place amongst the many subjects in which instruction has to be given during the individual training period, including courses in intelligence duties for battalion and brigade intelligence officers. It is not intended, therefore, to offer suggestions on training with the one exception of the usefulness of the inclusion of " Kim's Game " †

* Since this article was written certain amendments have been issued and the term Battalion Intelligence Section has been adopted, at least in Infantry Training, vol. i, 1926.

† The game merely consists of viewing a collection of articles for a stated period, and then writing down from memory the names of those articles the player has remembered. Of course, the number of articles exposed to view can be increased from say thirty to sixty, and the time limit cut down by degrees from say sixty to thirty seconds, as proficiency is gained. The occasional inclusion of a packet of cigarettes in the articles shown, to be awarded as a prize to the winner, is a pleasing incentive after a strenuous morning's work.

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in the programme of a course for battalion intelligence *personnel*. In the experience of the writer this pastime of Rudyard Kipling's masterpiece, and of Baden Powell Scouts, was included with advantage in the training of war-time scouts. It was astonishing the progress made. Powers of observation were steadily—almost rapidly—developed. These games, added to what, for lack of a better name were termed " observation marches " (very similar in character to an exercise now included in the weapon training courses at the Small Arms School, Hythe), made instinctive the actual seeing of objects and incidents, as opposed to the non-registering and useless glance of the casual or careless.

Recording Information.—A deduction made with smooth ease on the receipt of information may become smudged and ragged after countless details have come to hand: some relevant, others worthless. The " one man and a boy," the two limbered wagons, the three mounted men, etc., etc., seen at various places and at different times, all go to confuse the issue.

Information must be noted down, and the necessity for some form of record even the most expert will admit. " Method is the essence of successful Intelligence."

(*a*) *For a Battalion.*—Those whose duty it has been to record information on a map know the congestion that obtains when trying to mark up details on one of small scale. In the case of a battalion, information will necessarily be of a more detailed nature, and confined to a smaller area, than is the case the higher the formation concerned. What is the best way of dealing with this question? It is suggested that for a battalion, information can best be recorded by the use of an enlargement of some kind of the existing map. Here arises the question of time. Few occasions will occur where there is sufficient time to make an enlargement of a map during active operations, and even if time is available beforehand, the uncertainty as to the actual point of contact prevents this being done previously. There is, however, nothing to prevent the preparation of skeleton grids, say to a scale of twice, or three times, the scale of the map in use, each grid being equivalent to one large square of the map, and subdivided similarly into ten times ten small squares. A supply of these grids can easily be provided by the use of stencil or carbon paper.

It will be realized that it is immaterial at what place on the map the action is taking place. All that is necessary, as soon as operations really begin, is to take a skeleton grid, mark in the reference letter, having the zero small square in whichever is considered the most

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convenient part of the grid (this should be done with due regard to the likely course of the battle) and from then onwards fill in the information as it comes to hand.

Map references given in messages will of course correspond with the coordinates of the skeleton grid. *See* example below.

As an illustration the following information has been recorded.

Dropped message from close reconnaissance machine.

" 1510 hours 300 inf. moving EAST at W. 1806."

This will simply be marked in on the skeleton grid as shown. Probably later in the day the same column is reported, at 1600 hours at W. 3212, moving N.E. This is duly recorded ; and, if the column has been moving along a road, this is sketched in later.



(N.B.—Naturally any method desired can be used for marking in information. The example above is based on the system suggested in " To paint the Picture."* It has the advantage of

* *See Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.

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keeping track, by means of the indication arrows, of the line of advance of an enemy column, whereas a pin moved forward without any legend alongside does not do this.)

As opportunity occurs any salient features from the map should be sketched in on the grid, such as streams or rivers, roads and contours. These can be added to, as time permits. The first essential, however, is a record of information: elaboration of detail depends on the situation. Naturally sufficient topographical work must be put in the sketch to make it of use: this need not be minute.

The advantage of the skeleton grid is that it gives sufficient room for information to be written in. Also, it is useful from the point of view of a commanding officer, who, when called to a conference, has always a sketch-map of the situation ready to take with him.

For a battalion the writer considers that the above should be usually sufficient, but, if it should be desired to supplement this map record by a log book, the system of recording information given below for a brigade would be equally applicable.

(*b*) *For a Brigade.*—For a brigade information should be plotted * on a map. A little consideration will prove this necessity. It is easy to visualize an infantry brigade with attached troops, strong in tanks and mechanized vehicles, allotted the task of seizing some highly important tactical feature. Speed is essential. The enemy is known to be strong in artillery. What a brigade commander most needs to know, is the position of the hostile guns. The Air Force is asked for this information. Shortly radio-telephony reports, W/T or dropped messages come in.

" 1005 hours 2 guns firing NORTH at S. 2856."

" 1120 hours 1 gun stationary and 2 limbered wagons seen at S. 3048."

" 1135 hours 2 guns firing NORTH at R. 9560."

" 1140 hours 4 guns moving N.E. at R. 8840."

and so on, and so on. Such messages arrive at odd times throughout the day, interspersed with other information. If they are merely read, the places looked up on the map and the message consigned to some one's pocket, haversack or the file-clip, very little is conveyed to the mind. It is hard to form a picture. Many other things have to be dealt with. Unless this information is recorded on a map, at the end of a weary day there will be just the knowledge that somewhere in the vicinity of the N.E. corner of " R " square and the

* A suggested method of doing this has already been given in " To Paint the Picture," *Army Quarterly*, January, 1927.

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N.W. corner of " S " square there is artillery. Whereas, if the odd scraps and bits had been plotted, it is more than probable that a clear picture would have been the result. The dangerous half-circle of guns towards which the tanks are heading would have been discovered.

For a brigade merely to plot information is probably not sufficient. Some easy reference is necessary; some record of the action taken is needed. It is suggested that a log book, on the lines of the specimen page below, is required.

It must be remembered that in any form of log book, the essential is to reduce the actual writing at the time of an entry to a minimum. Headings must be made to do as much of the work as possible. Forms can be prepared beforehand when time will be available. When operations are in progress time probably will be everything. That oft-quoted remark of Napoleon's regarding the value of time applies even to the amount required to make an entry in a log book.

A figure, " yes," " no," the letter of a company, or a stroke in a column, is what is wanted. There will not be opportunity to elaborate: headings must be made to do this beforehand, always remembering that a multiplicity of these will tend to create confusion. Therefore cut down to essentials.

PRO FORMA OF PAGE FOR A LOG BOOK.

Serial No.	Date.	Time of origin.	Time received.	From.	Place (referred to in message).	Information.	Action taken.	Deductions (if any).	Remarks.

Graphs, etcetera.—In higher formations where various records have to be kept, graphs are of the greatest assistance: by their use train and other movements, estimates of the enemy's strength, etc., can be recorded.

In this connection it is of interest to note that the capture of Shanghai, in March, 1927, by the Southern, or Kuominchun forces, from the Northern, or Ankuochun, and the subsequent quietude in that part of China, was faithfully revealed by the peak of the curve of a movement chart.

Naturally different colours used on one chart enable various

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information to be recorded. Colours should also be used for what may be termed the scientific ruling of books, or forms, where long vertical or horizontal references have to be made. For example, in a statistics table, probably covering two pages of closely typed or printed matter, reference is facilitated if, say, every fifth ruled line is in a contrasting colour. The writer is aware that this sounds academic, but in practice it is found to be plain common sense.

General.—For all work the preference of the individual must be considered, for it has been said that " you cannot make an intelligence officer." He can be instructed in ways and means, given principles and rules, outlines of methods and systems, but at the end he may not make an intelligence officer. Nevertheless, it is only by practice that the art can be developed. To some, practice can never make any difference ; but to most, after a time, comes the knowledge of what to accept and what to reject, what is relevant and what is useless.

The burden of this short article is a plea for method in the carrying out of what may be termed the mechanical side of intelligence duties. Everyone is familiar with the individual who makes many markings all over a map, further assisted by various coloured pins and flags, but who carefully omits a " key " or " legend " of any sort. If he should be out of the room, or killed, the valuable information the map contains is concealed from those who wish to know what is taking place.

The higher the formation the more necessary does method become. A keen business man knows something of " motion study." It is sometimes questionable whether this subject receives much attention when an officer sets up his situation maps. It is possible the office in which this is being done may be occupied for some time. Countless steps, and the leaving and returning to a seat, can be saved if the map is near the desk or table at which the officer is working—and all movement takes time.

A card index cabinet (if in use) if set convenient to the hand of the user, and in a drawer which is the correct height from the ground, saves valuable seconds daily by the fact of being so placed.

There are many more examples of how time may be conserved. And —— " Ask me for everything but time," said Napoleon.

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THE MEANING AND VALUE OF EMOTION

" Immobility, physical, moral, and intellectual stagnation surrender a man unreservedly to his emotions, whereas movement, work of any kind, tends to deliver him from them."—" The Transformations of War," by Comdt. J. Colin.

HUNDREDS of apples must have fallen upon hundreds of intelligent heads before Sir Isaac Newton was prompted to enunciate the law of gravity, and in much the same way millions of people have experienced manifestations of the emotions without being tempted to know the reason for them. An occurrence has only to become commonplace and, so long as its effects are not markedly disagreeable, we are content to accept it as part of the ordinary day's work, and soon cease to trouble ourselves concerning its origin.

Some day, however, some one is sure to come along, whose brain—if the apple story is true—is more sensitive, as well as more inquiring, than those of his fellows. He begins to ask questions, to delve beneath the surface of things, and then one day he makes a remarkable discovery. Of course the public does not hear of this for a long time afterwards, or, if they do, they probably laugh at it as the idle dream of a philosopher; but the discovery gradually works its way into the main body of scientific opinion, and later, when science has moved far ahead, it finds popular acceptance in the form of a tradition.

This is what is happening to-day with regard to the emotions. Scientific investigators, spurred on perhaps by sensations unknown to the average man, have been seeking for some time past to explain the phenomena of emotion. As yet complete success has not crowned their efforts, but much interesting knowledge has been accumulated, and one wonders whether some of it may not be of value to the soldier. It is one of our maxims that " success in war depends largely on a knowledge of human nature," and it seems somehow as if this knowledge ought to include an understanding of the emotions.

Let us begin, then, by considering how we stand in this respect to-day. How much, if anything, do we know as to how our emotions work?

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We know that some races—and likewise some individuals—are more emotional than others; that some emotions are less pleasant than others; that all emotions, and particularly the less pleasant ones, are very contagious amongst crowds; and that all violent displays of emotion tend to leave us in a state of physical prostration.

But is any one prepared to say to what extent emotional excitement may be beneficial to the human being, or at what point it becomes definitely harmful? Can any one tell us to what extent the statesman and the general are justified in appealing to the emotions of those who follow them, or when such an appeal becomes merely a waste of precious nervous energy?

We British are on the whole an unemotional race, and it is significant that our two greatest generals, the Dukes of Marlborough and Wellington, were both comparatively unemotional men. But even amongst us there are certain types of emotion that are considered quite justifiable, such as warlike enthusiasm in times of great national emergency, and "righteous indignation," which is most often aroused in our people by the crime of oppression or cruelty.

It is particularly to be noted, however, that as a nation we are not good haters. Some of our continental critics probably attribute this to our inordinate national conceit, which makes us regard others as not worth hating. And in this, as we shall see, there is certainly a grain of truth, although not of the kind conveyed by such a criticism. The fact is, the Briton is too much concerned in doing things to give much attention to his own thoughts and feelings. If he does not like a man he has at him, and expends all his available nervous energy in the giving and taking of good honest blows.

There is a passage in the first volume of Fortescue's "History of the British Army" which, I think, expresses this characteristic perfectly. It concerns the little-known battle of Auray, which was fought between the British and French on the 29th of September, 1365, and it runs as follows:

"The English archers as usual opened the engagement, but as at Cocherel their shafts could not penetrate the armour of the French; whereupon with great deliberation they threw down their bows, and boldly advancing to the French men-at-arms plucked their arms from their hands and plied the weapons against their astonished owners with terrible effect. The whole proceeding furnishes so good an example of the thoughtless, thick-headed gallantry of the English soldier that one can only marvel that the battle of Auray should be practically unknown to Englishmen. The intensely ludicrous picture that can

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be conjured up of a series of detached struggles between the brawny, active Englishmen in their doublets and hose, and the unhappy Frenchmen cased stiffly in their mail, the panting, the staggering, and the rattling, the agonised curses from behind the vizor, and the great broad laugh on the honest English face—this alone should save it from oblivion." *

It is " the great broad laugh on the honest English face " that is characteristic of our race as fighters. Our men rarely lose their tempers, and the same placidity marks their relations with their officers. " The English soldier is extraordinarily immune to the stings of envy or the serpent's tooth of contrast." †

Others, however, think and act quite differently. No less a personage than Ludendorff regards the emotion of hate as a power which ought to be made use of in time of war. Lamenting the failure of the German politicians to guide their war propaganda aright, he writes :

" England's defiance of the laws of nations in employing the blockade against our very flesh and blood was not met by fiery protest ; the heart of the people was not filled with strong, manly hatred ; its holy ire was not directed against the inhuman enemy. Far from it. Discontent with the conditions at home, which were directly caused by the blockade, was permitted to spend its force internally, increase the effect of the blockade, and disintegrate our national life." ‡

So much for the purely military aspect of the problem. Before seeing what the psychologists have got to tell us on the subject, it might be of interest to take a glance back at political history. There we shall find numerous examples of the baneful effect of emotion upon the conduct of policy, with few compensating examples on the other side. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that emotion generally figures side by side with a negative policy, taking in consequence the form of envy, or some other component of what we might call the " sour grapes " complex.

Thus in 1844, when, at Lord Aberdeen's suggestion, the Emperor Nicholas of Russia had been invited to visit England for the purpose of clearing up the political misunderstandings which then existed between the two countries, the result was the reverse of that hoped for. For " the Tsar's expressed belief in the speedy decease of the ' Sick Man '—as he called Turkey—was interpreted as his own intention to commit homicide," § and Britain's distrust of Russia's Eastern policy was revived in all its old intensity.

* *See* " A History of the British Army," by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, p. 43.
† *See* " The Soul and Body of an Army," by General Sir Ian Hamilton, p. 128.
‡ *See* " My War Memories, 1914–1918," by General Ludendorff, p. 453.
§ *See* " Modern Europe, 1815–1899," by W. Alison Phillips, p. 235.

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Again in 1852, when the British Government, at the inspiration of Palmerston, had once more become hostile to Russia, the Tsar Nicholas, although he realized that to refuse recognition to the French Emperor Napoleon would merely be to play into the hands of England, yet could not bring himself to make this recognition acceptable to Napoleon.

"He would recognize the 'Emperor of the French,' but never the dynastic claims implied in the number III which Napoleon had added to his name. He refused to address the French usurper with the usual formula of 'my brother,' substituting 'my friend'; and sacrificed to his unbending pride that cordial understanding of Russia with France which it had been the one object of Russian diplomacy to obtain. For Napoleon, with the sensitiveness of the *parvenu*, bitterly resented the Tsar's attitude, and was prepared to retaliate on the first opportunity." *

Later, as the war clouds of Armageddon begin to gather, we still find envy occupying an unpleasant prominent place in international relationships.

"In a flamboyant speech at Reval in 1904 the German Emperor has already styled himself 'The Admiral of the Atlantic.' All sorts of sober-minded people in England began to be profoundly disquieted. What did Germany want this great navy for? Against whom, except us, could she measure it, match it, or use it? There was a deep and growing feeling, no longer confined to political and diplomatic circles, that the Prussians meant mischief, that they envied the splendour of the British Empire, and that if they saw a good chance at our expense, they would take full advantage of it." †

Nor does even a common brotherhood in arms protect one from the baleful influence of such emotions. On the contrary, the miserable record of misunderstandings and discord that has marked our own amphibious operations in the past, and the petty strifes and jealousies that have characterized every coalition since war began, seems to show that there are worse methods of settling our grievances than by an occasional hearty encounter.

What, then, is our judgment to be? Are we, like Ludendorff, to regard emotion as a cause, or are we to regard it merely as an effect?

Immobility, writes Commandant Colin in a passage which the writer has quoted at the head of this article, surrenders a man unreservedly to his emotions, and by the use of the word "surrender"

* *See* "Modern Europe, 1815–1899," by W. Alison Phillips, p. 339.
† *See* "The World Crisis, 1911–1914," by the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, p. 38.

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he leaves us with the impression that he regards emotion as a cause, although not of a beneficial nature.

It is now time that we turned to the psychologist for his assistance, and in doing so let us spread our net as wide as possible, lest we be misled by the too narrow view-point of any one particular school of thought. For those who are actually engaged upon scientific research it is essential to keep the field of inquiry limited in order that the number of facts to be investigated will be within the powers of human observation. Being concerned only with the recording of facts, it is immaterial to them that the picture at which they are looking is but a very small fraction of the whole.

For our purposes, however, we want to look at the wood, and not merely at a few of the trees. Our object is to generalize about the phenomenon of emotion, and this means that our theory must be based upon the widest possible foundations.

It would be presumptuous—and of course quite untruthful—of the writer to suggest that his knowledge of this subject covers the whole field of scientific endeavour, but he hopes that in the following paragraphs he will be able to present enough material to satisfy the reader, and to justify an attempt at generalization.

Professor William McDougall, in his "Social Psychology," defines emotion as the "affective constituent of an instinct," and he further regards it as the decisive characteristic of an instinct, the presence of which is proof that the actions which it accompanies are the result of instinctive causes. A sentiment, he tells us, is developed from an emotion by continued excitement, or habit, and it usually becomes centred round the object, or person, that first excited the emotion.

Morton Prince, writing on "The Unconscious," accepts this theory of McDougall's, and adds: "The central element, the emotion, provides the conative or impulsive force which carries the instinct to fulfilment. It is the motive power, the dynamic agent that executes, that propels the response which follows the stimulus."

Whilst Charles Baudouin, the French psychologist, seems to give partial confirmation to this theory by stating that emotion is the main cause of the majority of spontaneous suggestions.

There are psychologists, however, who hold entirely opposite opinions. Thus Rivers, discussing "Instinct and the Unconscious," considers that "the possibility cannot be excluded that the normal and unimpeded flight of animals from danger is not accompanied by the emotion of fear," and another writer, Slade,* definitely

* *See* "Our Phantastic Emotions," by T. K. Slade.

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assumes that emotion is not necessarily part of an instinctive action. He does not credit animals with the same kinds of emotion as human beings at all, but compares animal and human emotions to the river valleys and railway systems of a modern country.

From Saxby comes another idea, namely that emotion is a kind of safety-valve. "An emotion," he writes,* "tends to be produced when more energy is set free by the precept than is used up in action," and he further assumes that all slight emotions are pleasurable, whence he argues that a too hasty reaction is avoided and an increase in adaptability is obtained.

Finally, in the Freudian theory emotion is chiefly remarkable as the link between the known and the unknown. "That which was previously unconscious only becomes present to consciousness through the channel of emotion."† Freud has also evolved an electrical analogy for mental phenomena, according to which the evolution of consciousness and the higher planes of mental activity represents a gradual transformation of *libido*, or psychic energy, from a low to an ever higher state of potential. And although, so far as the writer is aware, he has not himself suggested it, the inference to be drawn from this analogy is that emotion is in the psychic sphere what resistance is in electricity, and what friction is in physics. At all events it is significant that they all three tend to manifest themselves in the same way, that is in the liberation of heat.

The writer proposes, therefore, to make use of this inference for the purpose of his generalization. Emotion, he suggests, is psychic resistance, or psychic friction, call it which you like, and that its chief value to us lies in the fact that without it we should be the unhappy victims of perpetual motion. Of necessity, therefore, all slight emotions must be pleasurable, but, on the other hand, emotion itself cannot be regarded as a safety-valve, any more than the brakes of a motor car can be so regarded. They do certainly procure our safety on occasions by converting the energy of motion into heat, but their object is simply to control the speed of the machine and not to prevent it from bursting.

The point, however, is a minor one and not worth pursuing. The essence of the theory is, first of all, that emotion in small quantities is useful, indeed unavoidable, but that in large quantities it is a mere waste of psychic energy. It is a sign that the machine is not working properly, that too much friction is being developed, and that it is time an expert mechanic was called in.

* *See* "Education of Behaviour," by I. B. Saxby.
† *See* "Psycho-Analysis," by Barbara Low.

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Now an expert psychic mechanic, if asked to define the causes of over-heating, would almost certainly embark upon a recital of Freud's theory of the mental conflict. The writer, not being an expert, will not be rash enough to attempt such an exposition, but will endeavour to illustrate my meaning with a little example taken from the life of the soldier.

Imagine, then, an outpost sentry suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by a large body of the enemy. Being fundamentally an individual animal with a proper regard for his own welfare, his first instinctive impulse will undoubtedly be to seek safety in flight. He will not of course think about it, but, if for a fraction of a second his feelings could be put into words, they would read very like the old rhyme about Yankee Butler.

> " He who fights and runs away
> Shall live to fight another day.
> But Yankee Butler thinks it right
> To run away before you fight,
> For if, he says, to fight you stay
> You may not live to run away."

Man's lowest instincts, called by Rivers the " Self-Preservative Group," work very much along the same lines as these. Not through cowardice, because when the occasion arises the lowest brute can make a very gallant fight of it, but simply out of due regard for his own safety. If such an one had sufficient education he might adopt the jargon of the war communique and say that he was carrying out a strategic retirement according to plan.

But by the time that he had got such education he would also have acquired a new set of instincts, the " Race-Preservative Group," the effect of which would be completely to change his actions. The preparatory measures would remain the same, the sudden racing of the pulse, the tautening of the muscles, etc., but before any movement could take place the " Race-Preservative " instincts would have intervened, and barred the way to self-indulgence. In this case, the voice of duty would say, your own safety must be subordinated to that of the army of which you are a member. And the voice of duty would be backed by the threat of physical and moral penalties which it would not be pleasant to incur.

In this way there will arise a struggle in the mind of the sentry, which may be long or short, conscious or unconscious, but which must end eventually in some sort of action. Even if the activity be only mental, it will give an outlet to the energy that has been piling up inside him, and thus save him from being sucked down, helpless, into a whirlpool of emotion.

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Manipulative activity, however, is better. "Every animal has a natural reaction to danger, perhaps more than one, and man's is manipulation of such a kind as to get him out of the dangerous situation." * So the balloon man, who has a certain amount of observation to do, but most of the time has no activity whatever and is sitting in the middle of a target, is more liable to nervous breakdown than the aeroplane observer, the observer than the pilot. Likewise having to sit still and be bombarded in a trench is more trying than fighting an enemy in the open, and to be between two barrages with nothing to be done is worse than to dodge one's way through the shells of one.

Here, then, we have found an answer to most of the questions which we set out to solve, and at the same time an explanation of the emotional stolidity of the Englishman. No one is to him worth hating because he has not got any energy to waste in the display of emotion. Fortune has decreed that he should have to work hard to obtain a living, and he has thus acquired a habit of doing things which has served him in good stead in easier times.

This same stolidity may also be viewed in another light. We English have been fairly described as a race of good average men, and it is this mediocrity of ours that is one of our most hopeful characteristics. For it denotes great mental stability, and balance, if the psycho-analysts speak truth, is the key to mental strength and health.

And patience, I think, is the hall-mark of mental balance. It is a quality which has characterized many great men, and no one more than the famous Duke of Marlborough.

"If there be one attribute which should be chosen as supremely characteristic of the man, it is that which William Pitt selected as the first requisite of a statesman—patience—which, as may be seen in a hundred passages during the war, was possessed by him in such measure that it appears almost godlike." †

It is difficult to think of any more fitting thought with which to close this little study of emotion.

* *See* "Report of the W.O. Committee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock,'" p. 57.

† *See* "A History of the British Army" (vol. i), by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, p. 590.

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THE UNCENSORED DIARY OF A GENERAL OFFICER

[THERE appeared in the October number of the *Army Quarterly* extracts from the uncensored diary of Mr. Y. Z., the famous war correspondent. We have been fortunate to obtain the uncensored diary of a General officer who rose to some distinction in the war. The following are extracts.]

Somewhere in France. October 10.—Confession is good for the soul. Thank God I can write in this diary what I really feel. This life of mine of make-believe is a strain that is sometimes almost unbearable. This little locked booklet shall be my safety-valve. . . . I have got to get on. I must not let this physical terror that besets me paralyze my intelligence. B.'s comment as we drove back from divisional H.Q. this afternoon was cutting. What a fool the man is! He will remain a brigadier until the end of the war, if he cannot tell his superiors a better story than he told H. this afternoon. But then he is so thorough, and so conscientious about visiting every hole and cranny in his line, that he is sure to "stop something." That, however, is no reason why he should be so beastly sarcastic with me for "telling the tale." I call it d——d rot for a brigadier to get shot like a rat in a hole, wasting his time in the front line when he has an efficient brigade-major to do the dirty work for him.

October 20.—These amateur soldiers are the limit. That d——d fellow commanding the Chalkdowners let me down good and proper this morning. No Regular soldier would have dared to have behaved as he did. But I will be even with him. H. has been invalided and they have sent K. to command the division. K. is a new broom, and the idiot must needs see my line. Fortunately he telephoned me overnight, so my old friend "Peshawar fever" came to my rescue and kept me in bed this morning. A day in bed is always good for a man during strenuous times. But then that d——d Chalkdowner Colonel let me down. At least this is the brigade-major's version of the affair. When K. had finished with

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the Chalkdowner's bit of front, the C.O. asked him into his dug-out to have a drink. He then produced an autograph album, saying that he kept it for the signatures of General officers who visited him in his front line. K. was all *bonhomie* and said, " I see, Colonel, you do me the honour of giving me a new page to myself." Then the blithering idiot of a C.O. replied, " Quite accidental, Sir, I assure you. *You happen to be the first General officer that has ever visited my unit when it was in the line.*"

October 25.—Thank God they have shifted K., and J. has come to command the division. I must now set about the shifting of that pestilential C.O. of the Chalkdowners.

October 30.—Finished my treatise on " Infantry attack in light of recent experiences in France and Flanders." I shall send it to D. at G.H.Q. He will show it to the Chief, and it should do the trick, as he is weeding out so many of his " obsoletes " from the divisional commands. The pen is mightier than the sword. I have also, to-day, put in my report upon that obnoxious fellow the C.O. of the Chalkdowners. It should cook his goose all right.

November 6.—J. sent for me to-day about that Chalkdowner fellow. Thank goodness he holds the right views about amateur soldiers. I explained the D.S.O. away all right, since they showered decorations on these fellows as a sort of " ground-bait " to encourage recruiting in the early days, and I pointed out that an individual act of so-called gallantry did not, of necessity, mean competency as a C.O. Anyway J. has sent my report on to the M.S., and Mr. Chalkdowner's number is up.

November 7.—Heard from D. He says that the Chief has read my paper and is much impressed by it. *En avant!*

November 10.—J. is much too energetic. He is as bad as his predecessor. He turned up here this morning while I was having breakfast, and insisted upon going round the line. Fortunately, especially as the Boche began to send some " heavy stuff " over, I slipped up on a duck-board and sprained my ankle—useful things, duck-boards!—and, of course, I could not go on. I limped home, and our Sawbones has put my foot into cotton-wool. Good fellow our Sawbones, he says that very often the worst sprains don't swell much.

November 20.—The C.O. of the Chalkdowners came to take leave of me to-day. If a look could kill, I should be a dead man. He never said a word, but I bet he was thinking a lot: these d——d amateurs imagine that you can become a soldier by the wave of a magician's wand.

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December 10.—It's come through. Got a wire from the M.S. to-day to say that I am to have the 606th Division. What a relief! It's a terrifying thing to have to command a brigade in battle. Thank heaven, I have been able to avoid doing so during my novitiate. Now as a divisional commander my anxieties will be reduced by about 80 per cent. You should have seen B.'s face when I told him the news. He is too observant is B., too honest; he'll never get beyond a brigade, even if he has phenomenal luck and is not killed.

March 20.—There is nothing like a bit of luck. I hadn't taken over my division a month before we got into a bit of open warfare. Open warfare, that's the stuff to make a success of a divisional command. If it only continues I'll get my K.C.B. in the next honours list. But I have a lot of slow-bellies to deal with from the Corps Commander downwards. That, however, is all to the good. One is able to stand out by comparison. Saw my first Boche, that were not prisoners, to-day. Curious, I have been out here over two years, and have not seen an active enemy before. Went up to the front held by the cavalry, and it overlooked about six miles of open plain. There, riding about, was a Boche cavalry patrol. I didn't half go off the deep end. The cavalry C.O. was another of these d——d amateurs. He was not in the least purturbed at seeing an enemy patrol loose in the open. Talked a lot of rot about them operating under the cover of a chain of machine-gun nests. I told him what I thought about him, and the cavalry in general, and ordered him to chase them out of it. I would have stayed to have seen what sort of a fist he made of it, only the Boche began to pour some shell over, and the position did not look too healthy. Never mind, I will get the Corps—the old Corps Commander feeds out of my hand, as he thinks I have a pull at the G.H.Q.—to put that white-livered yeoman under my command for a day or two. I'll larn him to let enemy patrols perambulate about my front—machine guns, or no machine guns.

March 22.—Slow-bellies all. Went to a conference at Corps H.Q. Told the C.C. if he would only say the word "Go," I would have my division through the Boche lines in twenty-four hours. Old X. rounded on me, and said that he had information that the enemy had only withdrawn to a position that he had been preparing for months, and that no object would be attained by committing the Corps to an operation that would only result in a lot of useless casualties. What is one to do with people who think like this? Well, we shall see. Given half a chance, I'll be standing in old X.'s shoes

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before long. Useless sacrifice of human life! What the devil is war for? Can't make omelettes without breaking eggs! I suppose that old X. believes what that miserable yeomanry colonel told him. Just fancy putting any credence in a play-boy soldier, and a cavalry one at that, who lets the enemy's patrols creep about his front in full view!

March 24.—Got some backchat from the Corps this morning. They say that one of my brigades has laid out the trace for its new line on the exposed face of the position we are to take up, in full view of the Boche's observation posts. This is that d——d fellow Y. God alone knows why they ever gave him a brigade. Now I shall have to go up myself and see what foolery he has been up to, and it's a d——d unhealthy spot. The Boche have all the ranges marked down. A divisional general is far too valuable a life to undertake any unnecessary risks. What the devil is a brigadier for, anyway?

March 28.—Pushed the Boche back on to their line to-day. Could direct, in perfect safety, from Point 303. Only had 1924 casualties in the division.

Am safe for my K.C.B.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE three most important books of the quarter, the War Diary of Crown Prince Rupprecht, the French account of the first portion of the Salonika Campaign, and the third of the German Official Monographs on the battle of the Marne, 1914, are reviewed in special articles. Of those included here the publications of Generals Hoffmann, von Seeckt, and Daniloff claim particular attention. The two American regimental histories are noticed because of the account which they give of the feelings of the American troops towards the British.

GENERAL

Under the title of *Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann* (The Jottings of Major-General Max Hoffmann), two volumes, Berlin, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 17.50 marks, Herr K. F. Nowak has edited and published a selection of the writings of Ludendorff's great assistant, who died last year. Hoffmann, it will be recalled, was in August, 1914, head of the Operations Section of the General Staff on the Eastern Front, continued in this capacity when Hindenburg took the place of Prittwitz, and when Ludendorff became First Quartermaster-General in September, 1916, he succeeded him as " Chief of the General Staff East," under Prince Leopold of Bavaria, the " Commander-in-Chief East."

The two volumes include an appreciation of General Hoffmann by Herr Nowak; Hoffmann's letters home during the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905, when he was German attaché with Kuroki's Army, to which Sir Ian Hamilton was also attached; " Notes," obviously extracts of letters written during 1914–1918; an article called " Thoughts on 1914 "; short papers on " The Spring Offensive of 1918," and Bolshevism; and reprints of his two books, one of which has been translated under the title of " The War of Lost Opportunities," a somewhat scathing criticism of the conduct of the Great War, and the other, *Tannenberg wie es wirklich war*, reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, April, 1927, a challenge to the accuracy of the German official account.

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Little of the personality of the man comes out in his letters, except, as his book on Tannenberg would lead one to expect, a disposition to claim that Ludendorff's successes on the Russian front were mainly due to himself. Thus on the 8th of October, 1918, he writes, " Since Ludendorff has parted from me (inwardly I mean) he has had no more ' luck.' " When in August, 1917, he was awarded the Order of the Iron Crown Second Class for the defeat of the " Kerenski offensive," he writes, " it is a distinction which I must regard as of small worth in comparison with my services."

As an unknown man, son of a magistrate and not of the military class, his rise in the German Army was, however, phenomenal. At the age of forty-seven, as C.G.S. to Prince Leopold, he was virtual commander-in-chief on the Russian front, and at forty-eight he was a major-general. It is of interest to note that he first attracted attention on account of his knowledge of the Russian language, just as it was command of Arabic that gave Lord Kitchener his opportunity. The letters from Manchuria throw no new light on events there, except for the impression made on Hoffmann by heavy gun and machine-gun fire—which the German General Staff did not overlook. Thus, his two books having already been reviewed when they appeared, it is only the 1914–1918 letters and the short papers which require notice here.

The letters are as a rule very discreet, and contain no startling revelations. One has to read pages before discovering anything of interest now ; but they seem to afford confirmation of certain things. As a rule they are merely a personal record, such as one might write to one's wife : " The Duke of Brunswick was here yesterday. I did the honours as C.G.S. for the first time. He was very nice and pleasant. Prince Leopold has gone to the Second Austrian Army for three days. This is the Army on our right flank." When Ludendorff left the Russian front he telephoned to Hoffmann daily, and one gets an occasional record of his views. Under the 10th of September, 1916, for instance : " Ludendorff called me up. The fighting in the West is heavy, but gives no reason for alarm. Bad mistakes have been made, and it is high time things were got in order." Ypres, 1914, and Verdun, 1916, are put down as Falkenhayn's great crimes. At one time there was a proposal to shelve him by making him Imperial Chancellor and appoint Knobelsdorf (the Crown Prince's Staff Officer) Chief of the General Staff. As other German books and captured documents have shown, the General Staff officers ran the war with little reference to

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the generals in command, who are rarely mentioned. The Kaiser is labelled " No shining light, but more clever than a monarch need be." The Crown Prince is " tight in grip of his Chief of the Staff, Knobelsdorf." The wounding of Prince Oscar, one of the Kaiser's sons, of which so much was made, the Iron Cross being bestowed on him, was due, we learn, to " thoughtlessness." He went along the front trenches with a " great crowd of people," and naturally the Russians turned some artillery on, and he was " quite lightly wounded."

Hindenburg, when occasionally mentioned, hardly counts except as a mouthpiece of Ludendorff to the Kaiser, who heartily disliked the First Quartermaster-General. Hoffmann, according to his own account, had to coach Hindenburg in what he had to say: " At Ludendorff's request, I spoke to Hindenburg alone for half an hour about politics [never about operations, it would appear from the letters]. At the end he was ready to speak to His Majesty, only I must give him in writing all that I have said." Through Hindenburg, Ludendorff appears to have at least assisted in the intrigues for the removal of Falkenhayn. The Field-Marshal was prompted to go frequently with complaints and suggestions to the Kaiser. Finally, Hoffmann takes the credit for proposing, after Rumania had declared war, that Hindenburg should say to the Kaiser:

" After Falkenhayn has let things go this way, I can no longer tender any more counsel. I am ready to risk my glory and popular favour and take over the heavy duties of Chief of the General Staff in the Field. If Your Majesty wills this, let Falkenhayn disappear right away to-day."

Of Ludendorff, Hoffmann writes in September, 1914: " He is the right man for the job here with his incredible ruthlessness and rudeness." But he gradually loses faith in him; especially after he became First Q.M.G., when, instead of sending reinforcements to the Eastern Front, which he had constantly demanded of Falkenhayn, he drained it of men for France.

Early in April, 1915, Hoffmann came to the conclusion that—

" We cannot beat England—at least not yet. I shall live to see it, but not in this war. Therefore, in my opinion, we must try to do a deal with England. England will bargain, she has difficulties in many places, heavy losses, particularly in officers; troubles at home (the effects of the U-Boat warfare are, however, greatly overestimated by us), Egypt, Sudan, India, Dardanelles and particularly also Japan."

He harps back several times to an agreement with England, the other belligerents do not seem to count. In October, 1917, he

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writes: "I am convinced that we can't be beaten, but, on the other hand, we are not in a condition to bring England clean down. On this ground, I am for a compromise peace." All he wants out of France is 25 milliards—"till she pays, we hold the mining area of French Lorraine," and "from Belgium an indemnity. We can hold the Belgian railways till she pays."

His "Thoughts on 1914" contain a few points of interest. For instance, we learn definitely that the celebrated Schlieffen receipt for victory contemplated only war with France and England, not Russia, and get the comment that the Official History does not explain why Moltke, the younger, surrounded as he was by Schlieffen's pupils, departed from its main principles. Hoffmann states, without giving a reference, that Moltke the elder

> "frequently pointed out that the Armies and resources of a modern State are so great, that it would not after a first defeat recognize itself as beaten and desist from making further effort; thus a modern war might last seven, even thirty years. The old soldier was not believed, but credence was given to the bankers and captains of industry who declared that a war could not last more than three or four months."

He points out, however, the absurdity of the idea of standing on the defensive in the West and making a decisive offensive in Russia; for he argues that a rapid advance there at outbreak of war would only have caught a few garrisons, as the advance of the Russian Armies only took place after their deployment well back from the frontier.

In discussing "The Spring Offensive of 1918," he poses the questions: "Was General Ludendorff perfectly clear that it was a question of a final decision, of life or death, and did he take his measures accordingly?" He answers both in the negative, and can find no indication in Ludendorff of a determination (*festen Willen*) to win victory.

The points of interest in the papers on Bolshevism are, first that Hoffmann, who was one of the German plenipotentiaries at Brest-Litovsk, says that the overtures of the Bolshevik leaders for a conference would have been declined "had we known how broken the once proud Russian Army was and how the masses were dominated by the one wish 'peace.' Then probably a less radical government would have been found, which had nothing to do but make peace." His remedy now is for the Powers to agree to active intervention, in which Germany, properly armed, would take part, and then American money must put Russia on her legs.

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Die deutsche Kraftverteilung während des Weltkrieges (The German Distribution of Forces during the Great War), by Ludwig Gehre (Berlin, Mittler, 3 marks), is valuable for the large coloured diagram, on squared paper, nearly 3 feet by 2 feet, which shows at a glance, under the various fronts and Armies and for the general reserve, the German strength in divisions on the 15th and last day of every month of the war. The strength in cavalry divisions—it was reduced from eleven to four during the war—is superimposed on the divisional curves thus obtained. The days of fighting are coloured: offensive actions blue, and defensive battles, red.

The author calls his work—which had been highly praised in the German military press—a Clausewitzian study, and he sets out to examine the war from the point of view of whether the German Supreme Command succeeded in assembling for decisive action in space and time the highest possible number of troops. He places in the forefront Frederic the Great's phrase, "Dear God is always on the side of the strongest battalions," and Clausewitz's principle, "the best strategy is to be very strong, first absolutely, and, that being impossible, at the decisive point." Incidentally he insinuates that Germany failed because, being a peaceful and non-aggressive nation, she did not maintain as large an Army as her population admitted, and demanded. He forgets to mention that it was proposed to add two corps to the Army in 1912; but this could not be done because the existing corps were already short of officers and non-commissioned officers, and none could be spared for the new formations. Secondly, he asserts that Austria did not give the assistance expected of her. As an example of this it is shown that at the end of the great offensive in Russia in 1915 Germany had five more divisions engaged there than at the beginning of it, although the front was a hundred and twenty miles shorter. Thus Germany had to provide divisions to support her ally. Until the revolution broke the power of the Russian resistance, she could not withdraw divisions from the East to obtain a decision in the West, and was therefore unable to make full use of the advantage of interior lines which she possessed. He admits, however, although not in this connection: "that the trench systems arranged in great depth, with their safe dug-outs, picked out with rapid-fire machine weapons, and guarded by indestructible obstacles, increased the strength of their garrisons in an unexpected manner." In fact, the stabilized fronts of trench warfare and the power of modern defensive weapons added enormously to the value of interior lines.

It is of course shown that numbers are not everything. "Russia,

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the numerically strongest of the belligerents, was actually the weakest." There must be taken into account the leadership, training, national characteristics, moral and the technical knowledge and skill on which armament and equipment depend. In the end, however, the author is inclined to think that numbers are the " only reliable means to victory." Absolute superiority is best, as Clausewitz says, and, if that is out of the question, then relative superiority at the decisive point, which may be achieved by good leading. In obtaining this relative superiority, surprise is an important factor; but it was rarely achieved in the war, as projected attacks were betrayed either by the lengthy preparations, the capture of orders, or the action of traitors.

After examining by the light of history the theory of the massing of troops to obtain superiority, with Rossbach, Ligny, Königgrätz, and the concentration of 1870 as examples, Herr Gehre proceeds to the Great War, and is somewhat critical of the German leading. He of course finds that the opening operations in 1914 failed because the German right wing in the West was not strong enough. Yet, as the British historian of the war has pointed out, it left " 34 (German) divisions free to deal with Lanrezac's Army, the tiny British Army of four divisions, and the almost equally small Belgian Army of six divisions—34 divisions against 20," whilst on the rest of the Western Front the forces fairly well balanced each other. A nearly two to one relative superiority, although greatly assisted by the French putting into practice their doctrine of the offensive at all costs, was in fact only sufficient to gain the Germans a temporary initial success.

In 1915, Falkenhayn, in order to settle with Russia and thus free sufficient forces to bring about a decision in the West, went eastward. But he did not take sufficient troops from the West to achieve his purpose, did not put in all he had simultaneously, nor did he go deep enough into Russia to prevent her from fighting next year. He might have at least secured the Ukraine and its supplies, thinks the author.

Things were worse in 1916. It was probably best, as Conrad von Hötzendorf wished, to settle finally with Russia. Falkenhayn had still to leave so many divisions in the East that he could not find sufficient for a decisive blow at Verdun: the assault was made with only six, with two in reserve. So far from Germany getting nearer to numerical superiority, she went back; for England introduced compulsory service, and France drew on her native colonial troops. Germany should in 1916 have struck Rumania, before the

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latter moved, by a preventive war: the possession of interior lines permitted her to do so; but, being a peaceful nation, she wanted the war ended, not extended. Then came the Somme and the Brussilov offensive. On the 11th of July Falkenhayn ordered the "strict defensive" at Verdun, but on the 21st of August he was forced to direct a renewal of offensive operations there, using the words:

"The general situation makes it unconditionally necessary to cause the enemy in the Meuse area to retain the impression that the German offensive is not abandoned, but will be systematically pursued."

In other words, as the author says, "Verdun became a diversion for the Somme."

Hindenburg—with a total misunderstanding of the situation—let both the Somme and Verdun continue. His appreciation was infantile: in any case, attack or defence, Germany must have the best of it. Of the Somme he said:

"the strength and losses of the attackers are so disproportionate to those of the brave defenders, that weariness and attrition will have their effect on the other side before they do on ours."

Whilst, if the German attack was continued at Verdun, he estimated the losses would be "2 Germans to 5 Frenchmen." On the 2nd of September, however, he ordered the cessation of attacks; but he did not order a withdrawal; he ought to have done so after the first success against Rumania: "in the late autumn it was forced on us with heavy losses by the enemy."

Now was a great opportunity. The retirement to the Hindenburg line was absolutely correct, but Hindenburg did not at once transfer all the troops he could to finish off Russia. "He lost six months. Only in June, when the Russians showed unmistakable signs of offensive intention, did he begin to strengthen the Eastern Front." The author forgets the Nivelle attacks, Arras, Vimy and Messines, and the necessity of giving the German troops in France a rest. Interior lines brought the Germans no advantage in 1917, and she had little choice as to the division of her forces.

Herr Gehre praises the great concentration of March, 1918, but would have employed part of Hutier's Army to make a diversion attack at Verdun to encourage the French to keep from coming to the assistance of the British. Hutier's problem of flank guard might have been solved defensively instead of offensively. The German Second and Seventeenth Armies alone should have been sufficient to overwhelm the English. "We know to-day why Ludendorff

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did not succeed: because the Seventeenth Army did not succeed in surprising the enemy."

The book ends with some general remarks on Germany's lost opportunities. The sending of a single U-boat to the Channel might have upset the transport of the B.E.F. "We began submarine warfare without U-Boats. In gas warfare we limited the effect of the new weapon [at second Ypres] to a tactical success, and denied ourselves its strategic exploitation." It ends: "We lost the war against unlimited superiority because we did not succeed in assembling superiority at the decisive point." Which seems to mean that the Great General Staff was at fault.

The title of *Die Wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung in Deutschland* 1914 (The Economic Mobilization in Germany 1914), edited from the papers of Clemens von Delbrück by his son (Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 10s.), is altogether misleading. It contains a number of articles written by Delbrück—who in August, 1914, was German Minister for Home Affairs and later Chief of the Kaiser's Civil Cabinet—probably with a view to publishing his reminiscences.

Amongst these papers are a sketch of his career, articles on Socialism, Conservatism and political matters, study of the Belgian question, an account of his employment in the General Governorship of Warsaw, etc. Only fourteen papers are devoted to the economic mobilization and these refer to the general policy in balancing exports and imports before the war, and we are told that "the complex which we now understand by economic mobilization was by no means so clear then as several years later." In a later part of the book is a paper on "Internal and War Economic policy up to the middle of January, 1915." We learn that little was done to husband food supplies because the military authorities concealed their failures from the civil officials.

> "The turn that the war took as a result of the battle of the Marne was noticed by non-military persons only much later, and until 1915 I was given no clear idea of the military situation either by the Chancellor or by the military authorities. For a long time one was inclined to consider the retreat to the Aisne as only an incident of a temporary character, and to expect a powerful offensive in the West on the model of Hindenburg's enterprises in the East."

As there had been a very good harvest in 1914 and the war was expected to last under a year, "there was no reason at the beginning of the war, to change the whole course of our economic life by compulsory measures, to seize food, forage and raw materials and

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ration them." Little therefore was done except to put the labour market, completely upset by mobilization, in order again, and provide hands to get in the harvest, assist in completing the frontier defences, and augment the output of the munition factories.

Volume VIII. of the *Histoire de la Nation Française*, a huge quarto, edited by M. Gabriel Hanotaux, is the second volume of the *Histoire Militaire et Navale*. The account of the wars of the First Republic are from the hand of the late General Mangin; of those onward up to 1914 by Marshal Franchet d'Esperey; and of the war of 1914–1918, by M. Hanotaux himself.

Marshal Franchet d'Esperey attributes the loss of the war of 1870–1871 to personalities.

"Rapid promotion obtained by deeds in war, sometimes dubious, had brought to the head of the army a number of leaders whose fighting qualities were not supported by work and study, and who lacked character and sound judgment. Napoleon III. in spite of good ideas was incapable of playing *vis-à-vis* to the French Army the preponderant rôle that King William exercised in Prussia."

There is no hint that the German successes were due to numbers, Moltke is barely mentioned and the Great General Staff not at all.

The account of 1914–1918 is even more extraordinary. The book is certainly a history of France, but her Allies' share in the victory might have received some recognition, if not some little mead of praise. In the description of the battle of the Marne the B.E.F. is not mentioned at all, and we read:

"From the 8th onward [really from the 6th] von Klück (*sic*), obliged to turn back to face the Army of Paris, made gaps in the German front, and, on the morning of the 9th, Bülow, menaced on his flank by the advance of the French Fifth Army into the breach opened by the *volte-face* of von Klück, considered himself as beaten; in the course of the day the two German Armies received orders [from whom ?] to retire."

Verdun is made the pivot of the war. The holding of the German attack in February, 1916, is described as a victory, and it is claimed it was exploited by a "second victory of Verdun" in October, 1917, "when important strategical consequences were first affirmed in a most startling manner." The mutinies of May, 1917, are passed over as "*singuliers mouvements dans les troupes de relève . . . troupes qui sans jamais molester leur officiers refusent de monter aux tranchées.*" It is not the British who come to the help of the French by attacking in Flanders, but a French Army of six divisions (General Anthoine)

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which goes there to assist the British. Haig is, however, given credit for demanding the institution of a unified command under Foch.

The Americans get even less mention than the British. The old legend that the attack on the Château Thierry Salient was made by ten divisions " among which were two American " [actually one weak French division and two American divisions of double its size] is brought out again. Not a word do they get for the battle of Reims ; but " the American Army, aided by the counsels of our staffs, by our artillery and by one of our army corps," are allowed the success of St. Mihiel.

The book is beautifully illustrated by coloured prints and wood cuts.

Gedenken eines Soldaten (Thoughts of a Soldier) by Generaloberst von Seeckt (Berlin, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 5 marks), contains a collection of speeches and articles on military subjects which are under discussion in England as in Germany.

The book derives its interest from the eminence of the writer, who was until recently head of the new German Army. Some of his opinions have a very definite significance in view of what is openly going on in Germany. Generaloberst von Seeckt, as he tells us in one article,

" was, at the beginning of the war, Chief of the General Staff of a Prussian Corps [the III of Kluck's First Army], then C.G.S. of an Army composed of German and Austro-Hungarian troops [Ninth Army], then of a Group of Armies of the same troops, then of a Group composed of German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian Armies [with Mackensen as commander, for the invasion of Serbia], then C.G.S. of an Austro-Hungarian Army, of a Group of Austro-Hungarian Armies, and finally of the Turkish Field Army."

Thus he fought on all fronts except the Italian, although he was in the West for a very short time only. Unfortunately, he tells us practically nothing of his war experiences, his articles deal not with the past but with the future, and the subjects of them have already been dealt with by English writers, and it cannot be said that he advances military thought beyond what has been reached here. But what he says is vividly and succinctly expressed.

The first article is a warning against catchwords and phrases like : " pacificism," " imperialism," " militarism," " war is a continuation of politics with other means," " Clausewitz," " Cannae" [the annihilation battle], " offensive war," " annihilation or attrition strategy " and " war aims." He thinks that " Bureaucracy, stupidity

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and catchwords are three things against which the human intelligence fights in vain."

The second section labelled "Symbols" contains speeches made in praise of Frederic the Great, the dead Schlieffen, and Hindenburg, and of the Swedish officers who fought in the German Army in the war—this is the first we have heard of them—and on the unveiling of a memorial tablet to the members of the Ministry of War who fell in battle.

The next article deals with the old subject of "Statesmen *v.* Soldiers"; but he offers no useful solution for the cooperation of politics and strategy, only giving examples of how the combination in modern times has failed.

"The attainable object" discusses the abolition of war. Seeckt can only see a signpost marked "To Eternal Peace. Distance unknown." As Germany is allowed only a small army, he is in favour of other armies being reduced—all that can be done, he thinks, on the way to peace—and, of course, he advocates "parity."

In "Modern Armies," elaborated from a lecture which received comment in the last number of the *Army Quarterly*, he points out the astonishing fact that all the armies which fought in the war were more or less insufficiently organized for it. Germany now having only a small army, he thinks that mass armies are out of date, and that no decisive result can be obtained with them. He advocates a small highly trained army; but the whole of the young male population must have a preliminary "effective general physical and intellectual training, enforced by the State," followed by a "short military training and the necessary refreshing courses." To conduct these, he would have a permanent instructional corps of officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

> "In this way one will get a military mass not suitable for open warfare and offensive decisive battles, but fit, after their training with suitable weapons, to fulfil the duty of defending the Homeland and to send the best men to augment the actual fighting army."

This scheme seems to find favour in Germany.

As regards the enormous armament required to equip such a force, he thinks that it will be sufficient to select the best and most up-to-date types of weapons and prepare for their mass production when war is imminent.

"The Army in the State" appeals for better understanding between the soldiers and the nation. The Army must do its best to become thoroughly efficient, the State must love and cherish its Army. To all parties he cries "Hands off the Army."

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In " Modern Cavalry," the general merely advocates the use of horsemen as mounted infantry, with motorized transport " to get the weapon to the enemy." The cavalry should aim at delaying the enemy, not fighting to a finish. There is a curious little suggestion that cavalry officers should be selected by the head of the Army alone.

In the " Chief of the General Staff " he discusses qualifications and duties. He quotes with approval the late Colonel Hentsch, of Marne fame—whom he speaks of as " much misunderstood, unlucky and yet so excellent." Hentsch, on being asked by a civilian what the D.C.G.S. did, replied, " The D.C.G.S. does everything that the C.G.S. cannot or doesn't want to do."

The final paper, " The Essential," implores everybody to do something for the Fatherland.

Heereskavallerie im Bewegungskriege (Independent Cavalry in Open Warfare), by Major-General von Borries, formerly of the German Supreme Command (Berlin, Mittler, 9.50 marks), has been written by order of the Inspector of Army Education for use in the German military schools. It is *apropos* at the moment when some nations are reducing their cavalry, for its purpose is to show that the mounted arm is still indispensable, absolutely so in Eastern Europe, where motors are almost useless. In any case air reconnaissance, the author believes, must be reinforced by the detailed work (*Kleinarbeit*) of horsemen. He admits that in the past cavalry has often failed, mainly because in peace the lessons of war were forgotten, the horsemen were not properly armed—in 1870, for instance, only dragoons and hussars had a carbine, the cuirassiers and uhlans only pistols—and right up to 1914 all European Armies trained their cavalry for the charge, and " regarded fighting on foot as uncavalry-like." The reviewer recalls having heard Sir John French say in 1910 that he hoped never to see again such a dreadful sight as cavalry digging. Had the lessons of the American Civil War, the author says, been taken to heart, the German cavalry would have done better in 1866 and 1870–1871.

General von Borries works through the achievements of cavalry in campaigns from 1757 (Seven Years' War) onward to 1920, and with the 46 sketch-maps provided the operations are easy to follow. Among others, the movement of French's cavalry division for the relief of Kimberley is cited, but nothing from the British Palestine campaign. He comments that—

" it was asking too much when the British sent their cavalry mounted against German fronts which had not been broken; the French also

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committed this mistake, but not so often. This was underestimating the enemy, which always avenges itself."

In conclusion he says :

"The cavalryman is not a mounted infantryman, in spite of his necessary training for fighting on foot. The mounted arm would lose its nature if it came to regard the horses merely as a means of conveyance, and not its most important and oldest weapon. Charges will still be possible, and on occasions carried out at full speed and with the sword, but the rule will be fighting on foot."

A table shows the armament of the Prussian and German cavalry since the time of Frederick the Great until 1914. It is of interest to note that until 1806–1807, all the Prussian cavalry carried a carbine, and did so again from 1812 to 1859.

America

The History of the 308th Infantry of the American Expeditionary Force, by Captain L. Wardlaw Miles (Putnam's Sons, $5), is of interest, for not only does it give an excellent detailed account of the experiences of an American unit, but the regiment trained with, although it did not fight alongside, the B.E.F., being taken in hand by the 39th Division. To it, too, belonged the battalion known to fame as "The Lost Battalion," which, cut off and surrounded for five days in the Argonne, held its own until relieved by the general American advance.

The author begins :

"It is not possible to name a particular day and hour which saw the birth of the 308th Infantry. Like the rest of the 77th Division of the National Army of America, it did not exist at the beginning of September, 1917, yet well before the end of that month, it was in vigorous being."

How this was brought about by the exertions of two, and two, only, Regular officers, is fully described.

The regiment left New York on the 5th of April, 1918, and proceeded via Liverpool and Dover straight to France.

"The British and American officers fraternized in the actual meaning of the word. With the men the relations were less cordial for a number of reasons. Chief among these possibly was the already mentioned British ration. This caused considerable dissatisfaction. Tea, jam (apple *or* plum), and cheese appeared with wearisome regularity at every meal ; hard tack seemed a poor exchange for the good and generously supplied bread of the American ration. . . . Another reason was the large number of Irish among us. . . . When, however, one considers the striking

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difference of tradition and experience belonging to the two Armies, the relations between the two were on the whole remarkably friendly."

On the 6th of June, just as it was ordered into the line, the Regiment left the British to join the 77th Division in Lorraine and went into the line for the first time near Badonvillers.

The two senior officers who were with the "Lost Battalion," write the account of its action, the 2nd to the 8th of October, 1918, on the Argonne. A total of 554 officers and men were cut off. Of the 17 officers, 4 were killed and 9 wounded, of other ranks, 103 were killed and 181 wounded. For 104 hours—noon on the 3rd to 8 p.m. on the 7th—the Battalion was without food and under constant fire. When relieved, exactly 194 of all ranks were able to march away, as the divisional commander reported, "an organized command, in good order and excellent spirits."

The book is beautifully got up with many photographs, a roll of honour, list of honours and mentions.

One is glad to know that not only has the Regiment an Association, but a nucleus carries on to-day as part of the "Organized Reserves."

From Upton to the Meuse with the 307th (New York, Appleton, $2), by Captain W. Kerr Rainsford, is an unconventional but vivid account of the 307th Regiment of the American 77th Division, from its formation at Camp Upton until its demobilization. It is referred to here because it trained in France with the British, although it did not serve at the front with them, and the author says:

"the troops, if only they could have learnt to like the British ration, British shoes and British Tommy, might have been perfectly happy. But the first was too short, the second too flat, and the trouble with the last rather difficult to determine. Unfortunately the American soldier, probably harking back to the injurious books of schooldays, decided to hate him; yet the feeling does not seem to have been reciprocal, and nothing could have exceeded the hospitality, courtesy and welcoming of the British officers."

The rank and file came "very largely from the East side of the city (New York), and contained every nationality that America has welcomed to her shores"; and this is borne out by the names on the roll of honour.

The book is well illustrated by photographs and pencil sketches by the author, who had graduated from the *École des Beaux Arts, Paris*, and served in the American Ambulance Section with the French Army during 1915–1916 before the National Army was formed.

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ITALY

Letzter Kampf und Ende der 29 Division, by General Berndt (Reichenberg, Bohemia, Verlag der Heimatsöhne im Weltkrieg, Kc. 10), describes the " Last Fight and End of the 29th (Austrian) Division." This last fight was the battle of the Piave in October, 1918, and the opponents of the 29th Division were the British. The book in fact deals from the other side with exactly the same operations as " The Defeat of Austria as Seen by the 7th Division " (by the Rev. E. C. Crosse, D.S.O., M.C., the divisional Chaplain).

General Berndt, after serving on the Russian front, arrived in Italy to take over command of the 29th Division in July, 1918. This Division, a German-Bohemian one, and well thought of, with the 7th (Hungarian) Division on its right and a *Landsturm* brigade in reserve, formed the Austrian XVI. Corps. The sector this corps held on the Piave, with Papodopoli island in front of it, was exactly opposite where the British XIV. Corps (7th and 23rd Divisions) arrived on the 20th of October. The author found the general situation very unsatisfactory. Although the Austrians had been over three months on the Piave they had done little towards preparing the front for defence, and the general efficiency was far below that on the Russian front, where the Germans kept the Austrians up to the mark. Papodopoli island was occupied as an outpost position ; the great river embankment was held as a front line ; but although a second position was marked on the map, it had not been begun. Such training as was in progress was for the attack, and so little preparation had been made against an enemy offensive that, although there was only one bridge over the river Monticano five or six miles east of the Piave, no one had thought of building others. Berndt tried to get timber to construct two more, but administrative difficulties were put in his way. Early in August the corps commander went sick, and Berndt then took over command, retaining that of the 29th Division as well. He at once got to work, at any rate without the opposition of the Army commander, Freiherr von Wurm, to improve the defences, form a battle zone and a rear zone, in accordance with the German manual on the defensive battle, and improve communications. Field-Marshal Boroevic, commanding the Isonzo Group of Armies, visited him once, and once only, on the 5th of September, promised him support, complained of the waste of resources in the homeland, and asked if he thought the war would come to an end in 1918. To this question Berndt replied that,

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" in view of the state of affairs on the Western Front, there was scarcely any doubt that it would."

In September there was an epidemic of malaria and influenza, and a storm which damaged all the aeroplanes. *Moral* was evidently falling, and propaganda at work to induce the Slav troops to quit the front. Leave was given freely, so that at the beginning of October the 29th Division was down to half-establishment, the *Landsturm* brigade somewhat lower, and the 7th Division to two-thirds. There was already talk, in view of the Wilson " Fourteen Points " correspondence, of evacuating Italy and making an orderly retirement to the frontier.

The attack of the British on the 25th of October came as a complete surprise. It was not even known that they were in the line. How the 22nd Infantry Brigade of the 7th Division captured Papodopoli island from the Hungarian 7th Division, the general does not understand. Still less, how the British crossed the great wire entanglement on the shore of the left bank of the Piave, seized the embankment, and worked behind the troops still in position. He got little information, only alarmist messages, from the divisions, and a request that they might retire to the rear zone position, which he refused. The counter-attacks that he had arranged for did not take place: the general commanding the corps reserves could not find his troops—the divisional reserves were used up in reinforcing. The only good news was that the Italians on either side of the British had been unable to cross the river. By the night of the 27th, the British with one Italian division, which followed them across, had got possession of a bridge-head six miles wide by two deep.

On the 28th, all Berndt's troops, including reinforcements from the 26th Rifle and 24th Divisions, were retreating, and, although the pursuit was not very active, they drifted back behind the Monticano to the rear zone position, leaving only outposts west of the river. Next day the British drove in the outposts and about 11 a.m. forced the passage of the Monticano: though driven back, it is claimed, at two places, they made a 2,000-yards gap at a place where the 26th Rifle Division stood. In the evening the Army orders for a general retirement were received. The Austro-Hungarians retired by night and " there were no more great collisions in this part of the Austrian front." General Berndt, in summing up the fighting, says, that

" the *moral* of the greater part of our Army was broken before the battle. . . . This great Army, without a Fatherland, did not even know for what it was fighting. . . . In the battle itself there was besides the undeniable

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impression made by the appearance of the British and French as adversaries, instead of the less highly-thought-of Italians."

There is indeed the undeniable fact that a few German divisions were able to lead the Austrians to victory against the Italians at Caporetto, and a few British and French divisions could similarly bring about the collapse of the Austrians. We get an idea of what might have happened had the Territorial divisions accompanied the B.E.F. to France in 1914.

On the 30th of October the Austrian troops first heard of the agitation in the homeland to bring about a republican form of government, and of negotiations for an armistice being in progress, a *parlementaire* having gone over to the Italian lines. Nothing was seen of the enemy except a few shells, and the corps halted on the Livenza to reorganize. Orders were at once received to retire behind the Tagliamento. The march was made by night to avoid aeroplanes, and the units which did not reach their destination by morning suffered severely from the bombs and machine guns of low-flying aviators. There was a serious mutiny in a regiment of the 26th Rifle Division.

When on the Tagliamento news came that an armistice had been arranged ; but as no time for it to begin and no line of demarcation was mentioned, General Berndt decided to continue resistance, as Italian patrols were pressing on. He at least was not deceived, and by threatening to fire he got his columns through, only his rear-guard having actually to use its arms. At the Austrian frontier bands of Italian and Serbian prisoners and local inhabitants started plundering and tried to stop the columns, demanding the surrender of their arms. But they were soon dealt with, and the retreat continued for 45 miles until the railway at Altlack, some 120 miles from the Piave, was reached on the 10th of November. the men worn out and nearly starving. Thence they were conveyed with many a delay by rail to Breitensee, on the outskirts of Vienna, and there disbanded. General Berndt claims that the Division returned in good order, but he does not give the strength. As the infantry on the 31st of October was down to 90 officers and 1,285 rifles, and the guns were abandoned en route, the balance which reached Breitensee cannot have been large.

L'Armata del Trentino 1915–1919, by General Pompilio Scharini (Milan, Mondadoti, lire 25), is the story of the Italian First Army, which was on the left of the front in the Trentino the whole of the war. The narrative is a general one, without great detail and is

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founded on the official diaries and reports. The sketch-maps supplied are indifferent, and, except in one case, have not the fronts or troops marked on them.

Russia

General Daniloff, who was Quartermaster-General, that is, Deputy-Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, for five years before the war and during the war whilst the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevitch was Commander-in-Chief, has published a second book,* which has appeared in a German translation under the title of *Dem Zusammenbruch entgegen. Ein Abschnitt aus der letzten Epoche der russischen Monarchie* (Towards the Catastrophe. A section from the last epoch of the Russian Monarchy. Hanover, Hahn, 11 marks). It consists of eighty-one different sections on persons and events connected with the downfall of the Russian Empire.

General Daniloff, who was in the best position to know, states, and all who watched events closely will agree with him, that Russia was not ready for war.

"The events of this year (1914) put before Russia the necessity of accepting the challenge of the Central Powers. In Berlin and Vienna it was well understood that every day of peace made Russia a little stronger and must give her a better chance in war. Common sense demanded that this huge awakening nation should be destroyed or brought to its knees in the face of the whole world and deprived of the increasing importance due to it. The experiment was made, the result was the war."

The cause of the revolution was, he considers, the fearful loss of life and suffering without compensating success, which widened the cleft between the ruling classes and the people, spread discontent, and prepared the ground for a demand for change. German propaganda and money did the rest. When at the end of 1915 he took over command of the XXV Corps he found its strength was only 8,000 infantry instead of 28,000, and the whole front littered with dead and maimed. By the end of 1916, thirteen million men had been called to arms, and units had suffered losses amounting to six or seven times their establishment. Only the highest leaders realized, although there was no visible result except colossal casualties, that the enemy was mortally wounded and that persistence for a little longer must bring victory to the Allies. It was the calling up of elderly reservists—*Landwehr* second ban—men who thought they

* His first, "The Russian Army in the World War," was reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925.

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were free from service, that brought discontent into the Army and caused the decay of discipline at the front.

He expresses great admiration for the Grand Duke Nicholas. At the outbreak of war the Commander-in-Chief was fifty-eight years old, " but bursting with energy and good health," he was " at any rate the most powerful, enlightened and prominent member of the whole Imperial family. . . . Richly endowed by nature, he had received the highest military education, including the Staff College course," and had had experience of command. " He was in every way a trained leader and there can be no surprise that he was regarded as the most probable and desirable candidate for the Commander-in-Chiefship in the case of war. . . . Only at Court was he regarded with mistrust, his popularity feared, and his ambition over-estimated." With the people his popularity increased and he became a national hero like Kitchener, Foch or Hindenburg in their countries ; but in the upper circles of society " envy, disfavour and slander were his share. A useful opportunity for the work of his detractors was naturally our unfortunate retirement in 1915."

The Tzar he describes as

" a mere average man, on whom the business of government and all the complications which arose during his reign weighed heavily. His whole mentality was suited to a more modest life without any responsibility. All attempts failed to warn him of dangers ahead and the possibility of a catastrophe : he had complete and mystical faith in the immutability of the Russian autocracy."

The Tzarevitch, he states, suffered from " hæmophilia,"

" the nature of which is that the veins are abnormally easily torn and possess feeble power of contraction. Any, even the smallest, injury leads to bleeding which cannot be stopped and may even occasion death."

There is little praise for the Russian generals. Ivanov, who at the beginning of the war commanded the group of armies on the Austrian frontier, is described as a court favourite, a man " without general or military education, incapable of grasping a situation . . . who conscious of his own incapacity tried to avoid personal expression of opinion." He remained in command until 1916.

Jilinski, in command of the Group of Armies of the North-West against Germany, he does not mention ; and he ascribes the Tannenberg catastrophe not to the Russian plan, but to the manner in which it was carried out.

The various articles are arranged in no sort of order, the first is on 1915, one in the middle is on a mutiny in 1907. There is no index.

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

All the World's Aircraft. 1928. Edited by C. G. GREY (Editor of *The Aeroplane*). Compiled by Leonard Bridgeman. Sampson Low, London. £2 2*s. net.*

EVERY issue of *All the World's Aircraft* sees a marked improvement on its predecessors; in the 1928 or eighteenth year of issue we find a simplicity of form which is approaching standardization.

The book is divided into five parts: Civil Aviation Historical, Service Aviation Historical, Aeroplanes, Aero-engines and Airships. The activities of any country in aviation can be found under its initial letter in these five parts. If a particular aeroplane or engine is sought it will be found under the initials of the constructing company. On this latter we still hold the view, at any rate in so far as service aircraft are concerned, that it would be more convenient to divide aircraft into single, two and multiple-seaters.

The outstanding feature of 1928 as revealed in the book is the remarkable progress of Civil Aviation in the United States of America, which, as might be expected from its geographical situation, leads the world in civil aviation to-day. As Mr. Grey has said, the American section alone describes more aeroplanes than appeared in the whole book a few years ago. We are reminded in the introduction not only of America's activity in civil aviation but also of the "financial boom in aircraft stocks and shares, accompanied by the inevitable flotation of inadequately manned mushroom concerns which must ultimately come to a bad end." We are glad to note that the Editor has qualified his reference to this boom, for it is one which we believe to be a little premature in spite of the progress of civil aviation in America. It is a progress which has been to some extent artificially hustled by the successful American Transatlantic Flights.

It is consoling to learn that, next to America, Great Britain has shown the greatest progress, thanks largely to the light aeroplane, in which we excel.

It is interesting to note how far behind are most nations, including Japan, in engine as compared to aeroplane design. Thus, while

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twenty-three countries design aircraft, only nine design engines, and of these, four countries may be discounted. The most popular engine to-day among foreign countries is the British Jupiter; the American Wright Whirlwind of Atlantic fame, however, is a growing rival.

Not all of the information under Dominions is as up to date as it should be, particularly in the case of Australia and New Zealand. For example, in the New Zealand section the reader is told what that country hopes to do in 1927. This is uninteresting in a publication appearing in January, 1929.

In the Service section there are, apart from service aircraft shown elsewhere, the details of the air forces of forty-three countries. We can say with safety that, as a work of reference, this book is one which no service library should be, and no staff college library can be, without. At the same time it is essential from the service standpoint that more information should be given as to the speed and endurance of foreign aircraft.

The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law. By BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK. Columbia University Press, New York City. $4.00.

"We are in necessity," exclaimed the German Chancellor in 1914, "and necessity knows no law." Mr. Rodick, however, shows in this important book that necessity does, on the contrary, know law. And since an officer even of low rank may, in a contest like the South African War, find himself in a situation where he may invoke the doctrine of necessity in support of action taken by him, friction may be avoided if he is aware, as he should be aware, of the limitations to which as a legal principle it is subject.

The author deals first with the historical foundation of the doctrine of necessity, which "helped to pave the way for a more rational and scientific consideration of the problem." This introduction is followed by chapters on the various phases of necessity, those on Naval Warfare and Necessity and Neutrality being of interest to all officers, while the chapter on Military Necessity is naturally of special value to those serving in the Army. In this, for instance, Mr. Rodick points out that it is the rule that "requisitions shall be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants; but circumstances of extreme necessity will doubtless excuse the seizure of requisitions of kind without demand." Also that, while military necessity will excuse the action of an army of occupation in holding

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the inhabitants of the occupied area responsible for damage to the lines of communication, it will not excuse the execution of punishment for such action if the territory is not fully conquered.

At the end of the book are very full Notes in regard to statements made in the text, a complete Bibliography, a Table of Cases, and a good Index.

Adventures in the Rifle Brigade. By Captain KINCAID. (Soldiers' Tales, No. 7.) Edited by Sir JOHN FORTESCUE. Peter Davies. 7*s.* 6*d.*

Kincaid's military memoirs have had a longer life than those of many of his more deserving contemporaries, having been frequently reprinted since their first publication—a date which neither author nor editor tells us. The writer in his foreword fears that some objections may be taken to his style, but promises to " deliver a round unvarnished tale." The objection most likely to be taken is that his style, so far from being unvarnished, has been covered over with a meretricious coat of flippant humour, which towards the end of the book grows intensely wearisome; he is always striving after a jest or an epigram, and usually falling short of his aim. Where he forgets his efforts to be funny, he attains a high level of brief straightforward narrative, and throws much light on the ways of Wellington's Peninsular army. From his pages it would appear to have been a light-hearted, light-fingered crowd, much given to the pursuit of wine and women, with a high *moral* and a jealous *esprit de corps*, justifiable perhaps in " the best army that, until 1914, England ever put into the field." As to facts the book is no less, and no more, trustworthy than any other volume of military memoirs written some time after the event—reliable as a general rule only for what the author himself saw and did, and for the rest only in broad outline. None the less we could ill spare his account of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, of the battles in the Pyrenees and in France, or of the campaign of Waterloo.

It would be impossible for Sir John Fortescue to write anything but a pleasant and readable introduction; but even if it is considered unnecessary or perhaps too laborious a task to add footnotes correcting Kincaid's more obvious misstatements, it would be of interest to know something more about the author than merely what is contained in the pages of his own work. We cannot believe that the editor of Mr. Herbert Strang's library for boys actually knows more about Kincaid than the historian of the British Army,

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but in his introduction to the volume in that series he tells us more. We should much like to have the benefit of Sir John Fortescue's greater knowledge on this and other points, but here we are not given it.

Some Aspects of Japan and her Defence Forces. By Captain M. D. KENNEDY. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London, 1928. Yen 6.00.

On the outside cover of this volume there is a picture of a charming Geisha Girl, with a background of charging cavalry and infantry and of battleships and aircraft in action. But it must not therefore be assumed that the book is a treatise on the explosive influence of the eternal feminine, for it contains things that are much more useful, namely "a collection of articles, written for different papers and magazines," which tell the reader of matters that British officers certainly should, but in general do not, know; and tell it in what may fairly be called a manner sympathetic to the Japanese point of view. For admitting that Japan did give "a most liberal interpretation of the terms of the (Anglo-Japanese) Alliance," when she declared war on Germany in 1914, it must, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, also "be affirmed as a general principle that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another is the interest of the nation that performs them." And it is certainly arguable that, in 1914, it was the supreme interest of Japan to get rid of an aggressive Germany as neighbour in the Pacific; and subsequently it was also her interest to protect her shipping, and incidentally that of her allies, from the attacks of the German seamen.

Captain Kennedy's book, however, only deals incidentally with such questions, and while the first two chapters are in the main historical and treat of the past intercourse of British sailors and soldiers with the Japanese, a valuable account is given in the third chapter of their fighting forces, and of the attitude of the nation towards disarmament. And here, and also in Chapter V, the author notes that the Japanese are inclined to overvalue the personal qualities and to underestimate the importance of weapons and mechanical appliances; and their forces, in consequence, are not so well equipped as those of the European Powers.

For reasons that are given by Captain Kennedy, the Japanese joined the comity of Great Powers when almost all of the land climatically well adapted to their physical constitutions—for they

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apparently dislike both the cold and the tropical zones—had been absorbed by nations who are hostile to Japanese immigration. In these circumstances, and since "land-grabbing" is now no longer practicable, the only way in which the Japanese can support a rapidly growing population is to assure for it free access to raw materials. It is therefore natural that, in Chapter IV and also in Chapter VIII, the question of Japan's economic needs and ambitions should be considered, and some of the weaknesses of her situation indicated —lack of mineral oil, for instance, and of iron ore.

Chapter V, which deals with the Japanese army and its methods, will perhaps be the most interesting to soldiers. But those who do not know the Japanese will not be right if they conclude that they are soft because special steps are taken to inure them to hardships; any more than the French woman was right who said that English women must be very dirty, for they took so many baths. The great difference between the mentality of the men of the British and Japanese armies will also be realized when the reader sees that: "To come to parade unshaven, or to have their boots or buttons unpolished is not a punishable offence in the Japanese army. . . . The main offences for which officers keep a look-out are those of political controversy and the smuggling of books into barracks."

Captain Kennedy gives the British case for the base at Singapore effectively, and he also shows how the Japanese regarded the decision to develop it. But when he writes of a speech made by Colonel Reginald Apple, which gave offence in Japan, he refers apparently to Colonel Reginald Applin; and it must be pointed out that the American President Monroe, who proclaimed the well-known doctrine, did not spell his name Munro.

A very useful feature of the book is a list of authorities quoted, who can therefore be consulted if the reader so desires. There is, in addition, a summary of the leading events in Anglo-Japanese naval and military relations, and there are good indices and sketch-maps.

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918. Vol. IX, *The Royal Australian Navy*. By ARTHUR W. JOSE. Australia, Angus and Robertson, Ltd. Sydney, 1928. Price 21*s*.

There is no question that Mr. Jose carries the reader along throughout this book at a high plane of interest, and sometimes, as in the account of the action between the *Sydney* and *Emden*,

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the narrative is thrilling. There is also no question that the book, which deals with operations in almost every corner of the world, teems with information that will be valuable to soldiers on the many subjects concerning the defence of a widespread Empire—information, for instance, regarding small landing-forces, the combating of hostile intrigue, transportation, radio-telegraphy, censorship, and coaling.

For military men the outstanding lessons of these operations, however, are strategical; and the first of these lessons is brought out in the Introduction, namely, the difficulty of reconciling the pure strategic doctrine that, since the seas are one, naval defence must be under a single control, with the perfectly natural and proper opinions of some of the British communities in the Great Dominions that they should possess and command naval squadrons of their own. Another important lesson is the degree in which the existence of the British Commonwealth depends, not on the freedom of the seas for all comers, but on the power of the Commonwealth to control the seas that connect its scattered territories; a control that in its turn depends first and foremost on naval power, next on the possession of bases where ships can securely obtain fuel, food, and ammunition and other requirements, and lastly on adequate means, which cannot be tampered with, of sending orders and information to the fighting forces. A tnird lesson is the great difficulty of holding fast to the principle stated long ago by Nelson, that the best defence "is to place myself alongside the French"; a principle that seems so obvious, yet is so often disregarded.

It appears that in this case, not by any means a singular case for civilian to differ from service opinion, "a good many high officials in London . . . were convinced that it (the war) would be over by Christmas (1914)—not necessarily ending with a disastrous defeat of Germany, but pursuing a course that would convince the German Government of its folly in starting hostilities, and so might lead to peace negotiations. In this case it may well have seemed to them both wise and of urgent importance that we should have in hand some German territory for bargaining purposes, possibly to exchange for Belgium"; and this led to the grabbing in 1914 of German territory in the Pacific instead of an attack on Spee's squadron. As the Governor-General of Australia pointed out, however, in November, 1914: "While reluctant to concern myself with naval strategy, I have to report a prevailing opinion that the loss of our cruisers (Cradock's force defeated by Spee's squadron) off the Chilean coast is the climax of a long bungle in the Pacific. . . .

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The maxim of seeking out the enemy's ships and destroying them has been ignored. . . . I have written so much on the naval situation with a view to prepare your mind for the large measure of local autonomy which is sure to be asked for when the war comes to an end." And so it has turned out.

High Pressure. By Colonel LIONEL JAMES, C.B.E., D.S.O. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London, W. Price 12*s.* net.

Colonel James begins his book with a racing incident; and racing pace—with, however, some of the morbidity that he says was required by journalistic finance—is the standard at which the reader is taken all through experiences as a Press Correspondent in the majority of the cluster of petty wars in which the British Army fought at the end of the nineteenth century, and in the early part of the Russo-Japanese War.

A war-correspondent is in a position resembling that of a Power commanding the sea: he can take as much or as little of war as he chooses. Colonel James favoured the former policy, and the result was some hair-breadth escapes. The first of these occurred in the Chitral expedition of 1895, and in the Tirah expedition of 1897–1898 he again risked his life in order that the story of the retreat of the 2nd Division of the British Force down the Bara Valley might quickly reach the Press; for he walked, with an Orakzai tribesman as guide, back from the rear-guard after darkness had fallen until he came to the picquets of the British troops from Peshawar. In the Omdurman campaign of 1898 the author came across Mr. Churchill, whom he had already met on the Indian Frontier, and who was now in charge of the "Officer's mess caravan" of the 21st Lancers; he was received by Lord Kitchener, of whom he says that "there was a fiction that the autocrat of the desert was a misogynist"; and by means of an audacious action he ensured that his account of the "great massacre" of Omdurman was the first to reach the London press.

In September, 1899, Colonel James was again on his way to active service as correspondent of the *Times* in the South African War, that useful curtain-raiser for the British of the greater war of 1914. He was present at the action of Elandslaagte, "a replica of the complete Aldershot field-day of the period," and at any rate a success; was shut up in Ladysmith, and carried at the end of the siege a message from White to Buller, and was therefore again able

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to ensure that his paper was the first to receive the news of the relief. As chief representative of the *Times*, Colonel James then found himself in a position of eminence, for Lord Roberts " constantly sent for me, and accorded to me the privilege of easy access to himself, in matters in which I might find myself in doubt." When near Johannesburg, Colonel James had another narrow escape while riding, among others, with Captain Milne ; and " I do not know," he writes, " to this day how any of us escaped and how Milne was spared to command a British army at Salonika. . . ." And he finally rode into Pretoria with the divisional staff of the victorious army. The author soon afterwards returned to England, for it was believed that to all intents and purposes the war was over ; but he subsequently went back to South Africa for a time, and was then for one instant a " captured man."

Early in 1904 Colonel James was sent to the Far East as chief correspondent to the *Times* in the Russo-Japanese conflict, which was then imminent ; and he cleverly arranged for the early receipt of information by his paper by chartering, in face of much opposition from rivals in the Press, a small steamer, which was fitted with wireless and communicated with a station set up at Wei-hai-wei. For a time the venture was a great success, but in the end the Japanese military authorities put an embargo on the ship's movements. After a huge bribe had been refused by Colonel James from a Russian agent who wanted to use the wireless installation at Wei-hai-wei for the purpose of communicating with Port Arthur, the story, which is remarkable for the absence of criticism and comments, is ended with the surrender of the charter of the little steamer.

Three Persons. By Sir Andrew Macphail, O.B.E., LL.D. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London. W. Price 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Sir Andrew Macphail's book consists of a group of very well-expressed essays on the writings of Three Persons, " each of whom was something more than a Person," and each of whom, he says, has not only come " voluntarily to the bar of history," but will " serve as a warning and a lesson. That is the intent of this book."

The second of the essays, on the Intimate Papers of Colonel House, has, however, no special interest for soldiers ; for it deals with a book that is largely " a revelation of the mind of Woodrow Wilson and of American political life," but " of military value there is nothing." In the last of the articles Sir Andrew is critical of, but not altogether unsympathetic to, Colonel Lawrence, the author

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of the "Revolt in the Desert," in whose work he recognizes an admirable "sequence and flow of words." And he does admit that "even a civilized community may lapse into savagery," such a community, for instance, as "the civilized State of Texas." But there is perhaps something more than the recognition that such lapses do occur, to be said even for such an apparently inhumane action as when Lawrence "wedged shut the door" of a wrecked railway wagon containing Turks sick of typhus "and left them there alone." To Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the other Person, the author, however, is most severe; to a man whom he turns, as it seems to the reviewer, often the wrong way out, for personality should surely in such a case weigh as much as print; and Sir Andrew never met, apparently never even saw, Wilson.

"Excessive accuracy," says Sir Andrew Macphail, "about things that do not matter is always tiresome." Too harsh censure must therefore not be given to such a statement as that Sir Henry Wilson "entered the war as a brevet-colonel; he emerged as Field-Marshal"; when, in fact, he was promoted to the substantive rank of major-general in November, 1913. Perhaps Sir Andrew was also merely poking heavy fun at the British Army when he wrote, although not accurately, that: "In so far as the British General-staff which Wilson set up thought of strategy at all as apart from the French, they had not proceeded further than the American Civil War. Their minds stopped short with Jackson's manœuvres. The General-staff was Colonel Wilson." But an author who claims to be "familiar with the war and with the literature of the war during the last ten years," should surely not have made such a statement as that "Namur, the central stronghold, fell; Boulogne was useless. . . ." Nor should he have written that: "Even Manoury's Sixth Army was withdrawn from Amiens, in panic over loss of Paris." Further, it may be pointed out that, before the battle of the Marne, Sir John French did not agree to carry out the particular plan arranged between General Wilson and Franchet D'Esperey, and it is therefore not accurate to write that "he then agreed. The battle of the Marne was won."

It is strange that a distinguished Doctor, who must be aware how difficult diagnosis is, how easy it is for those without technical knowledge to fall into error, and how obvious the wisdom seems that comes after the event, should criticize the military opinions of a Field-Marshal. Sir Andrew, however, is certainly right when he points out that Sir Henry was mistaken as regards the value, in the particular conditions of the late war, of quickly-raised troops.

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But the next war, if there is one, may yet prove that there was some ground for the soldier's contempt for "shadow armies," and that trained men are in fact as much more efficient in war than half-trained ones as they are in any other of life's activities. Few soldiers, also, will hold that Sir Andrew is in the right when he laughs at Sir Henry for complaining that shells were not available with which to reply to the enemy's fire. Nor will they agree that he is right when he treats with derision Sir Henry's annoyance that two divisions of the Expeditionary Force were at first retained in the United Kingdom in 1914. For it is evident that while the resisting power of six divisions is 50 per cent. higher than that of four, the mobility of the six is little if at all lower than that of the four. It is therefore also evident that six divisions will be better able than four to cope with eight divisions, even if incapable of arresting and defeating them.

Besides these particular criticisms of Sir Henry Wilson, the author also sets forth in vigorous language some of the military fallacies that civilians eternally harbour and that soldiers are therefore continually called on to correct. The fallacy, for instance, that strategy has been altered by "new conditions, railways, new arms, new explosives. . . ." when the principles of strategy can no more be altered by these than the principles of building by the use of concrete, iron, and steel, instead of mud and wood. And the other fallacy that "any history of war is of small military value," although the first campaign in which Napoleon was commander-in-chief, in 1796, is generally held to have been one of his best, and Wellington's Assaye campaign was certainly at least as good as most of the others. And both of these leaders were students of war.

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, perhaps because of it, the book is one that soldiers should most assuredly read with care, since not only does it expose the mind with which clever civilians too often regard both war and those who make its conduct their profession; but the author also shows how sensitive on some points our fellow-subjects in the Dominions are. The complaint that, "in 753 pages of diary (Sir Henry Wilson's) this commendation (of the first use of gas by the Germans) is the only hint that half a million Canadians were engaged on the Western Front," is an example; as is also the complaint that, "Neither Australians nor New Zealanders came under the notice of this Imperial Chief. Their name does not live even in the index."

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The Story of H.M.S. "Victory." By GEOFFREY CALLENDER.
Strange Adventures of the Seas. By J. G. LOCKHART. Philip Allan & Co. 3*s.* 6*d.* each.

These are the seventh and eighth volumes of The Nautilus Library. Professor Callender's history of Nelson's *Victory* was first published in 1914 to call attention to the urgent need of reconditioning the famous warship, and marked the beginning of the endeavour to raise the money needed to restore her to a likeness of what she was in Nelson's day. Such a genuine piece of naval history is an admirable addition to this attractive series of books of the sea. The story of H.M.S. *Victory* from the day her keel was laid in Chatham dockyard, nearly 170 years ago, until she was saved from the shipbreakers after the Napoleonic wars, is of absorbing interest. The mere landsman will learn why the *Victory* was an exceptionally fine ship and understand the prowess of those who sailed and fought her, and of those distinguished admirals whose flagship she was.

Mr. Lockhart's book will win the hearty approval of boys of all ages. Here are stories of pirates and buccaneers, maroonings, shipwrecks and sea mysteries—a round dozen of well-authenticated tales extremely well told. The first is concerned with the escape of John Fox, an Elizabethan stalwart who seized a galley and brought over 200 Christian fellow-captives safely out of the piratical lair of Alexandria. One may also read of Mary Ann Talbot, who not only served as a cabin boy in the action of "the glorious first of June," but, as a drummer, fought in Flanders under the Duke of York. Almost last in the book comes the story of the *Emden*, to which is added the adventures of von Müller's landing party under von Mücke. There is also a post-war mystery of a lighthouse, but none of the yarns surpasses that of stout John Fox.

Twenty-Five Years with Earl Haig. By SERGT. T. SECRETT, M.M. Jarrolds, Ltd. 7*s.* 6*d.*

Sergeant Secrett was the personal servant of Earl Haig from the days of the South African War until shortly before the death of the Field-Marshal. The intimate glimpses of his master which he is thus in a position to reveal will be read with interest by everyone. He gives many instances of the famous soldier's talent for command, tact, kindliness, courage, self-restraint, and sense of humour. There are tales of Haig in South Africa and during his Indian

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service, but naturally most of the book is devoted to the time when he was Commander-in-Chief of our Armies in France.

The sergeant must have been an excellent servant. He says it was his way " never to argue or never to presume, just to wait patiently, and serve promptly, anticipate his wants, but never ask a question." One is regaled with some interesting and unconventional impressions of the various personages who visited G.H.Q. in France. Of one prominent politician it is written that he was " so great a lawyer that whatever geniality he had ever possessed was caught up and absorbed." Due tribute is paid to the devoted work of the Field-Marshal on behalf of the British Legion.

Comment upon the larger issues of the War might well have been omitted. It is naïve and rather ill-informed. There are several misprints, and the price of the book is rather high.

The East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War, 1914–1918. By EVERARD WYRALL. Harrison. 15*s*.

Mr. Wyrall, who is an experienced writer with a long list of divisional and unit war histories to his credit, has made an excellent volume of this history of a regiment whose record in the fateful years 1914–1918 need fear comparison with any rival. There took the field between the outbreak of war in August, 1914, and the beginning of 1916, two Regular and eight Territorial and New Army battalions of the regiment, of which at the latter date four were on the Western Front, one in Macedonia, one just returned from Gallipoli, and four in Egypt, about to proceed to France. There were also ten other second line battalions at home, employed on reserve, draft finding, and garrison duty. In practically every battle of the war in theWest from the fighting in Flanders in October, 1914, down to the passage of the Sambre, in November, 1918, some one or other of these units played its part ; one emerged with credit from the unhappy episode of the landing at Suvla, and another saw a long period of service in the thankless theatre of war in Macedonia. In the whole course of the war 403 officers and 7,080 other ranks inscribed their names on the roll of the honoured dead, and 1,125, including four V.C.'s, won decorations for gallantry or good service in the field.

The story of such various and scattered service is not easy to deal with in the small compass of a regimental history ; Mr. Wyrall has wisely adopted the course of narrating the story of the different engagements in chronological order, with special reference to the

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part played in them by the battalions, and his account is enlivened by many descriptive touches, given usually in the words of the participants themselves. The difficult problem of maps has been admirably solved, and a number of war photographs add to the interest of an excellent book.

Sea Venturers of Britain, by "TAFFRAIL"; *The Cruise of the "Alerte,"* by E. KNIGHT. "The Nautilus Library," Philip Allan. 3*s*. 6*d*. each.

These are two of the initial volumes in an admirable new series of books about the sea, published by Philip Allan. "Taffrail's" book contains brief and popularly written accounts of famous British voyages of exploration, and retells in attractive language the adventures of three Elizabethan seamen (Hawkins, Frobisher, and Drake), Dampier's, Anson's, and Cook's exploits, and the Arctic expeditions of Franklin and Scott. Mr. Knight's book, first published in 1891 and now reprinted, is the account of an abortive search for buried treasure in the desert island of Trinidad, in the South Atlantic. Both volumes can be recommended to those whose taste lies in the direction of maritime adventure, and it is suggested that sketch-maps showing the places mentioned in the text would add to the interest of this attractive series.

A Short Account of Canteens in the British Army. By the Hon. Sir JOHN FORTESCUE. Cambridge University Press. 3*s*. 6*d*.

Canteens, except to those whose horizon is proverbially bounded by them, may seem to be a dull subject for a book. This impression will not survive the perusal of this little volume. Sir John Fortescue, in its eighty pages, gives us a full account of the canteen system from the early days when sutlers, such as "Kit" Ross and her like, followed and supplied the army for their own profit, down through the period of corrupt and greedy contractors and the beginnings of a better system just prior to the Boer War, to the establishment of the efficient and far-flung organization known to-day to all three Services as the "Naafi." The author, who is personally related to two of the four pioneers to whom the change for the better was primarily due, is pre-eminently fitted to tell this tale in the course of which he throws many an incidental side-light on the life and manners of the British soldier in bygone days. Readers will be well advised not to be deterred by the seeming unattractiveness of

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the subject from devoting an hour or so to the reading of this slim little volume.

The " Guide " Compass. This compass has been designed by Major L. V. J. Blacker and has a certain number of advantages over the ordinary compass. It is strong, externally simple, very steady when the card has settled down, and it can be carried strapped on the wrist ; also the luminous figures are very clear. On the other hand, it is not suitable for map setting, and owing to all its " works " being invisible it would be very difficult to teach magnetic variation, compass errors, etc., with it. It is also rather heavy and the card takes some time to settle. The compass is made by Henry Hughes & Son, Ltd., 59, Fenchurch Street, London.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

Blackwood's Magazine, January, 1929. " From Fuentes de Oñoro to Abbotsford : Lieutenant Doisy and Sir Walter Scott," by Sir Charles Oman, K.B.E., M.P.

The Edinburgh Review, January, 1929. " Lord Oxford's Conduct of the War," by Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G.

A review of " Memories and Reflections," " The Life of Lord Kitchener," and other works.

The National Review, January, 1929.

(1) " Chemical Warfare as a Branch of National Defence," by Dr. Lockhart.

(2) " A Regrettable Book," by Col. Sir T. Montgomery Cuninghame, Bart., D.S.O.

A review of " Britain and the War : A French Indictment," by General Huguet, translated by Captain H. Cotton Minchin.

The Nineteenth Century and After, January, 1929. " Isandhlwana : January 22, 1879," by Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton, C.M.G.

The Contemporary Review, February, 1929. " Painlevé's New Scheme of Defence," by Dudley Heathcote.

The Fortnightly Review, February, 1929. " The French Army and the French : A Personal Impression," by Major B. T. Reynolds.

The National Review, February, 1929. " Ticonderoga," by A. G. Bradley.

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The Empire Review, March, 1929.

(1) " Civil Aviation," by Sir Alan Cobham, K.B.E.

(2) " Empire Settlement and the British Soldier," by Major T. J. Edwards.

The National Review, March, 1929. " An Army List of 1808," by Captain Peter Bain.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

" All the World's Aircraft, 1928." Edited by C. G. Grey. Compiled by Leonard Bridgman. Published by Samson Low, Marston Co., Ltd. £2 2s. net.

" D Company, 4th Battalion, The Royal Berkshire Regiment." Records of the Company from August 4th, 1914, to October 31st, 1928.

" Adventures in the Rifle Brigade in the Peninsula, France and the Netherlands, from 1809 to 1815." By Captain J. Kincaid. With an introduction by The Hon. Sir John Fortescue. Published by Peter Davies, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

" Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18." Vol. IX. The Royal Australian Navy. By A. W. Jose. Published by Angus and Robertson, Ltd. 21s. net.

" Adventures in the Revolution and under the Consulate." By Moreau de Jonnés. With an introduction by The Hon. Sir John Fortescue. Published by Peter Davies, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

" Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces." By Captain M. D. Kennedy. Published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. Yen 6.00.

" Sistematizarea Cunostintelor Tactice referitoare la Defensiva si Ofensiva." By Captain A. G. Budis. Staff Officer, Constantza, Roumanie.

" Three Persons." By Sir Andrew Macphail, O.B.E., LL.D. Published by John Murray. 10s. 6d. net.

" High Pressure." By Colonel Lionel James, C.B.E., D.S.O. Published by John Murray. 12s. net.

" Remembered Yesterdays." Being the Reminiscences of Maha Mudaliyar Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranaike, K.C.M.G., with Introduction by Major Herbert Noyes. Published by John Murray. 15s. net.

" Twenty-five Years with Earl Haig." By Sergt. T. Secrett, M.M. Published by Jarrolds, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

" Aerial A.B.C. and Commercial Air Line Gazetteer, No. 4." Published by the Proprietors, The Aerial A.B.C., Ltd., London. 1s.

" Aircraft Engineering." Devoted to the Science and Practice of Aeronautics. Vol. I, No. 1. Edited by Lieut.-Col. W. Lockwood Marsh, A.F.R.Ae.S. Published by *Aircraft Engineering*. 2s.

" Strange Adventures of the Sea." By J. G. Lockhart. Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 3s. 6d. net.

" The Story of H.M.S. *Victory*." By Geoffrey Callender. Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 3s. 6d. net.

" The Cruise of the *Alerte*." By E. F. Knight. Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 3s. 6d. net.

" Sea Venturers of Britain." By " Taffrail " (Commander Taprell Dorling, D.S.O., R.N. (retd.)). Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 3s. 6d. net.

" The Baghdad Air Mail. By Wing Commander Roderick Hill, M.C., A.F.C., F.R.Ae.S. Published by Edward Arnold & Co. 18s. net.

" Some Chapters on Writing English." By Lieut.-Col. J. H. Gettins, D.S.O. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 3s.

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PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Commons

China (British Troops).—On the 22nd of January, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the date of the withdrawal of the British Forces from Shanghai must depend on the local situation. Of the additional battalions sent to China, three would be withdrawn by the end of the trooping season. Replying on the 29th of January to *Mr. Wardlaw-Milne*, he stated that of the additional battalions which will then be in China three would be stationed in the North China Command and one in the South China Command.

Officers' Training Corps.—On the 28th of January, in reply to a question by *Mr. Rennie Smith*, the *Secretary of State for War* produced figures showing the comparative strength and cost of the Officers' Training Corps and Cadet Corps in 1914 and 1928. Of the senior division, Officers' Training Corps, there were, in 1914, 23 contingents with a strength of 5,028 and in 1928, 20 contingents with a strength of 4,258; of the junior division, in 1914, 159 contingents with a strength of 26,504 and in 1928, 173 contingents with a strength of 33,838. Combined grants amounted in 1914 to £56,090 and in 1928 to £88,300. For the cadet corps, the figures for 1914 were: contingents 1,007, strength 39,045, grants £5,035; for 1928, contingents 935, strength 49,014, grants £10,332.

Airship R. 100.—On the 31st of January, in reply to a question by *Colonel Woodcock*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that Airship R. 100 should be ready for her shed trials in the early spring. The Government had paid £235,000 in connection with her construction.

Transport Vehicles (Subsidy).—On the 5th of February, in reply to questions by *Major Glyn* and *Mr. Wellock*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that it was not at present considered necessary to give an annual subsidy to passenger road vehicles of approved design which would be of use on mobilization. As

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regards mechanical transport goods vehicles, information was being obtained of the number suitable to Army requirements. Under the present scheme 1,000 such might be subsidized and that number was at present enrolled. The subsidy was £40 a year and the total payments made since the inception of the scheme in January, 1924, amounted to £147,000.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (REORGANIZATION).—On the 5th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Couper*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the reorganization of Territorial Army Infantry into three rifle companies and one machine-gun company would involve a reduction in the establishment of about fifty men a battalion. The mechanization of the artillery would involve a reduction of approximately 2,200 in all. Owing to the expense of the process of mechanization there would probably be no saving.

AIRCRAFT (REFUELLING).—On the 6th of February, in reply to a question by *Viscount Sandon*, the *Secretary of State for Air* stated that experiments in refuelling aircraft in flight had been successfully carried out.

RECRUITS.—On the 26th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. T. Williams*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that the number of recruits finally approved during the recruiting year ended the 30th of September, 1928, was 30,185. Of those recruited in the London area, 71 per cent. were stated to be unemployed at the time of enlistment.

GERMANY (BRITISH TROOPS).—On the 26th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Buxton*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the strength of the British Army of the Rhine on the 1st of February was 6,002, excluding a small infantry detachment of about 100 serving in the Saar District. This number was made up as follows: Cavalry 499, Royal Artillery 370, Royal Engineers 248, Royal Corps of Signals 169, Infantry 3,523, Royal Tank Corps 44, Other Services 1,149.

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APPENDIX

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I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

The Rt. Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., *Secretary of State for War* (*President of the Army Council*).

The Duke of Sutherland, Honorary Colonel, 4th/5th Bn. Seaforths, *Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War* (*Vice-President of the Army Council*).

Field-Marshal Sir George F. Milne, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D., Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*, *Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (*First Military Member*).

General Sir Walter P. Braithwaite, G.C.B., *p.s.c.*, K.C.M.G., *Adjutant-General to the Forces* (*Second Military Member*).

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Hastings Anderson, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*, *Quarter-Master General to the Forces* (*Third Military Member*).

Lieutenant-General Sir Webb Gillman, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Master-General of the Ordnance* (*Fourth Military Member*).

A. Duff Cooper, Esq., D.S.O., M.P., *Financial Secretary of the War Office* (*Finance Member*).

Sir Herbert J. Creedy, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War* (*Secretary of the Army Council*).

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

The Rt. Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.	Major-General Sir G. F. Boyd, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M., *p.s.c.*
Judge Advocate-General.	Sir F. Cassel, Bart., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Field-Marshal Sir George F. Milne, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D., Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.	Major-General J. R. E. Charles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Staff Duties.	Major-General C. Bonham-Carter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Military Training.	Major-General H. H. S. Knox, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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Adjutant General to the Forces

General Sir Walter P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.

Director of Recruiting and Organisation.	Major-General W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Personal Services.	Major-General G. S. Clive, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director-General, Army Medical Service.	Lieut.-General Sir M. H. G. Fell, K.C.B., C.M.G., F.R.C.S., K.H.P.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Hastings Anderson, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*

Director of Movements and Quartering.	Major-General E. Evans, C.B. C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Remounts.	Brigadier M. Graham, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Supplies and Transport.	Major-General G. F. Davies, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.
Director of Works.	Major-General P. G. Grant, C.B., C.M.G.
Director-General, Army Veterinary Services.	Major-General H. T. Sawyer, C.B., D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir Webb Gillman, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Artillery.	Brigadier H. R. W. M. Smith, C.B.E., D.S.O.
Director of Mechanization.	Major-General S. C. Peck, C.B., D.S.O., *p.a.c.*
Director of Ordnance Services.	Major-General C. D. R. Watts, C.B., C.M.G.
Director - General of Factories.	T. Towsend, Esq., C.B.E., A.C.A.

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.	The Duke of Sutherland, Hon. Col., 4th/5th Bn. Seaforths.
Director-General of the Territorial Army.	Lieutenant-General Sir Reginald B. Stephens, K.C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Comptroller of Lands.	H. G. Goligher, Esq., C.B.E. (*Assistant Secretary*).

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Financial Secretary of the War Office

Financial Secretary.	A. Duff Cooper, Esq., D.S.O., M.P.
Director of Army Contracts.	Sir N. F. B. Osborn, K.B.E., C.B. (*Assistant Under-Secretary of State*).

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War and Accounting Officer.	Sir Herbert J. Creedy, K.G.B., K.C.V.O.
Deputy Under-Secretary of State.	J. B. Crosland, Esq., C.B.
Assistant Under-Secretary of State.	A. E. Widdows, Esq., C.B.
Chaplain-General.	Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis, C.M.G., M.C., D.D.

3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME

A.—Aldershot Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir D. G. M. Campbell, K.C.B.
Brigadier, General Staff.	Brigadier J. E. S. Brind, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General J. C. Harding Newman, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
1st Cavalry Brigade.	Brigadier W. T. Hodgson, D.S.O., M.C.
1st Air Defence Brigade.	Brigadier E. F. Shewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Division.	Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Infantry (Guards) Brigade.	Brigadier B. N. Sergison-Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier A. J. McCulloch, D.S.O., D.C.M., *p.s.c.*
3rd Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier G. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 1st Division.	Brigadier J. G. B. Allardyce C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Division.	Major-General T. A. Cubitt, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
4th Infantry Brigade (Guards).	*See* under London District.
5th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier R. J. F. Hayter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
6th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier R. D. F. Oldman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
C.R.A. 2nd Division.	Brigadier W. Stirling, C M.G., D.S.O.

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B.—Eastern Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Brigadier, General Staff.	Brigadier A. E. McNamara, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General C. W. Scott, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.a.c.*
4th Division.	Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
10th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier T. W. Stansfeld, C.M.G., D.S.O.
11th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
12th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier E B. Hankey, C.B., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 4th Division.	Brigadier V. Asser, C.M.G., D.S.O.
54th (East Anglian) Division.	Major-General Sir T. G. Matheson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
161st (Essex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir F. C. Rasch, Bt., T.A.
162nd (East Midland) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir H. Wake, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
163rd (Norfolk and Suffolk) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. S. Allen, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 54th Division.	Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
44th (Home Counties) Division.	Major-General H. R. Peck, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
131st (Surrey) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel the Lord Roundway, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.
132nd (Middlesex and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. C. W. H. Wortham, C.M.G., D.S.O.
133rd (Kent and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. E. R. R. Braine, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 44th Division.	Colonel M. Crofton, D.S.O.

C.—London District

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General C. E. Corkran, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer 2nd Grade.	Major A. F. Smith, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*
4th Infantry Brigade (Guards). (At training and manœuvres.)	Colonel C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
26th (London) Air Defence Brigade.	Colonel A. F. Thomson, D.S.O.
56th (1st London) Division.	Major-General H. Isacke, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
167th (1st London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel F. G. Alston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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C.—LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

168*th* (*2nd London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel P. R. O. A. Simner, D.S.O., T.A.
169*th* (*3rd London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O.
C.R.A. 56*th* (*1st London*) *Division.*	Colonel C. W. W. McLean, C.M.G., D.S.O.
27*th* (*London*) *Air Defence Brigade*	Colonel C. Buckle, C.B.E., T.A.
47*th* (*2nd London*) *Division.*	Major-General L. C. L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
140*th* (*4th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*
141*st* (*5th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel F. S. Montague-Bates, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
142*nd* (*6th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel R. E. K. Leatham, D.S.O.
C.R.A. 47*th* (*2nd London*) *Division.*	Colonel B. B. Colbeck, D.S.O.

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel K. G. Buchanan, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Brigadier in charge of Administration.	Brigadier Sir R. S. May, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
13*th Infantry Brigade*	Brigadier W. A. Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O.
5*th Cavalry Brigade.*	Colonel P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.
6*th Cavalry Brigade.*	Colonel H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
50*th* (*Northumbrian*) *Division.*	Major-General H. W. Newcome, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
149*th* (*Northumberland*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel W. St. A. Warde-Aldam, D.S.O.
150*th* (*York and Durham*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
151*st* (*Durham*) *Light Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel G. H. Stobart, C.B.E., D.S.O., T.A.
C.R.A. 50*th* (*Northumbrian*) *Division.*	Colonel O. C. Niven, D.S.O.
49*th* (*The West Riding*) *Division.*	Major-General N. J. G. Cameron, C.B. C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
146*th* (*1st West Riding*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel M. R. Walsh, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.*
147*th* (*2nd West Riding*)	Colonel A. E. Irvine, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
148*th* (*3rd West Riding*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel D. S. Branson, D.S.O., M.C., T.D., T.A.
C.R.A. 49*th* (*The West Riding*) *Division.*	Colonel K. G. Campbell, D.S.O.

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D.—NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

46th (The North Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir P. O. Hambro, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
137th (Staffordshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. Clive, O.B.E., T.D., T.A.
138th (Lincolnshire and Leicestershire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. H. Martin, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.*
139th (Sherwood Foresters) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. Harington, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.	Colonel F. G. West, D.S.O.

E.—NORTHERN IRELAND DISTRICT

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General A. G. Wauchope, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.
General Staff Officer 2nd Grade.	Major R. M. Watson, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieutenant-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel R. S. McClinlock, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Brigadier in charge of Administration.	Brigadier E. N. Broadbent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
51st (Highland) Division.	Major-General Sir W. M. Thompson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C.
152nd (Seaforth and Cameron) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. I. M. Campbell, D.S.O., T.D., T.A.
153rd (Black Watch and Gordon) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir J. L. G. Burnett of Leys, Bart., C.M.G., D.S.O.
154th (Argyll and Sutherland) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir N. A. Orr-Ewing, Bart., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 51st (The Highland) Division.	Colonel C. B. Clark, D.S.O.
52nd (Lowland) Division.	Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G.
155th (East Scottish) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.
156th (West Scottish) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. Allason, D.S.O.
157th (Highland Light Infantry) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. H. I. Jackson, D.S.O.
G.R.A. 52nd (The Lowland Division).	Colonel A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., O.B.E.

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G.—Southern Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Montgomery-Massingberd, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Brigadier, General Staff.	Brigadier R. M. Luckock, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General A. A. McHardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Cavalry Brigade.	Brigadier J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
3rd Division.	Major-General Sir J. T. Burnett-Stuart, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
7th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier C. C. Armitage, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
8th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
9th Infantry Brigade.	Brigadier G. W. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 3rd Division.	Brigadier R. G. Finlayson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.
48th (South Midland) Division.	Major-General T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
143rd (Warwickshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. S. Popham, C.M.G., D.S.O.
144th (Gloucestershire and Worcs.) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. D. Buchanan-Dunlop, C.M.G., D.S.O.
145th (South Midland) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.	Colonel R. W. N. Bourchier, D.S.O.
43rd (Wessex) Division.	Major-General Sir G. D. Jeffreys, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G.
128th (Hampshire) Infantry Bgde.	Colonel E. G. St. Aubyn, D.S.O., T.A.
129th (South Wessex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. E. Gibbs, M.C.
130th (Devon and Cornwall) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. B. Incledon-Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A., 43rd (Wessex) Division.	Colonel W. D. Stillwell, D.S.O.

H.—Western Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieutenant-General Sir C. F. Romer, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel R. N. Dick, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Brigadier in charge of Administration.	Brigadier R. F. A. Hobbs, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
53rd (Welsh) Division.	Major-General C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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H.—WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

158*th* (*Royal Welch*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
159*th* (*Welsh Border*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel C. S. Owen, C.M.G., D.S.O.
160*th* (*South Wales*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel L. I. G. Morgan-Owen, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 53*rd* (*Welsh*) *Division.*	Colonel N. G. M. Jervis, D.S.O.
55*th* (*West Lancashire*) *Division.*	Major-General H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O.
164*th* (*North Lancashire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel F. H. Dansey, C.M.G., D.S.O.
165*th* (*Liverpool*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel M. O. Clarke, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
166*th* (*South Lancashire and Cheshire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel M. G. Taylor, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 55*th* (*West Lancashire*) *Division.*	Colonel D. J. C. E. Sherlock, D.S.O.
42*nd* (*East Lancashire*) *Division.*	Major-General W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
125*th* (*Lancashire Fusiliers*) *Brigade.*	Colonel G. N. Heath, D.S.O., T.D., T.A.
126*th* (*East Lancashire and Border*) *Infantry Bgde.*	Colonel G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
127*th* (*Manchester*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel A. H. Spooner, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42*nd* (*East Lancashire*) *Division.*	Colonel H. de C. Martelli, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

Guernsey and Alderney District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General the Lord Sackville, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Jersey District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

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4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
The Life Guards	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. G. V. A. Monckton-Arundel, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord A. R. Innes-Ker, D.S.O.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. S. Howes, D.S.O., M.C.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Gds.)	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. C. A. Heydeman, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
3rd–6th Dragoon Guards	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. W. Bullock Marsham, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
4th–7th Dragoon Guards	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. E. M. Dorman, D.S.O., M.C.	
5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards	York	Lt.-Col. J. A. Brooke.	
1st The Royal Dragoons	Egypt	Lt.-Col. E. W. T. Miles, M.C.	
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. A. I. MacDougall, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. F. R. Burnside, D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Meerut	Lt.-Col. H. E. Macfarlane, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Colchester	Lt.-Col. T. A. Thornton	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	Rhine	Lt.-Col. H. L. Jones, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Bolarum	Lt.-Col. G. F. Reynolds, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. V. J. Greenwood, M.C.	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. A. L. I. Friend, M.C.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. V. S. Charrington, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
13th–18th Hussars	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. W. Holdsworth.	
14th–20th Hussars	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. G. Darley, D.S.O.	
15th–19th Hussars	Risalpur	Lt.-Col. J. Godman.	
16th–5th Lancers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. J. L. Cheyne, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
17th–21st Lancers	Hounslow	Lt.-Col. V. N. Lockett.	

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B.—Royal Regiment of Artillery

Stations of Units.

Brigades, Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q.	Aldershot	3 (etd).	D	Trowbridge
	A, B			E	Risalpur
	O	Aldershot	Unbrig.	G	Trimulgherry
2	H.-Q. K			N	Sialkot
	C	Egypt		I	Meerut
	L			M	St. John's Wood
3	H.-Q.				
	J, F	Newport (Mon.)			

Field Brigades, Royal Artillery.

1	H. Q. 11 (H), 52, 80 (H) 98	Kirkee, Trimulgherry (for Sind)	16	H.-Q. 34, 72, 86 (H) 27 (H)	Jhansi; Allahabad
2	H.-Q. 35 (H) 42, 53, 87	Larkhill	17	H.-Q. 10 13, 26, 92 (H)	Colchester
3	H.-Q. 18, 62, 65 (H) 75	Exeter; Bristol	18	H.-Q. 93, 94, 95 (H), 59	Woolwich
4	H.-Q. 4 (H), 7 14, 66	Aldershot	19	H.-Q. 29 (H) 96, 97 39	Wiesbaden; Larkhill
5	H.-Q. 63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Shorncliffe	20	H.-Q. 41, 45 (H) 67, 99	Catterick
6	H.-Q. 69, 74, 77, 79 (H)	Bulford (for Bordon)	21 (Army)	H.-Q. Z. P Q (H) Y	Newcastle, Sheffield, Sheffield, Newcastle (for Catterick)
7	H.-Q. 9, 17, 16, 43 (H)	Bordon	22	H.-Q. 33, 55 (H) 32	Rawalpindi; Campbellpore (for Rawalpindi)
8	H.-Q. H (H) V, W, X	Brighton		36 (H)	Rawalpindi (for Campbellpore)
9 (Army)	H.-Q. 19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Bulford	23	H.Q. 60, 89, 90 (H) 100 (H)	Nowshera, Peshawar (for Jubbulpore & Nasirabad)
10 (Army)	H.-Q. 51, 54 30 (H), 46	Deepcut	24	H.Q. 70, 50, 56 (H) 22	Lucknow, Fyzabad and Cawnpore (for Lucknow)
11	H.-Q. 78 (H), 83, 84, 85	Aldershot	25	H.-Q. 12, 25, 58 31 (H)	Nowshera; Peshawar
12	H.Q. 6, 23	Lahore (for Jullundur); Jullundur (for Lahore)	26	H.-Q. 40 (H) 48, 71 15	Jubbulpore (for Bulford); Nasirabad (for Bulford)
	49	Ferozepore (for Lahore)	27	H.-Q. 21, 24, 37 (H) 47	Mhow
	91 (How.)	Lahore (for Ferozepore)	28	H.-Q. 3, 5 57 (H) 1	Meerut; Bareilly
13 (Army)	H.Q. 8, 44 82 (How) 2	Edinburgh; Dunbar			
14	H.-Q. 68, 88 (H) 38, 61 (H)	Quetta (for Bangalore); Hyderabad (Sind) (for Bangalore)			
15	H.-Q. R. T, U, S (H)	Bangalore (for Kirkee and Secunderabad)			

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Allotment of Batteries to Field Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
H	8th	1	28th	18	3rd	35	2nd	52	1st	69	6th	86	16th
P	21st	2	13th	19	9th	36	22nd	53	2nd	70	24th	87	2nd
Q		3	28th	20	,,	37	27th	54	10th	71	26th	88	14th
R	15th	4	4th	21	27th	38	14th	55	22nd	72	16th	89	23rd
S		5	28th	22	24th	39	19th	56	24th	73	5th	90	,,
T		6	12th	23	12th	40	26th	57	28th	74	6th	91	12th
U		7	4th	24	27th	41	20th	58	25th	75	3rd	92	17th
V	8th	8	13th	25	25th	42	2nd	59	18th	76	9th	93	18th
W		9	7th	26	17th	43	7th	60	23rd	77	6th	94	,,
X		10	17th	27	16th	44	13th	61	14th	78	11th	95	,,
Y	21st	11	1st	28	9th	45	20th	62	3rd	79	6th	96	19th
Z		12	25th	29	19th	46	10th	63	5th	80	1st	97	,,
		13	17th	30	10th	47	27th	64	,,	81	5th	98	1st
		14	4th	31	25th	48	26th	65	3rd	82	13th	99	20th
		15	26th	32	22nd	49	12th	66	4th	83	11th	100	23rd
		16	7th	33	,,	50	24th	67	20th	84	,,		
		17	,,	34	16th	51	10th	68	14th	85	,,		

Light Brigades, Royal Artillery.

Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H. Q. and Batteries.	—
1st	H.-Q., 6, 8, 10	Egypt	4th	H.-Q., 15, 20, 21	Deepcut
2nd	H.-Q., 5, 7, 9	Bulford			
3rd	H.-Q., 16, 18, 19	Norwich	5th	H.-Q., 1, 13, 14	Ewshott

Indian Mountain Brigades, Royal Artillery.

Brig.	H.-Q. and British Light Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.-Q. and British Light Batteries.	—
20th	H.-Q. 4 (How.)	Quetta	23rd	H.-Q. 17 (How.)	Peshawar Nowshera
21st	H.Q. 12 (How.)	Kohat Rawalpindi	24th	H.Q. 2 (How.)	Razmak Razmak
22nd	H.-Q. 3 (How.)	Abbottabad Kakul	25th	H.-.Q. 11 (How.)	Jutogh Ambala (for Jutogh)

Medium Brigades, Royal Artillery.

Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—
1st	H.Q. 1, 3 (H)	Larkhill	5th	H.Q., 17	Ambala
	5 (H)			21 (H)	
	22 (H)			15 (H)	Peshawar
2nd	H.Q., 7 (H), 4, 8 (H), 12 (H)	Shoeburyness		20 (H)	Ferozepore
			6th	H.Q., 19 (H)	Fort Brockhurst
3rd	H.Q., 2,			24 (H)	
	10 (H)	Longmoor		18	Christchurch
	11 (H)			23 (H)	Fort Fareham
	6 (H)		7th	H.Q.	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth
4th	H.Q., 9	Muttra		26 (H), 27 (H), 28 (H)	
	13 (H) (HD)	Agra		25	Fort Widley, Portsmouth
	14 (H)	Delhi			
	16 (H)	Muttra			

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Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery.

Brigade.	H.Q. and Btys.	—	Brigade.	H.Q. and Btys.	—
1st	H.Q. 1, 2, 3	Blackdown	2nd	H.Q. 4, 5, 6	Clarence Bks. Portsmouth

Heavy Brigade, Royal Artillery.

Brigade.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—
1st	H.Q. 3, 5, 16, 28.	Plymouth.

Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery.

Battery.	—	Battery.	—	Battery.	—
1	(*Cadre*) Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	11	Singapore	23	Bombay
		12	Hong Kong	24	(*Cadre*) Plymouth
		13	Karachi	25	Mauritius
2	(*Cadre*) Jamaica	14	Bombay	26	Bere Island
4	Gibraltar	15	Ceylon	27	Gibraltar
6	Malta	17	Lough Swilly	29	Gibraltar
7	Aden	18	Ceylon	30	(*Cadre*) Sheerness
8	(*Cadre*) Culver (I. of W.)	19	Bere Island	31	Hong Kong
		20	Hong Kong	32	Spike Island
9	Aden	21	Shoeburyness	33	Fort Carlisle
10	Malta	22	Singapore		

1st Survey Co., Royal Artillery .. .. .. Larkhill

C.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham.
School of Electric Lighting, Gosport
Training Battalion, R.E., Chatham
Depôt Battalion, R.E., Chatham
R.E. Mounted Depôt, Aldershot
Railway Training Centre, Longmoor
Rhine Railway Co., Rhine
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot
1st (Fortress) Co., Gibraltar
2nd (Field) Co., Egypt
3rd (Fortress) Co., Dover
4th (Fortress) Co., Gosport
5th (Field) Co., Aldershot
6th (Field) Park Co., Aldershot
7th (Field) Co., Rhine
8th (Railway) Co., Longmoor
9th (Field) Co., Shorncliffe
10th (Railway) Co., Longmoor
11th (Field) Co., Aldershot
12th (Field) Co., Aldershot
13th (Survey) Co., York
14th (Survey) Co., Edinburgh
15th (Field Park) Co., Aldershot
16th (Fortress) Co., Tynemouth Castle, North Shields
17th (Field) Co., Bulford
18th (Field Park) Co., Shorncliffe
19th (Survey) Co., Southampton
22nd (Fortress) Co., Gosport
23rd (Field) Co., Aldershot
24th (Fortress) Co., Malta
26th (Field) Co., Aldershot
30th (Fortress) Co., Plymouth
31st (Fortress) Co., Ceylon
33rd (Fortress) Co., Queenstown Harbour
34th (Fortress) Co., Guernsey
35th (Fortress) Co., Pembroke
36th (Fortress) Co., Sierra Leone
38th (Field) Co., Aldershot
39th (Fortress) Co., Sheerness
40th (Fortress) Co., Hong Kong
41st (Fortress) Co., Singapore
42nd (Field) Co., Egypt
43rd (Fortress) Co., Mauritius
44th (Fortress) Co., Jamaica
45th (Fortress) Co., Portsmouth
49th (Fortress) Co., North Queens-
54th (Field) Co., Bulford [ferry
55th (Field) Co., Catterick
56th (Field) Co., Bulford
58th (Porton) Co., Porton
59th (Field) Co., Catterick
Experimental Bridging Estabt., Christchurch
1st A.A. Searchlight Bn. R.E., Blackdown

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D.—Royal Corps of Signals

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

Signal Training Centre, Catterick
School of Signals, Catterick
Signals Experimental Estabt., Woolwich
Depôt Bn., Catterick
Training Bn., Catterick
"A" Corps Signals, Ewshott
Cavalry Divisional Signals
H.Q. "B" Troop, "C" Troop, Tidworth
"D" Troop, Aldershot
"E" Troop, Tidworth
1st Divisional Signals, Aldershot
2nd Divisional Signals, Aldershot
3rd Divisional Signals, Bulford
4th Divisional Signals, Colchester
Air Defence Brigade Signals, Blackdown
Aldershot Command Signal Co., Aldershot
Eastern Command Signal Co., London
Northern Command Signal Co., York
Scottish Command Signal Co., Edinburgh
Southern Command Signal Co., Salisbury
Western Command Signal Co., Chester
North Ireland Signal Co., Belfast
South Ireland Signal Section, Spike Island
Rhine Command Signal Co., Wiesbaden
Rhine Field Signal Co., Wiesbaden
No. 1 Co., Egypt Signals, Egypt
No. 3 Co. Egypt Signals, Egypt
No. 2 Wireless Co., Sarafand
Signal Section, Aden
Signal Section, Gibraltar
Signal Section, Malta
Signal Section, Malaya
Signal Section, Hong Kong
Signal Section, North China
Signal Section, Mauritius
Signal Section, Bermuda
Signal Section, Jamaica
Signal Section, North China
Signal Section, Ceylon
"L" Co., Jubbulpore

E.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. E. J. L. Pike, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O.	
3rd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. A. F. A. N. Thorne, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Coldstream Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. A. G. C. Dawnay, D.S.O., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Windsor	Lt.-Col. P. R. B. Lawrence, M.C.	
3rd ditto	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. J. C. Brand, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Scots Guards	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. H. E. C. Ross, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Warley (for Chelsea Barracks)	Lt.-Col. E. C. T. Warner, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Irish Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. V. Pollok, C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Welsh Guards	Chelsea Barracks (for Egypt)	Lt.-Col. R. T. K. Auld	
1st Royal Scots (The Royal Regt.)	Glasgow	Lt.-Col. N. K. Charteris, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Tientsin	Lt.-Col. F. C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	S. China Command (for Malta)	Lt.-Col. H. C. Ponsonby, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. H. N. A. Hunter, D.S.O.	
1st The Buffs (East Kent Regt.)	Bareilly	Lt.-Col. L. H. Smith	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. Crookenden, D.S.O.	
1st The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. H. A. Kaulbach, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi	Bt.-Col. W. H. Gribbon, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	York	Lt.-Col. W. N. Herbert, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Lahore	Lt.-Col. S. H. Kershaw, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Woking	Lt.-Col. C. T. Tomes, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Bombay and Deolali	Lt.-Col. J. A. M. Bannerman, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Ambala (for Kamptee)	Lt.-Col. R. H. Pipon, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. R. Howlett, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Egypt and Cyprus	Lt.-Col. D. M. King, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Lichfield	Bt.-Col. L. R. Schuster, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Norfolk Regiment	North China	Lt.-Col. J. P. L. Mostyn	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. H. Brudenell-Bruce, D.S.O.	
1st Lincolnshire Regiment	Dover	Lt.-Col. F. S. Thackeray, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Soudan	Lt.-Col. A. B. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Malta	Lt.-Col. W. E. Scafe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Devonport	Lt.-Col. E. Hewlett, C.M.G., O.B.E.	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. W. N. Nicholson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. W. M. Campbell, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's)	Hong Kong	Lt.-Col C. H. Little, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. H. I. R. Allfrey, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Holywood	Lt.-Col. A. M. Boyall, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Mhow (for Soudan)	Lt.-Col. W. A. Davenport, D.S.O., M.C.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Yorkshire Regiment	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. D. F. Anderson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. B. O. Trimble, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regt.	S. China Command (for Mhow)	Lt.-Col. J. P. Tredennick, D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O.	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Kamptee and Nagpur (for Ambala)	Lt.-Col. C. S. Davies, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. W. T. Bromfield	
1st The Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Strensall	Lt.-Col. H. W. McCall, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. C. H. de St. P. Bunbury	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Egypt (for Gibraltar)	Lt.-Col. R. Luker, C.M.G., D.S.O. *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Wellington, Calicut and Malappuram	Lt.-Col. G. E. Tallents, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers	Bordon	Lt. Col. H. C. Maitland Makgill Crichton, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Ferozepore	Bt.-Col. R. G. Crauford, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Poona and Kirkee	Lt.-Col. E. C. Maxwell, O.B.E., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. A. W. Stericker, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Quetta	Lt.-Col. H. V. V. Kyrke, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. P. R. Butler, D.S.O.	
1st South Wales Borderers	Egypt	Lt.Col. R. F. Gross, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Portsmouth	Lt.-Col. T. C. Greenway, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Bordon	Lt.-Col. H. J. N. Davis, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Hong Kong	Lt.-Col. L. J. Comyn, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Catterick	Lt.Col. H. C. H. Smith, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Nowshera	Lt.-Col. A. R. MacAllen	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Belfast	Lt.-Col. R. C. Smythe, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. Fane, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi (for Gravesend)	Lt.-Col. R. L. Beasley, D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. D.F.O. Faviell, D.S.O.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Worcestershire Regiment	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. F. P. Dunlop, C.B.E., D.S.O. *p.s.c.*	
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Quetta (for Bombay)	Lt.-Col. W. J. Cranston, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Pembroke Dock (for Catterick)	Lt.-Col. J. H. L. Poé, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Gharial	Lt.-Col. M. J. A. Jourdier, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Gibraltar (for Catterick)	Lt.-Col. M. J. Minogue, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	Lebong and Barrackpore	Lt.-Col. A. P. Dene, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. H. T. Dobbin, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Devonport	Lt.-Col. F. H. B. Wellesley.	
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	Lt.-Col. C. J. Pickering, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Border Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. E. Roach-Kelly, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	North China Command	Lt.-Col. A. J. Ellis, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. C. Harman, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi (for Landi Kotal)	Lt.-Col. J. S. Woodruffe, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Multan	Lt.-Col. H. G. F. Frisby	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. C. R. U. Savile, D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Khartoum (for Lichfield)	Lt.-Col. C. W. Frizell, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Malta	Lt.-Col. W. W. Roche	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Meerut	Lt.-Col. A. L. Ramsome, D.S.O. M.C.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. W. Clemson, D.S.O.	
1st The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Rhine	Lt.-Col. F. H. Charlton, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. B. Evans	
1st Welch Regiment	Gosport	Lt.-Col. G. Fleming, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Singapore	Lt.-Col. W. M. Hore	
1st The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Chakrata	Lt.-Col. R. A. Bulloch, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Fort George	Lt.-Col. L. P. Evans, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Parkhurst	Lt.-Col. M. F. Day, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Calcutta (for Maymyo)	Lt.-Col. A. E. Sanderson, D.S.O.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Essex Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. A. E. M. Sinclair Thomson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal (for Nowshera)	Lt.-Col. H. R. Bowen, D.S.O.	
1st The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. R. T. Foster, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Karachi and Hyderabad	Lt.-Col. R. S. Hart, D.S.O.	
1st The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Secunderabad (for Calcutta)	Lt-Col. C. V. M. Bell, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. Green, D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Malta and N. China	Lt.-Col. S. H. J. Thunder, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. G. L. Crossman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte	Fyzabad	Lt.-Col. A. G. M. Sharpe, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto [of Wales's)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. P. B. Robinson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. A. K. Grant, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto [Regiment	Guernsey	Lt.-Col. E. H. Norman, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. A. R. Keppel	
2nd ditto	Peshawar	Lt.-Col. E. H. Rigg, D.S.O.	
1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry	Razmak (for Rawalpindi)	Lt.-Col. B. E. Murray, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. C. Hooper, D.S.O.	
1st Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Catterick	Lt.-Col. V. L. N. Pearson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Madras and St. Thomas' Mount	H. E. Stanley-Murray, M.C.	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. F. L. Pardoe, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. T. G. Dalby, D.S.O.	
1st Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. P. S. Rowan, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	N. China	Lt.-Col. C. A. Barker, O.B.E.	
1st Manchester Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. B. C. Freyberg, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Maymyo (for Secunderabad)	Lt.-Col. J. R. Heelis, M.C.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Nasirabad and Ahmedabad	Lt.-Col. H. V. R. Hodson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. D. G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C.	
1st York and Lancaster Regiment	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. A. B. Beauman, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. M. G. H. Barker, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Durham Light Infantry	Egypt	Lt.-Col. C. L. Matthews, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Sialkot (for Razmak)	Lt.-Col. R. T. Lee, C.M.G., O.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
1st Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regt.)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. C. Greenwood	
2nd ditto	Cawnpore	Lt.-Col. C. H. M. McCallum	
1st Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire), Buffs (The Duke of Albany's)	Dover	Lt.-Col. V. M. Fortune, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Lt.-Col. J. O. Hopkinson, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Delhi	Lt.-Col. I. Picton-Warlow	
2nd ditto	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. J. Forbes-Robertson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Rangoon	Lt.-Col. R. Campbell, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. J. S. Drew, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
1st The Royal Ulster Rifles	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. D. T. C. K. Bernard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Poona (for Allahabad)	Lt.-Col. H. R. Goodman, D.S.O.	
Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Agra	Lt.-Col. F. W. E. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. A. W. R. Sprot, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jamaica and Bermuda	Lt.-Col. R. G. Maclaine, M.C.	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Jullundur and Amritsar	Lt.-Col. H. M. Wilson, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
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F. ROYAL TANK CORPS

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2nd Battalion	Farnborough.
Lt.-Col. J. M. Hulton, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
3rd Battalion (less 1 Section)	Lydd.
Lieut.-Col. H. D. Carlton, D.S.O.	
4th Battalion	Catterick.
Lieut.-Col. M. C. Festing, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
5th Battalion	Perham Down, Salisbury Plain.
Lieut.-Col. C. A. Bolton, C.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
1 Section, 3rd Battalion	Cairo.
Central Schools	Wool.
Lt.-Col. E. J. Carter.	
1st Armoured Car Company	Peshawar.
2nd „ „	Razmak and Razine (for Cawnpore.
3rd „ „	Cairo.
5th „ „	Egypt.
6th „ „	Bangalore.
7th „ „	Lahore.
8th „ „	Kirkee (for Wazaristan).
9th „ „	Cawnpore & Calcutta (for Kirkee).
10th „ „	Quetta.
11th „ „	Delhi.
12th „ „ (Less one Section)	Bovington.
1 Section, 12th Armoured Car Company ..	Rhine (under disbandment).

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II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

[*Corrected up to the 1st of February*, 1929.]

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Master General.	Major-General Sir E. H. de V. Atkinson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., B.S.
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Engineer-in-Chief.	Major-General A. G. Stevenson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

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(*Landikotal*)

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(*Ferozepoore*)

Commander. Col. (Temp. Brigadier) I. U. Battye, D.S.O., I.A.

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(*Jullundur*)

Commander. Colonel (Temp. Brigadier) W. L. O. Twiss, C.B.E., M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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(*Quetta*)

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Sind (Independent) Brigade Area

(KARACHI)

Commander. Major-General M. R. W. Nightingale, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

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(*Naini Tal*)

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Meerut District—continued

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(*Lucknow*)

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(*Secunderabad*)

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(*Maymyo*)

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Commander. (*Vacant.*)

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Director of Civil Aviation.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. S. Brancker, K.C.B., A.F.C.

Department of the Secretary of the Air Ministry

Secretary.	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
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Director of Contracts.	C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.
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Air Ministry—*continued*

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Department of the Chief of the Air Staff

Chief of the Air Staff.	Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D.
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Director of Equipment.	Air Commodore A. M. Longmore, C.B., D.S.O., *q.s.*

3.—R.A.F. Commands (United Kingdom)

(a) AIR DEFENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN

Headquarters: Hillingdon House, Uxbridge, Middlesex.

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*

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R.A.F. Commands (United Kingdom)—*continued*

Wessex Bombing Area

Headquarters : Andover.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal Sir J. M. Steel, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G.

Station H.Q. ..	Andover.
No. 12 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Andover.
*Staff College ..	Andover.
No. 100 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Bicester.
Station H.Q. ..	Bircham Newton.
No. 39 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Bircham Newton.
No. 101 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Bircham Newton.
No. 207 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Eastchurch.
No. 9 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Manston.
Station H.Q. ..	Upper Heyford.
No. 10 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Upper Heyford.
No. 99 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Upper Heyford.
Station Flight ..	Upper Heyford.
Station H.Q. ..	Worthy Down.
No. 7 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Worthy Down.
No. 58 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Worthy Down.
*Oxford University Air Squadron ..	Oxford.

Fighting Area

Headquarters : Uxbridge.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.SO., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., *p.s.c.*

Night Flying Flight ..	Biggin Hill.
Station H.Q.	Duxford.
No. 19 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Duxford.
Station Flight ..	Duxford.
No. 25 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Hawkinge.
No. 111 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Hornchurch.
Station H.Q.	Kenley.
No. 23 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Kenley.
No. 32 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Kenley.
Station H.Q.	Northolt.
†No. 24 (Commn.) Sqdn.	Northolt.
No. 41 (Fighter Sqdn.)	Northolt.
Station H.Q.	North Weald.
No. 29 (Fighter) Sqdn.	North Weald.
No. 56 (Fighter) Sqdn.	North Weald.
Station H.Q.	Tangmere.
No. 1 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Tangmere.
No. 43 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Tangmere.
Station H.Q.	Upavon.
No. 3 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Upavon.
No. 17 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Upavon.
*Cambridge University Air Squadron ..	Cambridge.

No 1 Air Defence Group

Headquarters : Sloane Square, London, S.W.1.

No. 502 (Ulster) (Bomb). Sqdn.	Aldergrove.
No. 503 (County of Lincoln) (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Waddington.
No. 504 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Hucknall.
Superintendent, R.A.F. Reserve	Hendon.

Auxiliary Air Force Units.

No. 600 City of London (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Hendon.
No. 601 County of London (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Hendon.
No. 602 City of Glasgow (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Renfrew.
No. 603 City of Edinburgh (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Turnhouse.
No. 605 County of Warwick (Bomb.) Sqdn. ..	Castle Bromwich.

* For discipline and administration only.
† Directly under Air Ministry for operations.

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R.A.F. Commands (United Kingdom)—*continued*

(b) INLAND AREA

Headquarters : Bentley Priory, Stanmore, Middlesex.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal C. A. H. Longcroft, C.B., C.M.G., D.S O., A.F.C.

Chief Staff Officer. Air Commodore J. L. Forbes, O.B.E.

Units Administered direct by Inland Area Headquarters.

Air Ministry Wireless Section	Air Ministry.	Home Communication Flight	Hendon.
*R.A.F. Central Band.	Uxbridge.		

No. 21 Group

Headquarters : West Drayton.

†Reception Depôt ..	West Drayton.	School of Store Accounting and Store Keeping	Kidbrooke.
‡No. 1 Stores Depôt	Kidbrooke.	§Medical Stores Depôt	Kidbrooke.
Port Detachment ..	South Dock, West India Dock, E.14.	‡No. 2 Stores Depôt	Altrincham.
		‡No. 3 Stores Depôt	Milton.
‡Record Office ..	Ruislip.	‡No. 4 Stores Depôt	Ickenham.
‖R.A.F. M.T. Depôt ..	Shrewsbury.	‡The Packing Depôt	Ascot.
‖Home Aircraft Depôt	Henlow.	Detachment	Orfordness.
¶Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment ..	Martlesham	R.A.F. Depôt .. (Including School of Physical Training.)	Uxbridge.
**No. 15 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Martlesham.	**R.A.F. Officers' Hospital	Uxbridge.
**No. 22 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Martlesham.		

No. 22 Group

Headquarters : Farnborough.

†School of Photography	Farnborough.	School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
‡Experimental Section, R.A.E.	Farnborough.	No. 13 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Andover.
No. 4 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Farnborough.	No. 2 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Manston.
School of Army Cooperation	Old Sarum.	No. 26 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Catterick.
No. 16 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn. ..	Old Sarum.		

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* Directly under Director of Personal Services, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

† Directly under Director of Training, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

‡ Controlled directly by the Air Ministry as laid down in A.M.W.O. 822/1921.

§ Directly under Director of Medical Services, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

‖ Directly under Director of Equipment, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

¶ Administered as laid down in A.M.W.O. 33/1926.

** Under No. 21 Group for administration only.

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R.A.F. Commands (United Kingdom)—*continued*

(b) Inland Area—*continued*

No. 23 Group

Headquarters : " St. Vincents," Grantham.

No. 2 F.T.S.	Digby.	No. 1. F.T.S. ..	Netheravon.
No. 3 F.T.S.	Grantham.	C.F.S.	Wittering.
No. 5 F.T.S.	Sealand.	Electrical and Wireless School ..	Flower Down.
Armament and Gunnery School	Eastchurch.	Detachment of E. and W. School accommodated at ..	Worthy Down.
School of Technical Training (Men) ..	Manston.		

(c) COASTAL AREA

Headquarters : 33–34, Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Units Administered Direct by Coastal Area Headquarters

*Inspector of Recruiting .. .. .. (*a*) R.A.F. Recruiting Depôt	Gwydr House, Whitehall, S.W.1.
‡Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment	Felixstowe.
(*a*) Flying Boat Development Flight	Felixstowe.
Station H.Q.	Cattewater.
No. 482 (Coastal Reconnaissance) Flight	Cattewater.
†Central Medical Establishment ..	3–4, Clement's Inn, W.C.2.
R.A.F. Training Base ..	Leuchars.
(*a*) Headquarters.	
(*b*) Accommodation for 5 F.A.A. Flights.	
Station H.Q.	Donibristle.
(*a*) No. 36 (Torpedo Bomber) Squadron.	
(*b*) No. 401 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.	
(*c*) No. 405 ,, ,,	
(*d*) No. 406 ,, ,,	
R.A.F. units for H.M.S. *Furious*, *Argus* and *Vindictive*	

No. 10 Group

Headquarters : Lee-on-Solent

R.A.F. Base	Calshot.
(*a*) Headquarters.	
(*b*) No. 201 (Flying Boat) Squadron.	
(*c*) H.Q. Training Squadron.	
(*d*) Navigation School.	
(*e*) Seaplane Training Flight.	
(*f*) Marine Training Section.	
School of Naval Co-operation	Lee-on-Solent.
R.A.F. Base	Gosport.
(*a*) Headquarters.	
(*b*) Flying Section.	
(*c*) Torpedo Development Section.	
(*d*) Marine Craft Section.	
(*e*) R.A.F. Auxiliary *Adastral*.	
(*f*) Storage Unit.	
Accommodation for 6 F.A.A. Flights R.A.F. Floating Dock	Portland.

(d) ROYAL AIR FORCE, CRANWELL

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore F. C. Halahan, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College. R.A.F. Hospital.
Band.

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* Directly under Air Ministry for technical administration.
† Under the D.M.S., Air Ministry, for technical administration (medical).
‡ Controlled directly by the Air Ministry as laid down in A.M.W.O. 822/1921.

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R.A.F. Commands (United Kingdom)—*continued*

(e) ROYAL AIR FORCE, HALTON

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore I. M. Bonham-Carter, C.B., O.B.E.

Units as follow :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training Apprentices	Halton.
School of Cookery	,,
Princess Mary's R.A.F. Hospital ..	,,
(*a*) Pathological Laboratory ..	,,
(*b*) Medical Training Depôt ..	,,

R.A.F. COMMANDS (OVERSEAS)

(a) R.A.F., Middle East

Headquarters : Villa Victoria, Cairo.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal T. I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G.

Chief Staff Officer. Air Commodore A. G. Board, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Units Administered Direct by Middle East Command Headquarters

R.A.F. Depôt, Middle East	Aboukir.
(*a*) Meteorological Station	,,
(*b*) Port Detachment	Alexandria.
No. 4 Flying Training School	Abu Sueir.
Station Headquarters	Heliopolis.
(*a*) Meteorological Station	,,
No. 208 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	,,
No. 216 (Bombing) Squadron	,,
No. 45 (Bombing) Squadron	Helwan.
Meteorological Station	Ismailia.
No. 47 (Bombing) Squadron	Khartoum.

*Royal Air Force, Transjordan and Palestine.

Headquarters : Amman.

No. 14 (Bombing) Squadron	Amman.
No. 2 Armoured Car Coy.	Ramleh.
Meteorological Station	Ammau.
Supply Depôt	Sarafand.
R.A.F. Hospital	,,
W/T Station	Jerusalem.
W/T Station	Ma'an.

Also the undermentioned military unit :—

No. 2. Wireless Coy., R.C.S. ..	Sarafand.

* Directly under the High Commissioner for operations.

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R.A.F. COMMANDS (OVERSEAS)—*continued*

(b) Iraq Command

Headquarters: Baghdad City.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., *p.s.c.*

Chief Staff Officer. Air Commodore F. W. Bowhill, C.M.G., D.S.O.

R.A.F. Units as follow:—

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters.

Station Headquarters	Hinaidi.
Command Accounts Office	Baghdad.
Aircraft Depôt	Hinaidi.
General Hospital	,,
Central Supply Depôt	,,
Supply Depôt	Mosul.
No. 6 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	,,
No. 30 (Bombing) Squadron	Hinaidi.
,, 55 (Bombing) Squadron	,,
,, 70 (Bombing) Squadron	,,
Armoured Car Wing H.Q.	,,
No. 84 (Bombing) Squadron	Shaibah.
Supply Depôt	Basrah.

Military Forces in Iraq.

Iraq Signal Section.	No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (No. 2 Section).
40th Combined Field Ambulance.	

(c) R.A.F. India

Headquarters: New Delhi.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Air Staff Duties. Group Captain R. P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C.

No. 1 (Indian Group).

Headquarters	Peshawar.

Units as follow:—

Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing ..	Kohat.
No. 60 (Bombing) Squadron ..	Kohat.
No. 27 (Bombing) Squadron ..	,,
Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing ..	Risalpur.
No. 11 (Bombing) Squadron ..	,,
,, 39 (Bombing) Squadron ..	,,
No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Peshawar.

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R.A.F. COMMANDS (OVERSEAS)—*continued*

(c) R.A.F. India—*continued*

Headquarters, No. 3 Indian Wing ..	Quetta.
No. 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	,,
No. 31 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	,,

Units administered direct by Command Headquarters :—

Aircraft Depôt	Karachi.
,, Park	Lahore.
No. 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron ..	Ambala.

(d) R.A.F. Mediterranean

Headquarters : Valletta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units cooperating with the Navy in the Mediterranean Sea area.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore R. H. Clark-Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.a.*

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. Base	Calafrana, Malta.

R.A.F. Units for H.M.S. *Eagle* and *Courageous*.

(e) Aden Command

Air Officer Commanding. Group Captain W. G. S. Mitchell, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.F.C.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

No. 8 (Bombing) Squadron	Khormaksbar.
Armoured Car Section.	,,
Aden Protectorate Levies	Aden.

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THE
ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. XVIII. No. 2. JULY, 1929

EDITORIAL

WITH the exception of the two essays which have been placed first and second in order of merit, the general standard of the essays for the Bertrand Stewart Prize this year was somewhat disappointing. The writers displayed a lack of clear thinking, and their views on the subject set to them were usually vague and unconvincing.

Most of the essayists considered that the course of tank development would follow that of the modern ship of war and would reproduce the contest between guns and armour which has become familiar in naval construction during the last seventy years. Nevertheless, they held that this would not eliminate infantry, as we define that arm of the Service to-day, because infantry would still be required to consolidate a position when it had been captured by tanks. It is clear, however, that if the development of the tank is really to be a contest between the anti-tank gun and the tank's armour, the weight of the gun or firearm must be increased, and that at a very early stage in this development the firearm will become too heavy for the infantry soldier to carry or to handle in action. The problem which has to be solved to-day, therefore, is how the infantry is to be remodelled and reorganized to fit it to cope with the new situation created by the development of tanks and the extended radius of their action. This problem was not tackled successfully in the majority of the essays.

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Several of the writers dealt at considerable length with the economic aspects of mechanization. They suggested, and probably correctly, that the limited funds available in time of peace for military purposes would retard the process of mechanization in most

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countries. No doubt, for example, the Government of a country like France would hesitate before adopting a policy of mechanical development which might render the French Army as at present organized obsolete. In this connection some of the writers considered that the great man-power of some of the conscript armies would compensate for a lack of mechanical equipment.

This suggestion might be true to-day, but, as the process of mechanization continues, it is likely that the strength of armies will be measured in the same way as that of navies, and the military power of a country may depend not so much on its man-power as on the quality and quantity of its mechanized armament.

* * * * *

It is rather surprising that so few of the essays dealt with the matter of permanent fortification. Since it seems unlikely that obstacles, capable of checking effectively the progress of tanks, can be constructed hurriedly to meet an emergency, it is probable that countries with largely extended land frontiers may decide to protect their more important localities with permanent fortifications. In the previous paragraph it was suggested that the development of mechanization might result in the maintenance of comparatively small armies resembling navies in their organization. Just as fortified dockyards are required for the protection of warships undergoing repair or refit, so fortified bases may well be needed for similar purposes by the mechanized armies of the future.

* * * * *

The essayists generally in discussing the use of aircraft in cooperation with mechanized forces confined their attention to the employment of aeroplanes on the work of reconnaissance. But it should be possible to design an aeroplane to carry a gun which could penetrate the overhead armour of tanks, and such a machine by diving attacks might well be a considerable menace to a tank. No doubt at any stage of the development of the aeroplane and tank, armour might be provided which could stop any projectiles an aeroplane could discharge; but if the tank designer had to provide protection against overhead attacks as well as against ground anti-tank guns, he might find it difficult to preserve an adequate mobility for his machine. A tank is not seriously endangered by the armour-piercing bomb, because this projectile, in order to obtain sufficient velocity for penetration, has to be discharged from a considerable height and accuracy of aim necessary for hitting such a small moving target as a tank is not likely to be obtained.

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The effect of mechanization on the conduct of operations in future wars was naturally by far the most difficult part of the task set in this competition. It is no easy matter to think out the course of an imaginary war and to describe in a short essay the influence that forms of armament, which have as yet only been partially developed, would have upon its operations. There was a tendency among the writers to take it for granted that a future war in Europe would be sufficiently long to enable the Powers engaged to raise and train new formations, and to equip them with material manufactured after the outbreak of war. No one would venture to assert that this view of the case may not be the correct one. At the same time it would be a mistake to assume that what happened in the Great War will be repeated in a future war. The mobilizing of the whole man-power of the various combatants between 1914 and 1918 was largely due to the fact that the armies actually mobilized at the outbreak of hostilities were too large for the theatre in which the main decision was sought.

If the theory which has been tentatively advanced in these Notes is a correct one—that mechanization may ultimately result in comparatively small armies—is it not conceivable that a Power which succeeds in gaining a definite superiority in the early stages of a war might be able to prevent its enemy from recovering? The theatre of operations is unlikely to be so closely restricted as to prevent mechanized forces from making the best use of their mobility. The war, consequently, might be one of quick manœuvre leading to a complete victory followed by the investment of the beaten army.

* * * * *

The appreciation of Marshal Foch which appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly* will be read with interest by all military students. The author of the article served on the Marshal's staff and is well qualified, therefore, to write of the great soldier who led the Allied Armies to victory.

What position among the world's great military leaders will ultimately be assigned to Marshal Foch must be left to posterity. His contemporaries can only remember the all-important part that he played in the concluding stages of the Great War and judge of his military genius by the triumph which he attained. His leading characteristic was undoubtedly his indomitable courage which enabled him to win through every difficulty and to inspire others with his own calm confidence in ultimate victory. "In war," he wrote, "the moral factor counts above everything else. The will to win dominates the whole situation . . . a battle won is a battle

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in which one does not admit that one is beaten." This was the military axiom which guided him throughout the Great War, and he proved again and again that a commander, who has faith in himself and who believes in the justice of his cause, can inspire his troops with the same spirit of confidence. His famous message to Marshal Joffre when the Army under his command was withstanding the fierce German attacks on the plateau north of Sézanne in the early days of September, 1914, was typical of the man: "*Mon centre cède et ma droite recule. Tout von bien. J'attaque.*"

Marshal Foch's permanent *mot d'ordre* was "attack." He was a profound believer in the efficacy of the offensive in war. Even when on the defensive, therefore, he never "wasted time," as he himself expressed it, in wondering what the enemy was going to do next. "While he has the initiative," he used often to say, "he can do anything he likes. How am I to know what he will do? Go and ask Ludendorff if you wish to know what are his intentions. My job now is to stop whatever he may try to do. *Cramponnez partout.*" But when the situation, as disclosed by battle, proved that the enemy was gripped, then the *coup de grâce*—such was the essence of Marshal Foch's military teaching in time of peace, such was his practice as a commander in war.

* * * * *

No more ideal commander for the Allies during the closing stages of the Great War could have been found than Marshal Foch. In the earlier phases of the campaign on the Western Front an offensive policy had been the wrong one for the French and British Armies. But once the great German onslaught of 1918 had exhausted itself the hour had come for an Allied attack all along the line, and no man by temperament and by training was better fitted than Marshal Foch to organize and to conduct such a series of operations. His optimism, his energy, his determination inspired all the commanders who served under him, while his tact and his broad-minded acceptance of other commanders' views smoothed over many difficulties which are inevitable where allied forces are concerned. It was characteristic of Marshal Foch's method as Generalissimo of the Allies that when discussing operations with the leaders of the various Armies he spoke of Marshal Pétain's troops as "we," and of Sir Douglas Haig's troops as "you" or "the British," thus indicating that he did not regard the British Commander-in-Chief entirely as his subordinate. It is well known, too, that on several occasions during his period of supreme command he changed his plans in accordance with Sir Douglas Haig's advice, and he was always loud

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in his appreciation of the military skill and judgment of the British leader. With the French generals his attitude was different. With them he was the Commander-in-Chief: his was the master mind: he gave his orders and they had to be carried out to the letter.

* * * * *

Marshal Foch will be honoured for all time as a great soldier and a great patriot. He served his country with his whole heart and mind, and had the supreme satisfaction of commanding the Armies which avenged the defeat of 1870. He was a born leader of men who by sheer force of character and by unswerving devotion to duty set an example to all those who served under him. His simplicity of character, his deep religious convictions and his high sense of honour made him in very truth *un chevalier sans peur et sans reproche.*

* * * * *

The political results that may occur from the fall of Mr. Baldwin's Government are matters with which the *Army Quarterly* has no concern. At the same time it is only natural that those who are interested in defence problems should feel a little anxious at the advent to power of a political Party so many of whose supporters are supposed to be in favour of radical reductions in the fighting Services. The same anxiety was felt in 1924 when the first Labour Government came into office, but the record of that Government showed that it fully realized its responsibilities in matters of defence, and there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's second Administration will be any less alive to its duty. However great may be our political differences at home, we all realize that the safety and well-being of the nation and the Empire must be preserved; that so long as other nations remained armed, we too must be prepared to defend ourselves against attack. No man realized this more clearly than the late Mr. Stephen Walsh when he was Secretary of State for War. His successor in the new Labour Government may be equally depended upon to do all within his power to maintain the efficiency of the Army against any attacks that may be made against it by the more extreme sections of his Party.

* * * * *

The adjournment of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on the 6th of May, without any definite progress towards military disarmament having been arrived at, must be a disappointment to those who would have us believe that

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an international agreement for the limitation of armaments is not really a matter of any great difficulty. These enthusiasts would always have us believe that the only obstacle to such an agreement is the stubborn determination of the military experts—the advisers of the various Governments—not to give way on technical matters. But in reality the obstacles that exist in the way of military disarmament at any rate are far more political than technical. The retention of military conscription, the limitations to be imposed upon the amount of war material to be in stock or in reserve, the amount to be spent on military budgets, are all matters of national policy which cannot possibly be satisfactorily settled except by a full Conference. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suggest that the work of the Preparatory Commission has had no results. It has at any rate made it clear that all the nations represented on the Commission are alive to the fact that the only means by which progress can be made towards the abolition of war is by a general acceptance of the principle of a reduction in armaments. The British representative, Lord Cushendun, was able to show that in this the British nation has given a lead to the world. "As compared with August, 1914," he said, "we have reduced nine cavalry regiments, twenty-one infantry battalions, and sixty-one artillery batteries, and in the last five years we have had a progressively reduced military budget. In 1925 our military budget was £36½ millions, in 1926 it was £34½ millions, in 1927 £33⅓ millions, in 1928 £32¾ millions, and in the present year £32½ millions (these figures representing military expenditure less pensions): so that during the last five years we have been continually and progressively reducing our military budget at the same time as we have carried out this progressive diminution of our land forces. Therefore it is quite possible—I am not making any assertion—that when the matter comes to be decided by the Disarmament Conference it may appear that we have already reduced to the level required by Article 8 of the Covenant."

* * * * *

An interesting leading article in *The Times* * and some letters which have appeared in the same newspaper may have drawn public attention to the report of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the Officers' Training Corps. So much may now depend upon the efficiency of the Territorial Army that it is just as well that the public should understand exactly what is the position as regards the O.T.C. from which should be drawn the greater number of the

* *See The Times*, 7th of May, 1929.

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officers required for the Territorial Army. Although in the recent examination there is a falling off in the numbers qualified in the written examinations, the C.I.G.S.'s report shows that about 2,000 cadets in the public schools and some hundreds more in the universities were successful in the examination for certificate "A." This is satisfactory so far as it goes, but it should be noted that last year only seventy-seven Commissions in the Supplementary Reserve and five hundred and fifty-two Commissions in the Territorial Army were given to men who had served in the O.T.C. *The Times* points out that as £159,900 is provided by the State annually in the form of efficiency and other grants, travelling expenses of senior cadets and permanent staff pay, "it is not unreasonable to expect better results; but there are many who doubt whether they are likely to be achieved while the O.T.C. and the Territorial establishments and strengths remain the interests of different authorities."

This suggestion is no new one, and there would probably be a good deal to be said for bringing the O.T.C. into the Territorial organization if, in the event of another war, the Territorial Army alone looked to this corps for its officers. But as the Regular Army also would look to this source for its supply of officers, it is probably the wiser policy to leave the O.T.C. in the charge of the C.I.G.S.

It is of course to be regretted that, although the O.T.C. has a total strength of over 36,000, officers commanding Territorial regiments and battalions should still be complaining that qualified men are not coming forward to take Commissions. There is to-day a deficiency of over 2,000 in the Commissioned ranks of the Territorial Army, and yet, as *The Times* points out, more than twice the number of cadets qualified last year in the school corps alone.

Various reasons are advanced by writers in *The Times* for this lack of patriotic enthusiasm among the young men of the present generation, but the true reason is probably that to-day the majority of those who are educated at the public schools and universities go into business and have little or no time available for military pursuits. Until business men and employers generally come to the assistance of the Territorial Army and give special facilities to their employees, it seems too much to hope, especially at a time when no war seems imminent, that any large number of young men will give up their short holidays to military training.

* * * * *

Amongst the distinguished British officers who have died since the last appearance of the *Army Quarterly* are General Sir Henry

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Mackinnon, Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Stopford, Major-General Sir William Birkbeck and Major-General C. W. Scott. General Sarrail, Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia and Colonel Bauer have also passed away.

Generals Mackinnon and Stopford, both Grenadier Guardsmen and soldiers of the old school, held a long series of staff appointments without having had a Staff College training. The former was particularly connected with the old Volunteers and the Territorial Force, leading the City Imperial Volunteers (C.I.V.) in South Africa, and becoming Director of Auxiliary Forces and the first Director-General of the Territorial Force. General Stopford was Military Secretary to General Sir Redvers Buller in South Africa in 1899, Director of Military Training at the War Office for two years, and then G.O.C. London District; but after an unlucky command at manœuvres in 1909, when he was opposed to Sir Ian Hamilton, he had no active employment until the Great War. His name will always be connected with the landing at Suvla. He has never told his own story; but if there is blame in the matter, it should fall not so much on him, as on the authority who sent a general of sixty-one years of age, out of touch for many years with war preparations and conditions, to carry out a most difficult task, for which Sir Ian Hamilton had asked young and war-proved commanders from France.

Sir William Birkbeck, a cavalryman of the K.D.G. and a *p.s.c.* who died from a fall over the cliffs at Dinard, will be remembered as the "genial giant" who represented the British Army in the Russo-Japanese War. He was head of the Cavalry School, and Director of Remounts in South Africa in 1899–1902 and at the War Office throughout the Great War. Major-General C. W. Scott of the Royal Artillery, who died after a comparatively simple operation, after being wounded in command of a field battery in May, 1915, was for the last two years of the war, from November, 1916, onward, at G.H.Q., as one of the principal members of General Sir Noel Birch's staff, responsible for the gun and ammunition supply.

General Sarrail, who, like the late Sir Henry Wilson, has been described as a "political soldier," was well known to the British Army as Commander-in-Chief at Salonika, where he remained until December, 1917. An infantryman, he was in August, 1914, in command of the VIII Corps; but after the early disasters he was promoted to command of the Third Army. In the battle of the Marne he pivoted his Army on Verdun instead of abandoning the

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fortress as G.Q.G.'s orders directed. For this some writers claim that he should be awarded as great a share in the victory as Marshal Galliéni. In July, 1915, an excuse was made of the heavy losses which his Army had incurred to remove him from his command: the real reason, it is now admitted, was a political intrigue which he was carrying on against the Commander-in-Chief. The command at Salonika removed him to a convenient distance. He was an extreme radical, a freethinker and an anti-clerical, and in his final appointment as High Commissioner in Syria, 1924–1925, through permitting himself to be influenced by his political feelings, he was a complete failure.

Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother of the ex-Kaiser, who adopted the Navy as a serious profession, was well known to British officers of both Services who appreciated his kindness to them when officially visiting Germany. During the Great War he was Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic station, and flew his flag at Kiel. He was never actively engaged, and when any important sea operations were in execution a special commander was appointed to take charge.

Colonel Max Bauer, who died of smallpox in China, where he had gone as adviser to the Nanking Government, was on the General Staff of the Supreme Command from first to last in the Great War, under all four Chiefs of the General Staff, having previously in peace served under Ludendorff in the Strategic Mobilization Section. Some of his books have been reviewed in this Review. A foot-artillery officer, he was in 1914 at first engaged on technical duties, and it was he who, as Moltke's representative, ordered the ill-advised attack on the Nancy defences. Under Ludendorff's régime he was mainly engaged on political liaison between O.H.L. and the Government in Berlin. After the war he was connected with the extreme nationalist and military parties and took part in the Kapp *Putsch*. Until he left Berlin to go to China, he openly advocated a combination of Germany with the British Empire to overthrow the Bolshevist Government in Russia.

* * * * *

It is interesting to note that accommodation for the Regimental Museum of the King's Own Royal Regiment has been found in Lancaster Museum in the Old Town Hall of Lancaster. This is probably the first time that a regimental museum has been housed in a municipal museum, and the example seems to be an extremely good one for regiments and municipalities to adopt. The more closely the territorial connection is maintained between the regi-

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ments of the British Army and the counties or towns from which they mainly draw their recruits, the better it will be for the Service as a whole. The establishment of a regimental museum in a building which is readily accessible to the public should lead to a more intelligent understanding of the history and traditions of the regiment. The exhibits, too, will supply a permanent record of the history of a regiment and will keep successive generations familiar with the notable actions in which it took part.

16th of June, 1929.

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MILITARY PRIZE ESSAY, 1929

CAPTAIN BERTRAND STEWART'S BEQUEST

The Referees appointed under the terms of the Bequest—namely : Lieut.-General Sir P. de B. Radcliffe, Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington and Lieut.-Colonel T. A. Headlam—have awarded the prize to Major B. C. Dening, M.C., Royal Engineers.

The Referees place the essay submitted by Captain C. A. P. Munson, M.C., Royal Artillery, second, and consider that those of Colonel A. P. Wavell and Colonel H. Rowan-Robinson deserve special commendation.

"While the 19th century saw the transition from standing armies to nations in arms and a large increase in the size of military forces, the tendency of the 20th century is to substitute machines for men and to develop force by the application of mechanical and scientific invention. What is likely to be the effect of this tendency upon the organization of armies and their operations in war ? "

By Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E.

(*The views expressed in this essay are the personal views of the author and are in no sense official.*)

Introduction

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, i.e. during the wars of Napoleon I up to the period of Waterloo, the weapons of the various European armies being more or less equally efficient, military power was measurable in terms of the number of men in the field. But the number of men in the field was governed by certain definite factors, the main being the size of the populations of the day, and the amount of money that could be raised by the leaders concerned. The absence of industries capable of large weapon production also limited forces to the output of a few arsenals.

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Further, the state of communications had an appreciable influence, there being a limit to the numbers that could be supplied, beyond a certain distance, by existing means of transport.

After Waterloo came a long span of years in which there were no wars of magnitude, and in which each of the limiting factors mentioned above was overcome to a large extent. Thus by 1870 populations had increased to a phenomenal degree, nations had become far wealthier by the sudden development of their natural resources, modern industry had been founded capable of a large production of war material, and the problem of communications had been largely solved, at least for the moment, by the construction of railways. Conditions had become eminently suitable for the expansion of armies to an extent never before experienced.

The process of placing more and more men in the field, which logically still seemed to be *the* way in which to increase the power of a State, was continued after the Franco-Prussian War until the climax was reached during the middle stages of the Great War. By that time England, France, and Germany had mobilized every available man, and several of the other Powers engaged had almost reached the same point.

Since the Great War the curve representing size of armies in relation to size of populations, which had risen so continuously from 1815 to 1915, has taken a sharp downward course. The immediate reasons for this are apparent. The first is the improbability of war and the consequent lack of a need for armed forces; the second is the state of poverty into which the main combatants, except the United States, have been thrown as a result of the last war; and the third, in the case of Germany and her allies, is that only small defence forces are permitted.

But even if these causes were removed, it is safe to affirm that, for military reasons, modern General Staffs would not from choice recreate armies of the size with which the world became familiar in the Great War.

Military Considerations affecting the Size of Armies To-day

The military considerations which have induced a desire for smaller armies are :—

(i) Modern automatic small-arm weapons can produce a great volume of fire and enable a few men to produce an effect formerly produced only by a large number of men.

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(ii) The strength of an attack is now measured not by the number of bayonets that are placed in the front line, but by the degree to which the power of infantry, armoured forces and artillery can be brought to bear.

(iii) The creation of mechanical transport in large quantities has given military forces greater mobility, and, within limits, a smaller mobile force is capable of performances equivalent to those of a larger immobile force.

(iv) The air weapon is developing every year. The rear organizations of large mass armies, upon which such armies rely for existence, are vulnerable to bombing attack, whereas those of smaller forces are less exposed.

(v) If there is any chance of exposure to armoured forces, large unarmoured forces are a source of weakness.

(vi) The future possibilities of gas are as yet unknown. The use of gas may render it dangerous to place larger forces in the field than can be specially protected.

(vii) In the case of overseas expeditions, the invention of the long-range submarine has made it desirable to reduce the shipping employed to a minimum. The smaller the army the less the shipping required.

All these considerations indicate that the military power of a nation is developed to-day not so much by the number of armed men in the field, as by the correct proportion of men, weapons and equipment placed in action. This correct proportion depends upon the capabilities and limitations of the various forms of weapon and equipment which have been introduced to supplement man-power. It is necessary, therefore, to investigate how far mechanical and scientific development have progressed.

The Situation as Regards Mechanical and Scientific Development

(*a*) *Automatic Small Arm Weapons*

Development has taken three forms, resulting in the production of a heavy machine gun (of the Vickers 0·303 type), the light automatic (Lewis or Browning), and the magazine rifle (primarily a bayonet carrier). The characteristics of these types vary sufficiently for it to be safe to assume that all three are required. The three types differ principally in the volume of fire procurable per man employed, and in the mobility of the weapon. The proportion of

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each type required in a given force depends mainly upon the tasks in front of that force.

As regards the future, it is unlikely that any marked changes in the characteristics of these weapons need be anticipated, though existing patterns may be superseded and later models embodied in future organizations.

(*b*) *Armoured forces*

Armoured forces have also been evolved in three directions—that of (i) the medium tank, (ii) the light tank, and (iii) the armoured car.

The heavy tank, of 30 tons and over, has gradually passed into the background, requiring as it does special bridges for its passage over obstacles. Also its main advantage over the lighter, faster types, viz. its ability to cross wide trenches, disappears in any form of moving warfare.

All armoured forces, it may be assumed, have sufficient thickness of armour to provide protection against the direct fire of small arms at close ranges.

(i) *Medium Tanks.*—These vary in size, weight and armament in different armies. Their general characteristics, however, which are likely to be common to all armies and to remain for many years, are that they are of medium weight (7 to 20 tons), possess a speed of up to 25 m.p.h. on the fairway, have a large cross-country capacity (in that they can break down walls and hedges, and climb over banks and through ditches and small streams), carry an armament of a light gun and several small arm automatics. They can cross barbed wire entanglements and crush men in the open. They are capable of engaging any other arm, but are themselves very vulnerable to direct hits from either field guns or tanks guns. By utilizing their mobility and cover offered by the ground, and by blinding possible enemy gun positions with smoke, a medium tank attack over suitable ground is very hard to stop.

This type of tank is, however, partially blind and may overrun an enemy. It cannot hold ground by remaining in position upon it. It is stopped by water obstacles over 3 ft. in depth, by very steep hills, by forests, swamps and any area of rocks and boulders. It is expensive and has a limited life. Modern types are relatively free from mechanical breakdown.

Medium tanks are likely to be controllable by wireless telephony, though this form of communication is in its infancy. Its occupants are protected from mustard types of gas spread upon the ground, though a tank proof against volatile gases has yet to be evolved.

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As regards future development, changes are likely to take the form of improvements in detail only, and the main capabilities and limitations are likely to remain as described above.

(ii) *Light Tanks.*—This type has as its main characteristics its lightness, cheapness, and handiness. It runs upon tracks or half tracks and wheels. Being light, it can be carried bodily in large vehicles. Its cheapness enables a large number to be placed in the field for the same cost as a small number of medium tanks. Its handiness facilitates the negotiation of narrow passages which would hold up the larger types and also makes easier the problem of concealment. By operating in large numbers the chances of anti-tank defence successfully stopping an attack are greatly reduced. The armament consists of small arm automatics only. The cross country capabilities of the vehicle are reduced in certain respects compared to medium tanks as far as crossing banks, hedges, walls, and ditches are concerned. On the other hand, this type offers an ideal instrument for engaging hidden machine guns which may be preventing all unarmoured movement above ground. *Personnel* are more exposed than in a larger tank, but are less blind. This type is held up just as the larger by water obstacles, swamps, woods, mountains, etc. If the vehicles are forced to make long marches upon their own tracks, their life is likely to be strictly limited. If carried in large road vehicles a long life may be expected.

Control of light tanks is likely to prove more difficult than that of larger tanks as little space exists in the machine for apparatus. As regards gas, it is unlikely that the light type will ever be made gas-proof without an increase in weight, size, and cost.

This light tank has probably approached less to its final form than other types of armoured vehicle. But its main characteristics are unlikely to change greatly. Progress may be made by producing a wheel-cum-track machine, obviating the need for carriage in larger vehicles; or the speed, handiness and protection afforded may be improved.

(iii) *Armoured Cars.*—Armoured cars differ mainly from the tank types in that they run upon pneumatic tyres. They are therefore more vulnerable and less able to climb over obstacles, but have greatly increased speed and radius of action upon good surfaces. Six-wheeled cars are likely to possess very fair cross-country capabilities, though they will be held up by practically all obstacles that can stop tanks. Armoured cars have an armament of small-arms automatics. They are eminently suitable for long distance reconnaissance and pursuit of disorganized forces but not for

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close fighting. By their speed they can escape from gun fire and gas clouds. Control by wireless is likely to be perfected. The life of cars is long, and the future is unlikely to see great advances upon present-day patterns.

(*c*) *Artillery Support*

Where the advance of an army has been stopped by the power of the defensive, the forward movement can be continued by the aid of artillery fire. The limitations of this form of support need to be emphasized. A further advance can only be ensured up to the depth of such intensive bombardment as is put down and upon a limited frontage. Immense accumulations of ammunition are required, and the ground shelled is so cut up as to act as a most formidable obstacle to the subsequent advance of the army. Nevertheless, upon selected occasions, such as the forcing of an obstacle line where aid from armoured forces is unprocurable, the advantages of artillery bombardment are not to be overlooked.

Mechanical and scientific developments have reached such a stage that guns of calibres up to 18-inch may be expected in the field, drawn by tractors, firing shrapnel, high explosive or different forms of gas as required. The range of many of these weapons is very great, but for purposes of decisive bombardment direct ground observation or close and uninterrupted air observation are essential, neither of which are to be counted upon to any great depth beyond the enemy's front line.

The employment of large artillery concentrations, while it economizes the number of men required in the assault of a given position, implies great costs of production, large organizations in rear exposed to air attack, and a great slowing up of the general advance of an army. It may mean the special construction of roads and railways.

Artillery, since it has been steadily evolving for a great many years, is unlikely to change its characteristics to any appreciable extent in the future.

(*d*) *Mechanical Transport*

All modern industrial nations possess mechanical transport in large quantities, available for military use in time of war. The capabilities of this transport in the direction of reliability, radius of action, cross-country capacity and weight carrying determine its military value.

As regards reliability, it may be accepted that in the case of all

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types using roads a high degree of perfection has been attained. With proper supervision and adequate workshop facilities it is unlikely that operations in war should in future be hindered by mechanical breakdown in the transport.

Similarly, the radius of action of mechanical transport, as far as military operations are concerned, may be regarded as satisfactory, allowing as it may for movements up to a hundred miles per day.

Cross-country capacity and weight-carrying ability are diametrically opposed attributes in a vehicle. In the ascertainment of the ideal ratio of the one to the other in military vehicles, mechanical science has yet some way to go. At the present time accepted types are the 3 to 5-ton lorry, designed to run upon roads or flat hard surfaces only, and capable of carrying the main bulk of army requirements, and the 30 cwt. six-wheeler, made to pass either at high speeds with full loads upon fair surfaces or at low speeds and reduced loads across country. In its latter function the six-wheeler has shown remarkable powers, being able to traverse heather, rocky areas, and, with chains, soft mud of the worst type. This type can act readily as the first line transport of troops, rarely being unable to follow where previously horse transport has been used.

The chief limitation as regards mechanical transport at the moment lies in the quantities available. Of the heavier road vehicles a great number are used in civil life, but of the six-wheel cross-country pattern there are insufficient in existence to meet the likely needs of an army.

The future is likely to show less a development in types than in quantities, though increased mechanical efficiency and performance may be anticipated. As far as armies are concerned, every future organization should take into full consideration the fact that large quantities of mechanical transport are in existence.

(*e*) *The Air Weapon*

Aircraft affect the future organization and operation of armies by virtue of their powers of reconnaissance, low-flying attack and bombing.

In the matter of reconnaissance, aircraft have a great radius of action and now render considerable precautions necessary if strategical surprise is to be obtained. Large movements by day, large concentrations and extensive constructional works can no longer be permitted, if secrecy is essential. At close distance aircraft have made it more difficult to achieve even tactical surprise

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By low-flying attack, using machine guns, aircraft can expose columns on the march to sudden fire and cause dislocation of movement. Columns of mechanical transport are particularly susceptible to this form of attack.

But it is by means of heavy bombing that the air weapon is most able to affect armies. Heavy bombing squadrons have a radius of action at the moment of about 250 miles. While the ability of an airman to hit a small target is open to doubt, it is established that against an appreciable target, such as base depots, docks, encampments, ammunition dumps, railways and columns upon roads, bombing attacks, even with high explosive, may prove very effective. The result is likely to prove far more serious if gas bombing, using persistent gases, is resorted to. Defence against such attacks is obtained by the use of anti-aircraft guns, defence squadrons of fighter machines and bombing squadrons of heavy bombers with which the aerodromes of the enemy's bombers can be attacked.

Mechanical science is hard at work developing, on the one hand, bombers of greater performance, more capable of protecting themselves in the air and with more accurate bomb sights, and, on the other hand, improved methods of anti-aircraft defence. But it will be unwise to assume that defence against the air weapon will reach such a stage as to render armies safe against attack, and organization and operations should be so ordered as to take it into account.

The vulnerable point of an air squadron is its aerodrome. Aircraft must have a landing-field of a certain size and can only operate within a definite radius of that field. In a country with few possible aerodromes, by denying enemy aircraft the use of certain aerodromes they may be prevented from reaching certain perhaps vital objectives. The location of the army may thus be governed by the question of aerodromes. Similarly, in country suitable to penetration and raids by armoured forces, an air weapon may be counteracted by the temporary occupation and destruction of its aerodromes by armoured forces.

(*f*) *Gas*

The possibility of opponents in war developing the use of gas can by no means be ruled out in contemplation of the future. While the experts differ as to the future of this weapon,* the present-day organizer should recognize that gas attack may come in volatile

* *See R.U.S.I. Journal*, Aug. 1928, p. 492, Report of Lecture on "Chemical Warfare."

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form, either from shells or bombs, against which a mask will be necessary, or it may be met in a persistent form upon the ground over appreciable areas, attacking the bodies of any one coming in direct contact or remaining in those areas. Whatever the gas used, it is to be remembered that the areas affected will be limited and that rapid movement through or away from them will bring troops to safety. The advantages of troops being in vehicles in which rapid motion is possible, and which keep men from actual contact with the persistent types of gas, are obvious.

The Effect of Inventions upon Organization

Mechanical and scientific inventions have not altered the functions of an army. They have merely altered the methods and the organizations of armies in the performance of these functions. But in order to arrive at the extent to which these inventions are about to affect organization, it is advisable not to examine the effect of each particular invention upon existing armies, for such action is apt to result in the mere addition of new units and weapons to the old, but rather to start from first principles, enumerate the functions and tasks of armies in general and to build up from all types of weapons and units, both old and new, what appears to be the most practical new organization capable of fulfilling these functions and tasks. By evolving, in outline, a sample of the new formations required, the full effect of the inventions upon existing organizations will be apparent.

The Functions of an Army

To protect its vital interests, a nation may have to impose its will upon another nation. One of the means which it may have to employ to achieve its ends is the use of armed force. Application of force in practice involves either the occupation of the enemy's vital areas, such as his seats of government or his sources of supply, or an immediate threat to the security of such vital areas.* For an army to reach a position to threaten the enemy's vital areas it is usually obliged to meet and defeat the enemy's armed land forces, for, as a general rule, it is unsafe for an attacking army to proceed to the occupation of the heart of an opponent's possessions while an

* The writer here assumes that no final decision against a determined enemy will be obtained by air or naval action alone.

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undefeated armed force is free to operate against it. The functions of an army may therefore be enumerated as follows:

(*a*) To search out and fix the position of the enemy's main land forces.
(*b*) To destroy, capture or permanently neutralize such forces.
(*c*) To pursue forces in retreat.
(*d*) To hold and consolidate positions as gained.

If an army is capable of these four functions it will be able to establish itself permanently if necessary in a position which threatens the enemy's vital areas, and so will be able to enforce the terms of its Government. This is equally true whether the enemy be a foreign Power, a tribe in rebellion, or a disaffected element within a country.

The Tasks Facing a Modern Army, and the Formations Required

In fulfilling its functions, a modern army will have a definite series of tasks to perform which can be more or less defined.

(*a*) *Fixing the Enemy*

In order to fix the enemy, the army needs to send out its observers as far as they can go with regard to security and the transportation available. The first task is therefore reconnaissance.

Having located the enemy as far off as possible, the next tasks are to maintain contact with him, to drive in his protective detachments in order to obtain information as to his main bodies, and to seize and hold advanced positions, such as river crossings, which may be vital as far as the rapid advance of the main body is concerned. The army, then, requires for these tasks a force containing units capable of traversing great distances rapidly, remaining securely in observation of located enemy forces, applying considerable force against enemy detachments, and of holding ground gained. This force might well be termed the "Independent Mobile Force."

(*b*) *Destroying, Capturing or Permanently Neutralizing the Enemy's Army*

Once the enemy's main forces have been located, the main task commences. To carry it out an army must be capable of a sustained advance over most sorts of terrain, e.g. over fields, moors, rivers and canals, through defiles, villages, and medium-sized woods.

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It must be able to engage and rapidly overcome enemy resistance, except where such is based upon permanent or semi-permanent works, and even in the latter cases it must be prepared to force a passage upon a limited frontage if no other means of progress are available. Obviously, to be able to perform these very varied duties an army in the field will require a considerable assortment of units. This assortment will require to be organized into formations, which for purposes of discussion, may be termed "Divisions of the Line."

(*c*) *Pursuit*

In pursuit, the tasks of an army comprise rapid attack upon the rear of the retiring forces, attempts to outflank and cut off portions of those forces, and the seizure and retention of vital points such as river crossings, defiles, road and railway junctions. For these tasks, the Independent Mobile Force, in which the requirements have already been outlined, would seem suitable.

(*d*) *Holding and Consolidating Positions*

No army can be permanently advancing. A force in the field must be capable of retaining the advantages gained by successful attack For this, it requires considerable fire-power, both from guns, small arms, and weapons that can be concealed. It needs units able to take advantage of the ground by entrenchment, and mobile units which can counter-attack rapidly.

As it is undesirable to possess attack formations as distinct from defence formations, the Divisions of the Line already referred to will have also to perform the task of holding and consolidating a position.

The Organization of the Independent Mobile Force

For the first duty of this force, long-distance reconnaissance, air and armoured-car units are most suitable on account of their mobility. But neither of these is able to remain long in observation of one point. For the duty of maintaining contact and searching close country, units containing more men are necessary. A big question is whether these units should be cavalry or mechanized units.

The case for cavalry is that they can move more silently, across more difficult country, and search more thoroughly than mechanized units. Where horses exist they are a cheap form of unit. In emergency they live on the land.

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Against cavalry it must be stated that the days of shock action against unbroken troops are over, that cavalry are very vulnerable, and when the force to which they belong is required to move extensive distances at great speed the horsed units will be left behind. In a fast-moving fight with other armoured forces cavalry might prove a hindrance. In many countries there is a horse shortage, and forage requires more transport than petrol.

It would seem that in many armies, for the sake of economy, and in many theatres of war, cavalry will be retained, but that speaking for armies in general, the purely scientific solution would omit cavalry units as being too vulnerable and lacking in offensive power, and substitute more powerful units.

As regards the substituted units, the requirements are that the form of transport provided, perhaps six-wheelers, should be protected against small-arms fire as far as possible, and that the *personnel* should be capable of patrolling short distances from the vehicles where ground necessitates. The *personnel* should be as lightly equipped as possible and trained to specially active movement, and consequently might be termed " light infantry."

If the Independent Mobile Force contained some such units, reinforced perhaps by some small two-seater scout cars, it should be able to search ground in much the same way as a cavalry force would do, and at the same time it would not possess the disadvantages of cavalry.

Next, for the duty of fighting for information or for the capture of localities necessary to the advance of the main body, the Independent Mobile Force requires units of great fighting power. The medium tank has been shown to be the most powerful weapon in existence for a fast-moving attack. At the same time, it has been shown to be expensive and precious. The light tank has less power, but can be obtained in larger numbers. It would seem that the Independent Mobile Force would have need of both, i.e. a small number of the larger tanks held in reserve for use only when a really heavy punch is needed, with a larger number of the light tanks as the main fighting instrument, both supported by a mobile form of artillery. Both types of tank have a lesser mobility and a shorter life upon roads than the wheeled units in the Force. The larger tanks cannot be carried, but as they would normally be in reserve, their lesser mobility would not be so important. But the light tanks, it would seem, should be carried in six-wheelers themselves. They can then keep right up with the advance and can be unloaded fresh at a scene of action, their life thereby being much

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prolonged, while, when empty during a battle, the six-wheelers provide a useful transport reserve.

As regards holding power, this should be obtainable from the portion of the force required for remaining in observation of an enemy, i.e. of the light infantry in six-wheelers. These units, with small-arm automatics, will be capable of defence against unarmoured attack. But as presumably the enemy will attempt to dislodge them with armoured forces, they require the support of guns and tanks.

As regards the form of artillery for this force, required for close support both in attack and in defence. For the former, if the guns are to keep up with a moving attack of armoured forces some form of self-propelled armoured weapon, i.e. artillery tank, seems essential, for it is difficult to picture tractor-drawn guns having a chance to come into action under such conditions. In defence probably tractor-drawn guns or howitzers, being less conspicuous, would be preferable. It is true that self-propelled guns are in the earliest stage of experiment; but since the rôle of the guns in attack is more important than that in defence, it would seem that the inclusion of self-propelled armoured weapons should be aimed at in a future force, and that experiments to produce self-propelled weapons should be proceeded with. For the same reason it would appear, until a gun-howitzer is produced, that these weapons should be in the main guns and not howitzers, though a few of the latter for smoke production are desirable.

The Independent Mobile Force, it has been suggested, should also carry out the duties of pursuit. The duties enumerated for a force in pursuit could be performed completely by a force containing, as already suggested, air, armoured car, medium tank, light tank, light infantry and gun units.

As regards anti-aircraft units as part of this independent force; it is undesirable to include in the force any more units than are strictly necessary. The force should rely upon its mobility and its own weapons for defence against aircraft. At the same time any air unit of the force when on the ground is much exposed and is unable to change its aerodrome rapidly. The attachment of an anti-aircraft detachment to air units acting independently is probably necessary.

The Outline Composition of the Independent Mobile Force

The final composition of this Force will only be arrived at after considerable experiment and experience in war. Factors which

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will govern it are, however, that the Force must be readily controllable by one commander, and that it must be large enough for its probable tasks.

It is not unlikely that the effect of mechanical and scientific development will be to lead to the evolution of a Force of something like the following composition, which is arrived at by examining the various tasks foreseen for this Force :

1 Army Cooperation Squadron (organized as at present).
1 Armoured Car Squadron (organized as at present).
2 Light Tank Battalions (each 64 fighting tanks).
1 Medium Tank Battalion (of 32 fighting tanks).
2 Light Infantry Battalions (each to contain 2 machine-gun companies of 16 machine guns each and 2 skirmishing companies, each company to have one small anti-tank gun, units carried complete in partially armoured six-wheeled " carriers ").
1 Brigade self-propelled Artillery (12 field guns and 4 Howitzers).

In addition, engineer, signal, and administrative units will be required.

The Organization of the Division of the Line

The division of the line is required to make sustained advances over ordinary country and to be capable of exceptional performances in attack. It should possess, therefore, the utmost mobility and great offensive power. In order to be able to maintain a rapid rate of advance, the Division must be capable of forcing obstacles. Also, we have seen, the Division requires to possess defensive power, with ability to hold and consolidate a position won.

(*a*) *Mobility*

The line divisions of the Great War period owed their limited mobility to three factors :

(i) The efficiency of the small-arms bullet and barbed wire entanglements in retarding movement.
(ii) The quantity of artillery support required to enable any form of advance to take place.
(iii) The power of endurance of the human being.

To improve the mobility of the future divisions, each of these obstacles to movement needs to be overcome.

As regards the small-arms bullet and barbed wire, the experience

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of the last war has shown that sustained progress is to be made only if the front line attackers are protected. Their protection may take the form of armour, smoke, gas or artillery fire. Smoke, gas and artillery fire, however, have their limitations, for they protect only over a restricted area and their production of itself reduces the mobility of the force as a whole. Hence armour protection for the front line attackers seems to be one ruling factor as regards the future organization of the division, supported certainly, as and where possible, by the other forms of protection.

A second fundamental point appears to be that a field division can no longer expect the degree of artillery support accorded in the late war. Upon a special occasion, such as the forcing of the Torres Vedras or Chatalja Lines of the future, methods approaching those of a siege may call for immense bombardment, but as a normal case it must be recognized that a division will only receive support from lighter natures of ordnance, though possibly with the introduction of armoured field artillery this support may be both close and more direct than formerly.

The restriction placed upon mobility by the lack of endurance in the human being is perhaps the most serious. A soldier can only march a limited distance and carry a limited weight. He can be assisted in both directions by being carried in some form of transport. But once the idea of carrying the fighting soldier off a railway is entertained, many other problems arise. If the whole of a division is to be carried the general mobility of the division is greatly augmented, but methods of fighting, advancing, deploying, control and supply will need to be radically altered. Also insistence upon carrying the foot soldier necessarily involves the possession of a far smaller total of divisions on the same footing, for in spite of the large quantities of mechanical transport in existence, much of it is not of suitable type, and there is a limit to the number of mechanized units that can be maintained. There appear to be two alternatives, either to organize a few " wholly carried " divisions, or to possess a greater number of divisions in which the fighting man is assisted by the carriage of the greater part of his equipment.

As a point in favour of the " wholly carried " division, it must be remembered that it has already been shown that the front line attackers must be protected by armour, which means that for this portion of the division some form of vehicle will be required in any case. If part of a division only is carried, the unsound situation exists in which the fast-moving part of the formation is held back to the pace of the marching portion.

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Further, it has been pointed out that troops carried in vehicles have great advantages in crossing gassed zones.

Thirdly, if the air weapon becomes very formidable, small, highly mobile and powerful forces will be more secure than larger march formations.

But other points to be considered are the cost of the two alternatives and the existing defence arrangements of nations. Where a country possesses a voluntary and relatively highly paid army, by a reduction in the number of men (which might be allowed in exchange for increased fighting power in the new formations), it should be possible to produce a fully mechanized small army for the same cost as the older larger army. But a nation which has depended upon large man-power for its defence, utilizing poorly paid, conscripted men, will find it very difficult to adopt the wholly mechanized basis.

As the case of armies in general, and no particular nation, is being considered here, the decision as to which alternative should be adopted should rest upon which is the more likely to fufil the tasks of an army in future. In order to arrive at this decision, let a situation be visualized in which a few " wholly carried " divisions are opposed to double the number of marching divisions. Can it be doubted that, except where terrain neutralizes the mobility of the mechanized divisions, the latter should be victorious ? And as the normal army of the future should be designed to operate in the country of Great Powers, which it may be assumed are bound to possess a large proportion of fair arable land, fear of the nature of the terrain should not be allowed to predominate.

The arguments outlined above lead to the conclusion that for the main fighting force in the field " wholly carried " divisions of the line should be organized by any nation in a position to do so. This does not preclude the retention, to a less extent than at present, of a form of marching division for use over terrain unsuitable for mechanized forces, and for following up and policing territories won by the mobile army, but the backbone of the field army, it seems, should consist of the " wholly carried " division of the line.

(*b*) *Offensive Power*

The offensive power of a formation depends, apart from its mobility, upon its ability to bring overwhelming superiority of fire to bear upon an enemy. This fire can be delivered either by detachments of men brought safely forward with their weapons to positions which expose the enemy, or by vehicles in motion, i.e. tanks and self-propelled artillery.

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This consideration indicates that many of the vehicles which are to perform the functions of carrying divisions should be armoured, i.e. that the proportion of armoured tanks, guns and six-wheeled " carriers " should be high.

Forcing Obstacles

Though it is assumed that the terrain over which armies need operate will be fair as regards cross-country motion, the defence and passage of obstacles, particularly watercourses, across such terrain is likely to assume great importance. The main fighting formations, therefore, must be capable of forcing such obstacles. For such tasks, men rather than machines are required, and these men require to be assisted by as much protection in the form of artillery fire and smoke as possible. The division further will need to have the means for throwing bridges and rafts across a waterway.

(*d*) *Defensive Power*

The Division of the Line requires units capable of considerable defensive performances. Against unarmoured attack, units containing a high proportion of heavy machine guns are obviously the most economical. Against armoured attack, the force requires as many guns as possible. Further, no defensive position can be considered secure without a proportion of units of riflemen, to patrol between the nests of guns and machine guns, to provide protection at night, and to prevent infiltration. Also units providing protection on the march must not be overlooked.

The Outline Composition of the Division of the Line

The detailed composition of the future division will also only be discovered after many years of investigation. But in the preceding paragraphs, the main features of the new division have been indicated.

In determining the general size of divisions the tendency for rapidly moving formations to become unmanageable must not be overlooked. This may lead to a division containing perhaps only two brigades in place of the present three.

The brigade, being very mobile, will require to be capable of independent action, and it would appear not unlikely that the brigade rather than the division will be the tactical formation, divisional troops being allotted more to brigades and the division having mainly administrative functions :

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On these assumptions, a brigade of the Division of the Line may develop into the following :

1 Light Tank Battalion (64 fighting tanks).
1 Medium Tank Company (16 fighting tanks).
2 Light Infantry Battalions (each to contain 2 machine-gun companies of 16 machine guns each and 2 skirmishing companies, each company to possess a small anti-tank gun, units being carried complete in partially armoured six-wheeled " carriers ").
*1 Brigade Tractor Drawn Artillery (12 guns and 4 howitzers).
1 Engineer unit (with bridging material sufficient either for carrying the Brigade over small gaps or for rafting it over larger ones).
1 Signal unit.

Among the divisional troops the following would appear to be necessary :

1 Armoured Car Squadron (as at present organized).
1 Reserve Artillery Brigade, tractor drawn, of 12 guns and 4 howitzers.
1 Reserve Engineer unit (with additional bridging equipment, explosives and anti-tank mines).

Signal and Administrative units, e.g. supply, workshop, medical.

Air and anti-aircraft units are unlikely to be permanently part of a division.

A division so composed will possess the attributes suggested in earlier paragraphs as essential, and should be capable of the tasks which it has to perform.

The Effect of Modern Inventions upon Operations

Mechanical and scientific inventions have increased the military importance of industrialization in a State.

Operations between two Industrialized States

(i) *1st Phase*

For the next decade or two the opening phases of operations between two industrialized states, are likely to find the opposing forces organized in one of the three following ways :

* The remarks on page 247 with regard to self-propelled artillery do not apply with equal force to Divisions of the Line.

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(*a*) With both armies formed of unarmoured, marching formations, containing some armoured elements, supported by small air forces.

(*b*) Where *one* state possesses in addition some armoured "wholly carried" formations.

(*c*) Where *both* states possess in addition some armoured "wholly carried" formations.

In the case of (*a*), compared with the armies of 1914–1918, while there may be a greater proportion of armoured offensive weapons in action, there are also likely to be more anti-tank and more automatic weapons in use. The outcome of initial operations would appear likely, under normal circumstances, therefore, to be the same as that of the Great War. With the exception of some movement on the outbreak of war and of periodic expensive local victories, a state of stalemate is likely to result.

In the case of (*b*), assuming that suitable terrain is available, it seems very probable that the state which possesses some armoured "wholly carried" formations will break through the opposing line with those formations which will then be free to operate in rear of the opposing line of defence. Such a situation must result in the initial defeat of the army without any armoured "wholly carried" formations, and it will be forced to retreat precipitately to some line on which those formations can be held up. During this process of retreat the defending army is obviously seriously exposed to annihilation by its pursuers, both "wholly carried" and marching. Whether the armoured "wholly carried" force can prevent the enemy from reforming at all depends upon the proximity of the next line upon which they can be held up, the relative number of armoured "wholly carried" formations to marching formations, and the extent of front. On a very wide front, such as some of those of the Great War, the effect of a break through might only be to cause a deep bulge in the line. Assuming that a succession of defence lines are organized by the weaker army and that the proportion of armoured "wholly carried" to marching formations in the field in the first instance is not great (both reasonable assumptions), the probable result of initial operations in this case is likely to be that after one or two extensive victories, the armoured "wholly carried" formations will have exhausted themselves and a state of stalemate will again supervene.

As regards (*c*), if both armies possess armoured "wholly carried" forces in addition to marching formations, obviously a clash between

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the two mobile forces will be the first event of importance in the campaign. If these are equal in strength and more or less destroy one another, the "wholly carried " forces can be taken out of the reckoning and the subsequent course of operations is likely to end as in the case of (*a*), stalemate. If one of the armoured " wholly carried " forces is victorious and destroys the other, the situation is similar to that in the case of (*b*) and stalemate after large initial victories may be expected.

In any possible case of war between industrialized states it would seem, therefore, that after a phase of movement, a state of stalemate is to be anticipated. This, it would appear, will be due to the lack of sufficient armoured formations on the outbreak of war to force a war of continuous movement, and for reasons of policy and expense it seems certain that even the richest nations will suffer from this initial lack of armoured forces.

But once war is declared and it is realized that only by the creation of large armoured forces can a decision on land be obtained, states will mobilize their finances and their industries and turn out armoured formations as fast as possible. They will very likely decide to create also large air forces to work in cooperation with the armoured forces. Limiting factors as regards the size of the new forces would depend upon the circumstances of each state—in one case it might be the capacity of the manufacturing centres, in another the lack of raw materials, in a third the transportation facilities available to the theatre of war, and in a fourth, the maintenance facilities in the theatre of war. In most cases, however, it is safe to assume that it will be possible to create a considerable number of new armoured formations, and a large new air force.

Such a programme will take time to complete. Time is required not only for the construction of the new material, but also for the complicated training of the new *personnel*. It will not be possible to train new divisions in the time found possible in the Great War, owing to the far greater demands to be made upon every soldier. Obviously the nation which in peace time has ready a cut-and-dried programme of industrial mobilization for the construction of military and air material, will have a great advantage, as also will that state whose citizens possess a high degree of intelligence and education.

(ii) *2nd Phase*

After a period which it is difficult to estimate, but which might perhaps be placed at 1½ to 2 years from the outbreak of war, the

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new fully trained, " wholly carried " armoured formations may be expected in the field, accompanied by large air forces. The second phase of operations will then commence. During this, formerly conceived ideas on operations are likely to be altered to a considerable degree.

Firstly, with regard to objectives, under the new conditions the parts of the enemy's country which it is essential to reach if the war is to be ended will be the industrial centres and the sources of supply of raw materials rather than the political centres. Operations will therefore be planned either with a view to bringing such areas under the direct action of armoured land forces or with a view to gaining ground from which the objectives can be reached by air forces. The mobility of the new forces will enable objectives at great distances to be considered.

The contemplated employment of armoured forces makes the question of the nature of the terrain in the theatre of operations one of vital importance. Information prior to war as to all obstacles to cross-country movement will be essential. Tracts of dry arable land, as exist within the borders of every Great Power, will be the areas for which the opposing forces will manœuvre as affording avenues in which armoured power can be most fully developed and in which aerodromes can be found.

In order to examine the probable course of operations after the commencement of the 2nd phase, certain assumptions must be made. Firstly, let it be assumed that both armies in the field receive as reinforcements large armoured " wholly carried " forces and air forces, but that Army X receives larger reinforcements and receives them sooner than Army Y. Secondly, let it be imagined that the original armies fighting during the 1st phase are in contact on a wide front along some formidable obstacle such as a river line. As the new air forces arrive in the field the rear organizations of the original armies will be subjected to heavy bombing. Depots and railways will become increasingly hard to maintain, as the armies in France in 1918 were just beginning to discover when the Great War ended. In consequence, a tendency to reduce the strength of the marching armies in line can be assumed, the fronts being held by automatic weapons and as few men as possible, enabling railways, main roads, and large depots to be very largely abandoned and the line units to be fed by cross-country tracks which no bombing could prevent. Some of the original marching formations no doubt would be withdrawn out of bombing range, to occupy other lines of defence a long distance to the rear.

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Army X, which first received its armoured reinforcements, will possess the initiative, and to its commander will fall the task of forcing the opposing line. This task, if it be carried out across some anti-tank obstacle, as is probable, will be one for the marching formations, concentrated for the purpose. In a case where armoured forces cannot penetrate until an initial crossing has been forced by infantrymen, it is obvious that great artillery support will be necessary to create a breach. It may, however, be assumed that somewhere at some time a breach will be effected to enable the armoured formations to pass through.

The only counter which Army Y has to such a break through is the use of its own new armoured force.

The armoured force of X which has broken through the enemy's crust can use its own unbroken line as a base. It has two courses open to it, either to concentrate against the rear of Y's remaining marching formations in line or against Y's armoured forces. Marching formations will be organized for all round defence. X's armoured force will probably therefore not waste its time and energy against Y's marching formations, but move against his armoured force. A battle between these two is likely therefore to develop rapidly, for if Y's armoured force avoids fighting, that of X will be free to destroy the whole of the supply organization of Y's army in the field.

(iii) *3rd Phase*

The third phase, therefore, will be that in which the large new armoured forces are manœuvring against one another. During this it is likely that Y's marching formations will slip away as best they can to a new defence line, moving by night and occupying anti-tank localities where possible by day. It will be the desire of X's armoured force to reach a decision as soon as possible, in order to prevent a fresh crust solidifying against him. Mobile detachments of X's army other than his new armoured force will be able to pursue the enemy.

If X's armoured force defeats that of Y early in battle, as it should, whether Y will be able to prevent X advancing to his final objective or not will depend on whether there exist further natural lines of defence which can be easily held. Obviously X could be forced to repeat his operations many times if many obstacles across his line of advance existed on which Y could reform. But where natural obstacles do not exist, the chances of X would appear to be excellent, for to create a series of artificial barriers right across a

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country sufficient to stop an armoured force may be regarded as impossible. The third phase might well end with Army X securing a locality from which objectives vital to Y can be attacked by air forces.

In a war between two industrialized States, then, it would appear that to the extent to which the States possess armoured forces and according to the number of natural obstacles which the ground to be fought over contains, periods of static operations will be interspersed by periods in which considerable movement, headed by mobile armoured forces, will take place. During the periods of movement, the armoured forces will resemble fleets at sea. They will require to establish successive bases prepared for all-round defence and to be supplied by a convoy system using these bases. Successful armoured forces will require to be followed at a safe distance by marching armies for the consolidation and policing of territories won in battle.

In the case of an industrialized State opposing one not industrialized the former will possess such an advantage that its army should be able to force its opponents into a series of extensive retreats. But where neither State is industrialized it seems that operations will take a course similar to those in recent wars, i.e. the small amount of modern equipment, etc., procurable will not overcome the power of the defensive, and stalemate will result.

Conclusion

The first effect of the introduction of new weapons and machines in the twentieth century was to increase the power of the defensive to the extent demonstrated by the events of 1914–1918. The second effect has been the evolution of forces, both upon land and in the air, which can break the power of the defensive.

As far as organization of land forces is concerned, the result will be to develop, as the spear point of future offensives, ***mobile, "wholly carried" and armoured formations*** to the extent to which nations can afford, in addition to the marching formations, required for defensive and police purposes.

Operations will be affected to the extent that, wherever terrain permits and an army has sufficient armoured and air forces, periods of rapidly moving fighting will come between periods of static warfare.

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THE MECHANIZATION OF THE ARMY: ITS EFFECT UPON THE COOPERATION OF AIRCRAFT

By Squadron Leader J. L. Vachell, M.C.

Reasons for the Provision of Armoured Forces

Mechanization of an army is a somewhat vague term which for different people has different meanings, and before trying to suggest its possible effect upon the cooperation of aircraft, it is well to be clear about the degree of mechanization which is visualized.

Mechanization is usually spoken of as comprising three stages: first, the replacement of horses by mechanical vehicles for the supply services; secondly, the use of mechanical vehicles to convey some of the fighting arms to the battlefield, 'bus columns of infantry and tractor-drawn artillery are examples of this stage; thirdly, there is the armoured force whose capacity to move and to fight depends entirely upon machines. It is the cooperation of aircraft with such a force which it is proposed to discuss in this article.

The first two stages involved certain difficulties which at first made their introduction unpopular, but there are few critics who are not now convinced of the overwhelming advantages of mechanization. But, while the opposition to the new methods of warfare is rapidly diminishing, there are still many soldiers who consider the armoured force to be the product of the hyper-fertile imagination of the tank enthusiast, and there are probably many in the Air Force who have a very vague idea as to the reasons for this new departure in the composition of the Army. It is proposed, therefore, briefly to recapitulate some of the tactical reasons which have been put forward by the protagonists of the armoured force for their belief in its necessity in future wars.

The dominant factor in the war on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918 was the machine gun. In the early stages of the campaign machine guns were comparatively few in numbers and were more or less immobile, with the result that cavalry and infantry

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were able to achieve a measure of success. But it was soon found that the stopping power of the machine gun was so great that progress by infantry was impossible without a heavy artillery bombardment. The weight of the artillery bombardment was then increased until it defeated its own ends and churned up the front to such a condition that the infantry's advance was seriously impeded if not altogether prevented and all the element of surprise was lost. Tanks restored mobility to the operations, and, as the number of machine guns in civilized armies is steadily increasing and the advent of cross-country motor vehicles has made them more mobile, it seems clear that tanks will be required from the start of a future campaign if the operations are not very quickly to be brought to a standstill. The first tanks were heavy and slow with a very limited range; they were used purely as the handmaidens of the infantry to enable the latter to get forward through the enemy's machine gun defences. Since 1918 the design of tanks has improved so much that they can now be given a freer and more independent rôle, and it seems wise to make use of their mobility to operate against the flanks and rear of a hostile force where there is more probability of their being able to evade some of his anti-tank defences. If tanks are to be used in this way, they will require assistance from the other arms. Reconnaissance will be a necessity. Air reconnaissance will be dealt with in some detail later; armoured cars, probably of the six-wheeled variety, are eminently suitable for distant ground reconnaissance on roads, tracks and certain types of open country; light reconnaissance tanks will be required to fill in the gaps where armoured cars cannot penetrate. Artillery will be required to support tanks in the assault; engineers will be required particularly for crossing rivers and streams; a signal unit must be provided, and there will probably be a number of duties for which infantry is eminently suitable. Thus, if quite a small force of tanks, such as one battalion, is given what may be described as an independent rôle, quite a large number of other vehicles will be required to enable its object to be achieved.

The Composition and Capabilities of an Armoured Force

During the past two years an armoured force has been carrying out experimental operations on Salisbury Plain. During that time its organization has undergone a number of changes and it is most unlikely that it has yet reached its final stage, but for the purpose of this article it is proposed to take a force approximately similar

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to that described by General Burnett-Stuart * and to accept his estimate of its capabilities.

General Burnett-Stuart does not give the exact composition of the force, but it may be taken as follows :

1 medium tank battalion (48 tanks).
1 armoured car battalion (48 cars).
1 battalion of light tanks (70 2-men tanks).
1 armoured field brigade, R.A. (4 batteries).
1 armoured machine-gun battalion (36 machine guns).
1 armoured signal unit.
1 armoured field company, R.E.
Total :—about 300 vehicles.

The force must have ambulances, train, repair and salvage units which would bring it up to a total of about 800 vehicles, and it would require 170 gallons of petrol and 50 gallons of oil to move it one mile.

With its train loaded the force could move 180 miles, could stay out three days and fight one or perhaps two battles ; if it stays out longer it must establish a line of communications. With its own train and first-line transport it could operate with the fighting portion 180 miles from its base. The slowest vehicles can move at 8 to 10 m.p.h. on roads or over easy country and so could move 50 or 60 miles in a day.

The Approach March of an Armoured Force

A somewhat lengthy explanation has been given of some of the reasons for the existence of armoured forces, and of their probable composition and capabilities, but this was felt to be a necessary preliminary to a discussion of how they may affect the cooperation of aircraft.

It is unnecessary to stress the importance to a military commander of obtaining early and accurate information about the enemy's movements. This is important at all times, but perhaps never more so than during the approach march before contact has been gained by troops on the ground. Air reconnaissance may be classified as strategical or tactical, the former being the duty of day bombing aircraft, while army cooperation squadrons are responsible for the latter. Between the two there is medium reconnaissance which has some of the characteristics of each and is carried out

* *See* "The Progress of Mechanization," *Army Quarterly*, April, 1928.

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sometimes by one type of aircraft and sometimes by the other. Strategical reconnaissance is designed to obtain information about important troop movements behind the advanced forces, and it is unlikely to decrease in importance or materially to change in nature until the time when, if ever, armies consist entirely of mechanized forces. But the existence even of small armoured forces, it is thought, must cause material changes in the scope and nature of tactical or close reconnaissance, as it is more usually called.

The commander of an advanced force requires information about all hostile troops within striking distance of his troops, and this distance for convenience may be considered that which can be covered in one day's march. If the forces move on foot at 2½ miles an hour, the zone of close reconnaissance need be no more than 30 miles (a day's march for each side) in front of the advanced troops. But with armoured forces which move at 10 miles an hour and cover 50 or 60 miles in a day it is clear that the zone of tactical reconnaissance must be extended to a depth three or four times as great as in the past.

Hitherto reconnaissances extending to this depth have been undertaken by single aeroplanes flying very high to avoid interference by the enemy's fighters, but this will clearly be impossible for aircraft employed on tactical reconnaissance if they are to obtain accurate information. Many people, therefore, consider that in the opening phase of a future war tactical reconnaissance will have to be carried out by aircraft flying in formation. This view may prove to be correct, but should not be accepted without close examination. During the last war the line of battle on the Western Front stretched from the Alps to the sea and provided a line of demarcation in the air. Each side disposed its fighter aircraft so that a hostile air reconnaissance proceeding to any depth beyond this line was almost sure to be opposed. In the phase of operations now being discussed there will be no such line, and the disposition of fighter squadrons to prevent hostile air reconnaissance will thus be far more difficult. It is conceivable that a commander wishing to prevent the discovery of his forces' movements might be obliged to arrange an escort of fighters to drive away hostile reconnaissance aircraft. The latter finding they were unable to penetrate into a certain area would have to report the fact, and fighters would be sent to deal with the enemy and to make the reconnaissance possible.

The present writer has no strong views on the subject, but he is not convinced that in the opening phases it would prove impossible

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for army cooperation aircraft to proceed singly to considerable distances in front of the advanced troops. It must be remembered that reconnaissance carried out in formation requires three, five or even nine aircraft to do the work of one, and the army cooperation aircraft available are likely to be none too many for the work which will be required of them.

Great stress is laid upon the importance of giving detailed instructions to pilots employed on reconnaissance requiring them to give definite answers to certain questions. It is not an easy task to frame these instructions even when the zone to be reconnoitred is a small one, but the improvement in the information obtained when the instructions are good is usually very marked.

As the zone of tactical reconnaissance is extended it will become increasingly difficult to issue definite instructions, and it must be remembered that the area to be reconnoitred by each aircraft should be strictly limited. There are any number of examples of aircraft during an extended reconnaissance flying over important movements of troops and missing valuable information. No example of this kind of occurrence is more remarkable than one that took place in the opening phases of the last war before the battle of Mons. Several valuable air reconnaissances were carried out during those few days, but it is on record that one or two aircraft in fine weather flew over roads and localities where there were large numbers of Germans but found nothing to report. This may be attributed almost entirely to the wide area which those reconnaissances were ordered to cover. When the way in which an armoured force will probably move is considered, it will be realized that air reconnaissance in future will be a most difficult task, and it will be of vital importance that each pilot be asked to search very few roads or tracks or a very limited area, even though the enemy's armoured force may be located anywhere in a very wide tract of country.

The aircraft employed on tactical reconnaissance must have some means by which their information can rapidly be communicated to the commander of the force. In certain circumstances, in order to achieve surprise, wireless silence may be imposed as is usually done during the approach of fleets before a naval action, for if messages are sent either by wireless telegraphy or by radio telephony the position of the commander will probably be discovered by the enemy's direction-finding stations. The alternative method of dropping messages is slow and often rather uncertain, and aircraft employed on reconnaissance may at any time gain information of

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such vital importance that it is essential for it to be in the commander's possession with the minimum of delay. When wireless silence is imposed, therefore, clear instructions should be issued as to the circumstances in which it is to be broken.

Aircraft employed on close reconnaissance normally communicate their information by radio telephony to a vehicle which accompanies the commander's headquarters, and which can receive or transmit messages while on the move. Information of urgent importance obtained by strategical air reconnaissance is usually passed by wireless telegraphy to the squadron, or wing, headquarters, and is passed thence by other means to the commander. The range and reliability of radio telephony are steadily increasing, but it must be some years before it can be satisfactory for the long distances involved by tactical reconnaissance for an armoured force. It would appear, therefore, that in the immediate future at least, it will be more satisfactory to provide the commander with a vehicle which can transmit and receive messages by wireless telegraphy while on the move. A simple code similar to that now used by aircraft cooperating with artillery would be adequate and no special operator need be carried in the aircraft, for it is unlikely that any but the shortest of messages would have to be received.

Although stress has been laid on the necessity for the vehicle to be able to communicate with aircraft while on the move, it is probable that it would be the exception rather than the rule for it to be used in this way. The period during which headquarters would actually be moving should be comparatively short, for they should be accommodated in vehicles, including the W/T vehicle, capable of averaging 20 m.p.h. over good roads, and should seldom have to move any considerable distance across country. Even when a message has to be received or transmitted while headquarters is moving, it is preferable for the W/T vehicle to halt for a few moments, for the range is much increased by so doing and would then be ample to meet all requirements.

Having discussed the way in which reconnaissance aircraft will obtain their information and how it is to be passed on to those who will make use of it, the probable nature of such information must now be considered. Every one is familiar with the movements of troops who march on foot accompanied by horse-drawn vehicles. The column advances at a speed of 3 miles an hour with an hourly halt. If about 15 miles have to be covered, the head of the column must start early in order to allow the tail to reach its destination during the hours of daylight. A long stretch of road is occupied by

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troops for a lengthy period, and it is most difficult to escape detection by reconnaissance aircraft.

The vehicles of an armoured force of the type which is being discussed in this article would occupy a considerable amount of road space, but its movements could, and probably would, be entirely different in character. It would probably move in comparatively small groups, not more than 10 vehicles, by bounds from one place of concealment from aircraft to the next. These bounds might vary from half-an-hour's to two hours' travel, and only a portion of the force would be on the move at the same time. Moreover, there would usually be a far greater variety of routes available for an armoured force than for one of the old type. An armoured force consists entirely of cross-country vehicles, but it would normally make use of roads or well-defined tracks, because cross-country work means a number of small delays and a certain amount of wear and tear to the vehicles. There would usually, however, be a large number of roads and tracks from which to choose.

When moving a man-power force 15 miles the shortest route must be selected; an increase of 5 miles in the day's march involves hardship for men and animals, and an increase of 10 miles is out of the question. Thus there are seldom more than one or two routes available. But an increase of 10 or 15 miles would be immaterial to an armoured force and would involve no hardship; careful reconnaissance, therefore, should permit the use of a number of different routes.

If these assertions are accepted, the picture displayed for reconnaissance aircraft to report when an armoured force was on the move would be an entirely different one from that displayed by men and horses. Movements would probably be seen, but they would consist of small groups of vehicles moving at intervals along a number of different routes, and it would be exceedingly difficult from the air to estimate the strength and composition of a force which had no head and no tail, and the vehicles of which, though transporting different arms of the Service, were very similar in appearance.

At a staff exercise last year, when the operations of a mechanized force were being discussed, the opinion was expressed that the rapidity of movement in the future would make it necessary for military commanders or selected staff officers to get into the air and appreciate the situation so that rapid decisions might be made. But if the picture which has been drawn above is accurate, the commander or staff officer would probably get a very misleading im-

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pression of a hostile armoured force from an aeroplane. In a naval action where the pieces are spread out on the board and only inadequate concealment can be obtained by means of smoke screens, it is probable that decisions can best be made in the air. But for operations on land where, except in very open country, the observer can only see very small portions of the picture, the commander would probably be much better situated at his headquarters, where his staff would be employed in piecing together like a jig-saw puzzle the items of information obtained from several aircraft and from other sources.

Although the strength and composition of an armoured force may be difficult to decide from the air, it should usually be discovered if it moves by day. When the man-power army, as it may be termed for convenience, wishes to conceal its movements to effect surprise it resorts to a night move, and towards the end of the last war and for some years subsequently a good deal of attention was devoted to movements by night. Night moves are by no means impossible for an armoured force, but, as every motorist knows, unless good headlights are used, speed is impossible and a great strain is imposed on the drivers. An armoured force using headlights would be even easier to detect from the air than the same force moving in broad daylight, for the headlights would show up plainly in an avenue of trees which would give quite effective concealment from the air by day. Experiments have been carried out at Aldershot during the past few years with different coloured lights and different methods of shading them, but up to the present it has been found quite impossible to prevent a certain amount of light being reflected from the road surface and being seen from the air. It is probable that even if side and tail lights only were used (thus materially reducing the speed of which the vehicles are capable), it should be possible for air reconnaissance to obtain almost as much information about an armoured force moving by night as if the movement were carried out by day. The present writer suggests, therefore, that an armoured force would usually move by day and lie up by night. Now (unless a very large proportion of the troops are employed on outpost duty) it must prove somewhat difficult for a force of about 800 vehicles to bivouac for the night with adequate protection without offering a conspicuous target for air attack. Dusk reconnaissance, therefore, will be a most important duty for army cooperation aircraft, for if the bivouac position of an armoured force can be discovered, it will inevitably afford a vulnerable target for attack by night bombers.

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Not only may we expect an armoured force in its bivouac positions to provide excellent targets for night bombing aircraft, but it should offer many suitable opportunities for low flying attack during its moves by day. Columns of vehicles are even more vulnerable to low flying attack than columns of troops on the march. The latter, if they lie down or scatter off the road, must suffer a certain number of casualties and their moral will probably be lowered, but they will be comparatively immune. Armoured vehicles are far more vulnerable, for even tanks, which give more complete protection than other vehicles, will travel open in order to reduce fatigue of their crews and will not be immune from machine-gun fire from the air. The vehicles may often be able to scatter off the road and so offer a more difficult target to the aircraft, but their advance will be delayed, and if, by means of bombs, it is possible to damage one or more of them in a defile the delay may be a long one and the whole of their subsequent operation may be thrown out of gear. Quite a lot of attention has been paid by the Army during recent years to the protection of troops on the march from attacks by low flying aircraft. The best solution of this problem which has so far been found is the provision of machine-gun piquets along the route in the same way that a route is piquetted in mountain warfare, but as this would necessitate a very large number of machine guns to cover a day's march of an armoured force it would probably prove quite impracticable. Some type of anti-aircraft Lewis gun mounting for armoured vehicles will have to be designed and may already be in production, but it is clear that low flying attack by aircraft will be an important means of delaying the advance of an armoured force. It is scarcely necessary to mention that this low flying attack would not normally be delivered by reconnaissance aircraft; their rôle will be to provide information and only in exceptional circumstances would the risk of their loss from small arms anti-aircraft fire be justifiable.

So far the writer has not referred to the aircraft that should be allotted to an armoured force. It may be taken for granted that, when an armoured force is given an independent rôle, at least one army cooperation squadron would be placed at the disposal of its commander. Both during the approach march, when a force of similar composition is likely to be encountered, and during its attack on the objective, there appears to be an equally good argument in favour of the commander having a call upon a fighter squadron.

The closest cooperation by his aircraft will be necessary to the success of the commander of an armoured force which has been

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given an independent rôle. As has already been explained, the commander will probably get rather sketchy information from the air and for accurate information will have to depend upon his armoured cars and tanks. But, in view of the speed at which armoured forces can move and the consequent rapid changes in the situation, early information will be of vital importance and the earliest information will usually be obtained from the air. The commander, therefore, will require to be in the closest touch with the aircraft at his disposal.

In spite of efforts which are constantly being made to reduce its bulk, a Royal Air Force squadron in the field requires to carry with it a considerable supply of stores which necessitates a somewhat large number of transport vehicles. The move of its aerodrome takes some little time and is bound to reduce the squadron's efficiency to some extent while the move is taking place. Aerodromes, therefore, will be moved as seldom as possible, and it is quite conceivable that an army cooperation squadron allotted to an armoured force which has been given an independent mission would continue to work from the same aerodrome throughout the operation. Advanced landing grounds, however, will almost invariably be required, and the force commander will always try to locate his headquarters where an advanced landing ground can be found in the vicinity. The way in which these advanced landing grounds are to be established without unduly restricting the freedom of movement of the force's headquarters will require careful investigation and experiment before a satisfactory solution can be reached. The fighting portion of the squadron's headquarters must be at the advanced landing ground and all aircraft employed on tactical reconnaissance will have to land there before and after each flight if the commander is to get the best value out of them. When fighter aircraft have been placed at his disposal, it may sometimes be possible for one flight of them to be kept at the advanced landing ground in immediate readiness for dispatch against any suitable target which is discovered. It will seldom be possible to keep more than one flight at the advanced landing ground since the available space will usually be somewhat restricted.

The closest touch between the advanced landing ground and the aerodrome will be required and these communications will be an air force responsibility. There seems, therefore, to be a strong case for the provision of a second wireless lorry and trailer for an army cooperation squadron allotted to a force given an independent mission.

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The Attack

In discussing the approach march of an armoured force it has been assumed that the enemy will have a force similar in character. But in discussing the assault it is proposed to assume that the objective is to be a force of a more familiar character occupying a defended position. This course has been adopted for two reasons.

First, we have at present practically no experience of the attack by an armoured force against an enemy of similar type, and, secondly, Colonel Broad * has given a very clear description of the other type of action which it is proposed to use to discuss the cooperation of aircraft.

The objective of an armoured force will probably first be discovered from the air and will be confirmed by armoured car reconnaissance. Reconnaissance tanks will then have the task of fixing the enemy, locating his anti-tank defences, and creating the opportunity for the heavy fighting machines. It will be the duty of the reconnaissance tanks to ensure that the blow of the striking force falls on something really worth striking.

At this stage air reconnaissance may be invaluable. It will probably be quite impossible for aircraft to locate the enemy's anti-tank weapons, for it is unlikely that the latter will be unmasked before the attack is delivered. But it may be possible from the air to see tank obstacles both natural and artificial, and such information at this stage may be of material assistance to the commander in framing his plan and deciding his line of approach. In fact, if there is an advanced landing ground near his headquarters and sufficient time is available, it may be well worth while for the commander or one of his staff to go into the air and make a personal reconnaissance. But speed will be an essential factor in the type of operation under discussion, and it is probable that this personal reconnaissance will usually involve a delay in the attack which cannot be accepted. It must be emphasized that it is not wise to expect the enemy's anti-tank weapons to be discovered from the air before they actually open fire, but tanks may form an important part of the defence, and it may often be possible to locate them from the air and to direct artillery fire against them.

The striking force will rely on covering fire and shock, the former comprising the fire both of machine guns and of artillery. Air observation will obviously be of no use to the machine guns,

* *See* lecture at the R.U.S.I., 9th of November, 1927, *R.U.S.I. Journal*, February, 1929.

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and it is suggested that it may also be of little material assistance to the artillery. Colonel Broad's opinion is that the artillery will have three tasks, counter-battery work against enemy artillery which tries to destroy the attack at long range, smoke to blind the defence's observation posts and to screen the deployment, and close support. In the first two tasks air observation may render limited assistance, but for the third it will be of no use. The artillery with an armoured force would be comparatively weak and would have a limited supply of ammunition. It is essential, therefore, that its fire should be restricted to rendering the tanks direct assistance, and it would not be able to afford to waste ammunition on targets located from the air, the engagement of which would have no material effect on the success of the assault. It is considered, therefore, that observation for the artillery would normally be provided from the ground. Where this is impossible and air observation has to be employed, it seems clear that two-way communication between aircraft and artillery would have to be provided so that the latter could indicate to the aircraft the targets on which observation was required.

During their assault tanks may be rendered valuable assistance by low flying aircraft. They should be able to attack the anti-tank weapons of the defence as soon as they open fire and silence them with machine-gun fire or interfere with their observation by dropping bombs. But it should be remembered that this type of cooperation, with which we have become quite familiar in peace-time exercises, demands careful preliminary arrangements and exact timing of the attacks and is unlikely to be successful in war unless there is very close liaison between the force commander and the fighter aircraft at his disposal, An additional argument, therefore, is provided for the establishment of the commander's headquarters in a locality where it is possible to find an advanced landing ground, and for him to have a fighter squadron as an integral part of his command when his force has been given an independent rôle. The provision of this fighter squadron must depend upon the air situation, for no commander would willingly sacrifice local air superiority in order to have the assistance of low flying aircraft.

Continuous close reconnaissance will be required during the action, since otherwise the commander will be left in ignorance of what success is being achieved in the assault, and for this phase radio telephony appears to be more suitable than wireless telegraphy. It will thus be a great advantage when research has enabled both types of inter-communication to be established with one set of

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apparatus, an achievement which is by no means impossible during the next few years. If the assault is successful, close reconnaissance aircraft should be able to indicate the direction of the enemy's withdrawal and enable the reserve to be utilized in the pursuit with the best possible effect.

A proportion of the fighter aircraft should, as a rule, be kept in hand for the pursuit, for they may be able so to delay the enemy's withdrawal that the reserve can turn what might otherwise have been an indecisive action into a complete victory.

Summary

It is not claimed that the foregoing remarks by any means exhaust the effects which the mechanization of the Army may have on the cooperation of aircraft. Others, such as photographic reconnaissance during the approach march and before the actual assault, and the supply of an armoured force by air which may soon provide great possibilities, seem equally worth discussion. But it is considered that quite enough controversial points have been raised, and since many will probably disagree with a number of the opinions which have been expressed it is proposed briefly to recapitulate them.

The zone of tactical or close reconnaissance must be extended to a much greater depth in front of the advanced troops, and this may necessitate the employment of formations of aircraft. This course is considered by no means a certainty and should, if possible, be avoided. Even though the zone of tactical reconnaissance is extended the task allotted to each pilot should be strictly limited, and the issue of definite instructions will be of even greater importance than in the past.

Wireless silence may be imposed during the approach march, but instructions must be issued as to the circumstances in which it may be broken, and the increased range of tactical reconnaissance may make it advisable to substitute wireless telegraphy for radio telephony during this stage of the operations.

The moves of an armoured force during the approach march will probably be in comparatively small groups of vehicles by rapid bounds from one place of concealment from aircraft to the next and a greater number of routes will in future be utilized. Thus the picture obtained from the air will be very incomplete and may easily mislead a commander or one of his staff who undertakes a personal reconnaissance from the air. Movement by night involves

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a number of difficulties and has few advantages over movement by day; it will, consequently, probably be the exception rather than the rule. The night bivouac positions should, however, provide excellent bombing targets and dusk reconnaissance will thus be of greater importance. An armoured force on the move will be very vulnerable to low flying attack, and the system of defence by piquetting the route will probably be impracticable. Some form of anti-aircraft gun mounting, therefore, must be provided for the vehicles. Low flying aircraft will be a valuable means of opposing the advance of an armoured force, and should therefore be at the disposal of every military commander who is liable to such an attack. The question of the establishment of advanced landing grounds near the armoured force's headquarters requires close investigation.

When the objective of the armoured force has been located and fixed, air reconnaissance may be invaluable to locate tank obstacles though it will probably be unable to discover anti-tank mines or guns before the latter open fire. Personal air reconnaissance by the commander or one of his staff at this stage may be of great value in helping him to frame his plan, but it is probable that time will seldom be available. Air observation for the artillery may be of some value, but two-way communication must be provided if fire is to be confined to targets of the greatest importance. Low flying attack by single-seaters during the tank assault should be most useful in reducing the resistance offered by the anti-tank defences, but some of the fighters should be kept in hand to delay the enemy's withdrawal if the attack has been successful. Close reconnaissance will be required throughout the action to keep the commander constantly in touch with the situation, as otherwise he will seldom be in a position to use his reserve to the best advantage.

In conclusion, it seems clear that an armoured force employed in an independent rôle must rely upon the assistance of aircraft even more than the Army is at present forced to do. Success will only be achieved by the close cooperation of aircraft allotted to the commander and will depend upon the closest touch being maintained with both the army cooperation and fighter squadrons.

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THE EVOLUTION OF REGIMENTAL COLOURS

By Major T. J. Edwards

Regimental Colours have an ancestry almost as long as man himself, for they have their origin in the desire of primitive man to distinguish himself from his neighbour.

At the dawn of history every man was very much like his neighbour in appearance, and the scanty clothing he wore was not sufficient to achieve that distinction between families, tribes and races which would be necessary for many reasons, particularly when they went to war. We have much the same problem when trying to discern the difference in the faces of a regiment of coloured troops: they all appear "very much alike." To overcome this difficulty primitive man painted on his body the image of some animal or bird with which he was familiar and whose qualities he considered he possessed or wished to acquire. For instance, the fleet of foot would paint on themselves the figure of a galloping horse or a bird in flight, the strong would paint on a lion or a bear, the wise an owl or a serpent. This family badge or sign was also painted on the tent or other form of dwelling-place. When a tribe went to war the badge of the tribal chief was hoisted upon a pole so that it could be seen at a distance and in close country.

It is in these totems or tribal badges erected on poles for war purposes that the origin of Regimental Colours lies.

Although our beautiful silk Colours have their origin in these primitive images employed by the ancestors of the various races, they have not attained their present dignity at a single bound, but by a gradual evolution, influenced by the customs and conditions of the various ages.

In considering this question it will be convenient to divide the history of the evolution of Colours into six main stages, viz.:

1. Tribal totems and badges.
2. National ensigns and standards.
3. Personal banners of the knights of medieval armies.
4. Regimental Colours of the Commonwealth Army.
5. Personal Colours of the Restoration period.
6. Regimental Colours of the present day.

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The Age of Imitation

1. *Tribal Totems and Badges.*—The necessity for tribal signs has already been mentioned. They had a dual practical purpose, the first being to indicate the position of the tribal chief and the second to indicate the rallying point should the necessity arise. They were also, owing to conspicuity, employed to make signals.

The nature of their employment provides a clue to the essential features of their construction. As they were to be seen at a glance in the din and dust of battle and in forest and wooded country it is clear that bright materials of some description must have been used, and as a matter of fact we find that flashing metal and coloured ribbons and feathers were usually employed. Some good examples of such ensigns are found in those of the old Mexican and Aztec standards. The prairie "braves" usually employed figures of animals or birds represented in bright colours and poles fledged with feathers from the wings of eagles. The majority of these ensigns were erected on poles or lances, but, in the case of the Aztecs and Mexicans, they were fastened to the backs of the standard-bearers.

Under the category of tribal ensigns must be considered those of the Children of Israel, referred to in Numbers, chapter 2, verse 2: "Every man of the children of Israel shall pitch by his own standard, with the ensign of their father's house." These ensigns are supposed to be referred to by Jacob in the 49th chapter of Genesis in such references as "Judah is a lion's whelp . . . Issachar is a strong ass . . . Dan shall be a serpent . . . Naphtali is a hind let loose . . . Joseph is a fruitful bough . . . Benjamin shall ravin as a wolf." The lion of Judah is also referred to again in Revelation, chapter 5, verse 5.

In the Chinese "Book of War," * written 500 B.C., we find that the Chinese had banners on which were figured dragons, white tigers, red sparrows, snakes and tortoises.

The most recent evidence of the antiquity of totem standards is that provided by Sir John Marshall, Director-General of Archæology in India. Writing in "The Times" on the 4th of January, 1928, Sir John describes a discovery he had made at Harappa in the Punjab of representations of standards in use 5,000 years ago. He states:

"a third (picture) portrays a man carrying a standard (which was no doubt an object of Cult worship). There is a certain amount of evidence

* "The Book of War" (translated by the late Major E. F. Calthrop), p. 99.

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pointing to a connection with predynastic Egypt. Thus on one of the Faience sealings is a row of four standards borne aloft by men, each of which supports a totem figure remarkably like the well-known totem-standards of the Egyptian nomes."

The Age of Superstition

2. *National and State Ensigns and Standards.*—The main difference between this and the first stage is one of refinement. We still find images of animals and birds employed, but their representation exhibits signs of artistic progress. They are now usually made of gold or silver and elevated on beautifully ornamented staves instead of poles.

Some of the earliest examples in this category are the two standards depicted upon a column unearthed at Nineveh the date of which is placed at 2000 B.C. Both standards consist of circles about a foot in diameter, in one of which an archer is shown standing upon a running bull, and in the other two bulls are represented in the act of springing apart. Attached to the staves at the bottom of the circles is a pair of tassels.

The standards of the ancient Egyptians belong to this class. Thomas Venn, writing in 1672,* referring to the Egyptian army which pursued the children of Israel to the Red Sea, states: "To these chariots belonged colours or ensigns of Martial Honour, which were called standards or standarts, or the King's Emperial Trophie."

Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson in his "Popular Account of the Ancient Egyptians," † gives the following details of their standards:

"Each battalion, and indeed each company, had its particular standard, which represented a sacred subject—a King's name, a sacred boat, an animal or some emblematic device; and the soldiers either followed or preceded it, according to the service on which they were employed, or as circumstances required. The objects chosen for their standards were such as were regarded by the troops with a superstitious feeling of respect; and being raised, says Diodorus, on a spear (or staff), which an officer bore aloft, they served to point out to the men their respective regiments, encouraged them to the charge and offered a conspicuous rallying point in the confusion of the battle.

"The post of standard-bearer was at all times of the greatest importance. He was an officer, and a man of approved valour; and in the Egyptian army he was sometimes distinguished by a peculiar badge suspended from his neck, which consisted of two lions, the emblems of courage, and other devices.

* *See* "Military Observations," by Thomas Venn, 1672.
† Published in 1854 by John Murray. *See* Vol. 1, p. 342.

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" Besides the ordinary standards of regiments were the royal banners, and those borne by the principal persons of the household near the King himself."

In the illustrations given by Sir Gardner Wilkinson the fan-shaped standards and various kinds of boats predominate. There is also an assortment of birds, animals and a female head. To the majority is attached some kind of streamers.

The ancient Greeks also employed images of animals or birds which had some connection with the cities to which they belonged, e.g. the Athenians had on their ensigns an owl as being a bird sacred to Minerva, the protectress of the city; the Thebans employed a sphinx, in memory of the famous monster overcome by Œdipus. Sometimes a purple coat was erected on top of a spear.*

In the ancient Roman Army a *maniple* consisted of 200 men (two centuries), and originally its ensign was a simple bundle of hay on the top of a pole, and from this circumstance the member of a maniple was referred to as *miles manipularis*, a common soldier. Later a spear with a cross piece of wood on the top, sometimes the figure of a hand, probably in allusion to the word *manipulus* or to the fact that the soldiers sometimes fought with hands joined.† Below these pieces of wood a round or oval shield in silver or gold was fixed, on which was represented the images of warlike deities such as Mars or Minerva, and after the extinction of liberty, of the Emperors.

On certain festivals these standards were decked with flowers and perfumed.

A legion was approximately 6,000 strong and had standards superior to those of the maniple. Representations of animals such as the wolf, horse or bear were borne until Gaius Marius, in his second Consulship, ordained that the Roman legions should carry nothing but eagles, which reached the height of their fame under Julius Cæsar, and, owing to this fame, were adopted by Napoleon to crown the French Colours.

The Roman eagles were represented with expanded wings and sometimes holding a thunderbolt in their claws. Beneath the eagle there were the usual discs containing the figures of war gods and emperors. In addition to these discs wreaths and other ornaments were attached in recognition of some conspicuous service,

* *See* " Antiquities of Greece," by John Rollinson, D.D., published 1827.

† The Poona Horse carry a silver hand at the head of their standard lance instead of the crown and lion. This hand was a Persian standard which the regiment captured at the battle of Kooshab in 1856.

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a practice which finds its modern counterpart in the placing of battle honours on Regimental Colours.*

The Roman cavalry standard was the *vexillum*, a flag or banner, and was a square piece of cloth affixed to the top of a spear in the method of hanging a picture as distinct from fastening one side of the banner to the pole, which is the modern practice.

The veterans of the foot also served under a *vexillum*. They were kept distinct from the legions and served under a particular banner of their own, hence they were termed *vexillarii* (*sub vexillo*).

All the Roman standards were worshipped with religious adoration, and the soldiers swore by them. To lose a standard was esteemed disgraceful, particularly to the standard-bearer; sometimes it was a capital crime. Hence to animate the soldiers the standards were sometimes thrown among the enemy.

All standards usually bore the well-known initials "S.P.Q.R."

The famous Raven of the Vikings may also be classed in this category. This was a white banner on which was displayed a black raven with wings expanded. This banner was regarded with the greatest awe, and in battle it was said to foretell the course of the conflict by the attitude of its wings occasioned by the flapping of the banner. The Vikings had great faith in their Raven, and it is remarkable that when Alfred the Great captured it they were utterly routed.

3. *Personal Banners of War Lords and Knights.*—The progress made in body armour in Western Europe was such that by the middle of the eleventh century the entire body, and most of the head, were covered. With the partial covering of the face identification in battle was rendered difficult. In the din and dust of battle it was a matter of life or death to be easily distinguished, otherwise friend would be attacking friend and the soldiers would not know their own leader. From this circumstance evolved the personal banners of the leaders.

The record of the earliest of these banners is to be found in the famous Bayeux tapestry. This tapestry depicts, in a series of seventy-six scenes, the Norman account of the battle of Hastings (1066) and the incidents leading up to it. The work was carried out between

* The Roman practice finds its exact counterpart in the case of the King's (formerly Queen's) Colour of the 1st Battalion, The South Wales Borderers, which was saved at the Isandlhwana disaster in Zululand on the 22nd of January, 1879, and the King's Colour of the 2nd Battalion of that Regiment in that both carry, permanently, silver wreaths of immortelles in memory of Isandhlwana and the Defence of Rorke's Drift.

All regiments of Foot Guards carry wreaths of laurel on their Colours on the anniversaries of certain battles in which they have taken part.

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the date of the battle and the end of the eleventh century and it contains representations of thirty banners. The majority of the banners are differenced by their shape and number of tails. Some, however, have distinct features such as crosses and balls closely resembling heraldic devices but which are not recognized as such by heralds. What is important is their " individual " aspect.

The two principal banners are those of William the Conqueror and King Harold. The former's is a beautiful three-tailed banner fastened to a staff at the side. In its broadest portion it bears a cross with ball in each angle. Harold's standard is a red dragon, apparently fixed to a pole near its mouth. In appearance it resembles a tribal totem. Another banner of a distinctive character is one which resembles the fledged pole of the Indian brave. This banner contains a device which some think is intended to represent a raven.

The rise of heraldry in the thirteenth century was directly due to need for individual distinction in battle. " From the circumstance that it first found its special use in direct connection with military equipments, knightly exercises and the mêlée of actual battle, medieval heraldry has also been styled Armoury." *

As far as Colours are concerned the important feature was the placing of the family badge upon the banner, thus giving it a " personal " or " individual " aspect. This was only to be expected, as the knight's following in the field was mainly his personal responsibility in upkeep as well as efficiency.

Although body armour of some sort had been in use in Europe before the thirteenth century it was not until that period that the practice of completely covering the head and face came in. This rendered it difficult to distinguish friend from foe in battle, a matter of great importance both for the knights and their followings. At this period there was no such thing as organized regiments in Europe, the custom being for a number of retainers to follow the lord of the manor or estate in battle, the size of the contingent varying with the size of the estate. The members of the contingent rendered personal service to their lord, who in turn rendered personal service to an overlord or to the Sovereign directly.

To overcome the difficulty of distinction the knights copied the methods of early man and emblazoned upon their shields and horse-trappings their family badges. This apparently did not fulfil the purpose, so they placed their armorial bearings on a coat, hence a coat-of-arms, which was worn over the armour. The next step was for the armorial bearings to be placed upon the knight's banner.

* *See* " English Heraldry," by Charles Boutell.

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These armorial bearings emphasized the element of individuality among those who bore them.

One of the earliest writers on this aspect of military colours was Markham, who published his " Five Decades of Epistles of Warre " in 1622. He says that the colours of the " Captains ought to bee mixt equally of the two several colours, that is to say (according to the Laws of Heraldry) of Colour and Mettall." Another early writer was Ward, who wrote in 1639 * concerning the " Office and Duty of a Colonel over a Regiment " that :

" hee ought to have all the Colours of his Regiment to be alike both in Colour and in fashion to avoide confusion so that the Souldiers may discerne their owne Regiment from the other Troopes ; Likewise, every particular captaine of his Regiment may have some small distinction in their Colours, as their Armes, or some Embleme, or the like, so that the one Company may be discerned from another."

Before the Stuart period armies were not clothed in distinctive uniforms, but on their ordinary clothes they wore a sash, some feathers, etc., so that friend could be distinguished from foe. In this connection it is interesting to note the following Article from the " Statutes and Ordinances of War " of Richard II (1385) :

" Article XVII.—Every man, of what estate, condition or nation he may be, so that he be of our party, shall bear a large sign of the arms of St. George before, and another behind, upon peril that if he be hurt or slain in default thereof, he who shall hurt or slay him shall no penalty pay for it ; and that no enemy shall bear the said sign of St. George, whether he be a prisoner, or otherwise, upon pain of death."

The standards borne at the battle of the Standard (1138) were ecclesiastical banners from the abbeys of S. Peter of York, S. John of Beverley and S. Wilfrid of Ripon. They were fixed to a wagon and drawn by monks on the battlefield.†

4. *The Commonwealth Army.*—The first English standing Army was the New Model of the Commonwealth which came into being in 1645 and had a continuous existence until the Restoration in 1660 when it was disbanded. Before the inauguration of the New Model Parliament relied chiefly upon the London Train Bands in whose Colours there is plenty of evidence of standardization. A pen and ink record of these colours is to be found in a manuscript book in the British Museum ‡ compiled by one " R. Symonds—

* *See* " Animadversions of War," by Ward.

† This information has been kindly furnished by Canon Nolloth, the greatest living authority on the subject. He states that the popular theory that all these banners floated from one mast is erroneous.

‡ *See* " Mus. Brit. Bibl. Harl. 986. Plut. XLIX. G.-g.3."

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Ensignes of the Regiments in London, 1643. Taken as they marched into Finsbury Fields, being their last General Muster—Sept. 26, 1643." I made copies of these sketches and in doing so was surprised to find against the first colour the name "Colonel Thomas Atkins."

Throughout all the regiments the following system was observed:

Colonel's Colour—Of one entire colour throughout without any kind of distinction, except in the case of the Orange regiment in which all colours had in the centre, on an ornamental circle "Iehova Proviee Bit."

Lieut.-Colonel's—Distinguished from the colonel's by a red St. George's Cross in the dexter chief canton (i.e. in canton near pike-head.

Sergeant-Major's *—Same as lieut.-colonel's but with a blaze or pile-wavy, a lozenge, a star, a ball, an arrow, etc., near the canton containing the St. George's Cross.

1st Captain's—Same as lieut.-colonel's but with two devices.

2nd Captain's—Same as lieut.-colonel's but with three devices.

etc. etc. etc.

This MS. contains a set of five sketches headed "The Dragoons," showing guidons with rounded ends but without fringes. The first troop is indicated by one black ball, the second troop by two, and so on, indicating standardization.

The system of regularization appears to have been copied from that introduced by Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War in Germany (1618–1648) under which each subdivision of a regiment had a standard, but all the standards of a regiment were alike, being differenced solely by their colour.

This system was adopted by the New Model Army, the hue of the colour corresponding with the title of the regiment, e.g. the Blue Regiment had blue colours, differenced much the same as mentioned above for the London Train Bands. The cavalry had square standards, the dragoons had guidons and the infantry had colours. A manuscript work in the British Museum † contains sketches of a set of Colours of "The Lord Inchequin's Regiment for Ireland, 1646." Nine Colours are depicted: the field is red in each case and only one contains the St. George's Cross, pre-

* Now termed "Major."

† *See* "Banners of the Parliamentary Army," Mus. Brit. Bibl. Sloan. 5247—Plor. XCV. D.d.15.

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sumably the lieut.-colonel's. The sergeant-major's has the usual pile-wavy issuing from near the spear-head and a harp in the middle of the Colour. The eldest captain's has simply one harp, and the second eldest captain's two harps, and so on; the junior captain's Colour bearing nine harps.

It will be noted, therefore, that our first standardized Regimental Colours were characterized by extreme simplicity.

5. *Personal Colours of the Restoration.*—With the reversion to a monarchy at the Restoration (1660) our Colours reverted to the "personal" type. Charles II soon took steps to brighten up the appearance of Colours, and his first warrant ordering Colours for each company of His Own Regiment of Foot Guards (now the Grenadier Guards) stated that they should be "of white and red taffeta, with stands, heads and tassells, each of which to have such distinctions of some of Our Royal Badges, painted in oil."* It will be noticed that "our Royal Badges" for "Our Own Regiment" introduced the "personal" aspect into the Colours of our present standing Army from its inception.

It will be realized that as most of the early regiments were brought into being for the King's personal protection and in their early days were something in the nature of the King's Bodyguard, they received titles appropriate to their connection with the Royal Household, e.g. The King's, The Queen's, The Royal Regiment, etc., and therefore the distinctions on their Standards and Colours would have some reference to their Royal Colonel.

With the accession of James II in 1685, Colours of the Foot Guards reverted for a short time to their bare simplicity of the Commonwealth period. James's first act was to abolish the Royal Badges and substitute his cypher ensigned with a crown in the Colours of the First Guards. These cyphers and crowns were multiplied to denote the seniority of the captains. In the case of the Coldstream Guards numerals were employed instead of cyphers. In the case of other regiments, according to the painted record in the Royal Library, Windsor Castle, there is ample evidence to indicate that the personal aspect was gaining ground in the non-Royal regiments. For instance, in the Earl of Thanet's Regiment of Horse the Colonel's standard bore in the centre the crest of the Tufton family (a silver sea-lion, sejeant, on a heraldic wreath black and silver, over the crest an earl's coronet): the corresponding standard in the Earl of Arran's regiment (later 4th Dragoon Guards) bore the Hamilton crest as then used (an oak tree fructed and pene-

* This Warrant was signed on the 13th of February, 1661.

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trated transversely, in the main stem, by a tree saw)": that in the Earl of Shrewsbury's Regiment (later 5th Dragoon Guards) bore a charge of the Talbot family's coat armour. In the infantry regiments the following cases may be noticed: The Queen Majesty's Regiment (later the 4th King's Own) Colonel's Colour bore black eagles, being a part of the coat armour of the D'Este family: the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Colours bore a stag's head, a charge from the coat armour of Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, Master-General of Ordnance, and first Colonel of the Royal Fusiliers: the First Captain's Colour of the Earl of Bath Regiment (later 10th Foot) bore a "sufflue" or organ rest, a charge of Granville, Earl of Bath; the Colonel's Colour of the Duke of Norfolk's Regiment bore the Howard crest. The record contains many more examples of this type.

Colours underwent a change in 1707 owing to the Union of Scotland with England. Hitherto the red cross of St. George was borne alone on Colours, but now it was to be accompanied by the white saltire of St. Andrew in a blue field. About the same time a small "Union" was introduced into the colonel's Colours, which seems to be the first indication that the Sovereign should be represented in Colours.

One famous standard of this period which is still in existence is that carried by Cornet Richardson of the old 8th Horse (later 4th Horse, and still later the 7th Dragoon Guards) at the battle of Dettingen, 1743. The famous General Ligonier was colonel of the Regiment and the standard bears his personal coat armour, with a very small Union near the spear-head.*

6. *The Standardized Regimental Colours of the present day.*†—The "personal" aspect of Colours received its deathblow with the issue of the Royal Warrant of 1751, the object of which was to establish uniformity throughout the Army. The second paragraph of this warrant read: "No Colonel to put his arms, crest, device, or livery in any part of the appointments of his regiment."

Colours had been reduced to three per battalion in 1707, but under this warrant only two per battalion were permitted. This revolutionary warrant had many important features, the chief of which were the following:

(*a*) The Colours of the Foot Guards and infantry, which hitherto conformed to a general system, now diverge, for it was ordained that the first Colour of all infantry (except Foot Guards) was to be the

* This Standard is now in The Royal United Service Institution museum.
† Only the major changes in Colours are mentioned here.

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Union, while the second Colour was to be of the same colour as the regimental facings (except in certain cases), with the Union in the upper canton. In the case of the Foot Guards the King's Standard (crimson) remained the first Colour and the Union became the second, and so they remain to-day.

(*b*) The rank of the regiment (i.e. its number) was to be placed in the centre of each colour in gold Roman figures. This is the first occasion on which the number of the regiment was ordered to be placed on Colours and definitely introduced the "regimental" aspect.

(*c*) Certain regiments were authorized to bear ancient badges.

(*d*) In the case of the cavalry, it was ordered that the King's, or first, Standard was to be crimson, the remainder the colour of the regimental facings.

(*e*) Particular badges were to be borne on the second and third Standards, but not on the King's.

The general effect of this warrant, the first of its kind, was to make a definite break with the past. It curbed the powers of the colonels and brought Colours under some measure of official control.

Another warrant was published in 1768 which was on the same lines as that of 1751, except that it gave more details. Between the issue of these warrants four new regiments had been raised, viz. the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th Light Dragoons, and in the schedule to the 1768 warrant the battle honour "Emsdorff" was authorized to be carried by the 15th Light Dragoons. This is important as it is the first honour to be regularly granted to a regiment.

The Union with Ireland in 1801 again altered the appearance of Colours by the introduction of the red St. Patrick's Cross into the Union, thus completing the Union flag (commonly called the "Union Jack") as we know it to-day.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century many regiments were carrying Colours of non-regulation pattern, in spite of the warrants already mentioned. To bring the matter further under official control an Inspector of Regimental Colours was appointed in 1806. The Inspector's first act was to circularize all regiments. He sent them sketches showing what their Colours ought to be like (i.e. in accordance with the 1768 warrant) and asked them if they agreed with those now borne. If they did not agree, he asked the regiments to indicate this on some blank sketches which he sent for that purpose. After about five years' correspondence matters were more or less settled and the Inspector had paintings made in the Vellum Colour Books of all the Colours then carried.

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Each book was signed by the Sovereign and the paintings then became the authority for each regiment's Colours.

From an historical point of view these books are invaluable as they depict the appearance of Colours during the Peninsula and Waterloo periods.

The effect of the appointment of the Inspector was seen in the issue of the next regulations concerning Colours, viz. those of 1822, in which it was stated that—"No addition or alteration to be made without His Majesty's special permission and authority." But orders in those days took a long time to reach "all concerned," particularly those on foreign service, and strict conformity to every detail was rather the exception than the rule.

The regulations of 1837 contained some important features, viz.:

(*a*) No mention is made of Light Dragoons: they had in fact been ordered to cease carrying standards in 1834.

(*b*) Standards of cavalry to be henceforth carried by troop sergeant-majors. This also was in accordance with a decision published in a Horse Guards letter on the 30th of November, 1822, and apparently too late to be included in the regulations of that year.

(*c*) In making up new Standards and Colours an approved drawing had first to be obtained.

(*d*) Regiments were ordered to discontinue carrying third Colours. William IV had, however, made the decision in 1835—vide Horse Guards letter dated the 14th of August, 1835, addressed to Lieut.-General Sir James Kampt, Colonel of The Second, or Queen's Royal Regiment.

In 1844 the second Colour was, for the first time, officially referred to as the "Regimental Colour," battle honours, badges, etc., were ordered to be placed on Regimental Colours only, and the full title of the regiment was to be placed on the Colours. This last order seems very belated, as in the Vellum Colour Books, prepared between 1811 and 1822, all regiments have their full titles, either County or Royal, in the centre of their Colours.

In 1858 Dragoon Guards and Dragoons were ordered to carry but one Standard or Guidon, respectively. Hitherto, they had carried as many as four per regiment.

The year 1857 is important as far as the supply of Colours is concerned. The proprietary system came to an end in 1855 and in the regulations two years later it is stated that "Colours will be supplied . . . upon requisition addressed to the Secretary of State for War."

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The year 1881 was a great year of reorganization in the infantry. General Order 41 of that year inaugurated the " Cardwell System," causing many heartaches among those regiments with fine records whose identity, on amalgamation, was totally obliterated from the Army. Under the new system regiments received territorial titles and numbers were abolished. Since 1782 the majority of regiments had, as their secondary title, a territorial county title, and most of the amalgamated regiments (i.e. all above the 25th Foot—omitting the K.R.R.C., Rifle Brigade and Cameron Highlanders) succeeded to a new territorial title which embodied some or all of the elements of their previous secondary titles.

In paragraph VIII of G.O. 41/1881, it was laid down that devices, distinctions, etc., of both battalions of the linked regiments should appear on the Regimental Colours of both battalions. The effect of this instruction modified the appearance of some Colours considerably owing to each battalion assuming the extra badges, battle honours and mottoes, of its sister battalion. These easily earned accretions of distinctions gave rise to much bitter comment in several quarters.

One very important modification to the Regimental Colour occurred in 1881. For over two and a half centuries a small Union had appeared in the upper canton, but under these regulations it is removed from the Colour. There are still a few Regimental Colours in use bearing the " pre-1881 " small Union.

In 1892 the Army List becomes a matter of importance as far as Colours are concerned, in that the regulations stated that: " The Standard or Guidon is also to bear the devices, distinctions and mottoes which have been conferred by Royal authority, as given in the Army List." This instruction referred only to the cavalry, but, in 1898, it was extended to infantry Colours, and it is still in force.

An important innovation is mentioned in the 1926 Clothing Regulations. In 1844 battle honours ceased to be placed on the King's Colour, but now the ten selected Great War battle honours are ordered to be placed upon that Colour.

7. *Other changes in modern Standards, Guidons and Colours.*—*Size :* Under the 1768 Warrant the Colours were 6′ 6″ flying and 6′ on the pike : a reduction of six inches in both dimensions occurred in 1857, a further reduction of two feet took place in 1859 and a final reduction to their present size, viz. 3′ 9″ flying by 3′ on the pike, was authorized in 1868.

Fringe : When the reduction of size in Colours took place in

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1859 a fringe was authorized to improve their appearance. Standards and Guidons always had fringes.

Staff : In 1768 the cavalry lance was 9 feet including spear and ferrel : in 1868 the Royal Crest displaced the spear-head, and in 1896 the present length, 8′ 6″, was assumed.

As regards the infantry : the staff was 9′ 10″ in 1768, the Royal Crest was introduced in 1868, and in 1904 it was reduced to its present length, 8′ 7½″.

Life of Colours : First mentioned in 1842 as " 20 years for Home Service " (except Household troops). This regulation still obtains.

Consecration of Colours : Standards, Ensigns and Colours had always been regarded with a certain amount of veneration and in some cases, as with the Romans, they were worshipped. The banner carried by William the Conqueror at Hastings was blessed by the Pope. Barry, writing in 1634, says that after the captain of a company has chosen his ensign " the Colours to be blest," and it may be assumed that some form of consecration was observed in bygone days. There is in the British Museum a MS. service for the blessing of banners, which was composed about the end of the fourteenth century. William Maskell has reproduced it in his *Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesia Anglicanæ*, in which he also gives probably the earliest modern service, which is dated 1838.

The earliest official instructions on the subject did not appear until 1899, and, even then, they only referred to infantry Colours, no reference was made to cavalry Standards until the 1928 edition of King's Regulations.

Laying up of Colours : Old Standards and Colours were disposed of in a variety of ways. Even after the State provided them, they still remained at the disposal of the colonel of the regiment until 1898 when it was laid down that they must be placed in churches or public buildings.

Trooping the Colour : The ceremony of Trooping the Colour evolved from the former procedure of Lodging the Colour. The ceremony became linked with " Guard mounting " in 1755, which accounts for the erroneous belief that it originated with guard mounting.

Battle Honours on Colours : This was the subject of an article in *The Army Quarterly* of January, 1929.

In such a short article only a brief sketch of the subject can be given, but every authority of importance has been quoted to assist further research should such be required.

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THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

THE plan evolved by Graf Schlieffen, the German Chief of the General Staff, in 1904–5, just before he left office, by which France was to be overwhelmed in a few weeks, and the legend of how by departing from this plan—"watering it down" is the favourite expression—his successor, Moltke, failed to deliver the "knock-out blow," have been frequently discussed in the German military books which have been reviewed in these pages. Only short extracts from it and what purport to be summaries of it, often contradictory, have, however, been given, and it has never been published in its entirety. All writers have, however, been in accord that Moltke made the left or defensive wing in Alsace and Lorraine stronger than Schlieffen designed, and that he did so at the expense of the right wing, the decisive one, which in swinging round was to sweep the French Armies against the back of their eastern frontier fortresses and against the Swiss frontier. It has been repeated by many German authorities (e.g. General Groener) that Schlieffen made the proportion of one wing to the other 1 to 7, whilst Moltke changed it to 1 to 3, but how these figures are arrived at they do not reveal. According to General Groener in *Das Tastament des Grafen Schlieffen*, the deployment of the troops against France in the 1905 plan and in 1914 were, omitting Landwehr and Ersatz troops, for sieges and L. of C. purposes :

1905.	1914.	*Army.*
11 corps 7 Reserve corps	8 corps 5 Reserve corps (line just south of Namur)	First and Second
6 corps ½ Reserve corps	6 corps 3 Reserve corps (line through Mézières)	Third and Fourth
8 corps 5 Reserve corps	3 corps 2 Reserve corps (line through Verdun and Metz)	Fifth
3 corps 1 Reserve corps	4 corps 1 Reserve corps (line through Strasburg)	Sixth
nil	2 corps 1 Reserve corps	Seventh
Total 41½	Total 35	

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Schlieffen detailed 10 divisions for the Eastern front; Moltke, 8. Moltke, still less Schlieffen, never had the number of corps and divisions which the Schlieffen plan assumed to exist—the latter's plan was only a "*projet*." But, taking the above figures: in Schlieffen's plan the defensive wing is to the offensive as 4 to 37½ (1 to 9⅜), in Moltke's 8 to 27 (1 to 3⅜); but Schlieffen's, with the forces available in 1914, would have been 4 to 31 (1 to 7¾).

It has been left to Dr. Bredt, a member of the *Reichstag* and of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into the loss of the war, to tell what was the real nature of the plan, how Moltke altered it, and why he did so.* His work, which shows a wide acquaintance with war literature, purports to contain portions of the Schlieffen plan of which the public had not yet heard, and which fully justify the reproach that Moltke changed it for the worse, much the worse, but not in the way hitherto imagined. Dr. Bredt, however, points out that Ludendorff was head of the Operations Section of the Great General Staff in 1908–9, at the time of the vital alterations, and from what we know of the First Quartermaster's ruthless methods and ignorance of the world, he probably had more to do with the changes than his courtier chief. Dr. Bredt recalls, what most of us have forgotten, if we ever knew, that in the Januâry, 1909, number of the *Deutscher Revue* Graf Schlieffen anonymously protested against the changes—it was, of course, surmised who wrote the article, and it is now included in his works.†

"Graf Schlieffen," says Dr. Bredt, in discussing the plan, "quite realized that an immediate participation of the British on the side of our opponents was to be reckoned with. He did not estimate the value of the British Expeditionary Force very highly, but all the higher the value of the British activity at sea. He insisted in all circumstances on a rapid decision of the war, before the economic consequences of British hostility made themselves felt. For this reason the Franco-British Army must be rapidly and decisively beaten. In the East Graf Schlieffen proposed to remain on the strategic defensive until after the victories in the West. In Alsace-Lorraine the front was to be held with the minimum number of troops, supported by the fortresses of Strasburg and Metz. Should the French succeed in breaking in, so much the better, and it should not

* *Die Belgische Neutralität und der Schlieffensche Feldzugsplan* (Belgian Neutrality and the Schlieffen Plan of Campaign), by J. V. Bredt, "Doctor of Theology, Doctor of Law, Doctor of Philosophy, formerly Professor of Jurisprudence in Marburg University, Member of the Reichstag and of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry" (Berlin, Stilke, 10 Marks).

† This article, which revealed the basic idea of the German plan without going into details, was brought by a student to the notice of the late Sir Henry Wilson, then Commandant of the Staff College. He returned it with the remark "very interesting." It should have revealed to him the dangers to which the B.E.F. was exposed on the outer flank of the French.

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cause alarm, for operations there would only absorb the French troops without their serving any useful purpose, and keep them away from the real decisive theatre."

Quoting from the article, he goes on—

"The Germans can feel assured, if they stick to their own operations, that the French will quickly turn about and not north but south of Metz in the direction from which the greater danger threatens. It is therefore imperative that the Germans are as strong as possible on the right wing, for there the decisive battle is to be expected.

"The decision," the author paraphrases, "should fall in northern France. The *bataillon carré* on the right flank should be so strong that the French and their Allies can be driven against the rear of their fortress front and against the frontier of Switzerland. Thus by a huge envelopment of the French and British a colossal Cannae should be prepared. Antwerp and Paris should be invested by Reserve and Ersatz corps, but the decision lies not at these fortresses, but in the surrounding of the field army."

And, quoting Schlieffen again—

"It must be sought throughout to press the French by an attack against their left flank in an easterly direction against the Moselle fortresses, against the Jura, and against Switzerland. The French Army must be annihilated. The essential for the course of the operations as a whole is to form a strong right wing, to win the battles by its help, and in ceaseless pursuit by means of the same strong wing, to force the enemy to give way again and again."

The reasons for strengthening the left wing are given by Dr. Bredt as follows: Moltke could not abandon Alsace, as Schlieffen designed to do, for the Italians might take part on the German side; General Pollio, the Italian Chief of the Staff until his death in 1914, had assured him they would. As they were to be brought to Alsace, Moltke considered it necessary to hold that province with two corps. If the Italians did not appear, then the question of the transport of the two corps to the right wing would arise. As we know, the French attack towards Mulhausen fatally delayed this. These two corps, plus the two corps sent from France to Russia, would, if added to the right wing, have made it as strong as Schlieffen intended.

It emerges incidentally that the Schlieffen plan was worked out for war on the Western front only; for when drawn up Russia was still very weak as a result of the Manchurian War. It also contemplated additions to the army that did not take place. There

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was only a general statement that in the case of Russia intervening, ten divisions should be withdrawn from the Western front and sent to the East, without altering the proportion of the two wings.

More important than the changes in technical details was the alteration of the plan politically. In the Schlieffen plan "there was no ultimatum to Belgium, but the German army, without any notification, was first to deploy on the Dutch—Belgian frontier. As the German plan would be divulged by this, it was assumed that the French would take counter-measures. These, according to Schlieffen's views, could only be the occupation of the natural defensive position in the Meuse valley south of Namur; and thus the French would themselves violate Belgian neutrality. Such a plan must have been at least considered by the French, and in 1914 the German General Staff took it for granted that they would advance to the Meuse.* All this presumed that Belgian neutrality would not be broken by Germany first. Such a step Graf Schlieffen desired, if possible, to avoid. He wished to leave sufficient time so that, in one way or another, the German statesmen would be able to evade the reproach of the violation of Belgian neutrality. "That Liége would always be captured sufficiently soon after the entry of the German army into Belgium, to serve as the railway junction for reinforcements and supply, could be accepted."

This was all changed in the deployment plan of the mobilization year 1908–9, by which Liége was to be captured by a *coup de main*, without artillery preparation, during the mobilization. Dr. Bredt quotes from the mobilization instructions of that year:—

"The weakness of the garrison and armament offers the prospect of a successful attack in which the infantry, without waiting for the artillery to open fire, pushes through the intervals between the forts, obtains possession of the heights surrounding the town, cuts off the retreat of the garrison, and hinders the destruction of the railway stations, bridges and tunnels. The greater the surprise by which it is carried out, and therefore the less time the defenders have been allowed to mobilize the garrison and put the fortress in a state of defence, the better will be the prospects of success by this method of attack. Simultaneously the heavy artillery of the field army should go into position so that it is ready to fire on the night of the break-through. If the infantry columns are detected by the forts, the artillery should draw the fire of the defence as much as possible. It should further prove to the enemy, should he

* In order to give Germany no excuse to make frontier incidents the cause for war, the French in August 1914 cleared all troops out of a 10-km. zone next the Franco-German boundary; so it seems unlikely that they would have done what Schlieffen hoped.

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delay with surrender, that behind the infantry which has penetrated into the town there is an artillery that is capable of breaking the resistance of the forts. Finally, it should, if the coup de main fails, carry out the artillery attack."

There was, Dr. Bredt points out, a further reason in favour of the idea of a *coup de main* against Liége. The German deployment as imagined by Schlieffen would stretch as far north as Crefeld, that is, along the Dutch frontier.

"Schlieffen did not consider it out of the question, in view of the then [1905] political situation, as he judged it, that German diplomacy might succeed on the outbreak of war against England in obtaining from the Netherlands Government by an amicable arrangement (*auf gütlichem Wege*) permission for the German army to cross the Dutch province of Limburg (Maastricht, Roermond). By this means the fortress of Liége would be avoided by passing north of it, and could quickly be brought to surrender by threatening it in rear."

Moltke did not believe that Holland would give permission to traverse her territory, and dropped the idea of an advance of the German right wing by this route. On the other hand he feared that Liége could not be taken quickly enough by an accelerated artillery attack to prevent a delay in the general advance of the right wing. It was most important not to give the Belgians time to put the fortress in a state of defence, and in particular to construct defences in the intervals between the forts and destroy the important railways passing through Liége. It also appeared to him that it was impossible to march an army between Liége and the Dutch frontier. He therefore decided to take Liége by a *coup de main* carried out by troops on the peace establishment without mobilization immediately on outbreak of war.

"Two days and the following night were allowed for the execution of the coup de main." *

It is obvious that the immediate attack on Liége from the point of view of international law immensely changed the Schlieffen plan. Dr. Bredt first quibbles that the German Government had no *official* knowledge of this, claiming that "negociations (*Verhandlung*) with the Imperial Chancellor about it did not then take place, because particularly in peace no organic liaison existed for work in common between the Government and the General Staff." He then, however,

* As the 5th of August was the first day and the last forts fell on the 16th, the disappointment of the Germans must have been considerable.

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admits that Imperial Chancellor and Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, " knew long before the war that an inroad into Belgium was intended and also that international law was deeply touched by this matter." Nevertheless, he quotes the speech of Jagow in the Reichstag on the 29th of April, 1913, when, in reply to a Socialist question, he said : " The neutrality of Belgium is established by international treaties, and Germany is determined to hold to these treaties."

Dr. Bredt's excuse for the German violation of Belgian neutrality and Jagow's inexactitude is, first, that everybody expected the Germans to march into Belgium, at least as far as the Meuse ; and, secondly, that without making a wide sweep through Western Belgium it was not possible to catch the British. He rightly points out that the immediate ultimatum to Belgium and the attack on Liége with unmobilized troops cannot be laid to the blame of Schlieffen. It is, however, obvious that whatever the French did, Schlieffen meant to go through Belgium, and it has been said that he expected no opposition, only a protest, from Leopold II., then on the throne, and thought that the King could be squared by a payment of two million pounds sterling.

The portion of Dr. Bredt's book dealing with Belgian neutrality is for German consumption only ; but is interesting as giving the views generally held by well-educated Germans, views which by constant repetition in print they hope to impose on the world. Readers are asked to believe that the question of Belgium had nothing to do with Great Britain's entry into the war ; that Great Britain's claim that the fight for the civilization of the world and the sacredness of treaties was " eyewash." The only thing in doubt in Dr. Bredt's mind is the precise share of the war guilt which should be placed on Great Britain's shoulders, and how long before August, 1914, Sir Edward Grey had determined to bring the war about.

Germany had a right to annex Belgium because the latter's army resisted the entry of the Kaiser's troops after he had offered to make good any damage done by them and to guarantee her integrity if she would let them pass. Dr. Bredt thinks that it is a mistake to offer any other justification. He admits that " all attempts to bring the German march into accord with international law are fruitless," and pleads " necessity " and " self-preservation." He further argues that the " starvation " of Germany by the British blockade was contrary to international law, and more than cancels all the smaller sins of Germany.

Germany's declaration of war against Russia, he states, " was

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only a measure of defence," and was merely " a formal measure which Germany considered she must take under the obligations of international law."

Finally, Germany being encircled by foes as a result of alliances against her concluded by her neighbours—among them are Holland, Switzerland and Denmark—she was fully justified in trying to free her people by breaking through the hostile ring as her troops did when surrounded at Brzeziny.

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THE WAR DIARY OF CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT OF BAVARIA

(Concluded)

ON the 28th of August, 1916, Crown Prince Rupprecht took over command of the Army Group containing the First, Second, Fourth and Sixth Armies, with headquarters at Cambrai. Next day he heard that Hindenburg-Ludendorff had superseded Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff. The only remark he makes is, " At last." The situation was far from satisfactory, but one is struck with the extraordinary state of depression which prevailed on the German side during the battle of the Somme, which the Prince describes as " the greatest, longest and heaviest-in-losses of the war." There was, of course, good reason. When he assumed command, the only reserve of the Army Group was the 11th Division, and it was at the same time the reserve of the Sixth Army ; the Second Army had no reserve until the 23rd Division arrived later. Not only were there no reserves, but " a renewed warning of the Director of Field Ammunition arrived yesterday saying that gun ammunition must be used very sparingly." In the First and Second Armies there were actually only three days' " rations " of gun ammunition, 250 rounds per field gun, 150 per medium gun, and 50 per heavy gun.

As regards the troops, the Prince says :

" Unfortunately our troops on the Somme front are for the most part not the best, and those which will relieve them later will certainly not surpass them in quality. The old experienced officers and men decrease steadily in numbers, and the reinforcements incorporated in masses have not enjoyed the same soldierly instruction and training, and physically are mostly inferior."

This kind of remark recurs several times, e.g. on the 27th of September :

" Whereas earlier our infantry was inferior to the enemy's in quantity, but was greatly superior to it in quality, this superiority in quality, in consequence of the heavy losses, particularly in officers and N.C.O.'s, has considerably fallen off. As regards artillery, ours was in quality as good

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as (*gleichwertig*) the English, though not as good as the French, but, in view of the constantly increasing number of enemy batteries, is not equal to them in quantity. And moral depression, too, has mastered the troops, even the higher staffs, in consequence of the rigid defensive forced upon us, and the unavoidable loss of ground entailed, in itself of no real importance, and the losses and exertions of the continuous fighting."

Towards the end of the battle an Army commander reports that he is not certain that "our tired-to-apathy troops will stick it out in their present bad position in a long enemy offensive, as they would have done in former years." There are no positions for a serious battle, or "at least none which possess sufficient depth," and to construct them would exhaust the last physical and moral power of the troops.

"One of the causes of trouble is that, there being so few reserves, the German divisions have to be kept much longer in the line than the British."

General Fritz von Below reported on the 2nd of September that the losses of the First Army, north of the Somme, since the 24th of June had been 125,000 men; south of the Somme, however, only between 50,000 and 60,000.

On the 3rd of September the Prince hears with relief that the Supreme Command has sent to the German Crown Prince the order:

"The attack on Verdun is to be stopped, and the line gained to be developed as a permanent position. It may be expected that part of your forces will be utilized at some other place. The Army Group will report which line will be organized as the permanent position."

He remarks, "a very sensible order, at last." Colonel von der Schulenberg informed him that the German Crown Prince was opposed to the renewed attacks on Verdun.

As the High Sea Fleet refused to do anything more, the Prince suggested that its men and guns should be employed on land and in the trenches.

In the attack of the 3rd of September by twelve British and four French divisions, the Second Army reported that "eight French divisions expected to attack never came out of their trenches."

On the 6th of September came the first direction from O.H.L. for reconnaissances with a view to a withdrawal to economise troops and shorten the line.

"What O.H.L. intends ought to have been done long ago; but Falkenhayn always imperatively demanded that not a foot's breadth of ground should be voluntarily abandoned."

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On the 8th of September Hindenburg—with Ludendorff—arrived to pay his first formal visit, and made a good impression by bringing the Prince, on behalf of the Kaiser, a Prussian Field-Marshal's baton. As mentioned in the previous extracts, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, after a formal discussion of the situation, at which the German Crown Prince was present, withdrew to settle details with the chiefs of the Army staffs. The German Crown Prince, after lunch, expressed the opinion that, "if the losses continued, we must make peace before we are completely exhausted."

The Army commanders were at this time in a state of special depression, Below expecting a break-through between the First and Second Armies; Gallwitz complaining that the middle leading (divisions and brigades) had broken down, and that he learnt of the loss of ground from the Eiffel Tower before he did so from the troops. Rupprecht himself several times quotes the Eiffel Tower and Poldhu reports of captures of prisoners and gain of ground as the first news. He never doubts their truth.

On the 19th of October, on the occasion of a visit of the Kaiser, the Prince "laid before him the seriousness of the situation," and suggested that the transport of ammunition across Channel from England should be interfered with. The Kaiser replied that the U-boats would now attend to that. The German Crown Prince telephoned to him begging him to use his influence with the Kaiser, and to get his father, the King of Bavaria, to do the same, to make a separate peace with Russia, surrendering to her Poland and East Galicia!

Coming to the German retirement from the Somme: Ludendorff at first spoke of the Hindenburg line as a "coefficient of safety," and said that a withdrawal was not intended, but the very next day sent written orders for its construction to be hurried on. The Prince on the 27th of October paid a visit to Coucy le Chateau, and says "it would be much regretted if the chateau fell a sacrifice to the War." He adds that "the destruction of localities on the scale ordered is not to my taste." He hoped that the instructions would be changed, and would have preferred to hand in his resignation rather than carry them out; but if he retired it would be interpreted that there was strife between Bavaria and the *Reich*. So he contented himself with refusing to sign the order for the execution of the demolitions. The troops under his command, however, wrecked Coucy to the ground and turned the area into a wilderness.

All along he had hoped for a German offensive somewhere,

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and was dismayed by the receipt, on the 10th of January, 1917, of the Supreme Command orders :

" (1) Our task in the West consists now in the organization of the defence, and the pulling out and training of reserves.
" (2) It is not the mass of troops employed in the defence which will see us through, but care in the preparation and training, combined with the most careful supervision and the control even of the smallest details.
" (3) Reserves can never be too strong. The objection to pulling out reserves will disappear the more all ranks are convinced that they will be of value in a crisis. Any premature strategic use of reserves is harmful to the interests of the troops, and their training, and undesirable from the point of view of command."

The fourth point deprecated the calling for labour from home where it was required for manufacture of munitions and production of food.

On the 30th of January, 1917, the Supreme Command (that is Ludendorff) telegraphed for the work on the rearward position to be pressed on because " the British on the Somme have in many places erected no wire, and are not keeping their front trenches in order, and this may mean an offensive." Actually this was due, as we know only too well, to disinclination to work. The decision fixing the date for the retirement was given on the 4th of February. There is a map giving the stages of it. The Prince was doubtful, as so much time had been wasted, whether an undisturbed withdrawal was still possible. On the same day came the news that the United States had broken off diplomatic relations. He subsequently remarks :

" I scarcely believe that the Americans will actually fight us, except perhaps on sea ; they will probably confine themselves to doing what they have already done to our damage, that is support our opponents with money and deliveries of war material."

After the declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare, he quotes a neutral as saying :

" It is the remarkable and strange feature of this war, that in it the greatest Land Power seeks the decision on sea, and the greatest Sea Power on land."

The agents' reports which came in first indicated a French attack on the front Epinal-Verdun, with a false one near Rheims ; but on the 19th of February definite information came in that an offensive (Nivelle's) was preparing on the line Chalons—Epernay. Next

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day Rheims—Soissons is mentioned, and on the 22nd an escaped prisoner brought news of great assemblies of troops behind the line. Ludendorff expected a great British attack on the Somme, with a subsidiary one against Messines.

" In the course of the conference, however, Ludendorff let out that he was not yet fully convinced of a serious offensive intention on the part of the British, as they were always thinking of making the war a lengthy one and overcoming us by hunger."

An Irish prisoner a day or two later informed his captors that he had heard his fellow English prisoners speak of a great attack on the Somme front, and that it would begin on the 12th of March ! The British prisoners also spoke of hundreds of tanks being available. On practically every occasion the British prisoners did their best to mislead the enemy. News also came that the French attack would start on the 20th of March ! All this no doubt contributed to the issue of the final German order for the retirement. The movement was begun on the night of the 12th–13th of March, although the demolitions were not completed until the 14th. The Prince moved his headquarters to Mons. On the 1st of April, 1917, " a captured Canadian said, that, after a 6 to 10–day bombardment the attack on Vimy Ridge would begin in the first half of the month." As a result, a reserve of horsed heavy batteries was brought up, and a 5–day extra ration of ammunition provided. In excuse for the loss of Vimy on the 9th of April, the Prince remarks :

" This is the revenge of fate on the Sixth Army for being economical of ammunition in the last few days, keeping its reserves, in spite of warning from me, too far back on account of billeting difficulties, and also not asking in time for the reserves of the Army Group to be pushed up."

Enquiries next day attributed the defeat to the particularly poisonous gas shell used by the British, which not only forced the men to keep their gas-masks on for long hours, but killed the artillery horses, so that no ammunition could be brought up. He thinks that the British report of captures contains understatements, as 300 not 100 guns were lost.

The loss of the ridge seems to have been a great shock to Rupprecht, for he despairs of retaking it, and adds :

" It is questionable whether, with such an enormously increased artillery effect, we can stand up to further attacks. The further question arises too : in such circumstances, is it worth while continuing the war ? Only if there is a speedy peace with Russia. If that does not come off within a few months, we must declare ourselves beaten."

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On the 28th of April he expresses doubt whether, in spite of the visible preparations, the British will try to break through at Messines; he thinks they will continue the main attack from Arras, with a subsidiary one at Messines to attract reserves. On the 3rd of May, he finds "the British intentions opposite Messines are still not clear. On the 9th a prisoner hinted that an attack there was imminent, but on the 11th and 13th the Fourth Army also expressed doubts.

As late as the 15th of May the Prince records that he agrees with the Fourth Army that before an attack on Messines (in the Army area), the British will attack the Sixth Army; he equally thinks "that a British attack against the Belgian coast [then in preparation] is completely improbable. Nevertheless, constant mentions of fears of a landing either in Belgium or Holland crop up. It is not until the 1st of June, in consequence of the increase of British artillery, that he begins to anticipate a Messines attack.

It has frequently been said that the Germans knew nothing of the troubles in the French Army in 1917, but on the 10th of July he notes that "information of unrest, mutinies and sabotage come from all parts of the country [France]," and that mutineers have been shot and things are working up for revolution. Hindenburg at this time made a speech promising victory if the Central Powers only held out until U-boat warfare had its effect.

The first rumours of the Passchendaele offensive are mentioned on the 9th of July, and on the 23rd, "all observations and intelligence point to a great offensive in Flanders." When it came on the 31st of July, the Prince records that

his "mind is quite at rest about the attack, as we have never disposed of such strong reserves, so well trained for their part as on the front attacked."

But the losses soon alarm him. On the 5th of August is the entry:

"The divisions which must now be pulled out of the line had on the average losses of 1,500–2,000 men [that is in five days], whilst the losses in a 14-days' tour of service in the battle of the Somme were, on the average, 4,000." Between the 1st of June and the 10th of August his Group lost 2,020 officers and 83,508 men [excluding of course lightly wounded]."

On the 6th of October Ludendorff in a telephone conversation said that "the general situation was favourable, and we should certainly win the war before the end of the year" if the Fourth

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Army will only hold out. But after the attack of the 9th of October, the Prince is doubtful, and says that

" if the French attacked the Seventh and Third Armies simultaneously with the continuation of the British attacks on the Fourth Army, the Supreme Command would not be in a position to help us by sending fresh troops."

Ludendorff begs him to try and hold out for fourteen days longer. Next day, the Prince writes, " Luckily rain has fallen, our most effective ally."

The Cambrai attack " came as a complete surprise." Ludendorff became " very nervous and enquired on the telephone about a thousand details, which have a very upsetting effect," continuing on the following days to ask " questions which for the most part refer to quite unimportant things," e.g. " how many batteries and what calibres are firing at particular targets." Ludendorff only " gradually warms up " for the plan of the counter-attack.

The German casualties in 1917 which had to be replaced amounted to 1,200,000, and the *Ersatz* for them was inadequate, 250,000 recruits, with 50,000 convalescents returning to duty each month.

The Prince was present at the conference of the 11th of November, 1917, to settle the place and time of the spring offensive. He thinks that " Ludendorff underestimates the toughness of the British." At a conference on the 31st of December, Hindenburg declared that " before all, the British must be decisively struck," and later added, " the break-through must succeed in all circumstances." Rupprecht, remembering Ypres, 1914, does not think the German army strong enough for the purpose, and repeats more than once his opinion that

" Ludendorff, who got his experience chiefly in the East, underestimates the danger of the attack coming to a standstill. The Russians are of small account as enemies, whilst the French and British are of full worth and stick out artillery fire even as we do and get up reserves as quickly and energetically as we do."

By the 10th of January Ludendorff is " so immersed in political questions that no answers, or only insufficient answers, can be got out of him as regards the plan for the offensive." The First Quartermaster-General was at the time threatening resignation, and refusing responsibility for the great offensive unless he got his own way on the question of the Eastern frontier being made safe by pushing into Russia.

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When Kuhl, the Prince's Chief of the Staff, pointed out to Ludendorff that the direction of attack did not lead in any favourable strategic direction, the latter replied :

" We in Russia always fixed first on only a near objective, and later considered how we should go on."

Rupprecht remarks :

" All very well against the ponderous Russians, but not against the British, and particularly against the French, who are very mobile and skilful in the strategic sense."

The German Crown Prince was given a share in the offensive because

" on political grounds it is particularly desirable, after the failures at Verdun, to give him the possibility of making amends for the mistakes there—which really should go to Falkenhayn's heavy debit account."

The Prince offered to move to another front, so that Wilhelm might have all the credit.

On the 19th of February Rupprecht definitely told the Kaiser of the difficulties of the attack :

" We might, as far as can be seen, succeed in taking the enemy's first position and perhaps a considerable number of his batteries, but it is improbable that we shall achieve more than a partial defeat of the enemy, and the making of a great pocket in his defence system."

He went, however, to the golden wedding of his parents on the 20th, and found the King, on the strength of the Supreme Command reports, " full of the most astonishing optimism."

In a letter to a provincial *Landtag* on the 21st of March, the Kaiser most embarrassingly " announced a complete victory." The first impression on the Prince, however, was that Gough's Army had gone back voluntarily. Ludendorff " was beside himself, and very dissatisfied with the Seventeenth Army [the right] and talked of dismissing its Chief of the Staff "—a sure sign of failure in the German Army. Then it turned out that the right of the Second (centre) Army had not made the progress expected—and apparently reported—while the Eighteenth Army (left) " repeatedly sent in reports as regards points reached which greatly anticipated facts." It must have been difficult for Ludendorff to command under such conditions. His plan as it developed was first to break the front of the B.E.F., and then for the Eighteenth and Second Armies to swing south and meet the French coming up to help the Allies, and the Seventeenth and Sixth Armies to swing north and thrust the left

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of the British and the Belgians into the sea. The Prince, with other officers whom he quotes, considers that the 27th of March was the turning-point. During the previous night Ludendorff stopped the futile attacks of the Seventeenth Army, and sent the three divisions, with which the Prince proposed to reinforce it, southwards to meet the French. The Prince, when he heard this on the telephone, " called out in consternation, ' Then, we have lost the war ' " ; for the British ought to have been settled with before turning to their Allies. Ludendorff's final strategy before Amiens " only led to the piling up of divisions where the resistance was then the stoutest." In spite of the patent facts that the men were exhausted and that the offensive had come to a standstill, the Kaiser, Ludendorff, and even Hindenburg clamoured for more attacks. One is glad to read that the German supply was much interfered with and the roads blocked by British air attacks.

The Lys offensive failed because it was carried out with too few divisions on too narrow a front, and because the men were tired. We know exactly why it ended from the captured archives of the German Fourth Army. Ludendorff and Lossberg (C.G.S. of the Fourth Army) lost heart, and, expecting a British counter-attack, settled between themselves to stop it. The Prince, though aware that the general staff officers arranged matters behind his back, records that he had proposed to Ludendorff on the 29th that if no further progress was made, the offensive should be brought to an end, and

" when the attack of the Fourth Army on the evening of that day led to no more success, the stoppage of further attack movements was ordered."

The rest of the diary tells of the gradual falling off in numbers, fighting power and morale of the German forces. On the 8th of May the Prince writes :

" We have already arrived at the point when the numbers of our forces continually diminish and the diminution will increase still more because the numbers of the most important source of *Ersatz*, the reconvalescents, must continually diminish." . . . " The *Ersatz* question becomes more and more critical " (11th May).

In a memorandum from the Supreme Command is the particularly eloquent phrase, " we can no longer stand heavy losses " (17th May). He notes :

" Ludendorff told me to-day that our most serious care is the question of the *Ersatz* of men [20th May]. . . .

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" The increasing deterioration in the morale of the troops is making me anxious. . . . The morale is lowest among the older reservists brought from the East to the much-feared Western theatre [26th May]."

The first serious trouble with the troops recorded is on the 25th of June, when reservists coming up by train refused to obey orders, but the Prince mentions that he had some days before heard of " excesses " in the barracks at Munich. " It is a bad sign." By the 3rd of August

" bad food, great losses, and an outbreak of influenza affected the morale of the men of the 111th Division most unfavourably."

And so it goes on. On the 21st of September even Hindenburg, at Mons station, was greeted with cries of, " Strike him dead : we want peace." On the 12th of October "marauding increased in a most frightful way : whole bands of marauders prowl around, and rob and steal in combination with the natives. . . . It is really bad, too, with absenteeism." And he reports that the 12th Reserve Division left the front 550 strong, but in the march through Maubeuge gathered up stragglers and increased to 1100. By the 5th of November " even the troops reliable until now can no longer be fully trusted. . . . When attacked, the troops, as a rule, retire." And the next day the first definite mutiny occurs. The trouble would seem to have been long in preparation. As early as December, 1916, " some hundred machine guns and still many more pistols vanished from store, in view of the revolution of 1918 a significant circumstance," and just before the March, 1918, offensive, every Army was warned by Ludendorff to have two reliable battalions ready in case trouble should arise in the Homeland.

We have heard the German Crown Prince's protests that his Group of Armies was intact and could have fought on for months, but on the 27th of October he sent Rupprecht the information " that he expected a renewal of the enemy's attacks and could not hold out against them much longer."

The Prince does not think that hunger affected Germany, but it did Germany's Allies.

The 8th of August attack was a complete surprise. On the previous day is the entry that captured British flying officers in conversation had mentioned that " a great British army attack had been in preparation for months, and would take place between Dickebusch and Meteren," which was exactly what Sir D. Haig wished to make the Germans believe.

Ludendorff comes out of the record rather badly. His explana-

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tions at conferences were remarkably clear, " but in consequence of his great irritability [in January, 1918] it is extremely difficult to do business with him." His interference in minute details and his habit of dealing with staff officers over the heads of their generals have already been mentioned. His nerves frequently give way; even in July, 1917, he appeared " terribly overtired, and towards evening often completely exhausted. No wonder, for he attempts to get everything into his own hands; not only the conduct of the whole military operations, but foreign and home politics, the feeding of the nation, the production of raw material, and the transport question." In July, 1918,

Ludendorff had " a dramatic scene with the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, in which he demanded that the Navy must secure for certain that no American troopships reached France. Otherwise the war was lost."

All doubt is cleared away that, as Lord Haig always insisted, Rupprecht's troops were to make a final attack Arras—Ypres on the British after the German Rheims offensive in July, and " before the 1st of August." It was all ready on the 6th of July when Ludendorff desired that it should be preceded by a diversion. On the 11th of July instructions were given that the Flanders attack was to follow the Rheims offensive of the 15th, " the sooner the better." On the 18th of July, the day of Mangin's counter-stroke, Ludendorff arrived at the Prince's headquarters to discuss details with the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Sixth and Fourth Armies. On the 20th Ludendorff asked if the attack could be made on a narrower front, as he wanted reinforcements for the German Crown Prince. On the 21st, the Supreme Command decided against the attack, even in a reduced form.

The volume of appendices contains a most valuable collection of documents, proposals and plans for, and reports on, operations, naturally nearly all on our front, and letters from the Prince to his father. These latter picture the situation in 1918 as even more desperate than does the diary:

4th September.—" The situation is more critical than ever. The root trouble, from which all our difficulties arise, is want of men, which has made itself felt still more after the great losses of the last battles."

30th September.—" The military situation has grown worse . . . our troops have shown themselves capable of little resistance. . . . Through want of sufficient reserves, tired divisions have to be put in again at other places before they are fit to fight again."

" What I have long feared has happened earlier than I expected. The bow became so bent that at last it has broken. We have lost quite 800

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guns in two days, and the troops have no more powers of resistance. . . On the other fronts things are very bad, and we must be prepared for the all-worst. It is absolutely necessary to make peace at once and at any cost, for we are as good as defenceless."

14th October.—" The situation has visibly worsened. Large detachments, and officers also, have surrendered voluntarily. . . . The troops are so tired out that they make no resistance even to small attacks."

26th October.—" The attitude of the troops has visibly worsened. The men are indescribably tired, and have become quite apathetic; the one thought of the great majority is only, if it would only come to an end quickly, no matter how. Cases of the grossest insubordination pile up; one battalion that was being brought up by rail mutined at the station, and was disarmed after a short fire-fight."

1st November.—" It is very regrettable that many newspapers which reach the troops, make out that the person of the Kaiser and the Crown Prince form the only obstacle to peace. Only peace quickly, however hard the conditions may seem, can bring salvation."

No one, after these revelations, can deny that the German Army was beaten in the field.

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THE MILITARY METHODS OF THE MONGOLS *

(With Map)

By CAPT. E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C., The Royal Tank Corps

IN his address to the officers of the Mechanized Brigade at the beginning of their training in 1927, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff advised them that they could not do better than study ancient warfare and especially the period of the great raids of the Mongols and Parthians. It is to be feared that the ideas of many soldiers about the Mongols are little less vague than those of the lady acquaintance of Mr. Howorth, the great British authority, who wrote three large and learned volumes on the history of this race. This lady, sitting next to Mr. Howorth at dinner, talked to him the whole evening about dogs, under the impression that his mighty book was a history of mongrels. For those of us, therefore, whose ignorance on the subject is no less complete, though better concealed, these few notes on Mongol history and military methods may perhaps be of interest.

I. THE CONQUESTS OF THE MONGOLS

At the beginning of the thirteenth century the first and hardly recognizable seeds of English liberty were being sown in Magna Carta ; Western Europe was being rent by the struggle for supremacy between the Pope and the Emperor ; Eastern Europe was a welter

* The following works have been consulted : H. Howorth, " History of the Mongols," 3 vols., 1876 ; *Histoire des Mongols*, 1824 ; Kohler, *Entwickelung des Kriegswesens*, 1889 ; Sir O. Oman, " Art of War in the Middle Ages," 1924 ; Liddell Hart, " Great Captains Unveiled," 1927 ; article in Encyclopædia Britannica on Jengis Khan and the Mongols. There is too a good, brief summary of Mongol history in H. G. Wells's " Outline of History," while the chapters in Gibbon's " Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," dealing with the Mongols are still worth reading.

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of warring principalities and bickering princelings; Islam, though it had held at bay the Crusading armies, was breaking up into a number of separate and discordant States in all the area from Egypt and the Bosphorus to the Oxus; and China, divided into warring provinces under alien rulers, was fast losing her unity. It was at this time that in the desolate steppes about Lakes Balkash and Baikal there arose the portentous figure of the Mongol, Jengis Khan. The Mongols or Tartars were then a nomadic people, dwelling in tents, subsisting on their vast herds of cattle and on beasts killed in the chase, living simply and frugally, born horsemen and good fighters, but in no way distinguishable from half a hundred similar tribes settled in the vast grazing grounds of Central and Western Asia. It was Jengis Khan who raised them from this obscure position to be in less than twenty years the lords of all Asia, the dread of Eastern Europe, and the most formidable fighters of the Middle Ages.

Jengis Khan, who generally appears in history as a mere barbarian "scourge of God," actuated only by a lust for destruction, and owing his successes in war mainly to the numbers of his armies and the terror aroused by their cruelty and ferocity, was in actual fact an enlightened and far-seeing ruler of his people, and a real master of war. Born in 1162, and assuming power at an early age, he spent the first few years of his reign in consolidating his ascendancy over his own tribe and in forging the military machine which was soon to spread his fame over two continents. Then in 1203 he entered on his career of conquest, his first victims being the Kirghiz and Uigur tribes dwelling to the north and south of Lake Balkash, who were quickly reduced to terms. He then turned eastward against the Kin Empire of North China, breaking through the Great Wall, storming Pekin, and penetrating east and south-east as far as the Yellow Sea. The course of these campaigns, which ended in the complete subjection of the Kin Empire, and were followed by an equally successful attack on the territory of the Sungs to the south of it, and the eventual conquest of the whole of China, cannot here be described in detail. We must go on to narrate the westward progress of Mongol arms in those astonishing drives which carried them from their capital Karakorum as far afield as Lahore, Damascus, Moscow and the Adriatic.

The first enemy to be encountered in this advance was the Khoresmian Empire of Persia, a large and highly-civilized community stretching from east of the Oxus and north of the Aral Sea to the Gulf of Oman. Its inhabitants by assassinating the envoys sent

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to them by Jengis Khan brought on themselves a storm which in three short years completely laid waste their country. In the autumn of 1219 two Mongol Armies pushed forward to the Jaxartes, secured the crossings of that river, and held fast the Khoresmian forces under Shah Mohammed in their front, while Jengis with his main body, suddenly appearing out of the desert beyond the adversary's left flank, swooped round into his rear, and besieged and stormed his strongest fortress, Bokhara. The three Mongol Armies then closed in on Samarkand and the Khoresmian resistance collapsed; Shah Mohammed fled westward to the shores of the Caspian, where he found a miserable death, while the country was completely overrun, and all its fortified places fell one after the other into Tartar hands. While the main force, turning north, cleared up the area around the Aral Sea, subsidiary columns sent westwards into Khorassan secured the Merv-Herat district, defeated Jelal, who had succeeded Mohammed as titular ruler of the ruined empire, and drove him into Afghanistan. As soon as his own immediate task was accomplished Jengis marched after him into that country, inflicted on him two severe defeats at Ghazni and on the banks of the Indus, and by a vigorous pursuit as far as Lahore finally put an end to his hopes of recovering his lost realm. By the end of 1222 the Khoresmian Empire had passed so securely and completely under Mongol sway that Jengis and the main army were able next year to return to their own country.

Meanwhile, a second subsidiary force under two of the best of the Tartar generals, Chepe and Subutai, had carried out an astonishing raid which had taken them across North Persia, up through the Caucasus, and into the heart of Russia. Neither the mountaineers of Georgia, nor the Kipohak tribes of the lower Volga and Don valleys, nor the princes and Grand Dukes of Southern Russia were able to stem their progress; the latter were hopelessly defeated north of the Sea of Azov, and when the raiders finally fell back by way of the middle Volga and to the north of the Caspian, it was only because Jengis had ordered them to rejoin him, and not because of any resistance that could be put up by their helpless and demoralized enemies. "The victorious march of Chepe and Subutai," says Howorth, "must rank among the most wonderful military exploits related in history."

Shortly after his return home, in 1227, Jengis Khan died and bequeathed his empire to his son Ogotai. "He had conquered the greatest area of the world's surface ever subdued by one hand"; he had formed, trained, and led to victory the finest army of his time;

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he had drawn up a code of wise laws, organized the administration of his vast realm, repressed crime and disorder, enforced religious toleration throughout his territories, and opened them to travellers and traders from all Asia and Europe. "If it be no small thing," says Howorth, "for a man to leave his footprint in the page of history, his must surely have had an uncommon power who stamped his mark so deeply and lastingly on such a shifting, treacherous quagmire as the history of Asia and whose descendants ruled a very large portion of it for so long."

Ogotai, unlike his father, was not a great soldier, but he had under him a galaxy of brilliant leaders who worthily upheld the fame of Mongol arms and spread it far into the heart of Europe. The story of the great raid through Russia into Poland and Hungary will be found recounted in detail later in this article. Even during its course fighting on a smaller scale was going on in Persia and Asia Minor, where the pressure of the Mongols set in motion westward a tribe known as the Ottoman Turks, destined later to exercise a no less fateful influence on European history; while the Sung dynasty was putting up a stout though vain fight for its life in South China. In 1242 the death of Ogotai called the Mongol armies back home; the succession was disputed for some years; and it was not till 1251 that Mangu was recognized as the Great Khan. He found the task of governing the widespread empire of Jengis beyond his powers and delegated authority over its outlying provinces to his brothers, who in their turn led conquering armies against their neighbours and widened the area of their authority. Mangu reigned nine years, and under his successor, Kubla Khan, the Mongol Empire began to break up. Kubla Khan devoted his main attention to China, absorbed the whole country from the Amur to Tibet and Burma, and founded the Yuan dynasty, which lasted for close on a century. One of his brothers, Hulagu, overthrew the Calif of Baghdad, fought with the Sultan of Egypt, held sway over all the Middle East, and founded the Ilkhan Empire, from which sprang, a century later, a new "scourge of God," Timur, and a century later again, the Mogul Emperors of India. Western Siberia and Turkestan fell apart under separate chiefs, and another section, known as the "Golden Horde," spread over the whole of South Russia from the Urals to the border of Poland and Hungary, and gave to that country the peculiarly Tartar and Asiatic stamp which even to-day distinguishes her from other European States. Thus the Mongol conquests, far from being mere orgies of barbarous and barren destruction, left their impress

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deep on all Asia and Eastern Europe, and influenced for good or evil the subsequent history of every race inhabiting those vast and populous territories.

II. The Mongol Raid into Central Europe

In order to get a clear idea of Mongol strategy and tactics with the object of drawing lessons from them for use at the present day, a more detailed narrative of the most famous and brilliant of their campaigns must now be given.

In 1237, ten years after the death of Jengis, his successor Ogotai placed under the command of his nephew, Batu, an army estimated to number 150,000 men, and with it the best of the Mongol generals, with orders to carry out a raid into Eastern and Central Europe. Crossing the Urals in the autumn, their advance covered by two strong detachments under Mangu, who was later to succeed Ogotai as Great Khan, and Subutai, the ablest of all the Tartar leaders, they overran and subdued all the scattered tribes north of the Caspian Sea and in the Volga valley, passed that river at Saratov as soon as it had frozen over, and moved northward on Novgorod; Riazan, Kolomna, Moscow were all stormed; the Grand Duke of Susdal, who endeavoured to oppose their march, was surprised and slain, and his army put to flight; and only a sudden thaw, which rendered impassable the lake and marsh country round Novgorod, saved that city from capture and destruction. South Russia now felt the full weight of Tartar arms; unopposed, save by local bands, Batu's men marched by Kaluga to Perejaslav and Tchernigov, whence in the early summer of 1238 they retired to refit in the valley of the Don. The Russians were thus given a respite, of which, however, they made no real use.

It was not till the autumn of 1240 that the Tartars, refreshed and strengthened by their long spell of rest, once more drove westward. They encountered little effective resistance. Kiev, the strongest and most important city in Russia, fell after a short siege, and was so completely destroyed that to this day it has never recovered its former splendour. All the country now lay under Batu's heel, and he at once set to work to prepare for his next task, the invasion of Hungary.

For this offensive he divided his host into four columns, each of about 30,000 men. The right flank guard, under Baidar, was to move along the northern slope of the Carpathians, to deal with the Poles, known to be assembling in force around Cracow, and to

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come down into Hungary from the north. The right column was to cross the western Carpathians, and the left column to sweep round southward through Transylvania, while the main Army, starting somewhat later, was to move direct south-westward to meet the other two detachments under the walls of Pesth. Early in March, 1241, Baidar moved forward north of the mountains, crossed the Vistula, defeated a Polish Army, and occupied Cracow, which he found deserted and burnt. In front of him at Liegnitz the princes of Western Poland and Silesia, with a contingent of Prussian and Teutonic knights—a formidable force of picked heavy and light cavalry and good infantry—had assembled to forbid his farther advance, while Wenzel of Bohemia was leading up an army to assist them. But before Wenzel could effect a junction with his allies, the Mongol blow fell. Outflanked on both sides, punished for hours on end by the fire of the Mongol archers, and unable to push a charge home against their more mobile adversaries, the Poles were in a few hours of fierce fighting completely defeated and dispersed, with fearful losses. The King of Bohemia, when the news reached him, fell back hurriedly to cover the approaches to his own land; and the victors, having fully accomplished their task, did not further concern themselves with him, or press on into Silesia, but wheeled southward through the Moravian mountains to join the main army. In less than a month they had advanced four hundred miles, won two battles, and overrun all South Poland.

Before they arrived in Hungary, however, Batu had accomplished his conquest of that country. His two wing armies, moving forward on a wide front, had distracted the attention and dispersed the forces of the defenders, and when his advanced guard broke out from the mountains and in three days covered the distance of two hundred miles separating it from the Danube, the small force which endeavoured to oppose its progress was surprised and swept away. Facing the Mongols on the right bank of the river, however, lay a large Magyar army of 100,000 men, mainly horse-archers but with a strong contingent of infantry, and in order to draw them into a position where he could take them at a disadvantage, Batu fell back slowly to the Sajo river, a tributary of the Theiss. Behind this the Magyars, who had followed him, took up a defensive position, their front and right covered by the two rivers and a tangle of wooded hills to their left rear. The solitary bridge over the Sajo was barricaded and the army massed behind it to defend the passage with mounted detachments watching the fords up-stream.

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Batu at once formed his plan of battle, which was to send a strong force up-river to pass by unguarded fords beyond the Magyar left, and to come in on their flank and rear, while a frontal feint held them to their ground and deceived them as to the true direction of attack. Before dawn on the 27th of April, 1241, strong Tartar masses came forward against the barricaded bridge and its defenders; the main Magyar army seems to have been slow in moving to the help of its comrades, who were driven from their post by the hostile siege engines and left the enemy free to cross. At the same moment the flank attack developed and the Magyars, straggling out of their camp in great confusion, had to form a new front to face this fresh danger. Batu, seeing his opportunity, hurled his main body across the Sajo by the captured bridge and by the neighbouring fords; the Magyars were taken between two fires, and their fierce resistance served only to render their defeat more complete. By noon the Magyar army had been annihilated; 70,000 men were said to have been slain and the rest were dispersed in utter rout. Six hours' fighting had given all Hungary to the Tartars.

All over the great Hungarian plain the Mongol horsemen spread; crossing the Danube on the ice as soon as winter came, they took and laid waste the capital, Gran, Buda and all the Western cities, and some of them even pushed on into the mountains of Croatia and Dalmatia. Despite difficulties and losses, they cut their way as far as the Adriatic, caused panic fear in Spalato and Ragusa, and returned back through Serbia to the main Army, now collecting in the plains prior to its return home. It was, as we have seen, domestic events in Mongolia—the sudden death of Ogotai and the necessity for deciding on his successor—rather than the local military situation, which was not such as to cause Batu any immediate anxiety, that put an end to the brilliant operations of the Tartar Army in Central Europe and freed Poland and Hungary from a formidable, almost an invincible foe, whom, happily for their future, they were never to encounter in arms again.

III. The Mongol Armies and their Fighting Methods

It must be admitted that much of the success of the Mongol arms was due to the weakness, both political and military, of their adversaries. The decadent Khoresmian Empire of Persia; the weak and disunited tribes of the Caucasus and the Don; the Russian duchies torn with mutual strife and exhausted by a

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succession of internecine wars; Poland and Hungary, suffering from feudal anarchy and weak central government—all these were easy prey for Jengis Khan and his warriors. But the fact remains that whereas none of these various foes was really formidable, the Mongols had evolved a military system well suited to their needs and characteristics, and were a true army, while their enemies were little better than armed mobs.

First of all, the Mongols, though their numbers were constantly being swelled by volunteer adventurers from every country in Asia, and by vassals conscripted from all the territories conquered by them, were organized in definite formations, ranging from the *toman* of 10,000 men through units of 1,000 and 100 to the smallest of ten men only; and over all the larger units were placed Mongol commanders. Moreover, discipline was strict and even ferocious, each man of a unit being held responsible with his life for the courage and good behaviour in battle of his fellows, while obedience to orders on the part of both leaders and led was insisted on and secured. The general of a Mongol army could thus make his plans, issue his orders and be sure that so far as humanly possible they would be carried out and not marred by any untimely display of independence by some subordinate, or wrecked by the breakdown of a few units—and not a single tribal leader of Asia or feudal chief of Europe was in such a position, then or for many years to come. In other words, the Mongol victories were in the first place triumphs of organization and discipline over incoherence, divided counsels, jealousy and ignorance.

Secondly, the Mongols were first-class fighting men, well mounted, and trained from boyhood to the use of their weapons. As horse-archers their principal weapon was a powerful bow, but they were also equipped for hand-to-hand fighting; and both their horses and themselves were adequately protected by armour against the missile weapons of their adversaries. Furthermore, they were skilled in constructing and handling the siege engines which were in those days the equivalent of our heavy artillery, and even, so it is said by some authorities, made use of rudimentary cannon. The light horsemen of Persia and the ill-armed mountaineers of Georgia were no match for these formidable warriors; the mailed knight could man for man stand against them, but the tumultuary infantry levies which accompanied all feudal armies into the field were mere sheep for the slaughter when assailed by a Tartar army. The Mongol, in a word, was far better armed, equipped and trained than any of his enemies.

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Thirdly, Mongol generalship and methods of fighting were of a high order of excellence, whereas on the side of their adversaries leadership was conspicuous by its absence and for strategy and tactics reliance was placed on the light of nature. The Tartar leaders organized their intelligence service admirably and always had good information about their foes and the country in which they were fighting; their enemies remained in complete ignorance of the movements and designs of the Mongols until these appeared like a thunderbolt in their midst. The provisioning and supply system of the Mongols was carefully thought out, the utmost use being made of local resources and the services of the local inhabitants; the average Asiatic or feudal commander never gave any consideration to such matters, so that he all too often led starving troops into battle. Mongol armies were highly mobile, capable of outmarching and outmanœuvring any and every host which dragged about in its midst masses of infantry and followers on foot, so that the advantages of speed and surprise were all on the side of the former. Finally, Mongol battle tactics were admirably devised to get the best out of their armament and equipment and to exploit their mobility and handiness. The enemy was enveloped on flanks and rear by swift-moving masses of horse-archers; his ranks were scourged by fire from every side, including fire from the heavy missile weapons; if he attempted a mounted charge, he could not close with his immediate adversaries, who gave back before him and allowed their comrades to take full toll of his flanks and rear until his impetus had spent itself; if he stood for defence, he was subjected first to the prolonged, steady and incessant fire of arrows, and then, when the work of preparation had been fully accomplished, to a heavy and irresistible assault. The Mongols' strategy carried them unchecked over the whole breadth of Asia and right into Central Europe; their tactics laid every enemy they encountered helpless before them. If we add to all these advantages the prestige of their great successes and the terror which their ferocity and savagery spread like a pestilence before the advent of their armies, we shall realize how it was that their mighty conquests were achieved, and see that the causes of their great and enduring successes were no different from those which in the past have so often brought victory to well-disciplined forces, and may be relied on to do so again in the future.

What then are the lessons that these Mongol campaigns have for us to-day? They show us, first, that training and organization are prime factors in success, and that an army skilled in the use of

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its weapons, organized and disciplined into a supple and cohesive whole, and trained in the form of fighting best suited to its armament and special characteristics, enjoys a decisive advantage over enemies less well trained, less homogeneous and hastily levied to meet a sudden crisis. The proof of this is of course to be found in all military history; but these campaigns afford a new and striking confirmation of this universal truth.

Secondly, we may note the great value of mobility. The mobility of the Tartar armies was far higher than that of any army of the day, because it had as its basis the horse, whereas all their enemies were cumbered with infantry whose pace dictated that of their accompanying cavalry. While the Mongols could at need, as we have seen, travel at a rate of sixty miles a day, their foes could not cover more than a quarter of this distance; hence the latter were outmarched, surprised and defeated by their more mobile adversaries, and so vigorously pursued after their defeat that few were left to tell the tale. All the Mongol victories were won by sudden swift blows and were locally decisive of the campaign. Mobility of the whole army—not of individual arms or units within an army—is an asset of which we as yet have not enough experience to appreciate the value, but we can gauge something of it from a study of these campaigns.

This high mobility of the Tartar armies could, however, only be fully utilized because it was combined with striking power. The rôle of the horse-archer who could fire on the move, and of the heavy artillery, was to prepare the powerful shock action of the heavy-armed cavalry, which gave the final *coup de grace*, and decided the victory. Thus the speed of the Mongol advance placed them in a position of strategic advantage, which they were able to drive home by utilizing their tactical advantage to ensure victory on the battlefield, and instant exploitation of success until the final dispersal of the adversary. All this may be profitably taken to heart to-day, when the army of every nation is striving, after increased mobility combined with smashing power, in substitution for the military methods which in the last war reduced them to immobility and forced them to trust for victory to a process of attrition.

Finally, the Mongol victories were won by skilful tactics and by the cooperation of all arms. We have seen the preparation of the attack by the military machines and horse-archers; the gradual wearing down of the enemy by concentrated fire from front and flanks: the vigorous decisive attack when the right moment

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

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its weapons, organized and disciplin
whole, and trained in the form of fight
and special characteristics, enjoys a d
less well trained, less homogeneous
sudden crisis. The proof of this is
military history; but these campaig
confirmation of this universal truth.

Secondly, we may note the gr
mobility of the Tartar armies was
army of the day, because it had as i
their enemies were cumbered with
that of their accompanying cavalry.
need, as we have seen, travel at a ra
foes could not cover more than a qu
the latter were outmarched, surprise
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that few were left to tell the tale. A
won by sudden swift blows and were lo
Mobility of the whole army—not of i
an army—is an asset of which we as y
to appreciate the value, but we can
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This high mobility of the Tartar
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The rôle of the horse-archer who co
the heavy artillery, was to prepare t
the heavy-armed cavalry, which gave
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placed them in a position of strategic
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

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had come; and the relentless pursuit completing the destruction of the defeated enemy. These campaigns and battles may *mutatis mutandis* still serve as models for us to-day; they remain admirable examples of the handling of all arms to a common end, and of the use of the available means to attain the object. It is by the close and complete cooperation of all arms—whatever in the future those arms may be—rather than in the heroic deeds of one solitary arm, that we shall find our best hope of winning in the future such overwhelming and decisive victories as those which enabled the Mongols to play a famous part in military history, and to establish themselves among the nations who have changed the face of the world.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

ISANDHLWANA, THE 22ND OF JANUARY, 1879

(With Map)

By V. Wheeler-Holohan

It is hardly necessary to enter at length into the circumstances which caused the Zulu War of 1879. It is enough to say that the Zulus were a powerful and a martial nation which had been formed by King Tshaka into a most formidable fighting machine during the early days of the century. On his accession in 1873 Cetewayo resolved to carry on his uncle's traditions, and as Zululand was entirely surrounded by provinces under British rule, a collision with our forces was, sooner or later, inevitable.

The Zulu Army numbered some 40,000 men. It was no savage rabble, but was properly organized into various regiments, each in strength from one to four thousand. Numbers of the warriors had firearms, but, fortunately, the Zulu was a poor shot, and his real weapons were the throwing assegai, the stabbing assegai and the knobkerry. For defence he carried his great cow-hide shield, the colour of which varied according to his regiment. To these men, extraordinarily brave and in perfect training, fighting was a joy, a hobby, and their pride. No Zulu could marry without the king's consent, such consent being given only when the aspirant had gained military distinction by " washing his spear in an enemy's blood." The most famous regiment in the Army was the *Ngoba-makosi*, or " Boys' Regiment," mustering some 3,500 shields, all of them hopeful for glory and consequent permission to wear the head-ring of the " *kehla*," or married man. Among other well-known regiments were the *Umcityu*—also known as the *Kandampemvu*—(the " sharp-pointed ones "), the *Nokenke* (the " dividers "), the *Umbonambi* (the " evil-seers "), and the *Tulwana*, the king's special regiment.

An ultimatum was presented to Cetewayo in December, 1878,

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in which two clauses stood out. The Zulu Army was to be disbanded, and every man was to be allowed to marry when he wished to.

The result—as anticipated—was defiance, and war.

Now the Natal frontier, some 200 miles long, could not be held effectively, and the Colony dreaded the possibility of a Zulu invasion. Attack being the best defence, the British Army under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Chelmsford crossed into Zululand in three columns.

It is with No. 3—the centre—column, led by Chelmsford in person, that our story rests. It moved across the Buffalo river at Rorke's Drift on the 11th of January and camped on the Zulu side. The British infantry consisted of five companies of the 1/24th and seven companies of the 2/24th. Two companies of the former were left at Helpmakaar, while the eighth company (" B ") of the second battalion, under Lieutenant Bromhead, was left to garrison Rorke's Drift.

The second camp in hostile territory was pitched on the eastern side of Isandhlwana mountain, the force reaching there about noon on the 20th of January. Isandhlwana, or the " hill of the little hand," towers like a recumbent lion with its head facing almost due south. Some five hundred yards farther south is a small stony hill, and over the neck connecting this hill with the lion's head runs the road—or rather wagon track—to Rorke's Drift. The camp was placed with its rear to the precipitous side of Isandhlwana. The ground immediately in front of the site ran downwards to a long and narrow donga, or watercourse. The ground on the left—towards the north—rose abruptly, and then descended into a series of valleys, while on the right the ground between the little hill and the Buffalo river was very broken, and one deep gully or drift in particular extended to the river.

On each of these flanks parallel ridges of high ground prevented all but a very limited view. Archibald Forbes, the famous war correspondent, when writing of the site said, " The position seems to offer a premium on disaster, and asks to be attacked."

At 4 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd of January Lord Chelmsford moved out of camp, taking with him about half of the column and four of his six guns. His intention was, if possible, to force an action with the enemy and thus to clear the country in front of the border and remove the apprehensions of Natal concerning an immediate raid by the bloodthirsty Zulus, to reconnoitre generally, and to select the ground for his next camp.

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There is little doubt that the force left behind was adequate to hold the camp if attacked. It consisted of:

5 companies of the 1/24th Foot, 16 officers, 403 men.
1 company of the 2/24th Foot, 5 officers, 178 men.
2 companies, 1/3rd Natal Native Contingent, 10 officers, 200 men.
2 companies, 2/3rd Natal Native Contingent, 10 officers, 200 men.
2 guns of " N " Battery, Royal Artillery (7 prs.), 2 officers, 70 men.
And some 110 Volunteers and Police.

It was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Pulleine of the 1/24th. His orders, written by Major Clery, were to " draw in your line of defence while the force is out, but keep your cavalry vedettes far advanced." Also the General had told him verbally to " defend the camp."

Nothing happened at Isandhlwana for nearly four hours after Chelmsford's departure, when reports were received that Zulus in some force were in the vicinity, whereupon the men stood to, and waited. At 10 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Durnford, of the Royal Engineers, arrived in camp (he had been brought up by Lieutenant H. Smith-Dorrien, according to the General's orders), bringing with him five troops of his Basutos, one rocket battery, and two companies of the 1/1st Natal Native Contingent. At this time the total strength of the British was about 67 officers and 1,707 men, some 850 of the latter being white.

It is reported that Pulleine remarked to Durnford, " I'm sorry you have come, as you are senior to me and will of course take command." To this Durnford is said to have replied, " I'm not going to interfere with you. I'm not going to remain in camp." By this time an impression had got about that the Zulus were moving towards Chelmsford's force, and Durnford decided to advance at once and to try to engage them before they could trouble the other half of the column. He and Pulleine were not in agreement, the latter insisting that he was to hold the camp and not to indulge in an offensive action. Eventually, Durnford pushed off to the east with two troops of his Basutos, one company of the Natal Native Contingent (450 natives in all) and was followed by the rocket battery. He encountered the enemy in considerable force when some four to five miles off and retired, finding on the way that the rocket battery—having been taken by surprise—had been destroyed.

At about noon a skirmisher—Trooper Whitelaw of the Natal Carabiniers—discovered the Zulu Army in a valley to the north of Isandhlwana. According to official figures it numbered 14,000,

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but the Zulus themselves swore that it was nearly 20,000 strong. Shots were exchanged, and the Zulus began to move. It afterwards came out that the Zulu attack was unpremeditated, for they had no intention of attacking that day as "the moon was not right." Pulleine had sent out Cavaye's Company of the 1/24th about 10 a.m. to take up a position to the north about 1,200 yards from the camp. The Zulu right wing, however, made no direct advance upon Cavaye, but passing across his front to his left, descended into the valley which ran behind Isandhlwana mountain.

Until the discovery of this enormous *impi*, the impression in the camp was that the Zulus would not attack during the daytime but might do so that night. When Pulleine heard of the enemy's presence, he sent out Mostyn's company to support Cavaye but eventually brought them both back to the main line of defence.

This line was bent almost at a right angle. The northern face consisted of three companies of the 1/24th (from the left,—Younghusband, Mostyn, Cavaye); then, at the angle, was a portion of the Natal Native Contingent supported by the two guns, the eastern face being formed by the other two companies of the 1/24th with, on the extreme right, Pope's men of the 2/24th.

The Natal Native Contingent were a little in advance of the rest of the line, and gradually fell back into closer position with it. Soon after this position had been taken up the Zulu commander extended the left horn of his crescent right across the British front, and gradually worked round to the right front of Pope's company. Durnford, after passing the remains of his rocket battery, saw this movement and fell back on his right flank to try and check it.

About the same time a British post on the neck where the track runs to Rorke's Drift saw the advance of the *Nodwengu* regiment coming from behind the mountain. "First an officer, wearing his leopard-skin, followed by a cluster of two or three men appeared, and then came a continuous stream of Zulu warriors." And so the line of retreat to Rorke's Drift was cut.

The 24th were fighting in extended order, while the camp was not entrenched in any way. Until about 1 p.m. there was no idea of any great danger, the rifle fire adequately stopping the enemy's advance. Then the whole Zulu force showed up, and, in perfect order, made its real attack. Durnford, realizing that his men were in great danger in their loose formation, ordered the retire to be sounded, and hoped that by closing in on the camp he could get his men shoulder to shoulder, for at this moment his defensive line was nearly a mile and a quarter long. But before this move-

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ment could be effected the main centre of the Zulu Army got to within two hundred yards of the salient in the line. The British fire, which had been dropping the warriors in dozens, commenced to slacken. Some survivors say that the rifles were too hot to hold, and that the men, though they had some seventy rounds each, simply could not fire fast enough with the single-loading Martini-Henry. Other survivors maintain that the ammunition did run short, and that the badly constructed boxes could not be opened fast enough to enable sufficient supplies to be sent out to the firing line.

Be that as it may, the Natal Native Contingent in the angle found itself perilously close to the centre or chest of the Zulu crescent.

The Zulu particularly hated his fellow-black who was fighting against him. In turn, the Natal native dreaded the Zulu, and to add to this dread only one man in ten was armed with a rifle, the other ninety per cent. having to fight with shield and assegai. The guns were firing case, but doing little damage, when, as the notes of the retire sounded, the Natal Native Contingent broke, and fled in utter terror towards the tents. At the same time the portion of this same regiment which had been held in reserve also broke and ran. The gallant artillerymen limbered up their guns and tried to save them by galloping. One gunner was speared as he endeavoured to mount on to an axle-tree box ; the limber gunners were slain as they ran behind the guns. Right through the camp went the teams, and, on nearing the neck and finding the way to Rorke's Drift blocked by the *Nodwengu*, they swung to the left. By this time they were covered with men of different corps who were clinging to them, and shortly after entering the deep drift previously mentioned they came to dire disaster and upset.

Meanwhile the Zulu rush broke through the gap, and, swinging to right and left, the savages closed in using their assegais with horrible effect. Mostyn's and Cavaye's companies were butchered almost at once. Younghusband's men on the left formed a sort of rallying square and retreated with their backs to the mountain ; though completely isolated there, they put up a desperate stand. It is said that they had the Colours of the 2/24th in their midst, and that, so hot was their fire, the enemy halted and hung back. The plucky 24th taunted their enemies and dared them to come on, but gradually the cartridges failed, and the Zulus, using their throwing spears at a safe distance from the bayonet, eventually slew them all.

To the immediate right of the gap some of the 24th went down before they could either reload or fix bayonets, but on the extreme

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right flank Pope's company, supported by that on his immediate left, also made a ring. They were supported by Durnford and the remains of his mounted men, and here these heroes fought to the end.

Had the *Ngobamakosi*, who were the point of the left horn of the Zulu crescent directly it had outflanked Pope and turned Durnford's men, proceeded to unite with the *Nodwengu*, few of the British could have escaped. But before the circle was complete a number of fugitives escaped in great confusion through the deep drift, and the " Boys' Regiment " proceeded to pursue them. Only a few of the mounted men escaped, for the fleet Zulu could overtake horses over broken ground, and no man on foot stood the smallest chance. An ambulance had been filled with wounded ; seeing all was lost the gallant attendants whipped up their mules and tried to save their helpless comrades, but the enemy came up with them, killed the animals and dragging out the occupants slaughtered them all.

Gradually the noise of the British musketry died away, and the few groups of whites disappeared. All was over, and 52 officers and 806 non-commissioned officers and men lay dead together with 471 friendly natives.

Five white officer survivors also passed through the gap, none of whom had left the camp till after 1 p.m., when they realized that the day was lost and that they could serve no useful purpose by remaining.

As previously mentioned, the 2/24th had both their Colours in camp. These were never seen again, for when the camp was rushed the Zulus went baresark, ripped up the bodies, cut and slashed the tents and set a quantity of material on fire. But the Colour-pike of one Colour was found in May, 1879, in a kraal some two miles from the battle-field, while the crest that topped it had previously been picked up in the garden of a farm some four miles from Rorke's Drift. Later on the Colour-case was found in the bed of the Amanganyanna river.

The Regimental Colour of the 1/24th had been left at Helpmakaar with their two other companies. Seeing the end approaching, Lieutenant Teignmouth Melvill, their adjutant, escaped from the camp, carrying the cased Queen's Colour of his battalion. Lieutenant N. J. A. Coghill—who should have been out with Chelmsford's force (he was orderly officer to Colonel Glyn) but had been left in camp suffering from a badly sprained knee—had previously got away on horseback. These officers were about half a mile apart in the retreat. When Melvill reached the

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river he plunged in and lost his horse, and it is believed that he was forced to let the Colour go. He succeeded in gaining the Natal bank, however. Coghill had also got across the raging torrent, and the two met. But the exact circumstances of their meeting will never be known, for the two officers, after a brief but gallant fight, were both killed.

On the 4th of February, Major Black of the 2/24th, after repeated diving, recovered the Colour from the river-bed and took it to Rorke's Drift. Her Majesty subsequently crowned the battered Colour-pike with a wreath of immortelles, afterwards presenting each battalion with a silver wreath to be carried on the Sovereign's Standard in perpetuity in memory of the Regiment's gallant deeds on this day. "Melvill's Colour," now adorned with the ten battle honours won in the Great War, is still carried by the 1st Battalion of the South Wales Borderers.

The subsequent events of this fatal Wednesday may be shortly mentioned. After the annihilation at Isandhlwana, the Undi Corps and Udhloko Regiment, who had been in reserve during the battle, moved down to mop up Chard's post at Rorke's Drift. The wonderful defence they encountered will never be forgotten.

Chelmsford heard of the result of the battle at 3 p.m. He assembled his men, told them of the disaster and that they had got to retake the lost position. They reached Isandhlwana after dark, and bivouacked on that blood-drenched field. All their kit had been lost in the sacking of the camp, they had only a few biscuits and barely sixty rounds per man. Their position was critical. In the rear there was a considerable force of the enemy, on their right was the Army which had overwhelmed their comrades, while in front could be seen the flames of burning buildings at Rorke's Drift. But they remained cool, watchful and very steady. Before daylight could reveal the awful scene and dishearten them, Chelmsford wisely moved on. When the little depôt at the Drift was reached, and it was realized that 8 officers and 131 men—many of them sick—had beaten off the attack, the revulsion of feeling was tremendous, and roars of cheering greeted Chelmsford's quiet "Thank you all very much for your very gallant defence."

The horror and fear felt throughout South Africa when the full details of the disaster became known rapidly disappeared when it was realized that the Zulus did not intend to invade Natal, and that our men had displayed the most marvellous bravery.

While at first sight it seemed impossible to magnify the probable effects of the disastrous defeat, it was found eventually that the

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Zulu higher command regarded the battle as a Pyrrhic victory. When their Army left the Nodwengu kraal on the 17th of January, they were told by Cetewayo that they were to drive the Rorke's Drift column back and then follow it up into Natal right to the Drakensberg, and they believed that they could do it. But they were astounded at the gallantry of the British troops and were most uneasy at the death-dealing power of our musketry. One *induna* remarked that " Isandhlwana was an assegai thrust into the heart of the Zulu nation." Another Zulu who had also fought in the battle said that their losses were enormous. The isolated company of the 24th (Younghusband's) smashed up the Umcityu Regiment, " the *Ngobamakosi* fell in heaps, and the hill that the *Nokenke* descended was piled with their dead, while the *Undi* Corps must have lost nearly 500 at Rorke's Drift."

Cetewayo's sagacious generals soon realized that the annihilation of the British was due first of all to the element of surprise in the attack, and, secondly, to the poor tactics displayed by the white men, but that we should learn our lesson and fight either shoulder to shoulder or behind entrenchments. This view was strongly supported by the glorious victory at Rorke's Drift and the heavy defeat sustained by the Zulu hordes when they attacked Wood's entrenched camp at Kambula on the 29th of March.

The whole of the action was marked—on both sides—by examples of great heroism. The little groups of the 24th, their rifles almost red hot, the cumbersome bayonet at a great disadvantage against the Zulu shield, their ammunition exhausted, faced their enemy as they died to the last man—" they never looked behind them." The gallant mounted men, several of them in their teens, fought to a finish on the neck in endeavouring to prevent the left horn of the enemy from coming round. They had horses and could have escaped, but knowing that in this type of warfare it was wisest to concentrate on demolishing the tips of the Zulu crescent they held on to the bitter end.

In the terrible retreat to Fugitives' Drift there were cool heads and steady hearts among those who escaped and countless cases of self-sacrifice and gallantry were seen. To take but one instance, Lieutenant Horace Smith-Dorrien, of the 95th, though mounted on a poor and exhausted pony, tarried on several occasions to help others who were sorely beset. He " seemed to be one of the few who had neither lost heart at the magnitude of the disaster nor lost his own head at the very grave danger he was in himself." Reaching the stream he endeavoured to help a badly wounded man of the

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24th, but was overtaken and lost his horse. He jumped into the river and luckily caught hold of the tail of a loose horse which towed him across. On landing he gave up the horse and also his knife to Hamer of the Commissariat Department. Then, with but his revolver and a few rounds of ammunition, he tramped the whole way to Helpmakaar, followed for some three miles by Zulus who did not risk coming into pistol range.

Three men were blamed for the disaster. Lord Chelmsford was bitterly attacked in the House of Commons. He was certainly outmanœuvred by the Zulus, for the fact that the enemy when opposing his march on the 22nd evacuated strong positions so very easily and thus drew him away from the camp was, at the least, significant. "They kept on retiring to what, as events afterwards taught us, must have been their preconceived plan."

But he had left an adequate force behind him; his Standing Orders for the Field Force in Zululand laid down that no force should camp without entrenching either by earthwork defence or wagon *lagers*, and Pulleine, though he had plenty of the latter ready inspanned, made no such preparation. Also, he had strict instructions to "defend the camp." Chelmsford said that, had the "force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself and utilized there the material for a hasty entrenchment which lay ready to hand, I feel confident that the whole Zulu Army would not have been able to dislodge them."

Again, the Zulu attack was not premeditated, and hardly to be expected. It would seem as if Durnford, though no novice in South African warfare, was ultimately responsible. He advanced too far from the camp in his anxiety to reconnoitre and help Chelmsford. But it was surely necessary for him to make a personal reconnaissance, and, also, had not the danger of the enemy descending upon Chelmsford to be guarded against? In truth, whether two days or fifty years later it is very easy to criticize when one knows the Zulu dispositions and intentions, and what does it matter?

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

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RECOLLECTIONS OF MARSHAL FOCH IN 1918

By Brigadier C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O.

" E poi vedrai, che son contenti,
Nel fuoco perché speran di venire,
Quando che sia, alle beate gente."
(*Inferno*, Canto I.)

On the 26th of March, 1918, a meeting was held at Doullens of allied soldiers and statesmen—Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War; Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial Staff; Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of our armies in France; General Pétain, Commander-in-Chief of the French armies; M. Poincaré, President of the French Republic; and M. Clemenceau, Prime Minister and Minister for War. The " greatest onslaught in the history of the world " (p. 412, Vol. IV, " The World Crisis ") had just been made on the Third and Fifth armies, and there were reasons for believing that the British Army might be separated from the French Army if the enemy continued to push on towards Amiens. In these circumstances Sir Douglas Haig proposed at the meeting that Marshal Foch should be given command " from the Alps to the North Sea." " It is a hard task you offer me now," replied the Marshal as without hesitation he accepted, " a compromised situation, a crumbling front, an adverse battle in full progress." But he was not offered what Sir Douglas Haig proposed, as his written instructions were " coordinating the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front . . ." and it was not until the 3rd of April that he was given fuller powers.

He was at the time in his 67th year and would have been obliged to retire from the French Army on account of age in 1916 had it not been for an exception to the ordinary regulations being made in his favour.*

* Marshal Foch is always so called in this article, although it was not until August, 1918, that he was appointed to the dignity of Marshal of France. Sir Douglas Haig and his commanders are referred to by the names under which they were known at the time.

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There are many difficulties in writing a few pages in tribute to Marshal Foch. "*On fait ce que l'on peut*," which by the way was a favourite expression of the Marshal, and the writer will do his best to describe, however slightly, a few of the events which took place during the time he commanded the Allied Armies and the way in which he worked.*

Others might have been chosen for the Allied Command in France, French or British, and it has even been stated that M. Clemenceau might have been appointed, with Marshal Foch as his Chief Staff Officer. For many reasons an almost impossible situation would have been created if a British commander had been appointed, even one fitted for command in every way. There were, of course, other great French commanders, and some people in France thought that Marshal Foch was old and had been ill. He was soon to show that all such doubts were undeserved.

He had taught generations of French officers, and to them his principles were well known. In a lesser degree British officers were acquainted with his books, but in some ways they are difficult to understand and treat their subjects in a very different manner to which we are accustomed. Marshal Foch accepted his command without hesitation, and with a firm confidence in himself. His beliefs, his principles, his conviction of the power of moral force, can be found in his writings. He had in the first instance taught himself before teaching others. When he was appointed professor at the French War College in 1895, with his brain on fire to teach the students military history, strategy and tactics, he began to write the "Principles of War," for he was not content with the instruction which had been given before his day.

At first he could not arrange his own ideas, and so at Easter he went off alone to his own quiet home in Brittany to clear his mind in the peace of the country. For ten days he worked day and night until he had arrived at what he sought. He had begun, so the story runs, by asking himself that question which was so well known afterwards to all who had the honour of serving under him, "*de quoi s'agit-il?*" and the answer which he had found as the result of his labour became the foundation of his book. In a passage in this book the Marshal quotes from the Emperor Napoleon: "It is difficult to appreciate correctly what moral strength is required to deliver, after having thought completely the consequences, one of those battles upon which the history of an army and of a country

* The writer was attached to the Marshal from the 29th of March until the 11th of November, 1918, as well as for twelve months after the war.

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depend. . . ." Those who saw his work in 1918 can only believe that it was the moral strength, that supreme military quality of Marshal Foch, which enabled him to command during the battle which ended with the defeat of the enemy in France.

Let us see what he did in the first few days after the 26th of March, with the " adverse battle in full progress." Before he received his charter at Doullens, he had decided to carry out two " simple ideas," to re-establish the touch between the French and British Armies and to protect Amiens. After a hurried luncheon, he set about his work. He asked Sir Douglas Haig if he might visit his Army Commanders, and, receiving a favourable answer, went off to Dury, where he found Sir Hubert Gough, commanding the Fifth Army, and, on ascertaining the situation, gave him orders for his two Army Corps to hold on to a certain line at all costs. He also met there the Chief of the Staff to General Fayolle, who commanded a group of French armies moving up on our right, and gave him written orders to ensure " at all costs the protection of Amiens " ; next he spoke to a staff officer from General Pétain's headquarters, and insisted on the necessity of the troops holding on along the front. Leaving Dury, he went to Maigenlay, near Montdidier, and saw General Debeney, commanding the First French Army, who had just come from Toul, told him what he had done and what were his plans for the future. He then left for Paris, which he reached at midnight and said to his own family : " I have seen what there was to see, done what there was to do ; I can stop them, but pray to God that it may not be too late." Before returning to the front the next morning he wrote to General Pétain, giving in some detail a summary of the instructions he had issued personally on the preceding day, and concluding by saying that an order of General Pétain to the men under him, whose entire confidence he possessed, would make them realize their duty and obtain the result he desired. At Clermont that morning he met General Humbert, commanding the Third French Army, whose troops were already engaged on our right, and gave the same orders as he had given the day before, " hold on at all costs to the line ordered . . ." ; then General Fayolle, again confirming the same orders, and then on to Dury, where he saw Sir Hubert Gough, and sent orders to the French commander on his immediate right. From Dury he went to Beauquesne to see Sir Julian Byng, commanding the Third Army, and was delighted to find that there was no anxiety on his front for the moment. While there, through the intermediary of a French staff officer attached to G.H.Q., he received news from Sir Douglas Haig. He returned

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to Dury to see how his orders for the liaison between the French and British Armies there was being carried out, and then, learning that a heavy attack was being made against Montdidier, dashed off to his own temporary headquarters at Clermont, which moved in a day or two to Beauvais.

Thus in the first 24 hours of his command, with incomplete powers and an improvised staff, he had been everywhere, seen every one and given clear and decided orders, faithful to his own teaching —" The power to command has never meant the power to remain mysterious; but rather to communicate, at least to those who immediately execute our orders, the idea which animates our plan." In the next few days, in carrying out his simple ideas, he saw the Commanders-in-Chief of the French and British Armies several times, at least half a dozen of their General Officers Commanding, Sir Henry Wilson, Generals Bliss and Pershing of the American Army, as well as the Prime Ministers of France and of England, Lord Milner, Mr. Churchill, M. Loucheur and other Allied statesmen, in addition to his own staff and the officers attached to him from the British and Belgian Armies. None with him in those days will forget the lasting impression of mastery over the situation which he showed.

As the battle went on and the heavy attacks continued against the British Army it became imperative to obtain some measure of relief for our exhausted divisions. Sir Douglas Haig pressed the Marshal either to send up fresh reserves behind his front or to relieve some part of that front by French troops. The question was shortly whether our Army, " with our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause," could hold on against the repeated attacks of the enemy who was trying to destroy it. Allied reserves were low, communications much congested, and we had the feeling that the French Army was not doing enough in the battle. There were meetings of M. Clemenceau, Lord Milner and Sir Henry Wilson, with Marshal Foch on the 14th, 15th and 16th of April on this subject, and in the middle of the meeting on the 16th Marshal Foch, characteristically enough, went off in the middle to Sir Herbert Plumer to see for himself. But he would make no definite promises, and when he did send up reserves, they arrived at the last possible minute. He said at that time that the battle of Hazebrouck was over, that he expected the battles of Arras, Aimens and Montdidier, or any one of them, that his reserves were placed for these battles and that he would never give ground or relieve troops during a battle. He had a profound belief in our Army, and he never would admit

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for one instant that he was sacrificing our men to benefit the French troops.

It is perhaps a pardonable breach of confidence to give a short account of a conversation which Lieutenant-General Sir John Du Cane held with General Weygand, Chief of the Staff to Marshal Foch, on the 16th of April.*

General Weygand was on the most intimate terms with the Marshal and had always been with him since 1914. His great devotion to his master and to the Allied cause will not be forgotten, and no commander has had a more loyal staff officer.

Sir John Du Cane began by asking General Weygand to develop the Marshal's ideas on the following sentences which he was always using at that time:

Jamais céder du terrain.

Jamais faire la relève pendant la bataille.

On fait ce que l'on peut.

General Weygand dealt with these in turn. As regards the first, he quoted the battles of the Marne, Roye and the First Battle of Ypres, all in 1914. In these battles, the pressure from subordinate commanders to give up ground was very severe: the Marshal resisted it and eventually succeeded, but at the same time he admitted that absolute necessity might compel troops to abandon their positions, such cases being dealt with according to the situation at the time. A voluntary withdrawal he would never even contemplate, as it gave the enemy an advantage without fighting for it. He added that the Marshal thoroughly appreciated the situation of the British Army. In explaining the sentence about never relieving during a battle, General Weygand pointed out that, as the result of the fighting, the British troops from near Noyon to Hangard, south of the Somme, had been relieved, but to attempt any further relief, for example, up to the Somme, at a time when a serious attack was imminent, would involve in a turmoil twice the number of divisions now holding the line if an attack took place during the relief. He thought that it was far more desirable to use the French reserves to take over the parts of the line after the attack had taken place so as to relieve the tired divisions.

As regards the last sentence, Sir John Du Cane said there might be an impression that the British Army was being unduly sacrificed. In going over the dispositions of the French Army, General Weygand showed the positions of the French reserves and pointed out the

* Sir John Du Cane was appointed British Military Representative to Marshal Foch on the 12th of April.

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risks that General Pétain was taking. There were four situations to be faced, to guard the road to Calais, block the hostile advance towards Hazebrouck, and be ready for the Arras or the Amiens battle. The Marshal had only one desire, to use the Allied forces to the best advantage to meet the present crisis, and he had no *arrière pensée* whatever as regards sacrificing one army for the other. In any case he meant to prevent the separation of the British and French Armies and to protect the Channel Ports. He repeated this with great emphasis and said that if this were not done, irreparable disaster would follow. The reserves were placed to meet these possibilities, the honour of France was engaged and every available resource would be used to the utmost.

Meanwhile during these " days of anguish," as General Weygand called them to the writer this year, the headquarters of the Marshal were established in a quiet little village, and the daily work went on. The Marshal liked an atmosphere of calm and meditation ; nothing was done on an exalted plane. He was very easy to see at any time and was simple and informal. His small staff, *la famille Foch*, was round him, and he used to go in and out of their offices, praising, approving, explaining, very rarely blaming, with the kindly, quaint gestures which became so familiar. In his dealings with the British officers attached to him, sometimes he would be annoyed—" I will not have liaison officers in the general staff room " ; sometimes deprecating—" *Merci, mon cher, cette affaire de —— est une honte* " ; more often familiar—" *La colle commence à prendre* " ; sometimes grave—" No one is right but God." Now and then he would be formidable, and the writer remembers, on asking him what he would do in certain conditions when the Germans attacked again, getting the instant reply—" No hypotheses." We were often asked to his meals and he liked telling such stories as—" I remember in the High Street at Beauvais, while waiting for luncheon, that Mr. Lloyd George said to me : ' Clemenceau wants to know who to back, Ludendorff or you.' ' Back me,' I replied "—although, as a matter of fact, he told the writer this story the last time he saw him in 1928. But no one could be near him without realizing his dominating idea of victory over the enemy, and just as he was never tired, so he never forgot what he meant to do. In the summer at the end of an interview he suddenly remarked to Sir John Du Cane : " You must tell all this to the Field Marshal ; I cannot go as I am so busy ; Americans ; statesmen ; General Pétain ; all those occupy my time ; when do you think that the war will be over and we can have a little rest ? " Sir John Du Cane answered : " Perhaps in

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the autumn," and Marshal Foch replied: "It is the business of the politicians to talk of peace; we can never even consider this until the Germans are being driven from France or are willing to leave the country."

In the relative calm which followed the hostile attacks of March and April, the Marshal, without in any way giving up his ideas of counter-attack, was preoccupied with the necessity of obtaining reserves. Our Army had lost so heavily that it seemed impossible to maintain the number of divisions and some were reduced to cadres. Marshal Foch was resolutely opposed to this course, and used every means to get the divisions re-formed. As early as the 5th of April he referred to the subject, and hardly a day passed without his pressing the point. At last he convinced Sir Douglas Haig of the necessity, and realizing that all could not be re-formed at once, asked him, if he agreed, to use all his influence to re-form some of them, as they would be an invaluable support during the critical months of May, June and July. The Government eventually accepted his point of view and at a heavy sacrifice the number of British divisions in France was maintained.

Marshal Foch was also at the same time making every effort for the fuller use of the American troops in France, trying in every way to obtain for them artillery, ammunition, arms and equipment. In a word, he wanted at any cost to increase his reserves so as to regain the initiative and strike back at the enemy. In May he was given powers of direction on the Italian front and he was preparing an attack on a large scale with the French, British and Italian Armies when he was prevented again by the enemy. Ludendorff in his original plan had decided to destroy the British Army; he had failed, and before attacking again in Flanders he wanted to draw away reserves from that part of the front. In these circumstances the German Crown Prince made a heavy attack on the Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne. Both the French and British headquarters thought that such an attack was probable, but the French headquarters did not get definite news before the 26th, when the warning came too late. Whatever local signs there may have been were not believed by the French staff on that front. Unfortunately some of our tired divisions, made up with young drafts, had been sent down to hold what was believed to be a quiet front and were involved in the heavy fighting. They fought heroically but were almost destroyed. The German attack, for which full credit must be given, both for the secrecy of the preparation and the violence of the execution, gained a greater success than Ludendorff expected. The prepara-

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tions which Marshal Foch had been making for an allied attack to clear the Bruay mining area and to free Amiens had to be abandoned. No one at the time was certain how far the German reserves were engaged and whether an attack in the north was imminent. A large number of French divisions were engaged in the battle and suffered heavy casualties. The situation looked black and even the *famille Foch* was depressed. From a report made by the writer on the 2nd of June the following extract is taken: "General Foch and General Weygand are away, . . . but the presence of General Foch acts invariably as a moral tonic and on his return the general atmosphere will be more cheerful."

There was need for the Marshal to show the full force of his moral power. After some nine weeks of his command both the great armies under him had been heavily attacked. Many in England thought that our divisions had been sacrificed and in any case the Allied reserves had been unable to intervene with success. In France his position was shaken, for by the end of May the enemy was nearer Paris than at any time since 1914, and if the advance continued Paris would come under the effective fire of their long-range guns. In both countries there were doubts about the Allied Command and some want of confidence in the Commander. But nothing disturbed or depressed the Marshal. On the 6th of June he was sending out orders for an attack to gain the heights above Soissons, for he had observed that all the railway communications of the enemy to their Marne front passed through Soissons. In spite of another heavy local attack on the French front between Noyon and Montdidier and of the uncertainty of the scene of the next attack, the Marshal remained firm to his plan, and when he became convinced that the great attack would take place on the French front, still less did he abandon his intention. As he has written—"Should we again put off our preparations? No. For the circumstances have changed." He had reserves; guns, tanks, ammunition and aeroplanes were ever increasing; he had enough not only to stop the enemy but also to give him a severe blow. The enemy had failed to obtain a decision and could not maintain their troops in the field, and in a short time the Allies would have a numerical superiority. He meant to benefit by this state of affairs without delay.

Let us leave here this slight account of the campaign in the dark days, for the days of victory are better known, and it was in the earlier part of his command that the greatness of Marshal Foch first impressed those who saw his work. It is often asked how that

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Command was carried on. Putting aside any details of the staff work, it seemed to the writer that Marshal Foch had two distinct methods. One in which he carried out " the relatively simple procedure which one is accustomed to see in use with one's own army " (his own words) and one which he used for the Allied Armies. Most of his instructions to Sir Douglas Haig used some such expression as : " I should be grateful to you, if we are in agreement on the different points which form the subject of this letter," etc., and the necessity had to be urgent before anything in the shape of an order was dispatched. But the Marshal on several occasions has explained his system. " During the war I spent my time on the roads ; I went to see the Commanders-in-Chief, Corps Commanders, sometimes Divisional Commanders. If I knew one of them to be in a mess, I went to see him several times in the day. . . . You see, the Single Command is only a word. In 1917 it was not realized with Nivelle, it did not work. One must lead the Allies. One does not command them. The English are the English ; the Americans different ; the Belgians and the Italians different also. With the Allied Generals I could not go on as with our own. They were men of importance, who represented the interests of their own countries, who saw things differently to us ; who with reluctance endured the Allied Command though they accepted it loyally. . . . I could not give them orders crudely. That system could not be adopted with them ; one does not know what would have happened. . . . So when there was a question of importance, I went to see them or asked them to come and see me ; I gave them a solution but I did not impose it on them ; I forced myself to convince them ; this always happened. Talks in the morning, talks in the evening, several days if necessary . . . we met Sir Douglas Haig twice a week . . . this is the Allied Command ; one talks, one explains, one discusses, one does not give orders : One says : ' This is what must be done, it is simple, it is enough to wish it.' " (From an article in the *Illustration*, 6th of April, 1929, which the Marshal did not wish published in his life.)

His relations with his own country, her army and his own staff must be left to one of his own countrymen to relate. He never forgot the debt of gratitude that he owed to Sir Douglas Haig and the armies under his command. There were serious differences of opinion between Sir Douglas and Marshal Foch at times ; and no one would advance the opinion that Marshal Foch in these differences was always right. Such questions may well be left to the historian of some future day. It is of interest to know that

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there is good reason to believe that the Marshal had finished his own account of his charge before his death.

Marshal Foch was often in England and came over only a year before he died to follow Sir Douglas Haig to the grave. He knew many of our officers ; admired the Army and was very proud of his own rank of Field Marshal. During the many months under him in 1918 the British officers at his headquarters were received with unvarying courtesy, kindness and sympathy. The difficulties and the hardships of the British Army which they explained to him were always understood, their victories received with delight. The close personal relations which he maintained with Sir John Du Cane and the writer made it easy to understand him, for there was nothing mysterious about his ways and one might venture to state that we were treated almost as if we belonged to his own military family who adored him.

With lasting admiration, respect and love the writer pays his tribute to the great Commander of whom it is said that he, when the shadows of death were gathering round him, murmured to a friend, " I am conscious of having served England as faithfully as if she had been my own country."

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

MILITARY OPERATIONS, GALLIPOLI

Compiled by Brigadier-General C. F. ASPINALL-OGLANDER. Maps and Sketches by Major A. F. BECKE. Vol. I. To May 8th, 1915. London: W. Heinemann & Co. 1929. Price 15*s*.

"THE right thing to do, but done in the wrong way and not given a chance from the start," may well epitomize the conclusions to which the reader of the latest addition to the Official History of the War is almost irresistibly drawn by a perusal of General Aspinall-Oglander's excellent account of the initiation and opening of the Gallipoli campaign. Published on the 25th of April, 1929, exactly fourteen years after the dramatic landings which form its central theme, the volume is a notable addition to the literature of the war. It is common knowledge that a distinguished man of letters and a senior officer of high reputation and great administrative experience have both tried their hand at writing the story of Gallipoli and found it necessary to relinquish the task, but the Committee of Imperial Defence have been fortunate in their final selection of an author. Having been one of the original members of Sir Ian Hamilton's Headquarters Staff, General Aspinall-Oglander writes with the authority both of an eyewitness and of one in a position to know the why and the wherefore of what was done. This is apparently his first literary venture, but want of experience has not prevented him from telling his story with vigour and lucidity, from bringing out the essentials clearly and from presenting a well-written, candid and thoroughly readable account. His narrative does not perhaps guide the reader to the unexpressed conclusions its author wishes him to form, as happily and suggestively as is done by the volumes dealing with the Western Front: he is sometimes explicit where they invite one to read between the lines, while in some places (cf. pp. 181 and 343) the temptation to indulge in purple patches too reminiscent of Mr. Masefield has proved irresistible, but these are minor things. A more serious criticism is that the 8th of May is not wholly satisfactory as a terminus; that the true dividing line

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between the two volumes in which the story is to be told should have been drawn at the decision to send out to Gallipoli the three New Army Divisions who undertook the Suvla operations, if not at their arrival. This would have left General Aspinall-Oglander free to devote his second volume to Suvla and the evacuations; as it is, he will probably have to compress unduly the story of May, June and July or the volume may be inconveniently large. Moreover, the operations of May and June and the Fifty-Second Division's attack of the 12th of July really form an appendix to the story of the original failure to reach Achi Baba, and illustrate the disadvantages of that compromise between abandoning the enterprise and making Gallipoli for the time our main effort to which the War Council came on the 14th of May (p. 364).

It is difficult to write temperately of the handling of the whole enterprise by the War Council. Blindness to the teachings of history, failure to understand the elementary factors of the problem, a futile optimism and a fundamental short-sightedness which reveals itself in the repeated taking of important decisions without any attempt to assess carefully either the commitments to which these decisions would inevitably lead, or the consequential steps which they would involve (cf. p. 353), these meet one at every turn. General Aspinall-Oglander insists more than once on the narrowness of the margin between success and failure. Sometimes he seems to criticize what was done in the light of after knowledge; thus, when discussing the action of the troops at X Beach on the afternoon of the 25th of April (p. 246), he hardly allows enough for the influence of the exaggerated estimates of the Turkish forces (cf. p. 237, f.n.), but he does show that both at Helles and at Anzac we were within reach of victory on the 25th, that on the 26th the Turkish defence could hardly have put up much resistance against a vigorous attack (p. 279), that on the 5th of May the Turks were nearly abandoning Krithia and Achi Baba (p. 337), that even at that late date a fresh Division might still have achieved victory. It is difficult to quarrel with his verdict that (p. 352) "had the fleet attack been delayed till the Army was ready and the weather favourable, a simultaneous and combined operation . . . would probably have achieved an instantaneous and overwhelming success." As it was, the two months' warning given by the fleet's first attack in February enabled the Turks under German supervision to transform Sir Ian Hamilton's task from a reasonably possible operation into one of overwhelming difficulty. Enver Pasha put it neatly when he called it setting him to thread a needle with his toes.

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With the full story now before one, it is easy to spot things that might have been improved upon: the distribution of Sir Ian Hamilton's forces between the various attacks, the utter lack of proportion between the "covering force" of the Twenty-Ninth Division, its so-called "main body" little over half as large, the failure to keep any reserve in the Commander-in-Chief's hand (cf. p. 204) which deprived him of any chance of directly influencing the main battle, the inability to appreciate and provide against the difficulties of exercising control from the deck of a man-of-war over troops already on land and committed to action (cf. p. 253), the inadequacy of the orders issued to the Y and S Beach forces who found themselves confronted by just about the one contingency for which their instructions did not provide. That there was some want of push at Cape Helles may be admitted: at 4 p.m. on the 25th of April, when the 4th Worcestershire had carried the second of the two redoubts on Hill 138, a renewed advance might well have resolved the deadlock at V Beach and have carried the line right forward. But there had been an extraordinary number of casualties among staff officers and battalion commanders. The commander of the covering force had been wounded doing the work of a subaltern (p. 228), General Napier of the 88th Brigade, "the man who by his rank, his nerve and his knowledge would have been of priceless value," had been killed in trying to get ashore: there was no senior officer on the spot to initiate a new plan or organize a fresh attack, while as the two battalions at X Beach had been specifically detailed as Divisional reserve, and their commander naturally hesitated to commit them without orders which, as already noted, the Divisional commander, being still on board ship, was quite unable to issue. If chances were missed, they were mostly chances which were less obvious at the time than they are now in the light of full knowledge of what was happening on the other side of the hill.

For the failure to achieve more between the 25th of April and the 8th of May the reasons are easy to find. It is clear that the troops were throughout so short of sleep and water, and so exhausted by their exertions—even those units who had not lost heavily in the landings had had any amount of work in landing stores and ammunition—that they started dead-tired on the 28th of April (p. 284). There was only a very limited amount of artillery to support the advance (p. 285), the ground was unreconnoitred and unknown, while the numerous watercourses provided ready-made defences which could neither be located or indicated

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to the naval guns whose support was more imposing than efficacious. Small wonder that the advance failed; what is more remarkable is that it came as near as it did (p. 294) to success and that the Turks regarded the position as critical.

It was for want of fresh troops to take up the running from the weary and exhausted units who had effected the landing that the advance of the 28th of April failed. The subsequent arrivals of General Cox's 29th Indian Brigade and of the East Lancashire Territorials were all too late, but on the 28th of April one does feel that there was still a chance had any fresh reserve been available. There had been a still better chance on the 25th of April, had Sir Ian Hamilton only had at his disposal even a couple of battalions to reinforce Y Beach, where a real success had been achieved and an unopposed landing effected at a vital spot. Y Beach provides the most tragic pages in the whole story of tragedy and disappointment. Having been told to cooperate with an advance from the beaches nearer Cape Helles, the commander of the Y Beach force was at a loss to know how to act when that advance failed to come off. No doubt the exaggerated ideas as to the Turkish force available tended to make him unduly cautious and unenterprising, but the inexcusable thing was that he did not even set his men at work at once to entrench a position and secure their landing. Caution can be justified, but not absolute inertia. Ten precious hours were wasted. Not till 3 p.m. did the men start digging, and they had only scraped together some very inadequate defences when the Turkish attacks started. These they had actually repulsed when the discipline of one of the two battalions, composed it would seem almost entirely of raw and untrained recruits, collapsed completely and led to the lamentable and quite unnecessary evacuation. The Divisional Staff's failure to send any help to Y Beach is quite explicable, if regrettable (p. 208); its attention was fully absorbed elsewhere, especially at V and W Beaches, it had little information, what news it had was favourable and the episode illustrates conspicuously the difficulties of controlling troops on shore from shipboard. But the root of the evil lay in the inability of the Commander-in-Chief to make use of the opening, the importance of which he alone in any way realized (p. 204). Had he retained in his hand even one brigade of the troops employed in the subsidiary "Anzac" landing, Achi Baba might have been reached that day. Even if the South Wales Borderers, who were wasted on the successful but useless landing at S Beach, had been added to the Y Beach force, Krithia might have been secured and the Turks forced to

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evacuate Sedd el Bahr. The S Beach landing was an absurdity. A tiny force was thrown ashore, quite out of touch with any other detachment, much too weak to do more than hold on and wait for others to get on. Landed at Y Beach the battalion might have turned the scale; at S Beach it was isolated and impotent, and in the prevailing obscurity of the situation could not be blamed if it did not plunge wildly forward on its own.

That a brigade might without detriment have been taken away from the Anzac landing is perhaps a more doubtful proposition. As it was, the whole "A. and N.Z." Corps had to be utilized to retain the precarious foothold which was all that was retained on the evening of the 25th of April, and a brigade of the Royal Naval Division had to be put in to assist in making that position good. All the same Cape Helles was the more important landing, and complete success there was the main consideration. General Aspinall-Oglander pays a handsome tribute to the dash and gallantry and devotion displayed by Australians and New Zealanders in their first battle, but his account makes it only too clear that their cohesion in "team-work" did not prove equal to the unlucky accident by which the current deflected the first lot of tows so far to the left of the intended landing-place; the covering force was thrown into disorder from the first moment and the higher command lost all chance of effectively controlling the course of the fight. For raw troops they did uncommonly well, but it is absurd to deny that at their baptism of fire they were not the equals in discipline and knowledge of their work of the Corps which shared in the victory of the 8th of August, 1918, and that in consequence they failed to secure all that at one moment had seemed within their grasp. The story of the 25th of April at Anzac indeed has a strong family resemblance to that of the New Army Divisions at Loos, so well told in General Edmonds' last volume. The account given of the scene on the beach that evening (pp. 266–270) is frank and candid; there was great disorder, the landing seemed to have failed, and to the commanders on shore re-embarkation appeared almost inevitable. Sir Ian Hamilton's prompt and unhesitating decision in favour of holding on (p. 269) was, as General Aspinall-Oglander says, a proof of "his quick judgment and unflinching resolution," and its effect is well described as "electrical." It puts an immediate end to any suggestion of evacuation and infused even into the weary and despondent something of the Commander-in-Chief's own resolution and determination.

Those qualities were to be fully tested in the months that

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followed; one can only admire and wonder at the tenacity with which Australians and New Zealanders retained their almost incredibly unfavourable position, "with nothing behind them but the open beach and the sea," and with the Turks enjoying "the moral and material advantages of a man looking down from the top of a cliff at his adversary clinging on to a precarious ledge below him" (p. 299). It was a great achievement, and the photographs with which, in addition to some excellent maps, the volume is so admirably illustrated are most helpful in enabling the reader to appreciate the appalling difficulties of terrain which confronted the Anzac disembarkation, and largely explain why with all the advantages of surprise (p. 175) more was not achieved on the 25th of April.

It may be admitted, then, that General Aspinall-Oglander shows fair reason for thinking that, even after the two months' warning given by the naval attack, substantial success might have been achieved even in April. How far that success would have been decisive is another matter. One may speculate whether Sir Ian Hamilton's original force was equal to the task of opening the passage of the Dardanelles to the fleet and of keeping that passage open, whether the fleet's arrival at Constantinople would have led to a revolution (p. 356) or made Turkey's military position untenable by destroying the Zeitun Burner ammunition factory, practically her sole source of supply. General Aspinall-Oglander quotes von Tirpitz's view (p. 303) that the forcing of the Dardanelles would have been decisive. If it had been decisive, it would have been because it would have directly affected the struggle in the main theatre by bringing over the wavering Balkans to the side of the Entente and by opening a route to Russia for the munitions which would have enabled that country to put up an effective resistance to the attacks of the Central Powers. The defeat of Turkey was never desirable as an end in itself, only as a means to an end, to the defeat of Germany. It is because the Dardanelles venture, launched with a more reasonable chance of success than Sir Ian Hamilton was ever allowed, would have contributed directly to the defeat of Germany that it is differentiated from our other and unjustifiable Eastern ventures.

This brings one back, then, to the root cause of the failure, the slipshod, irresponsible, hand-to-mouth way in which the venture was initiated. The offspring of a reckless readiness to make strategical decisions without realizing what was thereby involved, linked to exaggerated ideas of what the Navy could be expected to

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accomplish, the planning of the expedition could hardly have been worse. General Aspinall-Oglander is to some extent traversing familiar ground in his description of the initiation of the campaign; he inevitably tackles again topics which Sir Julian Corbett has already discussed in writing the Official Naval History. Possibly he might have taken advantage of this to reduce the preliminary matter: it strikes one that there is room for reduction in the opening chapters; has not Turkey's entry into the war been already described in the Mesopotamian and Palestine volumes as well as by Sir Julian Corbett? Some overlapping and repetition is inevitable; the ideal story of Gallipoli should presumably include both the naval and the military sides, and the chief lessons of the campaign are an inseparable mixture of the naval and the military, while the Army's difficulties were in large measure due to the absurd over-estimates of what the Navy might be expected to do. One has the Turks described (p. 10) as being alarmed at the opening of the war because they believed the Dardanelles and Constantinople to be at the mercy of the British fleet, though with the story (pp. 25–26) of Duckworth's expedition before one, it is permissible to suggest that the mere forcing of the passage (not by any means the same thing as securing it) and the arrival of the fleet without troops before Constantinople would not necessarily have been the end of the story. But our rulers' blindness to the lessons of experience is an outstanding feature of the story. Despite the potent lesson of the Napoleonic wars that no sea-power can bring a great continental power to its knees, even in pre-railway days, by mere naval pressure and without ultimately committing itself to vigorous action on the Continent, one has current the absurd misreadings of history which General Aspinall-Oglander summarizes (p. 48) in the phrase: "History declared . . . that the army of a sea-power wholly committed to continental fighting was half its strength," as if once the point of attack has been chosen and the troops conveyed by sea to the selected spot, it made any difference whether they were the army of a sea-power or not. But the most monumental example of this misconception of the capacities of the Navy is contained in the War Council's resolution of the 13th of January, 1915—it would be ludicrous if it were not tragic—that the Admiralty should prepare an expedition "to bombard *and take* the Gallipoli peninsula." No member of the War Council responsible for that monstrous order can escape the charge of ignorance of the most elementary principles of amphibious war. General Aspinall-Oglander makes a tentative effort at white-washing the War Council by saying that "taken in

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the literal sense" the order "contemplates a strange task for a fleet." One would like to know in what other sense the resolution can possibly be taken. Little wonder that an expedition based on so complete a misconception of the realities of the case resulted in failure. Indeed after this fatuity one almost ceases to feel surprise at Mr. Churchill's inability to distinguish between the properties of a naval gun and a howitzer, which is the inevitable inference from the inflated language in which he was prone to indulge about naval artillery support for land operations (cf. p. 49).

General Aspinall-Oglander is probably right in emphasizing the complete neglect of the General Staff as a main cause of failure (p. 41). For want of its experience and guidance, one has the War Council drifting from the idea of a naval attack which could easily be abandoned if unsuccessful into a decision to go through with the enterprise even if the Navy failed (p. 76), a decision which even Mr. Lloyd George was able to see (p. 75) committed the Army to "pulling the Navy's chestnuts out of the fire." Sir Ian Hamilton was shipped off to Gallipoli with the scantiest possible information as to the problems before him (p. 90); no attempt was even made to assess the force required for the tasks assigned to him, he was just given such troops as were available and told to do what he could with them after the fashion of the Ministry of All the Talents, so aptly renamed by Sir F. W. Fortescue "the Ministry of All the Blunders." At every turn there is some striking example of the utterly haphazard way in which the problem was handled. One has Mr. Churchill quite unable to realize that the naval experts were nothing like as enamoured of his projects as he fondly imagined (p. 58); one has Lord Fisher's utter ignorance of military matters, admirably epitomized in his dictum about its being so easy to find "a person to let off a rifle in a trench" (p. 60), which was coupled with a childlike readiness to teach the Army its business (p. 54); one has the gross blunder of the bombardment of the Helles forts on the 3rd of November, 1914—it is nowhere stated who was responsible for this; one has the failure to send out the 10 per cent. "first reinforcements" (p. 90); one has above all the failure to cancel the naval attack when on the 16th of February it became evident that troops would after all be available to support it if it had been postponed (p. 68).

In a sense the main lesson is that of General Edmonds' volumes—our unpreparedness for war and our consequent difficulties in waging it. Had we been ready to strike vigorously directly war was declared we should have found the Turkish defences utterly unready (p. 33),

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but we were not ready to utilize any opening. We embarked on the enterprise without any clear idea of what the troops would have to do or what troops would be required to do it. Each new step was taken with little preliminary consideration, and each false step led to another. Lack of preparation and lack of secrecy between them converted a "daring but legitimate operation into an adventure of extreme hazard" (p. 108). Liman von Sanders was given just enough time to recast his defensive scheme and make the necessary preparations for receiving us (p. 159). The amount of wiring he was able to get done made all the difference on the 25th of April. Above all, when it came to the crisis and it became clear that the force placed at Sir Ian Hamilton's disposal was unequal to the task imposed upon it, the old fatal policy of half-measures was still pursued. The issue should by then have been abundantly clear; there were two reasonable alternatives, to abandon the enterprise or to pursue it with the utmost vigour, even at the cost of suspending our intended offensive on the Western Front (p. 364). "With barely enough ammunition for one theatre," says General Aspinall-Oglander, "an offensive campaign was sanctioned in two, and both ended in failure" (p. 354). We had not the trained men or the guns or the ammunition to carry two offensives, but, as things stood in the early summer of 1915, the chances of success at Gallipoli were brighter than those on the Western Front. What had turned the scale definitely in favour of the Turks in the battles of Krithia was the want of adequate artillery support. Had a quarter of the guns and ammunition expended in the ill-fated attacks of the 9th of May at Promelles and Rue du Bois been available for Sir Ian Hamilton's force, the story of Krithia might have read very differently. As it was, the Turks were hardly aware that there had been any bombardment, and over 6,000 casualties were incurred in carrying the line forward over 600 yards (p. 347). To expect the higher authorities of the B.E.F. to acquiesce in the allotting to Gallipoli of the guns and shells and reinforcements of which they stood in such need would have been more than one could expect, but the 9th of May ought to have convinced even them that without far more ammunition and artillery there was no chance of success for the time in France. Had the General Staff in May, 1915, been in its proper position of influence and authority, able to weigh the conflicting claims of the different theatres and to assess their different possibilities, it might well have decided that the risks involved in standing on the strict defensive in France were not so great as to justify withholding from Sir Ian Hamilton the support required

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to convert his initial success into victory, especially as it had become evident that the main German effort was being directed against Russia. June, 1915, saw shells and lives expended in mere local attacks at Hooge and Givenchy which might have given us Achi Baba. But the War Council had, characteristically, adopted a half-way measure: it was not prepared to evacuate Gallipoli, perhaps wisely, for evacuation in May would not have enjoyed the cover of the long nights of winter; it was not prepared to concentrate all their endeavours on forcing the Straits. The compromise adopted had all the usual faults of a compromise, and the War Council's last stroke in the Gallipoli venture was typical of its whole conduct. The palm for ineptitude hitherto usually assigned to the Newcastle Government for the way in which it drifted into the Seven Years' War must now surely be transferred to the War Council of 1915 which, under the influence of Mr. Churchill's fatal combination of energy, enthusiasm and ignorance, utterly mismanaged the Gallipoli campaign and turned a very promising opening into a tragic disappointment.

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THE BRIDGE OF VERA

(THE ACTION OF THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER, 1813)

(*With Map*)

WHEN the late King Edward VII visited the bridge over the river Bidassoa, near Vera, in the Western Pyrenees, he expressed surprise that no memorial had been erected to bear tribute to the gallant defence of it on the 1st of September, 1813, by a company of the 95th under Captain Cadoux. There was some delay in carrying out the Royal suggestion, due possibly to the upheaval of the Great War, but in 1921, a small tablet with a suitable inscription was let into one of the inside walls of the bridge. The memorial was designed to alter the general appearance of the bridge as little as possible, and succeeded so well that local inhabitants, when questioned recently about it, declared that no such memorial existed. The bridge, which was originally constructed for the passage of pack animals over the Bidassoa, is situated about half a mile upstream of the town of Vera. The houses which are referred to in this account of the action, and marked in Sir Harry Smith's plan, are still standing.

The epic story of the fight at the bridge on the 1st of September, 1813, is worthy of relation.

It will be remembered that after Vittoria the shattered French Army seemed to melt away, drifting piecemeal through the passes of the Pyrenees into France. Napoleon, on hearing of the disaster, immediately appointed Soult to succeed his brother Joseph in command of the French troops. By a decree, signed on the 1st of July, he nominated him "*Lieutenant de l'Empereur*," giving him command of all the French Armies in Spain. He was to be "*la seule tête militaire de la Péninsule.*" On his arrival in Bayonne Soult issued his proclamation of the 23rd of July, a lengthy affair, calling upon his soldiers "*repousser l'ennemi de ces montagnes d'ou, avec orgueil, il surveille nos fertiles vallées, et de le chasser de l'autre côté de l'Ebre.*"

Coming as a "new broom," Soult's achievements in a few short weeks were little short of a miracle. His energy and drive must have been remarkable. Having rapidly reorganized his Army he was able to assume the offensive on the 25th of July. His intention was to relieve Pampeluna, still besieged by Wellington, to gain touch with

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Souchet, and push the Allies back on San Sebastian. After remarkable initial successes he was checked and beaten at Sorauren, and withdrawing through the passes, he took up much the same position as he had held on the 25th of July. He occupied the right bank of the Bidassoa almost to Vera, thence his line ran through the mountain group of the Rhune towards St. Jean Pied de Port. His orders, however, were definitely to maintain the offensive, and the renewal of Wellington's attack on San Sebastian on the 27th of August stirred him to action. On the 28th and 29th he carried out the necessary concentrations to launch an attack on Wellington's left, that is to say, in the direct line to San Sebastian.

His attack intended for the 30th actually took place on the 31st. The corps of Reille on the right, and that of Clausel, with which we are chiefly concerned, in the centre, had both to ford the Bidassoa river at the commencement of their advance. Looking upstream the first bridge left intact was the mule bridge near Vera, which was curiously situated as regards the opposing forces. It was, in fact, in "no man's land." The French line ran along the foothills above Vera, while the British line, occupied at this point by the 95th and 52nd regiments, faced it at a distance of about 1,200 yards (*see* plan). To understand the events of the 31st of August and of the 1st of September it is important to realize what the lower valley of the Bidassoa is like. Most memoir writers of the Peninsular War are loud in their praise of the grandeur of its scenery. Perhaps Gleig's description in "The Subaltern" will serve our purpose; he says:

> "The two kingdoms of France and Spain are divided towards the shores of the Bay of Biscay by the river Bidassoa, an inconsiderable stream . . . on either side of this little stream the mountains, except at the passes of Irun, Roncesvalles, etc., rise so abruptly, as to form an almost impassable barrier between the one kingdom and the other. The scenery of the Bidassoa is, in consequence, romantic and striking in the extreme; for not only are the faces of the hills steep and rugged, but they are clothed, here and there, with the most luxuriant herbage; while frequent streams pouring down from the summits, form, especially after rain, cascades that are extremely picturesque, and in some cases almost sublime. The river itself is clear and rapid in its course; winding as mountain streams generally do, where hills come in to impede their progress."

On the morning of the 31st, Reille (on the right) attacked the Spaniards who were posted on the San Marcial heights, while Clausel, having left Maransin's Division with guns on the mountain slopes above the town of Vera, crossed the river by two fords a mile or two lower down, and, pushing back Inglis, who with his brigade

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of the 7th Division opposed his left flank, joined in Reille's attack. Progress was very slow and difficult owing to the precipitous line of advance. During the day Soult, who had received discouraging news from his left attack, decided to break off the engagement and sent orders to Reille and Clausel to fall back on their original line, north of the river Bidassoa. Reille, who had been roughly handled by the Spaniards, succeeded in doing this. But before Clausel had received his orders, however, "the battle was arrested by a tempest which commenced about 3 o'clock and raged for several hours with wonderful violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through the air like feathers by the howling winds, and the thinnest streams, swelling into torrents, dashed down the mountains rolling innumerable stones along with a fearful clatter. This was the storm which fell at San Sebastian." (Napier.) From this point the accounts of what happened to Clausel differ. Either his whole attacking force of three divisions, or, at any rate, a large portion of it, was unable to recross the flooded river. Efforts to do so were made at a point about a mile below Vera by the aid of ropes fixed to artillery vehicles, but the current was too strong and the lives of men and animals were sacrificed in vain. The situation was then a very precarious one. If daylight on the 1st of September found this French force isolated on the left bank of the river it might reasonably expect destruction. To cross by the bridge near Vera was the only solution, and a move was made, therefore, in the dark towards the bridge. There are two rather different stories of what happened at the bridge, and curiously they are supplied by brothers—Harry and Tom Smith of the 95th. Fortescue and Cope * accept the latter's story, but Sir Harry Smith's account is so extraordinarily vivid that it must carry conviction.

He says:

"The evening came on very wet. We knew that the enemy had crossed the Bidassoa (31st of August) and that his retreat would be impossible from the swollen state of the river. We knew pretty well the Duke would shove him into the river if he could; this very bridge, therefore, was of the utmost importance, and no exertion should have been spared on our part so to occupy it after dark as to prevent the passage being seized. The rain was falling in torrents. I proposed that the whole of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade should be posted in the houses, the bridge should be barricaded, and the 52nd Regiment should be close at hand in support. Skerrett (the Brigadier) positively laughed outright, ordered the whole battalion into our position, but said, 'You may leave a piquet of one officer and thirty men at the bridge.'"

* Cope probably accepts it for the good reason that when he wrote the history of the Rifle Brigade the autobiography of Sir Harry Smith had not appeared.

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Arguments were of no avail. Cadoux's company was for piquet, and being reduced to about fifty men he took them all. In the night General Alten, commanding the Light Division, sent a message to say that the bridge must be held. Just after it had been received the French attacked it. Sir H. Smith goes on to say :

" The fire of the enemy was severe and the rushes of his columns most determined ; still Cadoux's fire was from his post. Three successive times with half his gallant band did he charge and drive back the enemy over the bridge, the other half remaining in the houses as support . . . until a melancholy shot pierced his head and he fell lifeless from his horse."

The French column then crossed.

According to Thomas Smith, Skerrett sent a message to Cadoux to evacuate his post ; this he refused to do. Later Skerrett sent a direct order to Cadoux to leave the bridge-head, Cadoux could only comply, saying, " few of his party would reach the camp." This turned out to be only too true as every officer was killed or wounded as well as fifty-nine other ranks out of a hundred. Until the party left the bridge houses the only casualties had been the double sentries actually on the bridge itself, who were bayoneted in the first French rush. (Cope.)

Both brothers blame Skerrett, the one for leaving Cadoux in an impossible position without support, the other for recalling him when he was able to hold his own.

In the French accounts Soult in his letter to the Minister of War, dated the 1st of September, says :

" *Clausel voyant la Bidassoa grossir descendit sur la rivière pour chercher des passages. Il se convainquit de l'impossibilité d'en établir, en risquant avec le commandant de l'artillerie Lunel la perte de quelque avant-trains qui devaient former une chaîne pour briser le courant et servir d'appui aux troupes ; la crue ayant été considérable tout fut emporté, et l'on dut recourir au passage forcé du pont de Vera, appuyé par un petit fortin, dont le feu a été cependant éteint par celui de l'artillerie.*"

An eye-witness, Lapène, described it all in full. He definitely states that Clausel with the whole of his *corps d'armée* passed the night on the left bank of the river, and describes the attempts to cross the river, how they failed, and the resolution to march to the bridge of Vera. He speaks of the house occupied by the piquet, the necessity of attacking the bridge in narrow column, and of a thousand French casualties. He tells of the support given by Lunel's guns from above the town of Vera, of the attack by two hundred *voltigeurs* with General Vandermaesen at their head, and the death of this

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divisional commander. He considers that the neglect of the French to occupy the bridge head was "*une déplorable absence de précautions.*"

Referring to the escape of the French, Napier says: "A great opportunity was certainly lost," while according to Sir H. Smith, "The Duke was awfully annoyed as well he might be, but, as was his rule, never said anything when disaster could not be amended."

As regards the French casualties, as we have seen, Lapène puts them at a thousand. Sir H. Smith says:

"I was soon at the bridge. Such a scene of mortal strife from the fire of fifty men was never witnessed. The bridge was almost choked with the dead; the enemy's loss was enormous, and many of his men were drowned and all his guns left in the river about a mile or two below the bridge. The number of dead was so great the bodies were thrown into the rapid stream."

Fortescue gives the casualties to Clausel's force for all the fighting on the 31st of August and the 1st of September as follows:—

Taupin's Division	416
Darmagnac's Division	406
Vandermaesen's Division	231
Total	1053

If these figures are accepted the losses at the bridge could not have been anything like a thousand.

As far as can be ascertained there is no mention anywhere of the participation of any British artillery in this fight. Had the bridge and its southern approaches been under direct artillery fire a very different result might reasonably have been expected. Very few, if any, of the French could have crossed the bridge alive—and Clausel's force would doubtless have been eventually destroyed. Its only hope of salvation would have been an attack on the bridge-head by Maransin. That the French guns, which had been left behind above Vera, helped the enemy very materially is certain. Both Soult and Lapène definitely state that the Bidassoa was recrossed by Clausel on the 1st of September under cover of Lunel's guns. These guns would have little or no effect on the riflemen so long as they remained under cover of the houses, and it was evidently when they left them to counter-attack, or to withdraw, that they suffered casualties from their fire. There was no such cover available for the French had the British guns been used!

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Cope substantiates the use of Clausel's guns. He says that the French forded the Bidassoa on the 31st of August under the cover of some mountain guns—" The fire fell short at first and instead of reaching our people some shells fell among their own skirmishers causing no little confusion: while the riflemen who were looking down upon them (from Sta Barbara) burst forth into loud and derisive cheers as each shell fell among them." Again referring to Cadoux's men on the 1st of September, he states that " They at once became exposed not only to the fire of the troops on the bridge, but to a cannonade from the guns of the French reserve on a height near Vera."

How did Clausel appreciate the situation, and what were his orders to his reserve (Maransin)? According to Sir H. Smith, on the morning of the 31st he actually seized the houses covering the bridge head, but was immediately turned out by the 52nd Regiment under Colbourne, after which there was no more fighting during the afternoon. Maransin was presumably left behind to watch Skerrett, and to assist Clausel to recross the Bidassoa. Had he received orders to seize the bridge at Vera on the 31st? If not, why did he attempt to do so? This happened before the storm, and at a time when all fords were open. Why did not Maransin attempt to seize the bridge when it was obvious that the river was in flood, and impassable at the fords. Both Skerrett and Maransin must be blamed for inactivity. It is of interest to consider what would have happened if Skerrett had held the bridge with his complete force or been supported by artillery. Would the combined attacks of Maransin and Vandermaeson have dislodged him before Clausel's force was overwhelmed?

It is interesting, too, to compare the effect of this sudden storm with the one on the 12th–13th of December, when as a result of the rise of the river Nive the bridge of boats near Villefranque was washed away. Hill, isolated from the rest of the allied Army, was forced to stand and fight at St. Pierre with some 14,000 men against Soult with 35,000. Hill, however, was very differently placed to Clausel in that he had room to take up a good position which Clausel, being trapped in a defile, had not. Hill's force was intact, and he was able to hold his own unaided. He beat, and inflicted terrible casualties on, the enemy. Although there are certain differences in the accounts of the action at the bridge of Vera and gaps in the story which leave much unexplained, it is certain that Captain Cadoux and his men fought most gallantly and inflicted very severe casualties on the French.

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

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THE BATTLE OF MORHANGE

FOCH AND THE XX CORPS

(*With Map*)

THERE is a legend concerning the Battle of Morhange which obtained considerable credence in France, and appeared in one of the leading French reviews some years ago. The writer of the article said, in effect, that a rash offensive launched by Foch with the 39th Division —the left division of his XX Corps—at dawn on the 20th of August, 1914, uncovered the left flank of the corps and presented the Germans with the opportunity for a powerful counter-attack.* As a consequence, the reserve division on the left of the XX Corps was driven back, and the 11th Division, forming the right of the corps, was also involved in the precipitate retreat of the 39th, the inference being that these disasters on the left of the French Second Army resulted in de Castelnau ordering a general retreat.

Foch was no controversialist—had he been he might never have become the organizer of the Allied victory—but he permitted himself a prompt and categorical denial. This was in 1921, but the story is repeated in a panegyric of General de Castelnau, a new edition of which was published in 1928. As much concerning the Battle of Morhange has been published officially in France and Germany, it is possible to obtain a more or less reliable impression of the events of the 20th of August, 1914, upon the front of the French Second Army in general, and upon that of the XX Corps in particular. It is also interesting to speculate upon the probable origin of the apocryphal story of Morhange.

In response to de Castelnau's order of the 18th of August, which called for a rapid and vigorous pursuit of the enemy, the Second Army had been advancing in Lorraine. This jumble of hills and valleys, large tracts of forest, marshes and lakes, was quite unsuitable for big offensive operations, but constituted ideal country in which to conduct a series of rear-guard actions. So progress was slow.

* See Sketch Map.

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The French official account tells us that the XX Corps went forward steadily all day on the 19th of August, and that Foch reported his position to the Second Army at 8 p.m. After being constantly engaged with German cavalry and detachments of mobile infantry, supported by artillery on the heights north-west and south-east of Morhange, his advanced troops were on the line Marthil—Achain—Pevange—Conthil—Haut de Koeking, the main body of the 39th Division in the vicinity of Bellange and Vannecourt, and that of the 11th Division about Sotzeling and Chateau-Voué. It was the German artillery fire which had been most troublesome, and whilst losses in the 11th Division were slight, the 39th Division had suffered appreciably.

Both the XV Corps and the XVI Corps had had hard fighting, in perhaps more difficult country, and at the end of the day were not so far forward. The former had halted on the north bank, the latter on the south bank, of the unfinished Canal de Salines.

The commander of the Second Army still believed that he had only strong rear-guards in front of him. His orders for the next day are timed 5 p.m. The XV and the XVI Corps were to attack at five o'clock in the morning, with the object of reaching the Saarebourg—Bensdorf railway; the XX Corps was to establish itself firmly on the positions reached overnight, the left division (39th) to be disposed in readiness either to meet a counter-attack south-eastward from Metz or to continue its own advance north-eastward. Foch issued his corps orders in the small hours of the 20th, directing the 11th Division to attack Morhange at 6 a.m., the 39th Division not to move, but to assist with artillery fire. He detailed a regiment of cavalry, supported by one of infantry, to keep his left flank in close touch with the 68th Reserve Division, and to reconnoitre towards Lucy.

Thus there was no thought of committing the 39th Division to an offensive on the morning of the 20th of August; Foch had, indeed, taken measures to safeguard his left flank from sudden attack. And, as will be seen, the Germans took the initiative soon after daybreak, and threw the whole of the French Second Army on the defensive, so there is no justification whatever for the statement that Foch allowed his ardour to get the better of his judgment—*emporté par sa fougue* is the phrase employed by his critic—and thereby precipitated a crisis which obliged de Castelnau to order a general retreat.

But the story may have been inspired by certain messages which passed between the XX Corps and the Second Army in the early

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morning of the 20th; orders which, in the first place, were anticipated by the German offensive, and never became operative since they were only issued when the situations with which they were designed to deal no longer existed. The French official account says that the XX Corps order which directed the 11th Division to attack Morhange did not reach de Castelnau until the small hours of the morning, and that a staff officer was then despatched to Foch with very precise instructions. The XX Corps was not to attack, but local offensives were permitted if they became necessary. It was most important to entrench strongly in order to resist any attack from the direction of Metz, and close touch must be kept with the left of the XV Corps, which was to be assisted, not by any change of front, but by lending it troops if and when they could be spared. Before this officer arrived at his destination Foch had sent another message to the Second Army, announcing that he would attack at six o'clock. Twenty minutes after that hour a telephone message was sent from Second Army headquarters to Foch, absolutely forbidding him to launch an offensive, and enjoining him to obey strictly the operation order issued on the previous afternoon.

We may now turn to the actual progress of events as related by the French official account. The night was quiet, and there was a fog at dawn, which resulted in the postponement of the contemplated offensive of the XV and XVI Corps, which were told to begin their preliminary bombardment at 6 a.m. But about a quarter-past five the Germans attacked strongly from Lucy, routed the advanced troops of the 77th Brigade (the left of the 39th Division), took Frémery, and continued to advance. At 7 a.m. Oron and Chicourt were abandoned to the enemy, and the French, "under a murderous artillery fire," fell back to a position between Chateau-Salins forest and Fonteny. Advancing from Destry, other strong German forces swept over the ridge south and west of Baronville soon after 5 a.m., and drove the troops of the 39th Division back to Achain and Brehain. The batteries supporting the French infantry were put out of action.

On the front of the 11th Division the Germans attacked and carried Conthil, but were held by the French who took up a line south of the village; on its extreme right there was heavy fighting about Haut de Koeking, but little ground had been lost there at 7 a.m.

Considering that it would be nearly dark at 8 p.m. on the 19th of August, when the main body of the 39th Division was reported to be in the vicinity of Bellange and Vannecourt, and that of the 11th at

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Sotzeling and Chateau-Voué, the inference is that the forward line of the XX Corps was neither held in great strength nor properly organized for defence by the time that the Germans attacked it early next morning. One may also conclude that there had been little attempt to carry out the reconnaissance towards Lucy which had been ordered.

Meanwhile the Germans had made steady progress against the left of the XV Corps, which was pushed back towards Mulcey about 8 a.m., whilst the right of the corps, and the XVI Corps beyond, were also assailed. The inner flanks of the two corps were forced to withdraw fighting through the difficult country around the Etang de Lindre. Turning again to the front of the XX Corps, the 39th Division was soon forced to evacuate Achain, and to withdraw along the front Bellange—Brehain. "About ten o'clock Brehain is lost in its turn; its defenders, and shortly afterwards those of Chateau-Brehain, retire by the western edge of the Chateau-Salins forest." The 68th Reserve Division was driven back on Fonteny, but on the other flank the situation of the corps was better, for at 11 a.m. troops of the 11th Division are said to have been still in occupation of the line Bois d'Haboudange—heights south of Conthil —Lidrezing—Haut de Koeking.

However, at 10.10 a.m., being hotly engaged along his whole front and having used all his reserves, de Castelnau gave the first order for a general retreat. Special mention is made of his uneasiness for the safety of the left flank of the XVI Corps. Whilst the XVI and XV Corps withdrew south-westward to the line Maizières—Marsal (on the river Seille) the XX Corps was to refuse its right and hold a position from Marsal, in front of Chateau-Salins, to Jallaucourt.

But the XVI and XV Corps were now in very bad case. The troops of the latter were said to be almost at the end of their endurance, many guns had been lost, and casualties in all units were high; the XVI Corps reported considerable losses, especially in officers. So at 11.45 a.m. the commander of the Second Army judged it necessary, in order to be in a position to disengage his forces, to issue a preliminary order giving the lines for an extended retreat; the XVI Corps towards Lunéville, the XV to Dombasle, the XX to Saint-Nicholas, just south-east of Nancy, and the group of reserve divisions to the Couronné de Nancy. All heavy transport was to regain the left bank of the Meurthe. It is significant that in advising G.Q.G. of his intention to retreat de Castelnau attributed the necessity for such action to the heavy attacks delivered on his right

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wing. About this time the commander of the Second Army was informed of the retirement of the left wing of the First Army, which had also been hotly engaged.

Reports from the 68th Reserve Division said that as late as 12.15 p.m. its troops were still holding on in the region of Jallaucourt; and it seemed that this division and the XX Corps were not so hard pressed as the rest of the Second Army, and were also better placed for an effective resistance. De Castelnau accordingly ordered Foch to cover the retreat of the Army, and put the reserve division under his orders. He was to maintain the bridge-head at Chateau-Salins as long as possible. Foch made his dispositions accordingly, but, in consequence of the continued retreat of the XVI and XV Corps—they had been fighting hard all the afternoon in their endeavours to get clear of the German advance—de Castelnau ordered the commander of the XX Corps to profit by the hours of darkness to disengage his own troops. This was done, and by 4 a.m. next morning the bulk of the XX Corps was south of the forest of Bezange.

The remainder of the Second Army also marched throughout the night, and the XV Corps arrived in the vicinity of Serres, the XVI being much farther east, due south of Maizières. The troops were very disorganized and almost exhausted, but the German pursuit had slackened as night fell upon the 20th, and was not pressed again. We are told that one division of the XVI Corps rested until 9.30 a.m. on the morning of the 21st, and nearly all the divisions of the Second Army appear to have got back to the prescribed Lunéville—Couronné de Nancy positions on this day without any interference from the enemy. Of the troops of the XX Corps it is said that, although very tired, their moral remained excellent, the 11th Division being in particularly good shape; but the 39th Division had lost nearly all its artillery.

In his report to G.Q.G. on the morning of the 21st of August de Castelnau identified the II Bavarian Corps as having attacked the XX Corps, and the German XXI Corps as the assailant of the XV Corps and the left flank of the XVI, placing also the III Bavarian Corps as having been in action on his front.

"It would appear," he says, "that the enemy plan was to fall back from his first position in order to lure us on to a second, very strongly held. Here there was ample artillery, supplemented by heavy guns, whose fire was difficult to neutralize. Then the enemy took advantage of the disorganization caused by our attacking in the face of his powerful artillery fire to counter-attack in force *et d'une façon extrêmement brutale*."

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De Castelnau was nearly, but not entirely, right in his appreciation.* The Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, his opponent, on taking over command of the German Sixth Army, found it deployed according to plan. It was strung out along the frontier in a position too long for it, too close to the enemy, and weak everywhere. He therefore withdrew it in order to concentrate, the Seventh Army, under his direction, conforming. Finding that the French were still advancing on the 19th of August, he decided to attack them in the difficult country in which they were engaged, with their left flank corps (the XX under Foch) spread out and appearing an easy prey. As the Germans had kept touch with the fortress of Metz during their retirement, the III and II Bavarian Corps on the Prince's right wing were well placed to make the flank attack. It has been noted that de Castelnau was apprehensive of an attack from the direction of Metz, instructing Foch to guard against such a possibility; and the latter ordered a special reconnaissance, but too late it would seem to prevent a surprise from that quarter. Furthermore, as the general direction of the advance of the French Second Army was north-eastward, the left of the XX Corps was the most vulnerable spot.

The German offensive was begun at 5.30 a.m., and it is claimed that there was little organized resistance, so that by mid-day the French columns were everywhere in retreat.

* The following information has been taken from the Bavarian official account, *Die Schlacht in Lothringen*, just published, which it is hoped to review shortly.

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

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THE CHANNEL TUNNEL

By Lieutenant-Colonel O. L. Mathias, O.B.E. (Formerly Director of Railway Transport, Northern Command.)

The last outburst of activity on the part of the Channel Tunnel Company took place in 1906–7, supported by a not inconsiderable volume of "literature." The newspapers devoted much space to the subject, and a lecture and discussion took place at the Royal United Service Institution. The Prime Minister of the day, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, referred the matter to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, on its report, announced that the Government would oppose the Channel Tunnel Bill, which was thereupon dropped. Since that date the question has been referred in the same way by three other Prime Ministers—by Lord (then Mr.) Asquith early in 1914, by Mr. Lloyd George in 1920, and by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1924—and on each occasion "the answer was in the negative."

The inquiry instituted by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was particularly comprehensive in character, for the matter came not before the Committee of Imperial Defence alone, but also before four of its previous chairmen, in the persons of Lord Balfour, Lord Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Baldwin, and was considered only after the submission of independent reports from the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry.

The demand for a Channel tunnel has now been put forward once more with redoubled vigour, backed by propaganda and obviously, also, by money to pay for it, on a scale never before approached. In deference to this demand, Mr. Baldwin followed the example of his four predecessors in the Office of Prime Minister, and undertook to hold yet another inquiry, after consultation as to its character with the leaders of the other two political parties.

The arguments in favour of the Tunnel may be summarized as follows:

(1) A geological stratum exists across the bed of the Channel which is eminently suitable for tunnelling.

(2) The engineering difficulties in other respects are not regarded as insuperable.

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(3) It will provide employment over a long period for a large number of men, if not on the actual work, then at all events by means of contracts for the necessary material.

(4) It will add enormously to the volume of passenger and goods traffic between England and the Continent, and generally facilitate transit.

(5) The cost of running and maintenance will be very low and the receipts extremely high.

(6) As our insularity has ceased to exist in war time by reason of aircraft and long-range guns, there can no longer be any military objections to a tunnel, and in any case, provision will be made to render it useless by instantaneous means.

Let us now examine these arguments in detail.

Engineering Problems.—It is said that engineers do not anticipate any insuperable difficulties, but it would, perhaps, be more remarkable if they did, and one may be pardoned for thinking that the propagandists now at work are inclined to dismiss this part of the question somewhat lightly. In the first place, the estimate of thirty millions as the cost of construction seems to err on the conservative side. Engineering estimates are peculiarly susceptible to expansion, owing to local conditions and natural phenomena which cannot be foreseen, and this is particularly so in the case of the Channel tunnel, for it is unique as an undertaking, and there is no precedent on anything approaching this scale, or under similar conditions, to which engineers can turn for guidance.

The estimated length of the tunnel is thirty-three miles, of which twenty-one or more will be under the sea. The longest tunnel in the world is the Simplon, which measures twelve miles, and is, of course, not under water of any kind. The longest subaqueous tunnel is that under the Severn, which measures 4⅞ miles.

Assuming the stratum of grey chalk to be continuous across the Straits, it is a matter of some importance to know whether it remains fairly level, as the tunnel must follow it, and any deviation from the horizontal will result in gradients, with consequent increase in the cost of construction and maintenance.

The gradients of the Severn tunnel are 1 in 100 on the English and 1 in 90 on the Welsh side. The gradient of the boring from Shakespeare's Cliff, so far as it has gone, is 1 in 72, and what may be met with in the course of the remaining twenty odd miles under the sea cannot at present be foretold. The question of ventilation, too, scarcely seems to have received sufficient attention, at all events in public writings and speeches. Comparisons have been drawn

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between the ventilation of the Channel tunnel and that of the various London tubes, but the conditions are entirely different. In every land tunnel recourse is had to ventilating shafts at regular intervals, while in the case of the tubes an inflow of air is also obtained from the various stations. These conditions will not exist in the Channel tunnel. The usual method of ventilating a subaqueous tunnel is to make a heading in the centre and to carry from it parallel shafts connected with fans at one or both ends. This method was adopted in the Mersey tunnel between Birkenhead and Liverpool, and also in the Severn tunnel; but between a length of one mile, or even of just over four, and one of twenty-two there is a considerable difference. It is interesting to recall in this connection the experience in ventilating the original "Twopenny Tube" from the Bank to Shepherd's Bush, a distance of six miles. During the non-traffic small hours of the morning the stations were completely closed and the ventilating fans turned on for three hours, in which time it was found that the tube was entirely cleared at the rate of not quite once an hour. In six hours' ventilation during traffic hours the tube was found to be about half cleared, the current pumped in being, of course, broken up.

Ventilation—not to mention temperature—may also be affected by the depth of the tunnel below the surface. The depth of the Straits varies between twenty and thirty fathoms, giving a mean of twenty-five fathoms, or one hundred and fifty feet. How far below the sea-bed the grey chalk runs remains to be seen, nor is it possible at present to say with certainty at what actual depths the tunnel will be bored. In the Severn, the depth of the river-bed at its lowest point below the surface varies from sixty feet at low water to one hundred feet at high water, giving a mean of eighty feet, while the tunnel itself is from thirty to forty-five feet beneath the river-bed.

Provision of Employment.—It is claimed that the making of the tunnel will reduce unemployment, if not by direct labour, then by the placing of large contracts for the necessary material. Every one must hope that this will be the case. There appears to be little prospect of employing much labour on the actual tunnelling work, as it will be carried out by machinery operated by a small number of skilled men, while it is claimed that a method has now been discovered of disposing of the waste material by mechanical means.*

* Since this was written the General Election has placed in office a Labour Government which is said to contemplate the construction of the Channel Tunnel as one of the remedies for unemployment.

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The possibility of large contracts being placed in England seems to call for some comment. The scheme outlined by Baron Emile d'Erlanger, Chairman of the Channel Tunnel Company, provides for the flotation of one British and one French Company for raising the thirty millions of capital, each being responsible for half that amount. The securities of these two companies are then to be vested in a holding company, which will operate on the money markets of the world. The finance of the whole undertaking is thus of an obviously international character. Will those controlling it feel bound to buy in British markets when, in engineering materials, Continental firms can and will submit tenders as much as 50 per cent. lower ?

A somewhat similar question might also arise in connection with the ventilating machinery. Among existing tunnels fans and power-stations are to be found either at one or both ends. Which system is to be adopted for the Channel tunnel and, if the former, at which end is the machinery to be erected ? The most probable answer seems to be : " Whichever is the cheaper." Would British tenders prove to be in the running, and would British wages to the workmen at the power-station be able to compete against corresponding Continental rates ?

Additional Traffic.—It is claimed that a vast increase in the volume of Continental traffic will follow the opening of the tunnel, the chief grounds for such a claim being that passengers will be able to travel between London and Paris in less time and without the possible discomfort of a Channel crossing, and that the through transit of goods, with its consequent advantages, will benefit our manufacturers and exporters. At first sight, these arguments appear to be self-evident, but will all these advantages actually follow as a matter of course ?

At present, under the most favourable conditions, the journey from London to Paris, via Dover and Calais, takes six hours thirty-five minutes, of which one hour fifteen minutes is passed on the boat. Owing to the necessity of reducing speed through the tunnel the submarine crossing would probably take not far short of an hour, and the through journey from London to Paris about six hours, so that under normal conditions the saving of time would not be so great as many people seem to expect. In stormy weather the saving would, of course, be greater, but the tourist traffic into England does not come during the winter months. This brings us to another point. Would the tunnel, in actual fact, bring the vast number of foreign visitors anticipated ? The French are essentially

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stay-at-home in their tastes, and it is natural inclination and not the fear of sea-sickness that makes them spend their holidays in their own country. By far the largest and most paying class of visitor is the American. Is it suggested that, except perhaps on one occasion as a novelty, American visitors will leave their huge ships at Cherbourg and undertake the railway journey thence to Calais for the sake of using the tunnel, with all the extra expense, double Customs' examination and visa charges, when they can remain on board and land at Southampton in about five hours? There might, and probably would be, an increase in the number of foreign visitors, desirable and otherwise, but what is absolutely certain is that an enormously increased volume of British tourists would leave England and spend their money abroad. If, as we are told, it is the fear of the Channel crossing which deters foreigners from visiting England, the same argument must apply conversely. Even under existing conditions the newspapers are filled with columns of exhortations to visit the Continent, which meet with an ever-increasing response, and which, with the coming of the tunnel, would have an even greater effect. But as the currency of many foreign countries is greatly depreciated and seems likely to remain so, while British currency is not, it hardly seems probable that British institutions would gain, although the internationally financed Channel Tunnel Company might do so.

The possibilities as regards goods appear, at first sight, to be even greater than those claimed for passenger traffic. Our manufacturers will be able to load their commodities at their factory sidings and deliver them without disturbance in all parts of Europe, while, on arrival, trans-Atlantic cargoes will be placed on rail at British ports for conveyance to the Continent, via the tunnel, instead of at Continental ports—particularly Hamburg. No one can deny that such possibilities exist, but it is important to remember that they can only come into the realm of practical politics even after the tunnel has been made, subject to certain conditions and at the cost of sacrificing, in some respects, long-standing institutions and traditions.

There are certain technical differences between British and Continental railways which one cannot dismiss as calling for mere "minor alterations" in the airy manner of some newspaper correspondents. It will be necessary to have rolling stock of an universal pattern for service via the tunnel. At present, the cross-section of the Southern Railway loading gauge on the London-Dover route is seventy-six square feet, and on the Nord Railway of France, with which the tunnel would connect, ninety-seven square feet. Are the

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French prepared to sacrifice 21 per cent. of their loading capacity for the sake of the tunnel, or, alternatively, are the Southern Railway in a position to spend millions in making it possible for the Berne International standard gauge rolling stock to run over their system, in addition to the cost of providing the stock? And this, be it noted, at the very time when the cross-Channel steamers would be earning a greatly reduced revenue, even if it still paid to run them at all.

There is, too, an economic aspect of the traffic which must not be overlooked. England depends for its existence on food supplies from abroad. The extent to which this is the case was demonstrated to a dangerous degree during the Great War. These supplies, together with a great many other things which we have come to regard as necessities, are now furnished regularly and fully by sea transport. They will continue to be so furnished by means of the tunnel, but the advantages claimed for the latter in various respects may result in the additional facilities being utilized for the importation into England of large quantities of luxury articles produced under the lower standard of labour conditions obtaining abroad. Are British manufacturers prepared to compete successfully at home with such articles, or to equalize matters by exporting British goods for sale abroad at competitive prices?

Expenditure and Receipts.—As previously remarked, the estimate of thirty millions as the cost of construction of the tunnel is likely to be considerably exceeded. At all events, as many examples could show, it would be foreign to experience for the estimate and the actual expenditure to agree in a gigantic and unprecedented engineering undertaking. Indeed, all figures in connection with the tunnel must, at this stage, be pure conjecture. Baron d'Erlanger estimates that if the tunnel were opened in eight years' time, it would carry four million passengers as compared with about two and a half million carried by the various cross-Channel services to-day. Taking the average fare for the boats between Dover and Calais and Folkestone and Boulogne as 16*s.*, he obtains £3,200,000 from passengers. He puts receipts for goods, mails, etc., at £800,000, but this appears to be an entirely arbitrary figure, which brings the total receipts up to the convenient round sum of four millions.

He puts the cost of working and maintenance at one million, or 25 per cent. of the gross receipts, as against approximately 75 per cent. in the case of most ordinary railways. He accounts for this difference by the fact of there being no stations and no rolling stock, apart from the small number of electrically driven locomotives which

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will take over the trains at or near the entrances to the tunnel. Until the tunnel is made, it appears impossible to form any reliable estimate of the probable cost of maintenance, as the practical conditions obtaining in it must until then remain a matter of conjecture. There is, however, one direction in which the cost of maintenance is likely to exceed estimates, and that is in the corrosion of metals. The Great Western Railway carried out a series of very careful tests in the tunnels on their system, and in the Severn tunnel it was found that the maximum amount of wear and corrosion combined to give a total of no less than 2½ lbs. per yard per year—a figure which involved very heavy expenditure in the way of renewals. On the non-tunnel portions of the system, the average wear was only 0·25 lb. in the same period.

Under the heading of engineering problems reference has already been made to the question of the whereabouts and cost of the power station and plant for the ventilating system. Assuming that the decision come to was for the machinery to be at one end of the tunnel only, it is not quite clear how the cost is to be met after the initial capital outlay has been disposed of. Will the holding company pay the expenses and charge them equally against the French and British companies? If so, may not the shareholders in the company at whose end of the tunnel the plant is not situated complain that the cost is too high, and could be reduced if the plant were at their end? It must be remembered that although the new Kentish coalfields are near the English end of the tunnel, the coal produced may not necessarily be of the kind required, and that coal is equally available at the French end, while between the miners' wages in the two countries there is no comparison. If, however, the holding company is not to deal with the matter, it would appear that either the British or French company would do so, in which case it would presumably debit half the cost to its "opposite number," which might still be able to make the same complaint.

Military Considerations.—It will be convenient to consider this point under the above general heading, but before proceeding to do so it seems desirable to examine the character of the present agitation and some of the means by which it is being carried on. It should, however, be realized, first of all, that the tunnel is being regarded as a purely commercial undertaking, and that its finance must, of necessity, be of an international character. It is not, and cannot be, a matter restricted to England and France. The system foreshadowed by Baron d'Erlanger has already been described, and it would appear possible for a controlling interest in the tunnel to be

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acquired by persons unconnected with England or France, and not necessarily anxious to promote the welfare of either, while if the Governments of those countries exercised their veto on directors nominated by such interests, following on their acquired control, a delicate situation might easily arise. This aspect of the question does not appear, so far, to have been given any prominence in the discussion.

The campaign in favour of the tunnel is, on this occasion, being conducted with great skill. The advantages claimed for the scheme are being represented as being so overwhelming that no one outside a lunatic asylum would dream of opposing it, and that its adoption is a foregone conclusion among all but one small body, the Committee of Imperial Defence. Not merely columns, but whole pages of the daily newspapers, costing hundreds of pounds apiece, have been utilized in support of the scheme, while an extensive and well-organized system of circularizing has been carried out and results of the canvass published at frequent intervals.

There is, of course, a large and important body of public opinion which is strongly in favour of the scheme and is quite honestly unable to see any objection to it; but there are others, not always disinterested, and in a position, moreover, to disseminate propaganda on an enormous scale, who are doing all in their power to represent the Committee of Imperial Defence as an archaic body living in a fool's paradise of bygone ages. This is a particularly easy game to play, because the information and proceedings of the Committee are necessarily of the most secret character, and the reasons for any decisions it may come to on this and associated questions obviously cannot be published. Yet it is this picture that is being painted for the especial benefit of the "man in the street," who, in matters of such magnitude, is quite incapable of taking more than a narrow and superficial view. In early Victorian days, when warfare and the whole field of international relations were totally different in every respect from what they are to-day, the fear associated with a Channel tunnel was the sudden irruption of a Continental army on English soil. That, of course, is no longer the primary objection, but it is being persistently represented as being so. At a recent meeting Baron d'Erlanger himself is reported to have said: "It is possible that opponents of the scheme see that the military objections do not carry the same weight as heretofore, because people are realizing that armies like the British are able to defend a little mouse-hole coming out on the coast of England." (Laughter). If that were, in fact, the sole problem before the Committee of Imperial Defence,

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the solution might not present many difficulties; but the question covers a very much wider field, and involves considerations far removed from and bigger than the movement of an individual military force. As already noted, the proposal has been considered by four Governments during the last twenty-two years, each belonging to either the Liberal or Labour party, neither of which is traditionally associated with warlike influences. It is also to be remembered that, in spite of its name, the Committee of Imperial Defence is predominantly civilian in its composition, the Service members being, in effect, merely expert advisers to the main body.

In 1907, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in announcing the result of the inquiry held on that occasion, said: "There would exist throughout the country a feeling of insecurity which might lead to a constant demand for increased expenditure, naval and military, and a continual risk of unrest and possibly alarm which, *however unfounded*,* would be most injurious in its effect, whether political or commercial."

In 1924, it was considered that the tunnel "would add to the anxieties of those responsible for national defence and *would involve permanent expenditure*." *

As two of the four inquiries have taken place some years since the end of the Great War, it cannot be said that conclusions have been reached on out-of-date evidence or under conditions which no longer exist. The first consideration is, in fact, the psychological effect of a Channel tunnel on the people of this country—and, be it remembered, this includes not merely the well and fairly well-informed portions of the community, but the far larger part whose ignorance and credulity is astounding. Among the great mass of the population a catch-phrase or a belief can take root and flourish in face of every sort of discouragement. What would be the position of a Government if apprehension of the military dangers of a Channel tunnel took some such obstinate form? And is political morality so strict that no Opposition would foster such a feeling in order to gain a party advantage? Nor has such apprehension been confined to "the man in the street," for the 1924 inquiry expressed the opinion that there was "an element of danger in the scheme," and if that conclusion was reached by men of affairs, fully enlightened on the subject, it is not unreasonable to expect the natural instinct of the vast body of the uninformed to be much more strongly against a deliberate and voluntary junction with the

* My italics.

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Continent by artificial means opposed to the insular history and traditions of this country. So much for psychology.

The tunnel, if made, will be a permanent structure of great strength. To render it useless, whatever means may be employed, is not necessarily to destroy it or to put out of action more than a comparatively small section.

In 1870 the tunnels through the Vosges Mountains were elaborately prepared for demolition, but the demolition was never carried out, and they were used by the Prussians throughout the campaign. During the South African War, when thousands of miles of line were open to destruction by swiftly-moving Boer commandoes, it was very rare to find more than a short section damaged or a culvert blown up. The destruction of railways, which was one of the most frequent and widespread objects of Lawrence's operations in Arabia, seldom resulted in more than a few hundred yards of line being closed to traffic, apart from the blowing up of bridges, and the biggest combined raid, which helped to bring final disaster on the Turks, was confined to a few miles of track.

The tunnel, as already remarked, will be a permanent structure. Are its supporters prepared to say that relations between England and France will be equally permanent, and are they prepared to guarantee the peace of Europe in perpetuity? It is just thirty years since England was within twenty-four hours of war with France over Fashoda. Troops returning home from India were stopped and disembarked at Suez, and commanding officers were given their orders for action on the declaration of war. Would any one at that date have ventured to say that in sixteen years' time British troops would be fighting in France, often under French generals, against a common enemy? Are we now able or ready to say that the pendulum will never again swing the other way? It is, of course, urged that after the experiences of 1914–18, hostility between ourselves and France is "unthinkable," which is precisely the word used prior to 1914 regarding war with Germany and the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Naturally, every one hopes that friendly relations will continue to exist, and, as we cannot see into the future, we can do no more than hope, but as, in the Channel tunnel, we are legislating for posterity, it seems wise to ask whether, in the years to come, posterity may not have grounds for regretting that our generation did not build on a more solid foundation.

Assuming that our friendly relations with France will never at

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any time and under any kind of unforeseen circumstances change for the worse, there are other countries in Europe with whom our connection is neither so long nor so strong.

The Channel tunnel must stand out as an obvious military objective for attack, and a necessary point for defence, which would not simplify the international situation when it is remembered that one terminus will be in England and the other in France. If the tunnel had been in existence in 1914, it is extremely unlikely that the Battle of the Marne would have taken the course it did. The vast German strategic movement of five armies pivoting on Thionville, and intended to pin the French against the Swiss frontier, taking Paris *en route*, would probably never have been attempted. The fall of Amiens on the 31st of August, 1914, had the effect of cutting off the British Expeditionary Force from its Channel ports, and it is difficult to believe that no German efforts would have been made to exploit this position by seizing the French end of the tunnel, though its use would have been equally impossible whether one end were in hostile hands or any portion of it destroyed in defence.

There was never any chance of England being invaded during the war, but there was a possibility of a raiding force being landed for the sake of moral effect, and doing as much damage as possible. If it was considered necessary, as it was, to maintain considerable forces in England, at all events in 1914–15, in deference to popular feeling and as a measure of precaution, what would be the position in face of the known existence of a direct link with the Continent? It is not a question of ability to defend a "mouse-hole." It is a question of strategy on the part of high commands controlling vast numbers of troops and of political considerations on the part of those charged with the welfare of civil populations.

The claim that an enormous volume of traffic will pour through the tunnel, combined with the possibility of rendering it useless at a moment's notice, constitutes a danger that seems to have received but little attention. As traffic which is now sea-borne is diverted to the tunnel by the latter's advantages, so will the number of ships decrease. This may not seriously affect the ocean-going liners, but a very large proportion of our imports is brought in the small craft which ply their trade in the narrow seas. It is first and foremost among these that the results of the tunnel would be felt. Even to-day freights are so low and foreign undercutting so severe that it pays owners, in many cases, to lay up their vessels in preference to running them at a loss, and it is quite certain that if the claims made for the tunnel were fulfilled, or anything like it, the railway-

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owned boats, at all events, would disappear wholesale. Under such circumstances, the temporary increase of employment in engineering trades, claimed as one of the advantages of making the tunnel, would appear likely to be more than counterbalanced at a later date by a permanent increase of unemployment among seamen.

There would be a strong tendency to concentrate our traffic on one route, with the result that in the event of its war-time suspension, the only alternative—shipping—would have dwindled to tonnage insufficient for our requirements. The steady process of attrition experienced in the German submarine campaign would, in fact, be felt at its maximum strength at one fell swoop.

Of the possible effects of strikes occurring in one country and not in others, space forbids discussion.

Let it not be thought that the views expressed in this article are the captious criticisms of a biassed opponent of the tunnel. The advantages claimed for it have been impressed upon the public in so widespread a manner that their summarized recapitulation seems sufficient. The points raised in discussing these claims are often technical, while others may not have occurred to all of those interested in the problem. Others, again, appear to have received little or no attention, in-so-far as they have been raised at all.

It is said that our insularity has disappeared by reason of aeroplanes and long-range guns, and so far as damage by bombs and shell-fire is concerned this is to some extent true, though a good many people seem to assume that such war-like advantages will remain exclusively with our enemies. But in other respects our insularity is as inviolate to-day as it has ever been, and it behoves the Prime Minister's committee to consider long before committing the country to a permanent and fundamental change in its traditional position.

> "Though man a thinking being is defined,
> Few use the grand prerogative of mind,
> How few think justly of the thinking few!
> How many never think, who think they do!"

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THE JUDGE ADVOCATE

By Captain H. Bullock, F.R.Hist.S., I.A.

The administration of military justice in the British Army was originally in the hands of the Lord High Constable and of the Earl Marshal of the Realm. Though at first justice was probably dispensed in a summary and informal manner, at a relatively early date a military court was instituted at which these two high officers of State exercised their judicial functions according to the law. Soon the court found it necessary to call trained lawyers to its aid: these experts were usually either clerks in holy orders—doctors of the civil law, or men of influence and good family, who had undergone training at one of the Inns of Court, as was then customary for persons of their station in life.

It is evident that these experts originally did duty both as assessors, weighing the evidence and assuming most of the functions of a jury, and also as referees and advisers on technical points of law. But after the attainder and execution of Edward, Duke of Buckingham, Lord High Constable, in 1521, the office of Constable lapsed; and has subsequently only been revived temporarily for great occasions of State such as coronations, when it has held no military significance. Full disciplinary authority in the Army, though deriving of course from the Sovereign in person, was exercised vicariously by the Marshal, and his court was known as the Marshal's Court. By association of ideas it came to be called the Martial Court, and finally the Court-Martial, as it is to-day. The origin of the present court-martial system dates from the calling-in of "colonels"—i.e. combatant officers—as assessors, to relieve the "judges" of the severe duty of considering questions of fact as well as of law. The legal experts were known as Judges of the Marshal's Court, later abbreviated to Judge-Marshal or Judge-Martial. They are the forerunners of the present Judge Advocates.

In the reign of Henry VIII the Marshal's Court sat on two days in the week. In addition to the Judge-Marshals there was also a Clerk of the Court, who prosecuted on behalf of the Crown.

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For the next two or three centuries the duties of prosecutor fell to the Judge Advocate, in addition to his responsibilities as a legal referee. This system has been abandoned in the British Army, and a Judge Advocate now maintains a strict impartiality, allying himself neither with the prosecution nor the defence, and expressing no opinions as to questions of fact. He is chiefly occupied with keeping the record of the proceedings, and advising the Court on legal matters. In the United States Army, however, there still exists a trace of the old English system, for although at an important court-martial in America there are now two Judge Advocates (one prosecuting and the other acting as does an English Judge Advocate), the appointment of the second of the two is an innovation; and until a few years ago there was but a single Judge Advocate at an American trial, who prosecuted on behalf of the State.

The earliest Judge of the Marshal's Court who has left a published account of his work is Sir William Patten, who was one of the two Judges of the Court which accompanied the Lord Protector Somerset's Army into Scotland in 1547. His companion Judge was William Cecil, later the celebrated Lord Burleigh, whose notes Patten used when compiling his story. It takes the form of a journal of the campaign from the Protector's arrival at Newcastle on the 17th of August, 1547, to the breaking-up of the camp before Rokesborough on the 29th of September. It was published in 1548, and is the first English printed book to contain military maps, as well as the second in point of time of all English printed military narratives. Patten's description of the troops and operations is full and interesting; and although he has little to say about his legal duties, he is well worth reading on his merits as a crisp recorder of a campaign. The book has been reprinted more than once, notably in Arber's "English Garner."* Patten's heart was clearly with the troops in the field of action rather than with his work in court; and though his journal opens with a promising account of a new gallows being erected in Newcastle market-place, the real value of the book lies in its description of the fighting at Pinkie and elsewhere.

The chief point of interest recorded by Patten regarding the Marshal's Court in this expedition is that it was apparently presided over by the Provost-Marshal, one James Wilford. It should be explained that the Provost-Marshal was an officer considerably subordinate, in the military hierarchy, to the Marshal: they were roughly as far apart as a major and a major-general are nowadays. Perhaps the explanation is that Wilford may have been not only

* *See* "Tudor Tracts," 1532–1588 (Constable, 1903).

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appointed Provost-Marshal to the force, but also Deputy-Marshal (i.e. deputy to the Earl Marshal of England). Such deputies were usually appointed when the Earl Marshal of the Realm did not accompany the forces in person; or for various other necessary reasons, just as to-day the duties of Earl Marshal are being carried out by a deputy during the minority of the Duke of Norfolk, the hereditary holder of the office.

It is fortunate that two early writers of English military books have each explained in considerable detail their ideal Judge Advocate. They are Francis Markham, the author of "Five Decades of Epistles of War" (1622); and Sir James Turner, who wrote "Pallas Armata" (1670–1), published in 1683. Francis Markham becomes quite lyrical on the subject, and deserves quoting freely though his standard is appallingly high:

"The subject whereof I intend to treat . . . is the Judge-Marshall, or as some call him (by the old Roman name) the Praetor, or Judge in all martial causes. This is a renowned and reverend officer; as some suppose attendant, but as I confidently imagine rather an assistant, to the Lord Marshal. For he is not always designated, nominated and appointed by the General or Lord Marshal; but oftener by the King himself and his Regal authority, which greatness in election proves the dignity and worthiness of his place. For it is a rule that in all Titles of Honor whatsoever, that is the greatest which riseth immediately from God: so those are the next best which rise immediately from the King, and not by a second [step] from the King's commission.

"But letting pass the curiosity in his appointment, let it suffice that his place is one of great Reverence and respect, and the man which ought to be elected thereunto should be a person of sincere and holy life. Learned, Religious, and of a sound and approved knowledge in matters of Justice and Equity, he should have a conscience like an Innocent and spotless Virgin—delicate, quick and tender, yet fit to receive no impression or stamp but that of goodness, for he hath to do with the bloods and lives of men. . . .

"I have known in mine own experience called to this place both reverend and famous Divines, and sometimes learned and worthy Civilians; either of which have discharged the place with all contentment and admiration, managing all their actions both with a Religious fear of God's judgements and a careful duty to the preservation of Justice . . .; methinks a man that had the mixture of both these qualities were sure[ly] of the best composition, and would far exceed the single Ingredient, that is to say, either Divine-Civilian or a Civil-Divine would far surpass a simple Divine or simple Civilian. . . .

"Divers, I confess, have written Military and Marshall laws, and of all those not any with a more worthy or memorable approbation than our Reverend and learned Doctor Sutclife,* whom I long knew in the

* Matthew Sutcliffe (*see* Dictionary of National Biography), author of "The Practice, Proceedings and Laws of Arms," 1593.

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wars and reverenced for his infinite virtues, being a man so able and uncontrollable through the merit of his own rare experience that few comes near, none equals him. Yet he, I know, will modestly confess that those laws cannot always be certain in all places; for Generals themselves, continually taking upon themselves to make new laws, find sometimes [that] those things which were imagined most fit, at other times to be held the most inconvenient; and what was at one time most dangerous, at another time is most sufferable and wholesome . . . so that to a well mixed law, to have a Judge of a better mixed temper, is the best. . . .

"The Praetor or Judge Marshall being thus chosen, his place or office is the same almost, in effect and quality, which they carry in our Civil Citties and Towns, whom we call by the name of Recorders, . . . [who] are the Mouths, Judgements and Censures of the Supreme Magistrate whom we call Mayor . . ., condemning or acquitting all such as are brought before them for any criminal offence . . ., because it is supposed the higher Magistrate is not learned in the Mystery and Science of the Laws. So is this Praetor or Judge Marshall the voice, Censure and opinion of the Lord Marshall of the Army, having full power and authority to draw up, Ingross and pronounce all Sentences and Processes . . . in a Marshall Court against any delinquent or Capital offender whatsoever, and for that cause he hath his seat and place in all Marshall Courts next under the Lord Marshall, where he sitteth and heareth all complaints, evidences and proofs . . ., taking ample notes thereof and reducing them into heads, both for his own and all the other Captains' helps, which are judges in the same court.

"Which being heard at large and upon solemn oath, he then calleth in the offender and against him layeth all the Inferences, Accusations, and Imputations . . ., receiving the Delinquent's ample and full answer to the same, with all those testimonies and excuses he can produce. Which done, and the offending party being withdrawn, the Praetor discourseth to all the Court his opinion of all he hath heard; what agreeth with the laws, and what standeth against them; discussing all doubtful questions, and truly and sincerely declaring how far the nature of the offence extendeth; . . . when his speech is finished, he craveth their judgement.

"Then the puny [junior] Captain first, and so successively all the rest one after another give their opinions of the nature of the offence, and what punishment it deserveth; then in conclusion the Lord Marshall himself (if he be present) giveth the final sentence. Which finished, the Praetor causeth the sentence to be drawn . . ., being read by him to the whole table . . .; immediately the Prisoner is called for again, unto whom (after the Praetor in a solemn and learned Oration hath ript up the quality and perniciousness of his sin, and the excellency of the Laws in cutting off the cruelty of such sins; and then sawdering up the wounds of a torn and delacerat [lacerated] Conscience with divine and wholesome counsel), forthwith he shall read unto him . . . his sentence . . . and then deliver it into the hands of the Provost Marshal to see it put into execution."

It will be conceded that the above not only throws considerable

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light on the duty of the Judge Martial; but also draws a plain picture of the procedure at a court-martial three hundred years ago: and that the likeness to the procedure to-day is striking.

The second writer named above, Sir James Turner, adds little detail to the picture. He agrees that the Judge Martial should be "a grave and judicious person, who fears God and hates vice, especially bribery," and a lawyer by profession. He tells us that "some princes remit the whole justice of the army so absolutely to the judge martial that they give him power to punish soldiers who transgress" his public proclamations, without first obtaining the consent of the offender's colonel.

"He hath power to call together a general court of war, and to call such colonels as he thinks fit, but herein he seldom acts till the general or marshall advise the matter with him. Such colonels as he cites as assessors, and do not appear, he may fine . . ."

Turner, who wrote about 1670, must have been one of the last to use the title of Judge-Martial, for a warrant issued by James II in 1666 is directed to the "Judge Advocate of His Majesty's Land Forces" *; and the style of Judge Advocate has always been used since.

* Public Record Office, War Office papers, 8/91.

NOTE.—The spelling and punctuation of extracts quoted in this article have been extensively modernized.

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CHINA UNDER ARMS

By Brigadier-General C. D. Bruce, C.B.E.

Few things will do more to enlist confidence in the Nationalist Government of China than its action in calling to its aid expert foreign advisers. The leaders of the present Government may differ only in degree from the would-be leaders of other Chinese political parties. Their object may only be the acquisition of personal power. They may care little or nothing for the welfare of the politically ignorant masses, but they are, for the present, the only foundation upon which a re-vitalized China can be built. The appointment of Sir Frederick Whyte, K.C.S.I., of a large staff of American financial experts for certain Yuans (Councils), together with that of a well-known American Railway Engineer and Police Officer, are at least mile-stones on the road to returning peace and confidence. If to the above are added agricultural and industrial proficients, technical engineers trained in road-making and the control of waterways, at long last some hope of permanent reorganization emerges. Here are definite elements around which the restoration of law, order, and authority may crystallize. But, one is bound to add, will they? China overrun by savage bandits masquerading as soldiers is a menace to the peace of Asia. China helplessly drifting is a danger to civilization. China even partially united under a Government not afraid to assert its authority is a different matter. At Hankow the experiment was made and so far it succeeded. But this is not enough.

Early this year a "Re-organization and disbandment Conference" was held at Nanking. It was to be followed by a "National defence Conference." There was a grim sense of humour in these announcements. The shooting off-hand by the youthful ruler of Manchuria of two of his chief generals hardly seemed the best preparation for a peaceful disbandment. Nor did the swift rush from the disbandment Conference-table into further civil war strengthen the hopes of a general disbandment.

While there is no reason to doubt the *bonâ-fide* intention of the Nationalist Government, it is useless to remain blind to the enormous difficulties still to be overcome in carrying out any such scheme.

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The chief of these difficulties may be summed up as the incubus of Militarism still existing, the entire lack of funds, and the inability of the Chinese Government, as at present constituted, to handle any scheme of such magnitude. Though foreign Governments have been hastening to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the new President of China, the one over which he presides hardly pretends to actual authority over more than half a dozen provinces out of twenty-one. Speaking in March to the National Congress at Nanking the new President emphasized this fact: "China is not now really united," he is reported as having said; adding that the Provincial Governments took advantage of their military strength "to dictate to the Central Government." Nor so far has the latter obtained any real financial support from more than three or four provinces. Such are some but by no means all the problems which faced and still face the Government in its attempt at disbandment and in establishing law and order.

Any attempt at disbandment without provision for the disbanded elements—the physically weakest and worst characters—will only flood the country-side with more bandits and outlaws. Coincident with disbandment must come the organization of some armed force solely under Government control, which in future should form China's standing army. Let us call this Aspect 1. Secondly, the creation of a National Gendarmerie or "Peace Preservation Corps" to enforce law and order when restored. This we may call Aspect 2. There is a third aspect of "China Under Arms," but it stands apart from the other two and will be considered later.

Even though the sudden death of that well-known German officer, Colonel Maximilian Bauer, has deprived Chiang Kai-shek of a very capable military adviser, possibly of the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies—it may not be without interest to discuss some of the possibilities connected with the appointment of the late Colonel Bauer, and the possibilities facing any other such adviser selected to succeed him, and, before doing so, some of the conditions under which he must work.

The late meeting of the Nationalist Congress at Nanking, more usually known as the "Third Party Congress," has not really helped to consolidate the position of Chiang Kai-shek. Like previous meetings of the Congress, the last has merely served to accentuate the bitter discord between the various cliques which still tend to disrupt the Kuomintang party. Communism and the extreme left are far from being scotched. They hope, and may be able, to pull down Chiang Kai-shek and the present Government. The advance

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upon Hankow to a certain extent interfered with the work of the Congress, but no attempt was made to solve any of the most pressing political and financial problems which beset the country. It has been truly said that the Congress "achieves nothing more than providing a legal basis for the existence of the present Nationalist Government for another two years, when the Fourth Party Congress should be held."

Such is the political situation to-day in China. There is hope for a respite from civil war. On the other hand there is nothing stable, no security, no guarantee of law and order.

Since the Great War it has been said with truth that Asia bristles with arms, and that peoples hitherto peaceable have learned not only the art of war but that to survive they must always be prepared for it. Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia are armed and arming. Of the policy of Soviet-Russia it is unnecessary to speak. China to-day has about 1,750,000 so-called soldiers under arms. She has also at least four high military autocrats working at times in accord with the Government and at times opposing it. Up to now these military autocrats have sometimes fought each other, sometimes bargained with one another, sometimes as at present paused to take stock of the political situation and their mutual bearings. Of this enormous force, by far the largest in the world under arms, less than half would amply suffice to restore and to maintain law and order if adequately trained and properly organized. Seventeen years of war—intermittent civil war—have provided ample practice even for the most peaceably inclined peasants. It would be strange indeed if this universal appeal to brute-force had not tended towards at least a superficial Militarism in China. Nor should it be forgotten that the substitution throughout every district of military for the old well-tried civil authority has done more than anything to produce and prolong the chaos. In China to-day it is the so-called military officials who everywhere take precedence. It is they who govern or misgovern provinces or groups of provinces, who receive general if unwilling homage, and who pose perpetually in the limelight. Instead of the old-style and often venerated Viceroys, Civil Governors, and Judicial officials in each province, to-day are to be found so-called "Marshals," "Generals," and "Commanders-in-Chief" innumerable, and like the locusts, insatiable.

Nor are present conditions throughout Asia and the countries bordering upon the Pacific such as to inspire thoughts of peace. What the League of Nations may eventually achieve in the way of

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universal disarmament in Europe is outside the scope of this article. In the face of the recent utterances of certain European statesmen he must indeed be a confirmed optimist who will stake the safety of his hearth and home upon universal disarmament. Nor will the "Kellogg Pact"—as now ratified by the American Senate—be accepted in Asia without demur. The East no longer looks to the West for guidance. The East has finally and for all time rebelled against the forced adoption of Western civilization *en bloc*. In China, as in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, each government is now making its own choice of what the existing government considers most useful in Western civilization. Nor should it be forgotten that in all four of these countries the government is more or less in the hands of one man who has achieved and keeps his position solely by means of a tolerably efficient military force. Could China create for herself a modern army and navy as Japan has done, the peace of Asia would in all probability be more secure. Paradoxical as it may appear, a China efficiently and adequately armed would make for world peace. The mandate of the Nationalist Government to-day runs just as far as the might of its purchasable armies and the bargaining power of its ever-changing politicians can carry it. Not one step farther. Finally, and in the minds of Chinese of all classes fundamentally, runs the thought consistently planted there that the sorrows of their country are due to the "Unequal Treaties." These, as they believe, were obtained solely by the use of superior military power. To some readers such statements may seem exaggerations. But it is as well to recognize facts when we meet them, much as these may disagree with idealistic theories.

"Nationalism" in China has come to stay. It has been described as a mighty force not even yet fully understood either by the West or by the Chinese themselves. It is also one which wisely wielded and used for no base ends could undoubtedly be the means of making China one of the great nations of the world.

It has already been remarked that the substitution of military for civil authority has of late years been the chief curse of the Chinese people. Until the old order has been restored there can be little if any improvement.

"How then," it may be asked, "can this improvement come about?"

Only by the presence of one supreme authority with behind it a standing army which has legal force.

"To the State alone in its aspect of sovereignty (i.e. the power which ultimately determines the policy or direction of the State) belongs the

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decisive right of force. . . . There must be force, overruling force, but the force must itself be established, recognized, accepted. The primary fact of the State is not force, but a universal order constituting a foundation for all activities." *

Presuming that the duty of a government is to govern, what should be the next step in justifying its existence taken by the new Nationalist Government? We know that "a country unable to defend itself against external foes or to suppress internal disorder is clearly incapable of self-government."

Before enforcing it is obviously necessary to have secured law and order. This then must be the next step in any Nationalist programme. To restore law and order in an Empire consisting of some 4,000,000 square miles (including Manchuria, Mongolia, Hsinkiang, and Thibet), is a task which might appal the greatest administrator that ever lived. That such a gigantic undertaking could be entered upon at one time is, of course, out of the question. But in what we may for our purpose consider as China proper, little by little, province by province, this work must proceed, or China remains clearly incapable of self-government. To complete such a task and to maintain law and order the Nationalist Government will need to have at its disposal some armed forces. As already stated (Aspects 1 and 2) these forces should consist of a highly efficient standing army comparatively small in numbers, and of a National Gendarmerie. Both forces as in all civilized countries would be under the control of the Civil Authorities. These two aspects of a "China under arms" need cause no heartburnings in any Foreign Chancery.

The attempt to lay down exact numbers for the two forces mentioned would in this article be out of place. For present purposes, to describe briefly the tasks they would be called upon to carry out will be of more use (Aspect 1). If the leading Militarists, Fêng Yu-hsiang,† Chang-hsueh-liang, and others, support the Government and General Chiang Kai-shek, and if no attempt is made to disband *their* armies, no doubt most of the minor military adventurers can under the superintendence of a competent military adviser be overawed. But would this be disbandment as so earnestly desired by the mercantile and banking communities in China and elsewhere? It is hardly human to expect a man whose sole importance rests on military strength to submit to being deprived of

* "The Modern State," by R. M. MacIver (Clarendon Press, 1928).

† Since this article was written, Fêng Yu-hsiang has declined to acknowledge the authority of the National Government.

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his one asset. Hence for Feng Yu-hsiang and the biggest war-lords the question is likely to remain an academic one. Without armies such men as Wu Pei-fu would sink rapidly into political insignificance. But if the Nationalist Government is strong enough to carry out a general disbandment—a very questionable proposition—some forty or fifty Divisions would suffice to ensure permanent order. The division is the standard unit of most of the armies, and a Chinese division may be taken as consisting of roughly 10,000 of all ranks. What are known as " mixed brigades " are in favour in some of the armies. These are often made up as follows: two infantry regiments, one regiment of cavalry, one brigade of artillery, one company of engineers, a few companies of machine guns and necessary transport. If the future political organization of China is to be on the lines of that of the United States of America, a federation of provinces, there should be in each of the twenty-one provinces of China proper and Manchuria not more than two divisions. One of these divided up could garrison the various larger district cities while the other remained at and around the provincial capital. Forty-five divisions, or roughly half a million troops of all ranks would represent the armed forces at the disposal of the central government. There is considerable variety in the geographical configuration of many of the twenty-one provinces. These variations, subject to the particular means of communication necessary in each province, call for quite different strategical dispositions. In population and in what may for our purpose be called " character " the differences in the various provinces are almost equally marked. To restore law and order in such provinces as Szechwan, Kansu, or Yunnan may require special military arrangements.

The second aspect of " China under Arms " is essentially the most important to foreigners of all nationalities. The creation of a Government Gendarmerie properly organized and paid would go far towards banishing many of the at present hopeless problems which confront the leaders of the Nationalist Government.

The chief difficulty in maintaining any such force efficiently, and one which might in the present state of Chinese ethics be found insuperable, is the wholesale financial corruption which still permeates much of official life. Rarely would such opportunities for peculation (local " squeeze ") come the way of any minor official as in carrying out most of the gendarmerie tasks. Adequate numbers for the performance of the above-mentioned duties can only be calculated

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as each section of the duties is taken in hand. The first and, to the Chinese people of all classes and professions, by far the most important duty is the preservation of law and order. Once this has been secured special policing of all main trade routes should follow. In every provincial capital as well as in the smallest *hsien* town the Gendarmerie should represent the authority of the government. Of old, no country in the world required less police protection thanks to the sense of discipline inculcated by Chinese family and village life. Were law and order once more restored these favourable conditions would, to a very large extent, recur. What matters most to all Foreign Powers, more especially the Great Powers, is that 400,000,000 industrious Chinese should be free to go about their own and foreign business in peace and with adequate security. The protection of Sino-foreign trade as well as the cessation of all the vexatious and intolerable hindrances to that trade, whether under the all-embracing name of *Likin* or by any new term, is the bounden duty of any would-be government.

Another and so far almost entirely neglected aspect of police control in China is the want of any effective water police at the disposal of the Government. With a seaboard of 2,150 miles—increased if all indentations be counted to close on 5,000 miles—it might be thought that every effort would have been made to make use of such natural advantages for naval control, but this has never been the case.

One of the blackest spots upon the police record of any Chinese government of late years has been the increasing prevalency of piracy. Practically no attempt has been made to preserve law and order, or to protect human life and trade, over thousands of miles of waterways. The mere mention of such resorts as Bias Bay recalls the evil. But another and far less widely known aspect is the terrible tale of local piracies committed upon junks and small native craft. The seaboard of China is one long chain of local harbours, to and from which junks and small steamers ply incessantly. Almost every sandy bay or river estuary has its own junks. No weather is too bad for these hardy and efficient sailors. No ordinary sea-risks sufficient to daunt them. But when attacked in cold blood, themselves practically defenceless, by pirates well armed with modern weapons, what chance have they? As piracy increases in Chinese waters so must the coastal trade and that on inland waterways diminish.

The third aspect of " China under Arms " is a military one pure

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and simple. World disarmament may follow the Kellogg Pact. On the other hand, it may lag far behind. There is here no intention to suggest that the Chinese have become a martial race, or that a naturally peace-loving people have the least wish to maintain vast armies. But during the last decade one specific lesson has confronted every man, woman, and child in China, and that lesson is the triumph of brute force. This lesson may be said to have actually begun at the conclusion of the Great War. It continued and was driven home during the " turning down " of the Chinese claims both at Versailles and at Washington. It is not yet ended. " If," the Chinese fairly argue, " force is to be the deciding factor in International intercourse, what force can China raise ? The ' Unequal Treaties ' are the result of ' Foreign Imperialism ' (i.e. of Western armed interference) and the ' Unequal Treaties ' must go."

Such, in brief, is a summary of the thoughts at the back of most Chinese minds ; vague perhaps, but none the less present. Kept there, too, by unceasing Communist propaganda.

Addressing the Central Branch of the Kuomintang at Nanking in December last General Chiang Kai-shek acting-President is reported to have said :

" Should all the various military leaders abide by the decision of the Disarmament Conference, I am confident that, within three years, China will rid herself of Imperialistic oppression and aggression, and become a powerful nation."

That this is a veiled threat or intended by General Chiang Kai-shek as any more than a patriotic gesture is not suggested. But such utterances are part of the lesson already referred to, and must be accepted as such.

Let us examine briefly first the numerical possibilities of universal service in China, secondly the raw material from which any such forces would come. Some years ago the writer was permitted to comment upon these possibilities in the pages of the " United Service Magazine." By the light of recent experiences it may be of interest to supplement what was then written. That the necessary force to place China beyond the reach of aggression from any foreign Power could be created the writer knows from first-hand experience. What a formidable one it might be he realizes more than ever. Shortly after the " Boxer " outbreak he wrote in the " United Service Magazine " :

" In fifty years or in half that period *under European organization* an army could be created in China such as the world has never seen. Easily ruled, sober, industrious, inured to such hardships in the bare struggle

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to live that few European peoples could stand, the ordinary trials of a soldier's life would be luxury to many millions of Chinese. Easy to teach, wonderfully assimilative, courageous enough, such is the material to hand —in millions. To whom will the moulding of it fall . . . ? "

It has been said that the Chinaman is not naturally pugnacious. This is true. He usually has no desire to fight. But he can be trained to fight, and will fight, well if given the right cause. Be it noted that such a cause still exists, a cause which would unite the armed forces of every province in China. Those who served in and around Tientsin in the early summer of 1900 are unlikely to forget that experience, or the unsuccessful effort of the late Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Edward Seymour, K.C.B., to relieve the foreign Legations at Peking. During the " Boxer " outbreak those who fought against the " Foreigners " were animated by a single idea and were united in a single cause. They were able to contain in Tientsin a force amounting to between three and four thousand European troops. They defeated and drove back into Tientsin over two thousand Europeans under Admiral Sir Edward Seymour. They dared to besiege in Peking the Legations of all the great Powers, containing some hundreds of Europeans, and had not relief arrived in time or wiser counsels prevailed, they would undoubtedly have annihilated them as well as thousands of their compatriots who had become Christians. Now the obvious remark which will rise to the lips of most readers is: " Granted; but solely by force of numbers ! " Yet in numbers Chinese armies must always be superior.

Whoever cares to devote the time can find ample evidence as to the power of Chinese armies in the past. Probably the greatest ruler that nation ever had was Kublai Khan, and the Empire which owned his suzerainty will bear comparison with that of ancient Rome at its proudest. Let us glance for a moment at some possibilities of a China fully armed and adequately organized for defensive war. If what Japan has succeeded in raising in the way of a national army is any criterion of what China might do we have a reliable basis upon which to calculate.

The present population of Japan is some 60,000,000 and it is increasing at a rate of 750,000 per annum. The peace strength of the Japanese army is about 200,000 of all ranks. The estimated war strength 750,000. If the much-discussed population of China is reckoned at 400,000,000 and allowing, as is usually accepted, that the proportion of males to females is larger than in any European country, we find that China could easily create a numerical army of

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from 8 to 10,000,000 men. That by Chinese alone any such numbers could be raised, trained, or led is, for years to come, unthinkable, but there is no insuperable reason why this should not be done for them. The creation and advance of the Nationalist armies last year from Canton to the Yangtze river, en route to Peking, succeeded not under Chinese but under Russian inspiration, the advance upon Hankow in March-April under German inspiration.

Granted that numbers even approaching the above could be raised, what is the raw material worth? There is still the "Comic Cuts" representation of the Chinese soldier. He is depicted as shuffling into battle armed with an umbrella, a bird-cage, or some other fantastic stage-property, but he does not habitually so arm himself and he does know quite well the business end of a Lewis gun and of a trench mortar. So-called battles, it is true, are systematically bought and sold, as are the arms and ammunition of the survivors when no longer required. But this is not to say that to-day an altogether different type of Chinese soldier does not exist.

One of the most interesting experiments of its kind was the creation of what was officially known as The Chinese Regiment when Great Britain first took over the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei. Up to 1906 this experiment continued and it was terminated solely from political not military reasons. During the period the regiment existed the writer, with other British officers and non-commissioned officers, was occupied for some eight years in turning the Chinese raw material into the British mercenary soldier. Napoleon has written:

"The first quality of a soldier is fortitude in enduring fatigues and hardships; bravery but the second. Poverty, hardship, and misery are the school of the good soldier."

Few Asiatics more clearly fulfilled these requirements than did the men of The Chinese Regiment, and during the severe fighting round Tientsin and the advance to Peking, they fought bravely and well.

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THE MILITARY FORCES IN INDIA

By Colonel G. M. Orr, C.B.E., D.S.O.

In 1924 the Government of India authorized the publication of a book entitled "The Army in India and its Evolution." It is sincerely to be hoped that a new edition will be published which will show the changes in the process of the reorganization subsequent to 1923.

The intention of this article, for most of the material of which the writer is beholden to the book in question, is to state briefly what the system of command and the organization of the Army now are, as evidenced by a study of the Indian Army List for April, 1929.

With the advent of Lord Rawlinson as Commander-in-Chief in India in 1920, a process of reconstruction was begun and, in the main, completed in his time. Lord Rawlinson was helped considerably in his reforms by the report of the Army in India Committee under the presidency of Lord Esher, which was issued about the same time. Among other terms of reference Lord Esher's Committee had to consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual capacity as head of the Army and member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Without going into details it will suffice to say that the Committee wished to abolish the duality of functions which imposed so heavy a burden of work upon the Commander-in-Chief, but the members were divided in their opinion as to the nature of the separate machinery to be created for the purpose. His position therefore remains the same. The Committee, however, was unanimous in upholding the principle that the Commander-in-Chief alone should have the right to offer military advice to the Government of India, and that he should have no military colleague in the Executive Council.

It is perhaps advisable to try and explain, for the benefit of those unacquainted with the system of government in India, the machinery by which the Army is administered and the command exercised. Under the Commander-in-Chief, and to assist him in the executive side of his administration, is the Army Headquarter Staff. The principal staff officers and heads of branches have two separate

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functions. In one direction they are responsible for the administration of their departments, for conveying the executive decisions of the Commander-in-Chief to the subordinate commands and ensuring that those decisions are carried out. In the other direction they are responsible for initiating, under the Commander-in-Chief, proposals for the better administration of the Army and the welfare of the troops. Such proposals require the decision of the Government of India, or even of the Secretary of State for India, and, when ripe for submission, have therefore to come before the Army Department.

The heads of the various departments of the Government of India, of which the Army Department is one, form the membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council. As already stated, the portfolio of the Army Department is held by the Commander-in-Chief. The Army Department is organized in the same way as the other departments. The head of its staff is a Secretary to Government, and like the other Secretaries has the constitutional right of access to the Viceroy. The holder of this appointment, which in the past has been reserved for a senior military officer, is now a civilian. Army administration, therefore, is represented in the reformed Legislature by the Army Member (the Commander-in-Chief) in the Council of State, and by the Secretary in the Army Department (a civilian) in the Legislative Assembly. In order that the Commander-in-Chief may not be put into the anomalous position of having to reject, as Army Member, a recommendation which he had approved as Commander-in-Chief, a Military Council has been set up, the membership of which consists, under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief, of the C.G.S., A.G., Q.M.G., M.G. of Supply, Secretary in the Army Department, and the Financial Adviser for Military Finance, who represents the Financial Department of the Government. By means of this Council the Commander-in-Chief is in a position to obtain advice in its military, administrative, and financial aspects of any large question of policy. In the light of such advice he can decide what course of action he will maintain whether as Commander-in-Chief or as Army Member.

The reorganization of Army Headquarters included the introduction of a Military Secretary's Branch, an Engineer-in-Chief's Branch, and a Director-General of Ordnance Branch. The latter, however, has since been replaced by the Master-General of Supply's Branch. The Director of Medical Services has lost his pre-war independence and is now under the Adjutant-General. It is of interest to note, in view of the recent changes in the staff at the War

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Office, that in India the Q.M.G. is responsible, through the Directorate of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, for the manufacture as well as for the storage and distribution of clothing. The manufacture of other ordnance stores and of all lethal munitions is under the M.G. of Supply, while their storage and distribution fall to the Q.M.G. The Directorate of Military Works which, before 1921, was in the Q.M.G. Branch is now absorbed into the Military Engineer's Services, and forms part of the responsibilities of the Engineer-in-Chief.

The main change in the organization of Commands subordinate to A.H.Q. was the adoption of the four " Commands " system and the reintroduction of " District " Commands in place of the former " Divisional " Commands. The area of the " Commands " and " Districts " coincides in the main with the areas of one or more of the provincial or subordinate civil divisions. Of the thirteen Districts under Command Headquarters six are graded as first class and seven as second class; the fourteenth District, which is also second class, is independent and directly under A.H.Q., and embraces the whole of Burma.

The lower formations are called cavalry or infantry brigades, or brigade areas. The headquarters of cavalry (and infantry) brigades have under them units which are chiefly allotted to the Field Army; they are numbered as well as named—thus, 3rd (Jhelum) Infantry Brigade. Brigades which are designated only by a name, such as Landi Kotal Brigade, contain units of the covering forces. Brigade areas such as Delhi Brigade Area hold units allotted to internal security. The staffs in the Commands and subordinate formations are organized and proportioned so that a certain residue may be left to carry on the normal routine when mobilization takes place. Four of the 1st class districts (Rawal Pindi, Baluchistan, Meerut, and Deccan) provide the headquarters of the four field divisions of the Field Army. There are eight covering brigade headquarters if that of the Multan brigade in the Punjab be included, four cavalry brigades and twelve infantry brigades for the Field Army, and eleven brigade area headquarters.

Since the initial allotment of districts and brigades among the commands, and of troops to the three categories of Covering Force, Field Army and Internal Security, changes have of course taken place, as experience showed the way to a better grouping.

Table A shows the organization in April, 1929, of brigade areas, brigades and districts within the commands together with a list of cantonments and a summary of combatant units within each

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district or independent brigade area. Aden, which has lately come under the Air Ministry, no longer figures in the Indian organization.

In addition to an improved system of command and distribution of troops, the reconstruction aimed at improvements in organization in order to achieve a greater capability of expansion, in the balance between combatant and ancillary services, and in the standard of equipment. It was found that the most essential changes could only be effected, within the financial limits imposed, by reducing both the numer of combatant units and their establishments. The standard of equipment has been vastly improved and, as will be shown when describing the new measures for the training and reinforcing of the army, efficiency is certainly raised. Omitting Aden, British Infantry battalions have been reduced from 50 to 45, British Cavalry regiments from 9 to 5. Omitting the 3 heavy (coast defence) batteries, the total other British batteries have been reduced from 70 to 60,* but Indian mountain batteries have increased from 12 to 19. At present only one field brigade is mechanized, with 6-wheel tractors. The Royal Tank Corps are represented by 8 armoured-car companies and the Royal Air Force have 8 squadrons. The most significant innovation was the inclusion of Indian ranks in British units. Each battalion now has an Indian platoon whose *personnel* lead, look after, and take into action the mules of the battalion's machine guns. In the Artillery the drivers of the ammunition line of batteries and of ammunition columns are all Indian.

Among Indian units the most drastic reduction took place in the cavalry arm. The grave defects of the old *silladar* system for a great war had shown the necessity for adopting measures by which the organization and maintenance of Indian Cavalry regiments would correspond to that of British Cavalry. This meant a much more expensive system ; consequently a wholesale reduction in the number of units had to be resorted to. The 39 cavalry regiments of 4 squadrons were reduced to 21 *non-silladar* regiments of 3 squadrons by a process of amalgamation of the old units by pairs.

It was in the measures taken to improve the capability for expansion and in the training of recruits that the greatest changes took place in the infantry. Organization underwent a complete change. Instead of battalions training their own recruits, and forming their own depots on mobilization, a regimental system was introduced whereby the battalions of a regiment are served by a training battalion. A regiment consists, on an average, of four

* Taking the brigade at Bangalore to be the equivalent of only two batteries.

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battalions with a training battalion. The new regiments are numbered in succession throughout the army—pioneer regiments being numbered separately. After grouping the old battalions into a regiment and reorganizing them so that they had an identical class composition they were numbered successively within the regiment, the training battalion being given the number 10. Thus the late 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th Punjabis have become the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th battalions of the 15th Punjab regiment, with the late 29th Punjabis organized as the 10th battalion. The 10 Gurkha regiments, which already had two battalions each, have been left unchanged except that each battalion now has a fifth or training company which will become the depot on mobilization. The return to India of a few battalions employed outside India which are redundant to the number required in India has recently allowed of the disbandment of an entire regiment—the 3rd Madras regiment. There are therefore now 19 regiments of infantry, other than Gurkha, numbered 1 to 20, with the omission of No. 3. The total number of battalions [excluding 19 training battalions] is 84 Indian and 20 Gurkha. Pioneer battalions are now organized in three corps, each of a corps headquarters and two battalions, and the Hazara Pioneers of one battalion and a training company.

A similar regimental system was not found to be possible for the cavalry units, but they have been arranged in seven groups of three regiments each, the regiments of each group being identical in their class composition. Seven cantonments have been selected which form suitable locations for regiments allotted to internal security duties, and one is allotted to each group. Each regiment of a group is in turn located at this permanent centre, at which on mobilization a group depot will be formed.

The field units of the Engineer Services consist of the Pioneer Corps already mentioned and of the 4 Corps of Sappers and Miners. The 3 Corps—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay—provide between them 4 field troops, 18 field companies, 3 army troops, 4 divisional headquarter companies and 2 railway companies. The Burma Corps provides 1 field company.

The Signal Services are provided by the Indian Signal Corps which is organized in 4 cavalry brigade troops, 7 divisional and Frontier District signal companies and 2 corps signals.

The reorganization of the Indian Medical Services saw the final adoption, for peace-time purposes, of Indian Station Hospitals analagous to British Station Hospitals. The chief innovation was the Indian Troops Nursing Service, the duties of whose members

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are chiefly to supervise the work of the Indian nursing orderlies. The pre-war Army Hospital Corps and Army Bearer Corps have been absorbed into the ten companies of the "Indian Hospital Corps." Field units are organized out of peace establishments.

No service in India underwent a greater degree of reorganization than that known before the war as the Supply and Transport Corps but now as the Indian Army Service Corps. The new responsibility to purchase and distribute rations to Indian *personnel* as well as to British, and forage to the Indian cavalry, has meant a very large addition to its duties. There were many important changes which have not only brought the service into closer relationship with the troops but which should eliminate the dislocation which a transition from peace to war conditions used to involve. The transport consists of both wheel and pack animal units and of mechanical units. The mechanical transport is now actually a part of the I.A.S.C. The total amount of mechanical transport maintained in peace is 7 companies and 1 section of 30-cwt. 4-wheeled lorries and 2 companies of 3-ton 6-wheelers, 6 motor ambulance convoys, 4 mobile repairs units, 4 heavy repair shops, a depot and stores depot. The animal transport consists of 3 cavalry brigade companies, 11 infantry brigade companies, 9 divisional troops companies, 9 pack mule companies on low establishment, and 8 camel companies, of which 4 are on a low establishment.

Attention has already been drawn to the division of duties between the Master General of Supply and the Quartermaster General regarding manufacture and distribution of ordnance stores. The final result of the various reforms has been to separate the old Ordnance Department into two organizations—an Indian Ordnance Department controlled by the Master General of Supply and an Indian Army Ordnance Corps under the Quartermaster General. Reorganization also extended to both the Remount Department and to the Army Veterinary organization in India.

An important outcome of the war and of the new political conditions introduced into India by the Montagu—Chelmsford reforms of 1919 was the organization of an Indian Territorial Force. In addition to catering for the military aspirations of those classes to whom service in the regular army has not hitherto appealed, it is intended to be a second line to, and a source of reinforcement for the regular Indian Army. At the same time the pre-war volunteer corps were reorganized as an Auxiliary Force. By the Act of 1920 under which this Force was constituted, membership is limited to European British subjects. In accordance with the recommenda-

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tions of the Shea Committee the Auxiliary Force is still to continue British and to be organized as regular British units, while the Territorial Force units will be on the same lines as the regular Indian Army. Both forces are liable for service in aid of the civil power, but liability for general service beyond the limits of India is limited to the provincial units only of the Territorial Force, and is enforceable only in case of emergency and by special order of the Governor-General in Council. Enrolment in the Auxiliary Force is for an indefinite period, in the Territorial Force for six years normally. In some stations—Agra, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Karachi, Lucknow—the units of different arms are grouped together permanently, under an Auxiliary Force commander, for administration and immediate command.

The total number of Auxiliary Force units is equivalent to 10 mounted regiments, 13 field and 1 heavy battery organized in 6 brigades and 7 independent field batteries, 3 field companies, and 1 searchlight company of Engineers, some 30 battalions of infantry, of which the railway administrations provide 11, and also several contingents of different arms. In the machine-gun corps there are 7 companies, and there are also units of the army service, medical and veterinary corps. The Territorial Force at present consists of 18 provincial battalions, each of which is affiliated to a regular regiment and is numbered on after the regular battalions—thus the Territorial battalions of the 1st Madras Pioneer Corps take the numbers 11 to 14. For training purposes there is a permanent British administrative commandant and adjutant and four British company commanders who are at the disposal of the training battalion of the regular regiment when the Territorial battalion is not undergoing training. In addition to the battalions of the Territorial Force affiliated to regular regiments there are now 11 University Training Corps whose members, drawn from the staff and students, are, however, not liable to military service. Since September, 1928, 4 "urban," as opposed to "provincial," battalions of the Territorial Force have been constituted. The great difficulty in the Territorial Force is to obtain officers.

One of the most marked defects in the Indian Army organization brought to light by the Great War was the system of reserves. Service in the reserve is now compulsory. In the infantry engagement is for fifteen years in combined army and reserve service, of which five years at least must be in the army. There are two classes in the reserve. Class "A" takes those whose combined service is not more than eight years, and class "B" takes them on to

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fifteen years' service. Training is for one month, annually in class "A," biennially in class "B." In other arms than infantry the terms vary slightly. Conditions of pay, pension, and gratuities have also improved.

When taking stock of the military forces in India, one is apt to forget those maintained by the Indian states; the "Indian State Forces," no longer called the "Imperial Service Troops," have increased in quantity and improved in quality since the days before the Great War. Government provides a staff of British officers, termed "Military Advisers and Assistant Military Advisers," to assist and advise the Ruling Princes in organizing and training the troops of their States. Several States have an organized force of all arms with a headquarter staff whose officers are allotted to definite general staff and administrative staff duties. Altogether there are among the Indian States the equivalent of 20 mounted regiments, 6 batteries, 27 battalions, and 4 field companies. Their total strength is some 40,000.

There are other military forces, recruited on a militia basis and officered by British officers seconded from regiments of the Indian Army, whose services on the North-West Frontier are of the greatest importance. From north to south they are the Gilgit Scouts, Chitral Scouts, Kurram Militia, Tochi Scouts, South Waziristan Scouts, Zhob Levy Militia, and Mekran Levy Corps. Nor must mention be forgotten of that very fine force known as the Frontier Constabulary officered by British members of the Imperial Indian Police seconded from their own service.

No account of the army in India of the present day can omit reference to the policy known as "Indianization," or the dilution of the cadre of British officers with Indians who have obtained the King's Commission. It may be advisable to explain that there are two categories of officers in the Indian Army: Those who hold the Viceroy's commission and who are mainly promoted from the ranks. They have powers only over Indian troops and in their units command the troops and platoons. The holders of the King's Commission, who prior to the war were British, command the squadrons, companies, and units, and hold all staff appointments regimental or otherwise. When, as a result of the widespread policy of Indianization inaugurated after the war, Indians became eligible to hold the King's Commission, ten vacancies a year were reserved annually at the R.M.C. for Indian cadets. In response to political pressure to increase the number of King's Indian Commissions and to institute a Military College in India, a committee under the

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presidency of the then C.G.S.—Sir Andrew Skeen—was set up to investigate the whole question. The decisions of the Home and Indian Governments in regard to the Report were explained by the Commander-in-Chief in his speech on the Army Budget on the 8th of March, 1928. He said it was recognized that a further degree of Indianization was necessary, but there must be no decline in the efficiency of the Army and no breakdown in the supply of British officers for the Indian Army. There would be an immediate increase in the number of vacancies available at Sandhurst from ten to twenty, and a further five vacancies would be reserved for officers already holding the Viceroy's Commission. Indians would in future also be eligible for cadetships at Woolwich and Cranwell with a view to the formation of Indian artillery, engineers and air units. The Indianization programme would continue under Lord Rawlinson's scheme of eight Indianized units. Young Indians with the King's Commission would be absorbed in these units until there would be only one form of commission in them—the King's Commission. Consequently, as progress was made in those units their officers who held the Viceroy's commission would be transferred. He concluded by pointing out that as there was no means of predicting the future number of candidates, the Government could not fix a definite date (as suggested by the Skeen Committee) for the foundation of an Indian Sandhurst.

From the commencement of the system of young Indians entering Sandhurst the difficulty has been to get a suitable supply of sufficiently educated youths. The Government of India, therefore, started the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun, where education on British public school lines is provided In addition there are the King George's Royal Indian military schools at Jhelum and Jullundar for smaller boys.

Another problem which has been tackled with some measure of success is the maintenance of an effective reserve of British officers in India. The Indian Army List for April, 1929, shows that there were in the Reserve of Officers for the Army in India (both British and Indian units) 15 lieut.-colonels, 116 majors, 655 captains, 298 lieutenants, and 257 2nd lieutenants.

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TABLE A

ORGANIZATION OF COMMANDS AND SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS

Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Districts.	Cantonments.	Units in District or Indep. Bde. Areas.
Northern Command—Headquarters, Murree.	*Peshawar Dist.* (1st class) *H.Q. Peshawar.*	Outposts.	Malakand. Dargai. Chakdara.	1 Br. Cav. Regt. 1 R.H.A. Bty. 3 Ind. Cav. Regts. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty. 1 Med. Bty. 1 Fd. Co.* 1 Pr. Bn. 3 Br. Bns. 13 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co. 3 Sqns. R.A.F. 2 Tg. Bns.
		Chitral Force.	Drosh. Chitral.	
		Landikotal Bde.	Landikotal. LandiKhana. Jamrud. Shagai.	
		Peshawar Bde.	Peshawar.	
		Nowshera Bde.	Nowshera.	
		1st (Risalpur) Cav. Bde.	Risalpur. Mardan.	
	Kohat Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Kohat.*	Outposts.	Kohat. Hangu. Ft. Lockhart. Gulistan. Sangar.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty., less 2 btys. 6 Ind. Bns. 2 Sqns. R.A.F.
		Kohat Bde.	Kohat. Thal. Parachinar.	
	Waziristan Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Dera Ismail Khan.*		Dera Ismail. Khan. Kalabagh-Mari.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty. 1 Sec. Med. Arty. 2 Fd. Cos. 1 Pr. Bn. 1 Br. Bn. 13 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co.
		Razmak Bde.	Razmak. Razani.	
		Bannu Bde.	Bannu. Idak.	
		Manzai Bde.	Manzai. Khirgi.	
	Rawal Pindi Dist. (1st class). *H.Q. Rawal Pindi.*	1st (Abbottabad) Inf. Bde.	Abbottabad. Attock. Cambelpore.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty. 1 Lt. Bty. 2 Fd. Cos. 3 Br. Bns. 8 Ind. Bns. 2 Tg. Bns.
		2nd (Rawal Pindi) Inf. Bde.	Rawal Pindi. Murree Hills.	
		3rd (Jhelum) Inf. Bde.	Jhelum.	
	Lahore Dist. (1st class). *H.Q. Lahore.*	2nd (Sialkot) Cav. Bde.	Sialkot.	1 Br. Cav. Regt. 1 R.H.A. Bty. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty., less 2 btys. 1 Bde. Med. Arty., less 1 bty. and 1 Sec.
		Multan Bde.	Multan.	
		Lahore Bde. Area.	Lahore. Amritsar.	

N.B. Fd.=Field. Pr.=Pioneer. Tg.=Training.

* Signal Service units and R.E. units other than Field Companies are omitted.

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Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Districts.	Cantonments.	Units in District or Indep. Bde. Areas.
Northern Command —*continued.*	*Lahore Dist.* (1st. class) *H.Q. Lahore* (continued).	Jullundur Bde. Area.	Jullundur. Bakloh. Dharmsala.	4 Ind. Cav. Regts. 2 Pr. Bns. 6 Br. Bns. 7 Ind. Bns. 6 Tg. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co. 1 Sqn. R.A.F.
		Ambala Bde. Area.	Ambala Simla Hills.	
		Ferozepore Bde. Area.	Ferozepore.	
Western Command—Headquarters, Quetta.	*Baluchistan Dist.* (1st class). *H.Q. Quetta.*		Quetta.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty., less 2 btys. 1 Bde. Mtn. Arty. 2 Fd. Cos. 1 Pr. Bn. 2 Br. Bns. 7 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co. 2 Sqns. R.A.F.
		4th (Quetta) Inf. Bde.	Quetta. Chaman. Peshin. 5 Outposts.	
		5th (Quetta) Inf. Bde.	Quetta. 1 Outpost.	
	Zhob. (Indep.) Bde. Area. *H.Q. Loralai.*		Loralai. Ft. Sandeman. 13 Outposts.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Mtn. Bty. 5 Ind. Bns.
	Sind. (Indep.) Bde. Area. *H.Q. Karachi.*		Karachi. Hyderabad (Sind). 2 Outposts.	2 Fd. Bys. 1 Heavy Bty. 1 Br. Bn. 2 Ind. Bns. 1 Tg. Bn.
Eastern Command—Headquarters, Naini Tal.	*Meerut Dist.* (1st class). *H.Q. Meerut.*		Roorkee.	1 Br. Cav. Regt. 1 R.H.A. Bty. 3 Ind. Cav. Regts., less 1 sqn. 2 Bdes. Fd. Arty., less 1 bty. 2 Mtn. Btys. 3 Fd. Cos. 1 Pr. Bn. 4 Br. Bns. 10 Ind. Bns. 2 Tg. Bns.
		3rd (Meerut) Cav. Bde.	Meerut.	
		7th (Dera Dun) Inf. Bde.	Dera Dun. Chakrata.	
		8th (Bareilly) Inf. Bde.	Bareilly. Almora. Lansdowne. Naini Tal Hills.	
		9th (Jhansi) Inf. Bde.	Jhansi.	
	Lucknow Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Lucknow.*	6th (Lucknow) Inf. Bde.	Lucknow. Fyzabad. Sitapur.	1 Br. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty. 1 Fd. Bty. 5 Br. Bns. 1 Ind. Cav. Regt. and 1 sqn. 4 Ind. Bns. 1 Arm. Car Co. 2 Tg. Bns.
		Allahabad Bde. Area.	Allahabad. Benares. Cawnpore. Fatehgarh.	
	Presidency and *Assam Dist.* (2nd class). *H.Q. Calcutta.*		Calcutta. Darjeeling. Dinapore. Shillong. 2 Outposts.	1 Sqn. Ind. Cav. 3 Br. Bns. 2 Ind. Bns.

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Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Commands.	Under Hdqrs. of Districts.	Cantonments.	Units in District or Indep. Bde. Areas.
Eastern Command—*continued.*	*Delhi.* (Indep.) Bde. Area. *H.Q. Delhi.*		Delhi. Agra. Muttra.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bde. Med. Arty. 2 Br. Bns. 2 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co.
Southern Command—Headquarters, Poona.	*Deccan Dist.* (1st class). *H.Q. Bolarum.*	4th (Secunderabad) Cav. Bde.	Bolarum.	1 Br. Cav. Regt. 1 R.H.A. Bty. 3 Ind. Cav. Regts., less 1 sqn. 1 Bde. Fd. Arty., less 1 bty. 2 Fd. Btys. 5 Br. Bns. 8 Ind. Bns.
		10th (Jubbulpore) Inf. Bde.	Jubbulpore. Kamptee.	
		11th (Ahmednagar) Inf. Bde.	Admednagar. Aurangabad.	
		12th (Secunderabad) Inf. Bde.	Secunderabad.	
	Central Provinces Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Mhow.*		Mhow. Neemuch. Nasirabad. Ajmere. Saugor. Pachmarhi. Nowgong.	1 Bde. Fd. Arty. 1 Fd. Bty. 1 Pr. Bn. 2 Br. Bns. 3 Ind. Bns. 2 Tg. Bns.
	Madras Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Bangalore.*		Bangalore. Bellary. Trichinopoly.	1 Bde. Fd. Arty.* 2 Fd. Cos. 1 Pr. Bn. 3 Br. Bns. 3 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co.
		Southern Bde. Area.	Madras. Wellington. St. Thomas Mt. Cannanore.	
	Bombay Dist. (2nd class). *H.Q. Bombay.*		Bombay. Deolali. Santa Cruz. Baroda. Ahmedabad.	2 Heavy Btys. 1 Br. Bn. 4 Ind. Bns.
	Poona. (Indep.) Bde. Area. *H.Q. Poona.*		Poona. Kirkee. Belgaum.	1 Ind. Cav. Regt. 1 Bd. Fd. Arty., less 2 btys. 3 Fd. Cos. 1 Pr. Bn. 2 Br. Bns. 2 Ind. Bns. 1 Ard. Car Co. 1 Tg. Bn.
Burma Independent District—Headquarters, Maymyo.			Maymyo.	1 Mtn. Bty. 1 Fd. Co. 1 Pn. Bn. 2 Br. Bns. 3 Ind. Bns. 1 Tg. Bn.
		Rangoon. Bde. Area.	Rangoon. Port Blair. Mandalay.	

* On low establishment of 2 doubled batteries.

INDIAN UNITS SERVING OVERSEAS

(*a*) HONGKONG, 1 Ind. Bn.

(*b*) MALAY STATES, 1 Ind. Bn.

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PERMANENT STAFF INSTRUCTORS IN THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

By Lieut.-Colonel H. I. Powell-Edwards

At dinners and suchlike entertainments of the units of the Territorial Army one toast is always certain to be received with acclamation. It is the toast of the Permanent Staff " coupled with the name of Sergt.-Major Whatshisname."

As in the case of the *personnel* of the Territorial Army itself, there is one distinction which is generally speaking very noticeable between the pre-war and the post-war *personnel* of the Permanent Staff—namely, its youth. The system under which that staff is selected has been altered.

In the opinion of the writer the alteration is not for the better.

Whereas before the war the system was to select senior warrant officers of the Regular Army for positions on the permanent staff of the Territorial Army, and to appoint them for a period which need not be terminated until the Territorial Commanding Officer concerned desired its termination, the post-war system entails an appointment for a limited period (five years as a maximum) and contemplates the return to the Regular Army of the individual in question.

When the writer joined his own regiment the Permanent Staff included three men who had all served their full time in the Regular Army. They drew pay for this duty, and for every year they so served they became entitled to 1*d.* per day extra pension when they ultimately retired.

These men were thoroughly reliable. Their position in the squadrons was unique and unassailable. They were, to the men, authority, albeit benevolent authority, personified. To the junior officer they were wise men whose opinion was always of the greatest value—and they seemed to be very emphatically a part, and no small or insignificant part, of " the regiment."

That they were, according to present notions, a little old for active service goes without saying, although in fact one of them

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went overseas as regimental sergeant-major and did duty to the complete satisfaction of every one concerned till an enemy bullet ended a life of duty well done.

The new system started by giving us some men of whom it can only be said that it is impossible to believe that they were the best their units could produce.

Now, ten years after the war, we have men with whom little fault can be found, but in the getting of them the Commanding Officers of the Territorial Army have, in many instances, had to go through a drastic course of what may be termed selection by elimination.

The duties of a Permanent Staff Instructor in the Territorial Army are not by any means limited to the necessity of being a good instructor.

In many county units headquarters of component parts of the unit are scattered—sometimes widely scattered.

The amount of literature disbursed to, and the number of returns required of, and the voluminosity of records to be kept by units of the Territorial Army have been most hideously increased.

The time available to company, squadron or battery officers, on the other hand, has tended in these hard times to diminish. The one and only " full time " individual in these units is the Permanent Staff Instructor, and if he is not a pretty fully competent clerk it is certain that returns will be wrong, replies to letters delayed, and records faultily kept.

The Territorial Army relies entirely on volunteers to fill its ranks. Recruits of the stamp required are generally brought in by existing members. Existing members must be kept happy and contented, and if they are to be so the Permanent Staff Instructor must be a man who can combine authority with tact and whose personality will appeal to the rank and file.

Discipline, in good units, there is—and discipline of a high order—but it is not the discipline of the iron hand and it is discipline different in nature from that of the Regular Army.

Permanent Staff Instructors in many county units find themselves frequently located in drill halls which are far from the supervising eye of the adjutant or even of the regimental sergeant-major. Furthermore, they have a considerable amount of time in every day which cannot be used for purely instructional purposes. Instruction is confined, generally speaking, to evening hours. The daytime must be occupied in clerical and administrative work and in travelling—and the organization of this work and the method of carrying it

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out must very largely be worked out by the Permanent Staff Instructor himself.

We come therefore to this, that a good Permanent Staff Instructor must be a man of personality and of a pleasing personality, he must be a good instructor, he must also be a good administrator, industrious, methodical and completely trustworthy, even though under only intermittent supervision. He should, in fact, be very thoroughly imbued with the highest traditions of the service.

That Regular Commanding Officers can part with such men without a pang is not to be believed. That some of them have parted with such men is a fact, and to such Regular Commanding Officers the Territorial Army owes a debt which can never be repaid.

But those Regular Commanding Officers—and fortunately the number increases every year—who have served a period as adjutants of Territorial Army units, know that the number of regular warrant officers and non-commissioned officers who can conscientiously be recommended as fit for duty with the Territorial Army is very strictly limited, and the demand, on present lines, far exceeds the supply.

The qualities which have been enumerated as necessary can only be combined in very few men, and that they should be found in men of comparatively short service is very, very rare.

And yet the present system contemplates not only that a large number of such men should be found in a Regular Army depleted in numbers, but further that having found such men their services in the Territorial Army should be strictly limited in time.

What is the result? From the point of view of the Regular Commanding Officer it is that he is being constantly harassed by applications for instructors for the Territorial Army. If he says he has not got men fit for it, his popularity with his superiors is not great. If, knowing that men are not really fit, but thinking that after all some one must go, he sends an unfit man, his popularity with his opposite number in the Territorial Army sinks below zero and the man sent very probably returns.

From the point of view of the Territorial Army Commanding Officer he is confronted with a series of dips in the lucky bag. Now and again he draws a winner. More often he draws a man who after a probationary period of, say, 18 months full of incidents more or less distressing to all parties, becomes something near a winner. Sometimes he draws a very definite blank, but is in the fortunate position of being able to return the blank and have another dip.

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Meanwhile there continues an exodus from the ranks of the Army as a whole of excellent men who are nevertheless, and who always will be, extremely difficult to place in civilian life. They all want " positions of trust." Very, very few of them are qualified for any trade or profession. Many of them are married and have families. And the numbers who beg for " positions of trust " far outnumber the persons in this hard and material world who will trust any one or anything. The system, therefore, involves a continuous and steady demand for men who do not exist in great numbers, it requires also that such men should be young, it offers them only a limited time in the job when they have got it, and it then either returns them to the Regular Army or thrusts them out into a world which is not conscious of their worth and, even if it were so, has only too few niches into which they will fit, and where they must compete for posts in trade or business with men who for the past 20 years have been doing what they now propose to begin doing for the first time.

Surely such a system is wrong. It is believed to be founded on the idea that what the Territorial Army needs is young, active and up-to-date instructors. It is supposed that the pre-war system gave us old men too fat to run or ride, too soft to stand a strain, and inevitably " rusty " in matters of drill and military knowledge.

So far as the last is concerned, any rustiness or tendency to it can very easily be corrected by annual courses of instruction.

So far as the other points are concerned, the writer's opinion is emphatically in favour of the old system. Of the three Permanent Staff Instructors whom he remembers before the war, one was killed in action, as mentioned above, while both the other two finished the war with commissions as quartermasters, having served through the whole of it. Not bad for fat, old and soft men.

When we have found a good man we do not want to part with him in a hurry. The probability of our finding such an one will be increased inversely with the number of times we ask for him. Given that he may be a little " senior " for active service, his function is to teach us in peace. Within a short time of mobilization he does under existing arrangements, leave us, either for the Regulars again or for a second or third line unit.

In former days these posts were eagerly sought by senior warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. They were able to look on their Territorial units as their home and as employment with housing, but only so long as they gave satisfaction. There was thus no tendency to go to sleep. Rather was there every encourage-

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ment to go all out to retain a post which saved them from the bitter competition with younger men and the probable loss of position and of prestige involved in that rather heartless scramble for a living wage. Their seniority in years was a valuable asset with the young Territorial soldier, and their long experience and the knowledge that they were proved by many years of service made Commanding Officers inclined to look on them with favour from the start and also gave those officers an assurance they do not now possess, that in taking them they were not depriving their Regular confrères of men they could ill afford to lose, but rather were giving to good men a position and an occupation which was a suitable reward for good service well performed.

The writer believes that a return to the old system would be welcomed by the great majority of Regular Commanding Officers, by a great majority of Regular warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, and by almost all those Territorial Commanding Officers, of whom there are not now many remaining, who have had experience both of the old system and of the new.

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REGARDING EMIGRATION

By Major H. R. McCullagh, D.S.O., The Durham Light Infantry

Unemployment is without doubt the most serious problem which Great Britain has to face at the present time. The nature of the contract for military service whereby men retire while still in full vigour creates a special unemployment problem of its own and deserves serious consideration. A partial solution of this particular problem would be found if a large proportion of time-expired married men could be induced to emigrate to the dominions.

Let us therefore see what the Army has done in the past, is doing in the present, and what it can possibly do in the future to assist such a scheme.

In the past, every form of propaganda regarding emigration has been used although, admittedly, with little effect.

At present the matter is being taken up seriously by the Army, and men are encouraged in their last year of Colour Service to attend a course of instruction at the Army Vocational Training Centres. The object of these courses is to fit men for civil life whether at home or in one of our dominions. Various trades of a useful nature are taught by able instructors and the results are satisfactory. While there is no guarantee of employment, undoubtedly many men who have passed through these Vocational Centres and have been well reported on do find the kind of work they want. So far so good. The men get employment, but this is not the best we can do for them. These men cannot be as happy and contented in England as they would be if they emigrated to the dominions.

Let us therefore examine the position of a soldier abroad, say in India, in which country a large portion of our Army is always serving.

What opportunities has a soldier in India of learning a trade? He might be attached to a Government Dairy Farm, to the Artillery or Cavalry for learning shoeing and wheelwright's work, or he might find work in the railway shops at Bombay or Calcutta. But these

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opportunities do not compare favourably with the Vocational Training at home.

The climate in India is hardly suitable for a European to undertake manual work. The hot weather and the monsoon practically rule out six months of the year. In spite of that fact "something" is being done in the Army "in the present" to give Vocational Instruction, but sufficient emphasis is not being laid on the advantages and even necessity for emigration. We all know that every year many hundreds of men are transferred from the Colours to the Reserve. Many of these, perhaps even the majority, begin their civil careers by swelling the river of unemployment. In fact, these men really form quite a large tributary to that depressing and unwholesome river.

One of the objects of the Army is to return men to civil life better citizens than when they left it to join the Colours. This object is achieved, but with a queue of over a million unemployed already waiting for work the opportunities of the time-expired man of to-day are extremely limited. Some, of course, do get jobs, but the majority only get work of a casual nature. It seems a pity that this well-trained material should, so to speak, "go begging," and yet a solution seems almost impossible.

What, then, is to be done? It is useless to suggest flooding Canada or Australia with an army of unmarried men, for one thing, and one thing only, would happen: there would be a steady drift back into the towns where congenial company and amusements could be found.

It may be impossible to deal with the unmarried time-expired man, but the married man of the Army about to become time-expired form a tributary of no mean size and deserve the most serious consideration of every one concerned. To my mind this problem can be solved, to some extent at least, with good propaganda and cooperation for emigration.

A few years ago in India I attended a conference, or perhaps I should call it an informal talk, at Allahabad with a colonel of the Australian Staff on the subject of Army emigration. In this informal talk he was probing the question of the desirability of starting a Vocational Training Centre in India for those intending to settle on the land in Australia. His idea, in the rough, was to select a suitable place in India where Europeans could work all the year round, and start a class of intending settlers who would be taught Australian methods of farming by Australian instructors. Now this idea appears almost ideal in its simplicity. There are

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several suitable places in Southern India where Europeans can, and do, live and work all the year round—Wellington, Ootacamund and Belgaum are all suitable. The latter place, Belgaum, is at present the seat of the Senior Officers' School and possesses barracks and buildings entirely unused and most suitable for the training suggested. Except for minor alterations and adjustments, no expense would be incurred in building. Again, south of Belgaum are enormous tracts of forest land, and no doubt practice in felling trees and clearing scrub could easily be arranged in conjunction with the Forest Department.

Now comes the most important part of the scheme. "Is it worth it, and who will pay?"

Australia, India, England, all, perhaps two, possibly none.

The points of this scheme which require careful consideration are many. But the primary point—leaving out the financial side—is: "How many students could be trained on a course of six months and what is the prospect of these courses continuing for a number of years?" In other words, would there be a steady flow of intending emigrants? That seems to me to be the rock on which the scheme may be wrecked. It is a question on which no one can prophesy. If units could register names of intending emigrants who mean what they say and really intend to emigrate after they have done this course, then, and then only, could it be decided whether a Government was justified or not in initiating this scheme.

According to Lord Apsley's book ("Amateur Settlers," by Lord and Lady Apsley)—which should be well circulated in the Army—it is as important for the wife as for the husband to undergo some preliminary training, but not absolutely necessary.

Let us now concentrate on what is known as the "Married Patch" in the Army, especially those serving in India.

Here we have exactly what we require, namely, a man with a home and home ties and under forty years of age, and one whom we can presume wishes to bring up his family in decent circumstances. These people have been abroad from five to seven years, some possibly more, and no doubt the majority would—before definitely emigrating—desire to see the old country and friends once more.

Again, it should be remembered that in the Army abroad the married families live in comparative comfort, not to say luxury. In India money and servants are still more or less cheap, and it is really rather a shock to most when they find themselves once more in England looking for a home and work.

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Surely the "Married Patch" is good ground for the best propaganda. By this one does not mean flooding the home, institutes and sergeants' messes with posters, pamphlets and leaflets. They will possibly be glanced at but never read or digested. No, a good lecturer with a good cinema showing actual pictures of families at work on a farm on the "group settlement scheme" would be a real advantage; one would actually hear the lecturer and see the films and what is actually going on, the nature of the work and the home. This combined lecture and film would at least be remembered and, what is more, would lead to discussions and arguments. From now onwards interest in emigration would be aroused, which would be a distinct step forward.

I have recently taken the trouble to visit and talk to many families now serving in the Army at home and to some who have left the Service, and practically all say the same thing, namely, that they wish they were back in India. Now why is this? The answer is that abroad life is easier, cleaner and more congenial. There is no question of living in crowded streets in grim and dirty industrial centres, there is no poverty and squalor among the European community abroad. In fact, during their sojourn abroad these conditions have been forgotten. That these things exist comes as rather a rude awakening, and it is to prevent such as these from sinking into the slough of despond that I feel so strongly, that immediate steps should be taken to assist families to emigrate.

Also, one should realize that in many cases the children of the "Married Patch" have all been born abroad, and therefore their upbringing has been entirely different from that of their relations and friends born in England. Their outlook on life is different and the only poverty they know is the poverty of the Indian bazaars, and even that appears less gruesome than that of England on a wet and cold day.

It is to convince this class of people of the advantages of settlement abroad, especially in Australia on the group settlement plan, that I suggest most vigorous propaganda.

They have forgotten from what they have come and their children don't know to what they are going. Convince the heads of the families that it is a duty they owe to their offspring to put them out into the world under the best possible conditions; and that these conditions can be found under the "Group Settlement Scheme" but are very unlikely to be found in England.

Let us assume that a family in India, time-expired, wishes to emigrate to Australia but at the same time visit England and home

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first. On leaving the Army the husband is " paid off." He must then find a lodging somewhere or live with relations, and, unless he lives on his savings, find some work. If not, he will register for the Unemployment Benefit—" The Dole."

Now would it not be better for families like this to be " Registered for Emigration " and be paid during the period of waiting for a ship, either at his military rates or on a rate equal to the " dole " ? (but do *not* call it that). After all, this period of waiting is his holiday after several years abroad.

Whether he was paid at military rates or " dole " rates is immaterial ; the point is that he is being paid pending emigration. In other words, he is paid to take up employment, not just paid to remain definitely in unemployment. This I consider a very important distinction and I would extend the scheme further. I should pay him for his first six months after he has left England irrespective of what he may earn as a settler.

I cannot imagine any subscriber (taxpayer) to the " dole " objecting to this, for, for once, he would see a definite return for his money. It is a business proposition which should be examined generously and sympathetically.

To sum up. To stem the flow of unemployment let the Army concentrate with intensive propaganda both at home and abroad on the advantages of emigration to our dominions to the married Army man.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE War Diary of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and Dr. Bredt's book about the Schlieffen Plan are dealt with in special articles. The most interesting of those dealt with here are the Carnegie foundation publication on the French system for the Government Control of War, Lieut.-Colonel Charbonneau on the French Fourth Army in the battles of the Marne, 1914, and General Sikorski on the Polish-Bolshevik Campaign of 1920.

GENERAL

Les Formes du Gouvernement de Guerre (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 15 francs), by Pierre Renouvin, a publication of the Carnegie foundation, is of general interest as it deals with the whole subject of the changes and modifications in the organization of the powers of the Government in France in the course of the war—particularly as regards public liberty, the public services, and its relations with the High Command and Parliament. Incidentally it describes the authority obtained by General Joffre, and gives the story of his final disappearance from power, which the Government did not altogether intend.

In general, there was no radical change of organization in France, less indeed than in any other European country.

> " The routine of the political and administrative offices retained in appearance the aspect of its normal features : the exigencies of the crisis brought about modifications which affected the spirit of political life, but, as a whole, respected its form."

There was in existence in 1914 the law of " State of Siege," dating from 1849 and completed in 1878, which could be brought into force " in case of imminent peril due to a foreign war or armed insurrection." This gave the military certain powers of police control over the civil population, for requisitioning, and in the use of the railways, etc.

It is as regards the relations between the Government and the High Command that the book is of special interest.

By the Constitution the President of the Republic " disposed of the armed forces." He had the right to exercise command if he

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possessed the wish and the aptitude to do so. In practice he delegated the command, retaining in his hands the general direction of the conduct of the war. Thus the Government would decide the objects to be pursued and assume the political direction of the military operations in relation to alliances and diplomatic negotiations. In principle, the division of details was simple, but its application was difficult. The subject was many times raised in Parliament, in relation to Parliamentary control; but nothing was definitely settled except that by a Decree of the 28th of October, 1913, it was laid down that:

"Each theatre of operations will have a commander-in-chief, unity of action being ensured by the responsible executive power. The Government will designate the principal adversary against whom should be directed the greater part of the national forces. In consequence, the Government will allot the means of action and resources of all natures, and put them at the absolute disposal of the generals and admirals charged with the command-in-chief in the various theatres of war."

In the regulations, published six weeks later, provision was made for the fixing of a line of demarcation between the *zone de l'Intérieur* under the Minister of War, and the *zone des Armées*, placed under the High Command and the commanders of Armies, so that railways and supply and medical services in the latter came under the generals commanding the field troops.

Various attempts were made to clear up the question of how far Parliamentary control would remain in force; proposals were made for delegations, commissions, etc., but nothing was done except to provide for members of Parliament liable for service having eight days' leave on mobilization, so that they might be present to vote on the first measures taken. A Socialist deputy Marcel Sembat, in 1913, summed the matter up by saying, "*Faites un roi ou bien faites la paix*"; for Republican rule and the idea of war, he said, were self-contradictory. War requires a high degree of Government energy, and the Republic "has not so far been capable of conducting the administration of the country satisfactorily in time of peace." How can a war be won when the preparations for the struggle, which imply "secrets," "dissimulation" and "intrigue," are in the hands of a Government which may go out of office at any moment. "I do not believe," said Sembat, "that one can ever find in a Republic the qualities which the conduct of a war require."

When the war came in 1914, as there was only one theatre of war and only one commander-in-chief, under the Decree of 1913, the Government evidently lost one of its functions. There was no

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division of troops or resources to make. The commander-in-chief became absolute, and the then Minister of War, M. Messimy, said to Joffre, " You are the master of the war, and we are only your suppliers."

M. Messimy was not even kept informed of General Joffre's plans or operations. He intervened with an order on the 25th of August that an Army of three active corps should be constituted for the defence of Paris, with which Joffre did not comply. The Government fled to Bordeaux and effaced itself, and Joffre created an " impassable wall " round the zone of Armies by forbidding access into that zone to civilians, even to the Parliamentary Commission of the Army, which exercised control by criticism in peace time. Joffre was supreme.

When the Army of Salonica was formed a new situation arose. There were now two fronts, and the Government had the right to divide the effectives. On the 4th of September, 1915, they directed Joffre to withdraw four divisions from his front for despatch to the East. The Commander-in-Chief protested. He demanded that the *Conseil Supérieur de la Défence Nationale*, which had not met since the outbreak of war, should be reconstituted, with the President, President of the Council, the Ministers of War and 1 oreign Affairs, and himself as members, with a permanent secretariat to study " the conduct of the war as a whole." The Government yielded in order to afford Joffre the fullest support in the Inter-Allied Conferences, at which he sat as Commander-in-Chief on the French front, when questions of the war in the Near East came up for discussion. On the 2nd of December, 1915, by Decree, Joffre's authority was extended to the Army of the Orient. He was practically generalissimo, but he had to keep the Government informed of his intentions, so that there might be a discussion of his projects. The President of the Council summed up the situation : " The Government had the conduct of the war ; but not the conduct of the operations." General Galliéni, Minister of War since the 29th of October, 1915, made an attempt to assert his authority. He demanded to be consulted as regards the appointment and dismissal of Army commanders, he informed the High Command that the Government expected that " partial offensives " would cease, and drew the attention of the generalissimo to the weakness of certain parts of the line. Joffre protested and threatened resignation, and the Government gave in and ceased interference.

Then came the Verdun offensive, against one of the parts referred to as weak by the Minister of War. Galliéni made proposals for

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reorganizing the High Command, but his colleagues failing to support him, he resigned. Joffre's position was, however, shaken, and he was informed by M. Briand that henceforward decisions concerning the war and the conduct of the war would all be taken *au sein du governement*. Finally in November M. Briand determined to supersede Joffre, and on the 29th informed a secret sitting of the Chamber that he had gone back on the Decree of the 2nd of December, 1915, and that, as there were now two theatres of war, the Government would resume its constitutional rights, and take general control, assisted by a technical counsellor, practically "a General-in-Chief of the French Armies," in the person of General Joffre, thus depriving him of the effective command, but leaving him a high moral position.

This did not last long, for on the 12th of December M. Briand remodelled his Ministry, replacing General Roques as Minister of War by General Lyautey. As soon as the latter had assumed his office, he pointed out that the regulations of 1913 had not provided for "a generalissimo technical counsellor," and it was the right of the Minister of War to direct the commanders-in-chief of the different theatres. On the 27th of December Joffre was made a Marshal of France, and the post of technical counsellor after a month's existence disappeared.

The powers of the commanders-in-chief were now reduced, in particular the powers of nominating commanders of armies and corps reverted to the Minister of War, and General Lyautey visited the generals at the front in France, and made them submit their plans of attack.

He then took to himself a Chief of the Staff or technical assistant, General de Castelnau. But the Government sent the latter on a mission to Russia, and on the 14th of March Lyautey himself left power. His successor, M. Painlevé, took up Lyautey's ideas, and on the 29th of April he created a post of Chief of the Staff of the Army, and appointed General Pétain to it. When on the 16th of May Pétain succeeded Nivelle as Commander of the Armies in France, Foch was appointed in his place. His position as regards seniority with Pétain was never defined, but as he gave most of his attention to relations with the Allied armies, the system seems to have worked without friction.

Nominally the Government retained control by the assembly from time to time of Grand Councils of War—e.g. in the time of the Verdun attack and before the Nivelle offensive—at which the President, President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of

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War, the Commander-in-Chief and commanders of Groups of Armies were present, in order to have the explanations of the Commander-in-Chief and the views of the senior generals.

There was practically no parliamentary control. Joffre confined the privileges of the Commission de l'Armee to visiting military establishments outside the zone of the Armies. Not until the advent of General Galliéni on the 17th of May, 1916, were representatives of the Commission permitted to visit the front occasionally to examine the sanitary state of the troops, the railways and the lines of defence. They were not allowed to remain permanently in the zones of the Armies. In July, 1916, the position of the commissioners was defined, they were allowed to visit the Armies, but not to see documents relative to the conception and execution of plans of operations, or plans of defences ; a line was fixed at the times of operations beyond which they might not go—this remained in force until the end of the war—and during the mutinies of June, 1917, they were not allowed to visit the troops to study their morale. Finally in October, 1917, subject to the above restrictions, they were allowed to make visits at any time, provided they informed the Minister of War.

There are tables of the composition of the seven Ministries which were in power during the war.

The German Parliamentary Committee which for the past ten years has been inquiring into the " Causes of the German Collapse in the Year 1918," * has, under the title of *Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruch in Jahre* 1918 (Berlin, Deutsche Verlag für Politik und Geschichte), published four more large volumes (Volumes IX and X each in two parts), giving an account of the sittings held and the evidence taken with regard to the connection of the Navy with the revolution.

The general conclusions of the sub-committee which dealt with the matter are that the general causes which led to the collapse of the nation as a whole affected also the Navy, but were rendered more acute by the conditions of life on board ship. In particular, it was established that unrest and serious disaffection appeared as early as the beginning of 1915 among portions of the crews of various battleships and battle cruisers, but it is not known whether they occurred on smaller vessels. The disaffection had its seed ground in the inactivity, so far as the war was concerned, of the men and officers ;

* See article in the *Army Quarterly*, April, 1926, and Notes on Foreign War Books, October, 1928.

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for the larger ships never went into action, and the narrow routine life crowded together on board ship proved depressing, and in the end told on the nerves. The irritation was increased by a feeling amongst part of the men that their complaints as regards food and treatment had no chance of redress, and that the great difference between conditions in the officers' and men's messes might by good will have been adjusted.

The men could not understand why the fleet was not employed, and in the end the increasing desire for peace in the nation affected them.

The crews were also contaminated by the political work carried on amongst them, as in the army and in the homeland, by the Independent Socialist and Left Radical groups. On the other hand, the officers initiated active propaganda in favour of annexation of occupied enemy territory. The effects of the Socialist political propaganda were greatly assisted by the news of the progress of the Russian revolution.

In 1917 orders regarded as unjustifiable were disobeyed, combined absenteeism from ships took place, and meetings of the men were held on shore. The execution of two seamen by sentence of court martial for disobedience was regarded as unjust and embittered the relations with the officers. The existing unions of sailors and stokers then broken up was not re-established, and no further revolutionary meetings, so far as is known, took place. In fact, until the autumn of 1918, the men responded to all calls on them.

The instances of refusal to obey orders in the autumn of 1918 were due to the crews of certain ships feeling that a victorious sea battle could not change the course of the war, and the fleet was to be sacrificed for the sake of prestige. They further thought that a battle would disturb the peace negotiations. The request by the Supreme Command for an armistice was regarded as the end of the war. The mutinies of 1918, so far as the mass of the seamen was concerned, were not originally directed towards upsetting the form of government; but, under the guidance of leaders united and determined in their purpose, the agitation eventually took a definite political colour. The proceedings in Kiel formed the prologue to the general German revolution.

Western Front

La Bataille des Frontières et la Bataille de la Marne vues par un Chef de Section (8 *Août*—15 *Septembre*, 1914), by Lieut.-Colonel

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breveté Jean Charbonneau (Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, 10 francs), is based on the diary of the author, in 1914 a subaltern commanding the machine-gun section of the 7th Colonial Regiment, in the 3rd Division of the Colonial Corps in the Fourth Army (General de Langle de Cary). The diary is printed in its entirety and provides the local colour, but between blocks of entries a nearly complete story of the operations of the Colonial Corps is given. There are nine sketch-maps.

Colonel Charbonneau thus sums up the life of an infantry unit :

" We march, we march, very often marking time. Now and then we fight, and, when we can, we rest, and even, if circumstances permit, do a bit of instruction, which, by the way, is by no means superfluous. Yes, really, and contrary to what some people imagined before 1914, we don't fight every day. And fortunately so : great battles like those of the 22nd of August demand such a state of nervous tension that we could not ' hold on ' if we had to stand such violent fire without respite on ground without cover."

The great French offensive of the 22nd of August was ordered because intelligence information showed that the Germans were making " a great flank march parallel to the French front in the general direction of Namur—Brussels "—now known to have been a general wheel pivoting on Thionville, designed to bring about an envelopment of the French right. It was thought that a vigorous offensive on the flank of the movement would defeat the German strategic plans.

The orders of the Fourth Army should have resulted in simultaneous attacks—" the enemy was to be attacked wherever met," good old phrase—by all the corps, marching in parallel columns, echeloned from the left. Naturally divisions could not keep such an alignment in hilly, wooded country. The different columns ran unsupported into the German corps : " what actually happened was that, instead of our troops falling on the flank of the enemy, it was the enemy who struck our flank."

Nothing was really known of the enemy. Aviators reported that the ground in front of the Colonial Corps was free of Germans, and that there were no important forces within twenty-five to thirty miles of the outposts. On the morning of the 22nd there was an extremely thick mist, the route of the French troops was through forests in leaf, and the cavalry could do nothing to clear up the situation. The 7th Colonial Regiment, acting as flank guard,

" arrived within a few hundred metres of the enemy without even suspecting his presence. . . . Every one says that the regiment fell into

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a trap and was not supported. The roads were blocked with the wounded of the 7th and other units of the division."

Two companies of the 7th were away on escort duty, the others lost 70 per cent. of their effectives. The author comments that "the famous theory of the instantaneous deployment (*éclatement*) of the advanced guard was either not applied or proved out of the question." The artillery of the corps was caught on the road as it left the village of St. Vincent, and in consequence of heavy losses and difficulty of getting into action, only one *groupe* was able to render much assistance to the infantry.

The author is quite sure that the Germans had not prepared fortified positions in which they waited to be attacked. It was an encounter battle. The German VI Corps, the left of the Fourth Army, was moving southwards to get in touch with the right of the Fifth.

"Chance willed it that it should debouch into the clearing south of the Forests of Neufchateau and Rulles, at the very moment that the head of the right column of the Colonial Corps entered the forest; making an oblique movement to the right, it fell on the flanks of the colonials."

The latter could do little on ground whose configuration—it was cut up by streams as well as wooded—prevented the several columns and even part of the same columns from rendering each other assistance.*

There was nothing to do but fall back first behind the Chiers, and then behind the Meuse, where a good fight was put up on the 27th of August to prevent the Germans from forcing the passage. But they managed to do so farther north, and the Colonial Corps then began a long retreat just west of the Argonne to behind the Marne—Rhine Canal in the neighbourhood of Vitry le François. The reason given for the retreat was "the critical position of the British and the Fifth Army."

The morale during the retreat was good. "Supplies never failed," and the men were much cheered by the miserable appearance of the few German cavalry prisoners they took, obviously half starved, and the horses without one or more shoes.

When the order to end the retreat came the Colonial Corps found itself alone, for the II and XII Corps on its right and left had been

* A good account of the fighting in detail will be found in an article in the *Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires*, for October, 1928, entitled "Le combat de recontre de la 3e division Coloniale française et du VI. C.A. actif allemand près de Rossignol St. Vincent et Tintigny le 22e Août 1914," based on papers by Captain Allemand in the *Schweitzerische Monatschrift für Officiere aller Waffen*, September, 1927, to April, 1928.

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moved back by train, and were well in rear of it, and it was not until midday of the 7th of September that the II came up abreast of it—the XII apparently arrived later. A line was taken up about three miles from and parallel to the Marne—Rhine Canal. The Germans attacked fiercely on the 6th, and pressed the left centre of the Colonial Corps back slightly. Fighting continued through the 7th and 8th, and Mont Moret, at the junction with the XII Corps, was in danger. But on the 9th the attacks lost their violence. On the 10th the Germans only bombarded the Colonials. During the night of the 10th–11th there was much firing, and then " at dawn absolute quiet reigned on the battlefield. Timidly our men ventured over to the trenches occupied the previous evening by the enemy, and found them unoccupied."

The diary account of the state of the German lines says : " The trenches had evidently been evacuated in haste. All around was covered with clips of cartridges, rifles, tools, haversacks, wire, and telegraph instruments."

At midday the Colonial Corps was ordered forward. After the experience of the 22nd of August, the march was slow, " units being formed in column with wide intervals and proceeding by bounds. Rain beginning at 4 p.m. made movement across country very difficult. The enemy made no attempt to retard the march."

Colonel Charbonneau points out that the battle of the Marne was just the reverse of the Battles of the Frontier. In the latter the French went :

" heads down, eyes closed, against a solid barrier composed of numerous German divisions, perfectly trained and well provided with guns of various calibres and machine guns. The shock was all the greater to us, as we showed plenty of dash."

At the Marne it was the French who waited for the enemy and offered a continuous defensive front, not too well organized, but with good liaison between artillery and infantry.

General Joffre's famous order of the day for the battle did not reach the Colonial Corps until the morning of the 8th, and was read " in the colourless voice of the sergeant-major between details of daily duties and the distribution of letters."

Du rôle de l'Armée de Champagne et des Forteresses belges en 1914 (Brussels, Institut Cartegraphique Militaire, 10 francs), by Lieut.-Colonel Duvivier and Major Herbiet, both of the Belgian General

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Staff, gives an exceeding clear sketch of the operations of the Belgian forces from the outbreak of hostilities until the retirement on Ypres in October, 1914. The object of the book is to discover what German forces were detained by the Belgians and kept from the main battles, and the argument is supported by copious references to German official publications.

It is shown that the fortress of Liége not only blocked the passage of the Germans until the 16th of August and interfered with the deployment of the German First and Second Armies, but covered the mobilization and concentration of the field army, tore the veil from the German plan of campaign, and compelled the enemy to send there his powerful siege train—which was badly wanted for the operations in Alsace and the absence of which may have contributed to the failure of Crown Prince Rupprecht to force the Meuse line.

"In addition the defence of Liége, from the moral point of view, had an enormous reaction. It was the confirmation of the proud response of the Belgian Government to the ultimatum of the 2nd of August. Liége became a symbol."

As regards the fortress of Namur, tables drawn from German histories are given which prove that the enemy forces left to deal with it between the 20th and 25th of August amounted to an average of 120,000 men of the field army and over 500 guns. Further, it created a gap between the German Second and Third Armies, so that they were unable to combine their operations; it delayed the attack on Givet; and gave time for the destruction of the Seilles tunnel on the Liége—Maubeuge line and thus contributed to the resistance of the fortress of Maubeuge. It might have been added that Namur held out long enough for the main advance of the French to have reached it had their plan not been formed on erroneous doctrine and surmise. As it was, a French detachment arrived in sight of Namur on the day it fell.

Coming to the Belgian field army it is shown that its presence on the Gette led to Kluck's Army making a large enveloping movement by the north in the hope of cutting it off from Antwerp and tired out and delayed his troops.

The retirement of the Belgian Army compelled the Germans to detach a flank guard, first of Kluck's army and then a special force to watch it and guard their rear and the communications. This force by the 23rd of August amounted to seven divisions, apart from Landsturm battalions. The total number, therefore, detained by Antwerp and Namur and kept from the battle of Charleroi amounted to about fourteen divisions and a corps of cavalry.

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Early in September the German Supreme Command determined to form an Army of Belgium (later the name Seventh Army was transferred to it) under General von Heeringen, to consist of the III Reserve and IX Reserve Corps and Marine Division already in Belgium, the VII Reserve Corps besieging Maubeuge, and the XV Corps and 7th Cavalry Division from Alsace. Actually the German divisions detained in Belgium during the battle of the Marne amounted to ten and a half, whilst the arrival of others from Alsace and the sending up of reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies was delayed by the situation in Belgium and the damage done to the railways.

The authors consider what would have been the result had the Belgian field army on the 18th of August marched from the Gette to the left of the Allied Line, instead of retiring on Antwerp. They think that " even if it could have got there, which is far from being certain, it would have found itself at the battle of the Marne, completely worn out, without ammunition, without a spare rifle and without possibility of being supplied." The Germans could have masked Antwerp with a few Landsturm battalions, and there would have been at least seven and a half more German divisions at the battle.

In conclusion the authors point out that the lack of preparation of the Belgian Army for war made its operations of special difficulty. Although the individuals were well instructed in their duties, " collective training had been completely neglected "; officers had seldom any opportunity of practice in manœuvring their units in the field, for the peace strength was so low that training amounted to skeleton drill. The fortresses, such as they were, rendered service in gaining time and detaining some of the enemy forces, but the decision of a war must always rest with the active army, and fortresses must be sacrificed rather than that field troops should be shut up and perish in them.

The book concludes with a number of tables showing the exact German formations engaged before the Belgian fortresses and the field army at various times.

Eastern Front

Das Gefecht von Arys (" The Action of Arys ") *am* 7 *und* 8 *September*, 1914 (Berlin: " Offene Worte " 1.50 Marks), by Hauptmann von Schellwitz, is of interest for the reason that the German 1st Division, with which it is concerned, during the course

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of the Battle of the Masurian Lakes encountered the Russians on its own training ground (Truppen-Uebungsplatz), the enemy actually occupying its own hut barracks.

The division as part of the I Corps on the right flank of Hindenburg's Eighth Army was entrusted with the task of turning the southern flank of Rennenkampf's Army, passing along the frontier between the lakes. In spite of the advantage of knowing the ground intimately and finding the old landmarks, the night advance of the division was not a success. The ground was certainly difficult, an area of "wet meadows and marsh, woods, and copses"; the troops were tired after three weeks' continuous marching and operations; and supply failed. "The field kitchens came up empty"; the refilling arrangements "could not keep pace with the tremendous marches; turnips were the "*Ersatz* for dinners." The real cause of failure, however, appears to have been that the Germans in September, 1914, had no idea of conducting night operations—the failure of the Crown Prince's Army near Verdun a couple of days later seems to confirm this view. The formation adopted for the advance in the dark was battalion columns, the leading companies deployed at half a pace interval and preceded by patrols. Fire was soon received and the companies were halted and dug in.

The 1st Division seems to have thought that the Russians, although now fully warned, would wait to be attacked, and without pressing on to keep contact made elaborate arrangements for enveloping them next day. But they quietly slipped off and "disappeared in a masterly fashion," only the shells which fell on the Germans showing that they were still in existence and their resistance unbroken.

The "Action of Arys" is not included among the twenty-one battle honours given in the German official list in "Schlachten und Gefechte" for the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the 5th–15th of September, 1914.

POLAND

La campagne Polono—Russe de 1920 (Paris, Payot, 25 francs), is an authoritative account by General L. Sikorski, who commanded the Polish Fifth Army in the campaign, and has been prime minister and minister of war. The French translation is by Commandant Larcher, there is a preface by Maréchal Foch and there are ten sketch-maps.

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The author begins by giving a most instructive description of Poland. With its vast forests and marshes, it appears to be a country singularly unsuited for the manœuvres of a mechanized army.

The campaign can be very shortly summarized. In the summer of 1920 the Moscow Government decided on the destruction of Poland, and collected for the purpose four Armies and two strong cavalry corps. The Commander-in-Chief on the Russian western front, Tuchazevski, announced in a proclamation to his forces: "The destiny of the universal republic lies in the west; the route of the world conflagation passes over the corpse of Poland. . . . Forward on Vilna, Minsk, Warsaw."

The Polish forces, in five Armies, had been scattered to protect the long eastern frontier, and were therefore incapable of any serious offensive. As there was no central reserve they were equally incapable of an effective defensive. The difficulties of the situation were increased by the vast size of the theatre and the lack of communications.

Throughout July the Bolshevik Armies continued to advance, delayed neither by the partial and ill-organized Polish counter-attacks, nor by the Notes addressed to Moscow by the Governments of the Allied Great Powers. These Powers, having disarmed themselves, had no troops to send. But they despatched General Weygand; and, in an ill-defined position, without having actual command, he became counsellor of the Polish General Staff. By his advice the defence of various lines of resistance and the partial counter-attacks were stopped. The five Polish Armies were collected and reorganized in front and on the flanks of Warsaw. The orders for this are given in full. Begun on the 7th of August the operation was completed by the 12th. By this time the Bolshevik Armies were closing on the capital, and on the 8th an outflanking movement on the north by the Fourth Army was developing. To meet this the Polish Fifth Army (under the author) was strengthened. Fortunately for the Poles, the Russian orders, sent by wireless—as in the Tannenberg campaign—could be easily read, and it was comparatively simple to outmanœuvre an artless foe who thus gave away his intentions.

On the 13th of August the Bolsheviks attacked the Polish forces before Warsaw, and heavy fighting continued in front of the capital on the two following days. On the 16th, however, the Polish Fifth Army, north of Warsaw, took in flank the Bolshevik outflanking force, and the Third and Fourth Armies on the right, south of Warsaw,

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advanced, wheeled northward, and caught in flank the main Bolshevik forces attacking Warsaw. The Bolshevik Fourth Army was destroyed, but the rest of the Russians fled so rapidly that Marshal Pilsudski's advance northward failed to drive them up against the German frontier. Nevertheless, 66,000 prisoners, 231 guns and 1,023 heavy machine guns were taken, and barely half the men reached Russia again. It may be that the fate of the western world was decided in front of Warsaw, for the prestige attaching to a Bolshevik victory would have been enormous.

Technical

Ingenieur und Soldat (" Engineer and Soldier "), by Otto Schwab (Nidda (Hesse), Hassia, 10 Marks), is a technical book dealing mainly with the organization and progress of artillery range-finding, particularly sound-ranging and flash-spotting, during the war. It is shortly referred to here, as otherwise it may escape notice. The author is a civil engineer by profession. At the outbreak of war he was a student at a technical high school, and went into the field as an underofficer of the reserve in a foot artillery ammunition column, eventually becoming a lieutenant of foot artillery, and instructor at the artillery range-finding school at Wahn. Lieut.-General von Wissel, who contributes a preface, stated that he had so much to do with the organization of scientific range-finding that " his name is forever coupled with the development of the German artillery."

Lieut. Schwab began to write his personal reminiscences, but whilst engaged on them it struck him that, although some years had passed, relatively little had appeared in military literature on range-finding and shooting methods in the war, and that he could best serve the interests of the rising generation by giving an account of them. The book traces year by year the development of artillery methods, in improving which the author encountered much opposition from the higher staffs. A good many of the experiments were carried out in the Ypres sector.

Both belligerents, it is curious to note, developed the same ideas almost simultaneously. The idea of sound-ranging first occurred to the author in January, 1915, when he was an observer. In February he went back to the Electro-Technical Institute in Darmstadt, and in four weeks, in collaboration with Professor Wirtz produced the first magneto-electric " Schalzeitschreiber," and it was in working order at the front in May. In this invention, therefore, the Germans were slightly behind the French, who (see the British

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Official History, Vol. IV, p. 19) had it going early in 1915, and brought their instrument to the notice of the British in March.

Flash-spotting was begun in an elementary way in the German army in December, 1914, as it was in the British army. The first recognized unit with an official establishment was formed on the 1st of October, 1915, and in the British army on the same date.

The book contains very numerous illustrations. It ends with a more than usually patriotic exordium, in which it is claimed on an examination of the casualty returns that :

" 1,000 soldiers of the Central Powers put 966 opponents out of action, whilst 1,000 soldiers of the Entente only accounted for 365 soldiers of the Central Powers. Thus we occasioned nearly three times the losses that our foes did, and it must be remembered that the purely German proportion is greater, a proof that the effect of our fire and our training was greatly superior to that of the enemy."

The fallacy, of course, is that this calculation includes the Allied (at any rate, the British) lightly wounded and excludes the German. It may be admitted that the Germans were superior to the Russians, Serbs, Rumanians, and Italians ; their defeats came from the French, Belgian, American, and British, and were largely due to the effect of the Allies' fire, if not to their superior training.

Déstructions et Dévastations au course des guerres. Réparations (Paris, Berger Levrault, 15 francs), by Général Robert Normand, a very convenient summary, is principally concerned with the demolitions executed by the French and Belgians in the retreats of 1914 and 1918, the wholesale destruction carried out by the Germans in 1917, and the repair of the damage. An introduction of 36 pages shortly refers to the devastation of the Palatinate in 1689, and the destruction done in the American Civil War of 1861–5, the war of 1870–1, South Africa, 1899–1902, and Manchuria, 1904–5. The chapter headings show the arrangement of the book : Destruction of roads in 1914 ; German devastations in the strategic retirement of March, 1917 (railways excluded) ; Destructions and repairs in 1918 (railways excluded) ; Demolition of railways in 1914 ; Repair of railways by the French in 1914 ; Repair of railways after the German retreat of March, 1917 ; Repair of railways during the French offensive of 1918 until the armistice ; Repair of railways after the armistice ; Various demolitions (canals, telephone, and telegraph lines) ; Industrial destruction. There are 72 illustrations of damage and repairs, and of the German " booby-traps."

Pointing out the senseless fury of the Germans in destruction in

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March, 1917, General Normand shows that its only military result was that the French advance to the Hindenburg Line took five days instead of two. He prints a German order of the 108th Infantry Brigade which says that " wells everywhere are to be contaminated " —in violation of The Hague Rules. The order explains much of the senseless damage: battalions were merely given areas " to destroy," and it concludes, " besides the units named, it is the duty of every one to participate in these destructions."

From a book of 600 pages issued by the German Great General Staff in 1916, *Die Industrie im besetzten Gebiete* (" Industry in Occupied Territory "), the author shows that the Germans had a definite policy of destroying factories, mines, power-houses, etc., not for military purposes, but with the object of crippling France as a competitor after the war. Engineer troops engaged on such work miles behind the line said to French prisoners : " *Ici, après la guerre, nicht travail.*"

" On the 12th of October there was not a chimney standing in any mine in the Departments of Nord and Pas de Calais, not a hoist, not an alternator, compressor, or ventilator ; not a building, in a region where not a shot had been fired, 30 or 40 kilometres from the front."

In Tourcoing and Roubaix not only the machinery but even the safes were broken, " of 75 factories only 7 after considerable repairs were got going again by the end of 1919. 760,000 spindles and 15,000 looms were destroyed." France was thus deprived of 80 per cent. of her output of cast iron, 63 per cent. of steel, 82 per cent. of copper, 25 per cent. of lead, and 90 per cent. of textiles.

" The object was not only to disembarrass themselves of competitors, but also to create clients, for the Germans hoped to be called on to furnish machinery for the restoration of France "—at a price.

Truly the code word for the destructions of 1917, " Alberich," the name of the malicious dwarf of the Nibelung Saga, was most appropriate.

General Normand points out that although the Germans were duly warned by Marshal Foch :

" The German people, who are accessories to these criminal acts, will have to bear the consequences of them. The authors and instigators of these crimes will be made responsible for them morally, criminally, and pecuniarily. Vainly will they seek to escape the inexorable expiation which awaits them. The most terrible account of people to people is open. It shall be paid."

But, as the author insists, the criminals have entirely escaped all punishment and will only go one better next time.

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Der Nahkampf. Beispiele und Lehren auf Grund der Erfahrungen des Weltkrieges (" Close Fighting. Examples and Deductions based on the Experience of the Great War "), by Lieut.-Colonel Egon von Loebel (Berlin, Mittler, 2.75 Marks), is an interesting pamphlet giving examples of hand-to-hand fighting under the headings of (1) Bayonet attacks of large bodies under cover of darkness, the examples being the Guard and Saxon dawn attack on the 8th of September and the Crown Prince's night attack the 9th–10th of September, 1914, during the Marne battle. (2) Hand-to-hand fighting of infantry in small bodies, (*a*) in attack, with examples taken from the Argonne, First Ypres, Verdun, Caporetto, etc.; (*b*) collision of patrols; (*c*) in defence; (*d*) close fighting after mine explosions; (*e*) defence against tanks. (3) Cavalry attacks. (4) Artillery in close fighting. There are deductions and a bibliography. The author excuses himself for reviving the dreadful memories of hand-to-hand fighting maintaining that:

" the bayonet, for centuries the symbol of the noblest soldierly virtues of bravery, forgetfulness of self, and fulfilment of duty to the utmost, will be no superfluous or worthless instrument in the battle of the future, but will justify its existence as the weapon of the fighter on foot."

Deutscher Eisenbahner im Weltkrieg, 1914–18 (" German railway troops in the World War, 1914–18 "), by Lieut.-Colonel H. Baur, whose last appointment was regimental commander of the railway troops on the Eastern Front (Stuttgart: Belser, 6 Marks), is particularly valuable for its account and photographs of railway work on the Russian front, about which little has been written. The organization and regulations of the German railway troops have been dealt with in several of the books on military railway work on the Western Front already reviewed in these pages. It is, therefore, only necessary to draw attention to the new points raised by Colonel Baur.

In 1918 there were employed on German railways outside the frontiers of the Empire:

108,000	railway troops.
70,000	civilian railway employees.
45,000	prisoners.
219,000	natives of occupied territories.
442,000	

" These figures exceed the total strength of the whole army which was engaged against France in 1870–71."

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The special railway units brought into existence by the war were :

(1) Railway Machine Parks, composed of tradesmen specially skilled in iron and woodwork, who put together, repaired, or made machinery as required, and were particularly useful in Russia, where there were few factories or machine shops.

(2) Underwater Cutting Detachments, which included divers, and were employed to remove the debris of demolitions of bridges, particularly under water, and to clear waterways.

(3) Railway Telegraph Construction Troops, independent of the Signal Service.

(4) Rope-way Formations.

(5) Wood Felling Companies, for cutting timber for railways, particularly sleepers.

(6) Miner Companies, employed for repair of tunnels and construction of railway lines in difficult mountain and rocky country.

Normal-gauge railways were found best suited to military requirements ; the 60 cm. field railways were used only near the front where concealment, rapidity of construction, and lightness of material for transport were considerations. Otherwise narrow-gauge railways were not much used except in absolutely flat country, like Belgium, where little preliminary earth work is necessary ; once considerable earth moving has to be done it is more economical to construct normal-gauge lines.

The author considers that in future wars heavier locomotives and trucks of larger capacity, over 15 tons, must be used. With improved braking apparatus it will be possible to give military trains greater speed and send them off at shorter intervals of time.

In Russia special precautions had to be made to protect railway bridges from damage by floating ice.

Some of the wooden bridges constructed in Russia were of colossal size. One over the Dubissa was 550 yards long and built of six rows of trestles to a height of 80 feet ; " there is a whole forest in this bridge." Another at Grodno, 567 yards long, was built on trestle piers 96 feet high above normal water-level.

An ingenious Austrian system, Roth-Wagner, was used in some cases. A standard iron lattice girder bridge something like the Hopkins type, was first built out from the shore and balanced by a temporary shore-end like the Ingles bridge ; on the top of this span was run a travelling crane which brought further material into position at bridge head.

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Biographical

Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck. Wanderjahre—Kriege—Gestalsten (" Generalcolonel Alexander von Kluck. Apprenticeship —Wars—People ") (Berlin, Eisenschmidt, 12 marks), is an autobiography. The general tells us the story of his life, but, as he has already written a book about his share in the opening phase of the great war (which was translated as the " March on Paris "), only eighteen pages are allotted to the war in the present volume, and they contain little more than what he said to Lord D'Abernon, and is recorded in the latter's book, " An Ambassador of Peace." His excuse for not outflanking the Allied line is that he was tied to Bülow, who clamoured for him to keep touch. With some justice, he claims that the Supreme Command " limped after " and never led, always approving of his actions ; in fact, on the 6th of September, the opening day of the battle of the Marne, the Supreme Command loaded him with " inordinate praise." He disputes the judgment of the German official histories, that he and his Chief of the Staff, Kuhl, were responsible for the difficult position in which the First Army found itself on the days following the 5th of September, on the grounds that the Supreme Command gave him no information, and he was not in a position to remedy " the crying want." Actually on the 1st of September he contemplated attacking the north-east front of Paris. If reinforced he could have captured the city, but his Chief of the Staff pointed out to him that " the Supreme Command's instructions were to keep in close touch of Lanrezac's Army, and drive it towards the Second Army." These instructions have not been mentioned before ; according to the official history, the Supreme Command merely approved of his following up Lanrezac after he had wheeled to do so. Kluck, of course, claims victory everywhere on the 9th of September.

Kluck was serving as a probationary officer in the infantry in 1866, and took part in the Main campaign in Goeben's division. In 1870 he was in the First Army, and was at Spicheren. His watch was hit by a bullet at the battle of Borny, and he got enteric during the investment of Metz. He states that he was offered employment on the General Staff or in the Higher Adjutantur, without going to the Staff College, as he otherwise would have done, and, preferring to be in touch with troops, chose the latter. He was subsequently what we should call garrison adjutant, brigade major of an infantry brigade, and from 1881 to 1887 instructor and commandant of three different non-commissioned officers' schools. In the latter year he

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became a battalion commander, and then commanded every formation in succession, regiment, brigade, division, and corps, and, in the war, an Army.

There are long accounts of manœuvres. "After nearly 40 arduous years' service," in 1903 he decided to take a trip to the Riviera and Italy, and in 1910 another to Sicily. In 1912 he had to go to the Tyrol for change after "a neglected East Prussian catarrh." Otherwise he gave his whole time to his duties.

On the 28th of March, 1915, he was hit by seven shrapnel bullets whilst visiting the front trenches near Vailly, and the wounds did not heal properly until well on in 1916. He and Bülow were both put on the retired list in October, 1916. His elder son, in the Marine Corps, was killed at Ostend in January, 1915, and the younger in the Signal Service, was very badly injured in a motor accident on the day the general himself was wounded.

Kluck believes the loss of the war was due to Germany having no statesman of understanding greatness like Clemenceau or Lloyd George. He approves of the offensive of March, 1918, but when it failed the Armies should have been withdrawn to a defensive position, Hindenburg made dictator and Tirpitz, Chancellor.

Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Denkwürdigkeiten, compiled by Colonel von der Goltz and Lieut.-Colonel W. Förster of the *Reichsarchiv* (Berlin, Mittler, 17.50 marks), is a record of the life of the author of "The Nation in Arms," who died mysteriously in Mesopotamia just before the fall of Kut. The first chapter about his childhood he prepared himself, but the remainder of the book is compiled from his papers.

The book covers the same ground, but has not the same personal quality of an earlier life, entitled "Goltz Pascha," written by the field-marshal's contemporary and close friend, General Schmiterlow, which was reviewed in October, 1926.

Die Deutschmeister is not, as the title might perhaps suggest to the causal observer, a book on German masters of painting or music; it is the history of the now disbanded Austrian "Household" Infantry Regiment Hoch- und Deutschmeister Nr. 4. It derived its strange title from the fact that the Grand and German Masters of the Teutonic Knights raised contingents of troops to assist the German Emperor in combating the Turks, and on the 15th of March, 1695, shortly after the death of one of the Grand Masters, the then existing Deutschmeister troops were taken over by the

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Emperor and used to form the nucleus of an Imperial infantry regiment.

In November, 1918, the regiment did not, as reported in the Vienna newspapers, mutiny and murder its colonel, but returned to Vienna, all three battalions, technical company and machine gun company, as a fully organized unit, and was there disbanded.

The book is well illustrated and contains a series of pictures showing the changes of uniform from 1697 onwards.

Translation

The volume on the war by a Norwegian officer, Colonel G. I. Schnitler, attaché during hostilities with the German Army and now professor at the Norwegian Staff College, which was favourably reviewed at some length two years ago (*Army Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, p. 165) has been translated into French under the title of *La Guerre Mondiale*, 1914–1918 (Paris, Payot, 25 francs).

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Some Chapters on Writing English. By Lieut.-Col. J. H. GETTINS, D.S.O., Army Education Corps. Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 3*s*.

It is inevitable that the soldier, whose general education now receives so much attention, should have many text-books written specially for him. But these " chapters " of Colonel Gettins hardly deserve so uninteresting a name. In the light of his own first-hand experience he has provided a pleasant and interesting aid to those who wish to improve their command of the written language. The soldier who reads diligently herein should find himself better fitted to cope with those examination papers which, nowadays, he can hardly escape.

Using both precept and example Colonel Gettins contrives to avoid being dull on a subject which is apt to invite dullness. After treating of words and their meaning, the construction of sentences, and the rules of grammar—this last can hardly be otherwise than hard reading—he has brightly written chapters on the letter, the précis, and the essay. He is rightly content to quote Matthew Arnold as regards the teaching of style.

If the second part of the book, " Some Exercises," seems to indicate drudgery, the third part, which contains " Some Examples of Writing," provides ample compensation. The selections which range from the Old Testament to Hazlitt, Lamb, Dickens, and Calverley, are well chosen. Lincoln's Gettysburg speech is here, also a passage from Masefield's " Gallipoli," and Mr. Baldwin's oration " On England."

Acknowledgments to H.M. Stationery Office are duly made for permission to quote from the regulations of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Needless to say the extract is not cited as an example of lucid English.

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The Path of Glory. By GEORGE BLAKE. Constable & Co. 6*s.*

Mr. Blake already had to his credit two novels, two essays in realistic fiction dealing in a capable and penetrating manner with certain phases of Scottish life. In this story he carries certain types of Scottish character, which he knows supremely well, into the *mäelstrom* of the war, reconstructing some phases of the struggle in Gallipoli with remorseless candour and sincerity. These scenes must be the result of Mr. Blake's own experience.

It is the tale of Col Macaulay the piper, son of tinker folk in the Western Isles, who drifted into the Clydeside shipyards and became a private soldier—not through any patriotic fervour but carried away by his great love of making pipe music. He enlisted in a Scottish Territorial battalion, and his friends were another Highlander and a representative Lowland Scot. Col understood friendship if he could not understand the issues of the war. He was a gentle, obtuse, dreamy and obedient soldier, and the sordid matrimonial tangle he was too unsophisticated to avoid before going over-seas is related in uncompromising terms.

The identity of the division and of Col's kilted battalion is easy to guess, and so is that of the action on the peninsula which sealed the fate—not an ordinary fate—of Col Macaulay. The description of this battle, and the preceding pages which follow the fortunes of the battalion from coast defence duties in Scotland to the trenches before Achi Baba, form a notable contribution to those " undertones of war " which have become a feature of European literature. But one can hardly expect professional soldiers to agree when a corporal " smart, eager, and obsequious before officers . . . a bully and a cad with his men " is described as " the Army's ideal of a good soldier." Perhaps the author has himself suffered at the hands—or rather the tongue—of a Corporal Lowrie.

The Baghdad Air Mail. By Wing-Commander RODERIC HILL, M.C., A.F.C. Edward Arnold & Co., London. 18*s.*

The Cairo-Baghdad air route is fortunate in its historian. Wing-Commander Hill, the well-known pilot, commanded the squadron (No. 45) which ferried the mails for so many years; he commands also a facile pen. His style is invigorating, his prose poetic; at times we are reminded of Major Maurice Baring.

This book appears at an opportune moment in that its publication coincides with the opening of the London-Karachi Air Mail, the civil route which reaps the result of Service pioneering. The task

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of the Royal Air Force mail aircraft is done ; " other faster and more modern aircraft have succeeded them. But it was the work of the past that made the present possible."

Due, we suppose, to the fact that the author did not reach Iraq until September, 1924, we are not told as much about the earlier history of the Baghdad Mail as might be expected.

The first flight between Cairo and Baghdad was *viâ* Damascus in early 1918 by Captain (now Sir Ross) Smith in a Handley Page *en route* to India. This, though no easy flight in those days, involved none of the romance of the trackless direct route. On this flight was Sir Geoffrey Salmond, and no pioneer flights have been made east or west, to Baghdad or to and from India, in which Sir Geoffrey Salmond has not partaken ; moreover, the track across the desert owes its existence to his organization.

The first flights in the opposite direction *viâ* Damascus were made in February, 1919, by Wing-Commander Boyd and Flying Officer Nutall on D.H. 4's with R.A.F. water-cooled engines.

At the Cairo Conference in 1921, when it was decided that the Air Ministry should take over control of Iraq, Trans-Jordania and Palestine, it was also arranged that the Royal Air Force should endeavour to open an air route between Cairo and Baghdad *viâ* Amman in Trans-Jordania, a distance of 866 miles. In June, 1921, therefore, two parties set out, one westward from Baghdad, the other eastward from Amman, to find a route across the desert. Each party was composed of armoured cars and aircraft, the latter prospecting ahead. As they moved towards each other, the two parties, surmounting incredible difficulties, marked a track across the desert with ploughs attached to the cars ; at intervals of fifteen to twenty miles they selected and marked out emergency landing grounds. Finally, the two parties met at El Jid halfway across, and on the 23rd of June, three aircraft of No. 47 Squadron from Egypt flew ahead along the newly-made track from El Jid to Baghdad. On the 30th of June, an aeroplane flew from Baghdad to Cairo in one day, and on the 11th of July Sir Geoffrey Salmond flew from Cairo to Baghdad in one day. Both aircraft followed the new track which, as Wing-Commander Hill says, " is the beginning and the end, the pilot's past, present and future."

Shortly after its opening it was decided to use the new route to expedite correspondence between England and Iraq. On the 4th of August, 1921, the first Air Mail bag left London for Baghdad ; it contained one letter. Seven months later (the 23rd of February,

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1922) the number of letters carried was 1,029; in April, 1929, the number was 15,000 letters.

Of necessity Wing-Commander Hill is obliged to confine himself largely to his personal experiences on the route. He opens with a description of the country covered by the route and continues with an account of the organization by which it was operated in what are now the days of long ago, the days when it was a real task. His third chapter is devoted to wind and weather, in which the reader learns that deserts do not necessarily spell heat. Not a few engines have been lost on the air route at some remote landing ground owing to frost up to 13 degrees. In chapter eleven the reader is introduced in writing and in picture to what rain can do in the Arabian Desert, and we learn of the winter hardships endured by the Royal Air Force pilots, as compared to the awful heat of the summer mails.

In a short chapter "Names and Fancies," the author tells us of his own geography of the route, a phantasy worthy of a Barrie. There is no part of the book we have read with greater pleasure; no part, we feel certain, will appeal more to the imagination than this delightful division of the route into The Hills of Lost Thoughts, The Land of Nearly, The Upland of the Winds, The Land of Conjecture and The Plain of Sorrows.

Including his arrival by air in, and departure by air from, Iraq, Wing-Commander Hill covered the Air Route in both directions no less than eight times, and this apart from innumerable salvage flights and night flights to and from different points along the route. In that time he had many adventures and learned many practical lessons of the utmost value to pilots. In this aspect of the book we see a distinct value apart from its other attributes; no pilot can afford to be without its advice on how to overcome the difficulties incipient to desert flying in extreme heat and extreme cold, where the pilot, hundreds of miles from anywhere, is so largely dependent on his own resources and initiative in order to reach his destination. And what pilot, his destination achieved, will not feel with the author for the aeroplane which has borne him, so fast, so far and so well? "Any one who can look unmoved at an aeroplane after it has been a long run must indeed be insensitive to romance. An aeroplane home at last, with the oil dripping gently off her and the stains of travel evident about her, has something extraordinarily grand. She is the symbol of conquest, the earnest of fresh conquests to be. The wind has been singing through her canvas and taut wires; the white-hot flame driving the pistons of her engines; the sun has blazed on her through the long day; the moon looked on her through

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the lonely nights in the desert; and now she stands relaxed, yet majestic, with the breath of fire gone from her, resting after her great effort. She has served her master to the utmost of her capacity, and she asks no more."

"The Baghdad Air Mail" has an appeal for travellers on the route by Imperial Airways, for all those interested in adventure and in pioneer work, but we believe it to be a book of peculiar professional value to the pilots of the future, whether Service or Civil, whose duty takes them by air across the Arabian Desert. Hitherto their Bible has been "The Pilot's Handbook of the Cairo-Baghdad Route" as published by H.M. Stationery Office. Wing-Commander Hill has provided them with a New Testament.

The Armaments Year-Book. Published by the League of Nations at Geneva.

This is the fifth year of the publication of this most valuable work. Full information is given of the armies, navies and all matters that have bearing on the military and naval organizations of sixty nations. An interesting new feature is a chapter dealing with raw materials and different products of importance for national defence.

The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol. I.—The Old Empire from the Beginnings to 1783. Cambridge University Press. 1929.

The first volume of the Cambridge History of the British Empire gives a full and authoritative account of British Colonial expansion from the beginning until 1783. In its early stages the history of the British Empire is very largely a history of the growth of maritime power and mercantile enterprise. This theme running through the whole gives a certain unity to the book, and it suffers far less from lack of cohesion than is usual in the case of volumes to which several writers have contributed. As we are accustomed to expect in books belonging to one of the Cambridge series, each period is dealt with by a specialist in his own subject, and there is a useful bibliography of contemporary authorities and of later works.

A good deal of space is devoted to the period of discovery and to the early history of the American Colonies; and there are two useful chapters on the relation between international law and colonial policy by Professor Pearce Higgins. In an interesting

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chapter on the Great Emigration Dr. Little shows how, just at the time when the stimulus of adventure and the desire for trade expansion was beginning to flag, a new motive, the desire for security and political independence, drove men from the home country. Each successive wave left its permanent mark upon the New World and the diversities, which in England through a century of civil conflict were softened and smoothed away, there became stereotyped and hardened.

The climax of the story comes with the constitutional struggle with the American Colonies, the War of Independence and the final collapse of the mercantile system. These last chapters, as is perhaps inevitable in a book of this kind, suffer from over-condensation. The history of the ten years preceding the outbreak of the war, perhaps the most interesting of any in our Imperial history, becomes little more than a catalogue of events. In the circumstances it would have been tempting to dispense with some of the more detailed descriptions of well-known incidents and to devote more space to the inner history of the revolutionary movement in the New England Colonies. The political activities of Samuel Adams and his coterie at this time, the growth of extra-Parliamentary party organization, and the use of crude propaganda show a degree of political acumen comparable to the organization of the working-class opposition by Francis Place at the time of the Reform Bill agitation in this country half a century later.

There is a short but interesting section dealing with the Western problem by Mr. Cecil Headlam. The French evacuation of Canada and the Ohio left to the British Government a difficult heritage. Two alternative policies might have been pursued: either the Government might conciliate the Indians by checking further expansion westward, or it might establish a force in America strong enough to crush Indian opposition. The Government fluctuated between the two; the forward policy led to the Stamp Act and the raising of the constitutional issue; the attempt at least to consider native rights inflamed opposition on the border and made of the "men of the Western waters" the most resolute champions of the spirit of independence.

In a chapter on the political theory of colonial government Professor Ewing gives a brief analysis of the chief writers from Bacon to Blackstone. The failure to consolidate the government of the Empire was due above all things to the fact that no serious attempt was made to evolve any kind of Imperial Constitution. The origin of our colonial system was essentially mercantile, English

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statesmen failed to realize the need for some form of political organization to correspond with the economic organization which they had striven to create, and nothing was done to break down the stubborn provincialism of the colonial outlook.

Ypres—Outpost of the Channel Ports. A Concise Historical Guide to the Salient of Ypres. By BEATRIX BRICE. Mr. John Murray. 2*s.* 6*d.*

The Ypres League had already published two volumes, "The Battle Book of Ypres" and "The Immortal Salient," the latter being both historical record and guide. Realizing that a more compact and less expensive guide would be welcomed by many pilgrims to the Salient, Miss Brice, who is untiring in her work for the League, has produced this little book. A model of judicious compression, it begins with historical sketches of the city itself and of the fighting in the Salient during four years of war; then there are mentioned seven routes by following which nearly all the well-known "landmarks"—that is to say, the battle-famous localities—and memorials can be seen. Each route is briefly described, and the historical significance of each landmark and memorial is explained separately. A list of the cemeteries with the name of the town nearest to each is also given.

General Sir William Pulteney describes the British Settlement at Ypres; the church, school, parsonage and pilgrims' rest room; and there is an eloquent appreciation of the famous Menin Gate memorial reprinted from the *Berliner Tageblatt*. The two pages of travel information should be very useful, especially to motorists, and the map, though small, should enable almost any one to follow the seven routes above mentioned. Most of the illustrations are of memorials; very appropriately Field-Marshal Lord Plumer provides a short introduction.

With a Woman's Unit in Serbia, Salonika and Sebastopol. By I. EMSLIE HUTTON, M.D. Williams and Norgate. 12*s.* 6*d.*

This is the record of the war experiences of a young woman doctor who went out from Edinburgh to France to serve with one of the Scottish Women's Hospitals, was transferred with her unit to Salonika, and eventually found work in a children's hospital at Sebastopol until the "White" Russians evacuated the Crimea.

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Dr. Emslie Hutton writes simply and well, and is obviously not only keen and capable in her profession but also a human and understanding soul. She displays a generous appreciation of the cheerful devotion to duty of the women with whom she worked, and pays a special tribute to Mrs. Harley, sister of Field-Marshal Lord Ypres, who, after more than two and a half years of arduous hospital and welfare service, was killed in a bombardment of Monastir, where she had established a much-needed feeding centre for the women and children.

The narrative relies, to some extent, upon long letters written home, and to a diary the keeping of which, we are told, was never a task to which the author took kindly. She spent the summer of 1915 in Champagne with her hospital, which was afterwards sent to Salonika, " an alluring-looking town," and went up country when the French troops advanced to the Serbian frontier. The hospital was established at Ghevgeli, where doctors and nurses endured great hardships from the cold, had to carry on their work under the most primitive conditions, and performed a variety of heavy and unaccustomed tasks beside their ordinary duties, which were strenuous enough. But they tended wounded French Colonials and frost-bitten Senegalese with great cheerfulness and efficiency until the Allies withdrew to Salonika at the beginning of December. Here during the almost tropical summer of 1916 dysentry and malaria had to be fought.

The impressions made upon the author by the notabilities she met are amusing. She echoes, at first, the popular sentiment *Sarrail est magnifique*, but says that he became more and more criticized, even by the French, as time went on. Our present Chief of the Imperial General Staff was " a grave, reserved and shrewd Scotsman, dignified and straight in deed as he was in bearing, and had a something about him that rather terrified men and women alike. . . ." When she met him again in Constantinople he proved to be " less severe and terrifying than I had previously thought him." M. Venizelos, so far as his appearance, manner and voice went, " seemed to me more like a lay missionary than anything else." There is a good description of life in Salonika whilst the Allied army lay more or less inactive within the entrenched camp : the air-raids ; the great fire ; the various types of hospitality and entertainment ashore and afloat ; and, of course, many details of the medical work accomplished by the different hospitals of the Allies.

In the summer of 1918 Dr. Emslie Hutton was appointed to the command of the Scottish Women's Hospital at Ostrovo, ninety miles

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west of Salonika. Here she was under the Serbian military authorities. When the Bulgars were defeated the hospital advanced to Vranja, where it worked, at first, under the greatest difficulties. The bad communications made it difficult to get supplies and equipment forward, there was pneumonia and influenza to combat, and, later, a bad epidemic of typhus. Great admiration is expressed for the Serbs, although the author is by no means blind to their shortcomings. Men, women and children, she certainly learnt to know them well, and seems to have won their great regard; she writes of them with great feeling and sympathy.

Going on to Belgrade in the summer of 1919 to take charge of another hospital she remained in the Serbian capital until the Scottish Women's work in Serbia came to an end, about March of the following year. Instead of returning to Scotland—she had been home on leave once—she now decided to go straight on to the Crimea to work for Lady Muriel Paget's child welfare scheme, and so came to Sebastopol to work among the refugees whilst General Wrangel was making his last stand against the Bolshevik forces.

She has many tales of the refugee Russians, and took an active part in the relief measures both at Sebastopol and at Constantinople after the evacuation of the Crimea. Finally, when she set out to return to England at the end of 1920 she felt impelled to refresh and improve her medical practice by turning aside to visit the Vienna hospitals.

The Indian States and Ruling Princes. By SIR SIDNEY LOW. [Benn's Sixpenny Library.] 6*d.*

It is hoped that the usefulness of Benn's Sixpenny Library is recognized. The number under review, written as it is by an independent authority of high standing, is a brief and most clear exposition of the place which the Indian States occupy in the polity of India. The general public is slow to realize how meagre is its knowledge of Indian affairs, and how vital to the future well-being of the British Commonwealth of Nations is a proper understanding of the factors in the Indian situation. The Simon commission has returned, the Butler report has been issued, a new parliament has been elected, and soon the future governance of India will have to be definitely outlined. Sir Sidney Low's admirable pamphlet draws timely attention to a prominent, but little appreciated, factor in the situation. Every writer on India at the present time finds it necessary to remind the public that India is not, and never has been,

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a nation; that it is not a single political unit; that the Government of India does not issue orders nor the Indian Legislature make laws which are valid throughout India; that there are two Indias, British India and the India of the Native States; that the latter cover more than one-third of the area of India, and that their population is but a little short of a quarter of the total. In his chapters "Annexation and Alliance," "Paramountcy and Subordination," "The Period of Acquiescence," Sir Sidney Low traces the relationship of the states to the British Government from the days of the East India Company to the beginning of the twentieth century, when "the new spirit in British India had its repercussion in the Protected area." After the war came the Indian Constitutional Reforms. The recognition that the States had a claim to be consulted brought about the constitution of "The Chamber of Princes" in 1921, but its proceedings remain private, and not all the States are represented in it. While the Simon commission has attracted much attention, little heed has been paid to the Butler commission appointed at the same time to examine the rights, duties and legal position of the States. The States took the opportunity to present their case, stressing what they considered to be the undue interference by the central government in the past and their alarm at the dangers which may develop out of the present trend of events. The Indian nationalists and independents seem to have left the States completely out of the picture of their future India. Sir Sidney Low shows that they, however, dominate the situation, and that they must have a voice in the determination of any policy which would affect the peoples and industries of India as a whole. Doubtful of the practicability of real Dominion Government he foreshadows a future Federalism in some form. Instead of a sovereign federal legislature, there might be a Governor-General's Council for the States as a counterpart to the Executive Council for British India, both councils meeting in joint session on common matters. Whatever the final form may be, the end cannot be reached without the consent and willing cooperation of the Indian States.

Practical Horsemanship. By CAPTAIN J. L. M. BARRETT [13th/18th Hussars, Equitation Instr., R.M.C., Sandhurst]. H. F. & G. Witherby. 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

Captain Barrett's book can be recommended not only to the novice of any age, but to the old hand who may not have had the ability nor the inclination to express in words what he knows from

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experience is the truth of practical horsemanship. Though an early beginning may induce familiarity, and therefore confidence, with horses, such experience by no means produces necessarily a good rider. More bad habits, and a bad style, accrue from early uninstructed riding than is realized. A youth has lost nothing by not having ridden until he goes to, say, Sandhurst or Woolwich—at any rate nowadays. Instruction on the lines so clearly described by Captain Barrett has been, happily, in practice in the army for some years. The reviewer remembers well the obnoxious methods of the military riding school of the eighteen-nineties. Confidence seemed to be the last thing aimed at, and yet confidence in the beginning is so obviously essential. Fortunately, the experience of playing polo and, as in the reviewer's case the opportunity which the Indian cavalry gave early in his career, of having to train recruits showed the impracticability of the old military seat and the necessity of inducing confidence.

Captain Barrett, after dismissing with excellent logic the old "Hunting seat" and making clear that the so-called "Forward seat" is necessarily a "Show-jumping seat," describes the normal seat and the reasons for it. The basis is balance, but balance maintained to a large extent by grip. The interdependence of balance and grip is brought out well in the earlier chapters. The point is stressed, and rightly stressed, that the beginner should be deprived first of the temptation to stick on by his reins and that during the early exercises of riding without reins he should have the assistance of stirrups. Limits of space prevent reference to Captain Barrett's many practical hints and directions. The book is well printed and usefully illustrated.

All Quiet on the Western Front. E. M. Remarque. Translated by A. W. Wheen. G. P. Putnam's Sons. London.

The period immediately following the war produced a surfeit of war novels, mostly mediocre, of which the public soon tired. What the public wanted was something about the direction of the war, and they got it. For ten years now allies and enemies have read with avidity the memoirs of their leaders, political and military.

Modern war novels are of a class different to that to which we were accustomed. As the late Lord Fisher said of wars, their essence is brutality; but it is a brutality which carries conviction.

On the whole, with a few exceptions, it must be admitted that German war novels of the latest kind are in a class by themselves.

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We in England have produced few books like " Sergeant Grischa " and " The Way of Sacrifice." To these must now be added " All Quiet on the Western Front."

The story unfolded by Herr Remarque is that of a group of German private soldiers serving in the same regiment on the Western Front occasionally against the French, mostly against the British. At times the story might be simply that of a group of British soldiers on the other side of the line. The Germans are often coarser, occasionally more high-brow and always hungrier, but, these things apart, their routine and their thoughts were similar to our own. The outstanding features of the group were their loyalty to each other, their kindness to animals, their contempt for the " *bouches inutiles*," their affection for their families, their perpetual hunger and their detestation of their N.C.O's. The German officer is seldom mentioned; when he is, it is with respect and occasionally with affection.

The description of the Russian prisoners will appeal to readers of " Sergeant Grischa."

" They slink about our camp and pick over the garbage tins. One can imagine what they find there. . . . It is distressing to watch their movements, to see them begging for something to eat. Their backs, their necks are bent, their knees sag, their heads droop as they stretch out their hands and beg in the few words of German that they know—beg with those soft, deep, musical voices, that are like warm stoves and cosy rooms at home."

The writer is a volunteer. First we see him, not enthusiastic, for he has been a long time at the Front when we are introduced to him, but at least a keen and experienced infantryman. His friends are gradually killed. He himself is badly wounded, is sent home but eventually returns to the regiment. We note the decline in morale, the death of more friends, the gradual certainty that the enemy will win, and above all the lack of food. " Our lines are falling back. There are too many fresh English and American regiments over there. There's too much corned beef and white wheaten bread. Too many new guns."

On tanks the writer has views of peculiar interest to us, the protagonists of tanks—

" From a mockery the tanks have become a terrible weapon. Armoured they come rolling on in long lines, and more than anything else embody for us the horrors of war. The attacking lines of the enemy infantry are men like ourselves; but these tanks are machines, their caterpillars run as endless as the war, they are annihilation; they roll

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without feeling into craters, and climb up again without stopping, a fleet of roaring, belching armour-clads, invulnerable steel beasts squashing the dead and the wounded—we shrivel up in our thin skin before them, against their colossal weight our arms are sticks of straw, and our hand-grenades matches."

Though the book is coarser than good taste allows, it is full of humour, full of pathos and, above all, full of reality. Near the end the narrator carries the last of his friends, badly wounded, to the dressing station, only to find that after a desperate journey he has been carrying a dead body on his back.

Soon after, October, 1918, he joins his friends on a day reported by Ludendorf as "All quiet on the Western Front."

"Soldiers' Tales." Edited by The Hon. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE. *Adventures in the Revolution and under the Consulate.* By MOREAU DE JONNÉS. Peter Davies, Ltd. London. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Those who might feel less inclined to read this Soldier's Tale than others in the series written by their own countrymen will do well to rely on Sir John's discrimination: de Jonnés' adventures are the adventures of a civilian with a civilian's mentality, flung into the hurly-burly of the Revolution. Although he begins a military life at the age of thirteen and a half, and although he is caught up in military enterprises for twenty-four years, his outlook never changes. He somehow contrives to complete his education in the rare intervals snatched from military duty and completes it so successfully that, on leaving the Army, he becomes the first statistician in France.

de Jonnés was a simple patriot. This simplicity of his is most attractive. See him embarking as second master-gunner, on the expedition led by General Humbert to support the Irish rebels in 1798, quickly promoted, "much against my will," second-in-command of the artillery "of what was pompously called the Army of Ireland." He improvizes gun-teams and transport and "carries on," realizing full well the ultimate fate of the hare-brained escapade. When the inevitable capitulation comes he refuses to become a prisoner, so, with a little band of his gunners, makes for the Shannon with a view to capturing "some vessel large enough to keep the sea." After narrowly escaping death by the enemy and falling into a bog, he and a young officer whose father had entrusted him to his care, come to a large mansion where they sit down on the spacious lawn

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to enjoy the view. de Jonnés is well aware of the reception likely to be accorded them by an Anglican Bishop or crusted Tory, though his companion is irrepressibly optimistic. His optimism is justified ; a footman approaches, the mud-caked pair are led to Lady French and a bevy of " very great ladies and distinguished gentlemen," whom they approach " respectfully, but without embarrassment." Chivalry triumphs ; de Jonnés' companion's papers prove that " It would be impossible to find a finer or nobler line than that of *monsieur*, who must, from them, surely be the sister of Mademoiselle Henriette de la Tour." " I am she, Monsieur," replies de Jonnés' young companion.

Oh ! to have such adventures and the gift of telling them so well.

Remembered Yesterdays. By Sir SOLOMON BANDARANAIKE, K.C.M.G. [John Murray.]

Sir Solomon Bandaranaike retired in 1927 after forty-three years of public service in Ceylon, of which thirty-two were in the position of Maha Madaliyar [Great Chief] and adviser in Native Affairs to the Governor. Of ancient Singhalese family, he was the first native of Ceylon to be appointed C.M.G. and finally K.C.M.G. He had previously received the honour of Knighthood. He was undoubtedly a notable personality with the gift of making true friends in every class. Nowhere was he more welcome on his several visits to England, both private and official, than in the home circle of our Royal Family. His friendship with our present King dated from 1882, when His Majesty, then a midshipman, visited Ceylon ; after the manner of boys it was cemented by an hour's *tête-à-tête* in a tree-top. Educated at St. Thomas College, Colombo, it is on record that young Bandaranaike had a far wider acquaintance with English literature than is usual even among English boys. He did not travel or visit England until 1895, but he returned again and again. A trait that endeared him to all Englishmen was his keen sportsmanship. It was characteristic of him that on his first visit to England he learnt to drive four-in-hand, and by the fifth day took his team down Piccadilly. His private means allowed him to indulge in his love for horses, for not only did he buy—he must have been no mean judge of a horse—first-class hacks and driving horses, but was a most successful race-horse owner in Ceylon. He was the first native of Ceylon to be President of the Kandy Turf Club. Sir Solomon is most modest with reference to his

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own doings, but it is easy to believe the written evidence of Sir Hugh Clifford, who writes of his strong and unswerving friendship, of his advice, so frank, so firmly and courteously given, and so full of wisdom and discrimination; of his wide knowledge of men and things in Ceylon, and of his sound judgment and intense loyalty. Sir Solomon's recollections are chiefly of the friends he made and the notable people he met, about whom he relates many anecdotes both humorous and interesting. Many will perhaps regret that he has not touched more on the public affairs of Ceylon. In the matter of the University Site controversy, he records his opinion that if Ceylon needs a university at all—and it is a very big "if"—he favours a site away from Colombo. In modern politics he became President of the newly-formed Unionist Association, representative of a strong school of political thought which does not see eye to eye with the Congress. He was a sincere Churchman, and in 1908 presided at a big meeting to celebrate the Pan-Anglican Congress in London. His only son had been at Christ Church, Oxford, and been called to the English Bar. On his return to Ceylon in 1926, he stood for the Municipal Council and successfully opposed Mr. Goonesinghe, the chairman of the Labour Union, who has come into considerable prominence in the recent riots in Colombo.

Studies of the Napoleonic Wars. By Sir CHARLES OMAN, M.P., K.B.E., D.C.L., Chichele Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. Methuen & Co., Ltd., London. Price 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

In this collection of papers Sir Charles Oman has happily combined light with graver matters, the incidentally instructive with what is directly so, the background of war in distinction to its larger problems.

In the lighter matter, that is in the four Tales of Secret Service and the Story of the Prisoner of Albuera, a glimpse is, for instance, obtained of the working of the still and mental parts, which, owing to considerations of space, or to lack of information, are too often ignored by historians. And the reader is at the same time amused by the cool daring with which Gutteriez, a Spanish spy in the pay of the French, the adventurer Kolli, the Benedictine Robertson, and the soldier Colquhoun Grant, went about their delicate tasks. The story of the Prisoner of Albuera, though not devoid of diverting incident, is, however, what would nowadays be called a pitiable

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undertone of war. And another tale of a duel between two officers in 1807, apart from its interesting demonstration of the customs of the time, is definitely pathetic.

Of the more serious papers two deal with problems that were very familiar to officers of the last generation, namely column and line in the Peninsula, and Napoleon and his cavalry. But they are problems whose study may still help towards the solution of the very modern questions how best to use and to counteract tanks. Two other articles describe little-known yet important campaigns, that of Maida in Italy and that of Queenstown in Canada; and they emphasize a contention made elsewhere in the book, that it is usually personalities who turn the course of history. For if Stuart, "a picture of fussy incompetence," who commanded at Maida, had been in North America in 1812 Canada would probably have been lost. Both of these papers are illustrated by sketch-maps. But it must be mentioned that there is only one for Brock's campaign in Canada, and this does not include the area where he made his most brilliant stroke, the capture of Fort Detroit; also that, unless the north point in the map of the battle of Maida is wrongly placed, Sir Charles has once or twice written east for south and west for north.

In one of the three remaining articles the author explains why Wellington failed as a politician, but the others are concerned with broader aspects of history. Historical perspective, we are told, begins when a man consciously compares yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. Peoples of exhausted and dispirited civilizations give way to those possessing inspiration and enthusiasm; our perspective is continually changing, the World mind works by action and reaction. In a Defence of Military History a plea is made that politicians and soldiers should understand one another's outlook and problems, for they have to work well together if success is to be gained; and a "rule of strict and rigid non-interference (in war) by the civil power is quite as great a risk as the opposite danger of frivolous interference." Towards the end of this essay Sir C. Oman pauses to criticize the already much-abused French plan of campaign in 1914, which, he says, "argued from erroneous premises to false conclusions, and based itself on the old Napoleonic *offensive a l'outrance*." But, if the French had stood on the defensive, the Germans would have been free to develop their plans at leisure. And, as Mr. Churchill has pointed out in another connexion, "These same Germans were, of all enemies in the world, the most to be dreaded when pursuing their own plans; the most easily disconcerted when forced to conform to the plans of their antagonist."

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The Coldstream Guards, 1885–1914. By Colonel Sir JOHN HALL, Bart., C.B.E. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1929. Price 25*s*. net.

This episode of regimental history was written as a labour of love by the practised hand of the late Sir John Hall. And the result is a clear, well mapped and indexed narrative dealing mainly with what befell the Coldstream Guards in the South African War; a war now perhaps held in too little estimation, yet in some ways—the mobility of the combatants, for instance—probably of higher instructional value to the present generation of soldiers than the long wrestle of trench fighting.

The book begins with a summary of the political events that preceded the outbreak of war in South Africa in 1899, it ends with one of those that led to the Great War. And between this introduction and conclusion the author shows that the Coldstream lived fully up to their reputation; the best was expected of them, and they invariably gave it. "The Guards," as Sir John French said at the end of 1901, "play up splendidly."

The two battalions of the Coldstream Guards came in for their hardest fighting at the beginning of the war in the battles of Modder River and Magersfontein. At the first in the evening there was "some confusion and disorder . . . suddenly Major Henniker's well-known word of command rang out reviving memories of the barrack square at home . . . the effect was instantaneous. The symptoms of unsteadiness disappeared . . ." At Magersfontein they helped to cover the retreat of beaten troops. After this there was for them a period mainly of long marches to Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and finally to the Portuguese border at Komati Poort. And it was during this period that a "guard consisting of fifty men of the 1st battalion was ordered to receive General Cronje (when he surrendered at Paardeberg) with shouldered arms;" and that "Divisional headquarters . . . became (on one occasion) apprehensive that the Boers were preparing to blacken their faces and rush the picquets by night," and the outposts were strengthened accordingly. When near Middleburg there was what might have been a windfall, for nine thousand pounds in gold, twenty-two rifles, and a bag of official correspondence were dug up . . . Major Shute . . . put in a claim for some of it on behalf of the Regimental Institute . . ." but was told that spoils of war become the property of the Sovereign.

Both battalions were fully engaged in the curious guerilla war-

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fare to which the Boers resorted towards the end of the war ; curious because of their complete trust in British benevolence, as when they handed over men wounded in abortive attacks on posts to the garrisons for treatment. These good-humoured relations continued when peace had been made and enabled six officers of Guard battalions to see something more of Boer marksmanship in a spring-bok shoot with six farmers near Cradock. " We extended over the veldt about two hundred yards apart, and it was wonderful to see what expert shots these Boer farmers were. They invariably got a buck if he was anywhere near two hundred yards away, and, at the end of the day, our bag consisted of one hundred and seventeen spring-bok, of which, it is sad to relate that we, the British contingent, could only lay claim to twelve."

The Armies of the First French Republic and the rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I. The Armées de la Moselle, Du Rhin, De Sambre-et-Meuse, De Rhin-et-Moselle. By the late Colonel RAMSAY WESTON PHIPPS. Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford. Price 21*s.* net.

The first volume of the result of the researches of the late Colonel Phipps into the development of the armies of the French Republic and their leaders was published in 1926, and dealt mainly with the exploits of the Armée du Nord and its leaders. In the volume now under review an equally interesting account is given of the actions of the young men who were to become Marshals—St. Cyr, Bernadotte, Soult, Ney, Mortier, Marmont, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald, and Desaix and Marceau who were robbed by death of this distinction—their successes, their errors, their friendships, and their quarrels, during the years 1791–1797 in the armies, so closely intertwined by amalgamation and transfer, of the Rhine and Moselle and Sambre and Meuse. But, as is inevitable, the story tells even more of the commanders of these armies than of the subordinates: of Custine, or Pichegru, gloomy and taciturn because he mistrusted his own powers and who was a traitor, of Jourdan who was also to be a Marshal, of Hoche, who rose from the ranks of the Garde Francaise, but was far from being either a great commander like Napoleon or a model Republican general, of Moreau, a better general than most men yet hesitating and bewildered even by success. It tells also of their difficult relations with the Republican Government which did not for years discover " the importance of having one commander to supervise operations in

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one district," and had as War Minister Carnot, " who in the undying spirit of the War Office clerk, never able to understand why the man in the field sees differently from the man in the office, complained that the generals only found things impossible which they did not want to do." It tells of those Representatives, *commissionaires extraordinaires*, with the armies who were accustomed to issue sentences of death or to denounce the unsuccessful as traitors; and as a result one harassed general, instead of informing his superior that the enemy had crossed the Rhine and were behind him, wrote to the Jacobin Club in Paris to ask whether he should retreat. And it tells of other freaks of the Republicans that perhaps reached their zenith when a stern patriot, offended because the tower of Strasburg dominated the town, proposed to cut it down to the level of the houses.

The story of the military operations begins with the campaign of Valmy, and the operations in the Palatinate and on the Rhine in 1793 and 1794, which in some ways resemble those on the Western Front in the late war. Next comes the campaign of Fleurus, where the first war balloon was used and was not a success, and where Jourdan not only beat the Austrians and Prussians, but " what was more important . . . defeated the Representatives with his army " and also the authorities in Paris whose powers of interference were henceforward broken; then there is the French siege of Mayence and the Austrian counterattack, and lastly a clear narrative of the well-known campaign in Germany in 1796, and a brief account of events up to the conclusion of peace in 1797.

Besides historical information of great value Colonel Phipps also gives his readers good stories. One, for instance, is that of the caricature in which a Representative is telling the troops that with bread and lead they can go anywhere, to which the soldiers reply that nothing is said about boots. Another that, on one occasion, a drunken Grenadier, whose stomach was showing signs of rebellion at the mixture of red and white wine that it was expected to digest, gravely said: " Red and white, red and white, if you don't get together I'll turn you both out of doors." For those who disbelieve in the value of military history there is a quotation from what Jourdan wrote to the Directory when requesting to be relieved of the command of the Army of Sambre and Meuse: " I shall occupy myself in my retirement in studying the art of war . . . and when, in addition to the practical experience of five very active campaigns, I shall possess a knowledge of theory also, I shall accept employment with pleasure." And there is also the fact that, when con-

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valescing after being wounded, Desaix read " the works of Marshal Saxe and of Vauban, and for relaxation Goethe and Schiller's Thirty Years' War."

The " Guide " Compass. In our notice of this compass in April it was stated that the card takes some time to settle and that the compass is heavy. This may lead to a misunderstanding of its merits when comparing it with the Service compass. The " Guide " is lighter and takes less time to settle than the Service compass. The special advantage of the " Guide " compass is that it does not oscillate like the ordinary compass, it returns slowly, slightly overswings and then settles. The ordinary compass has a quicker movement but takes more time to settle.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The National Review, May, 1929. " Some Personal Recollections of Marshal Foch," by Colonel R. H. Beadon, C.B.E.

Blackwood's Magazine, June, 1929. " A Solo Flight from England to the Gold Coast in Cirrus-Moth G. EBZZ," by Captain R. S. Rattray.

The Empire Review, June, 1929. " Military Aspects of the Channel Tunnel," by Lt.-Col. A. Baird-Smith, D.S.O. (retired).

The English Review, June, 1929. " The Dardanelles Landings," by H. W. Nevinson.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

" The Path of Glory." By George Blake. Published by Constable & Co. 6*s*. net.

" All Quiet on the Western Front." By Erich Maria Remarque. Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd. 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

" Studies in the Napoleonic Wars." By Sir Charles Oman, M.P., K.B.E., D.C.L. Published by Methuen & Co., Ltd. 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

" The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol. I, The Old Empire from the Beginnings to 1783." General Editors : J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians. Published by The Cambridge University Press. 35*s*. net.

" The Official History of the Gallipoli Campaign," Vol. I. By Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* Published by

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William Heinemann, Ltd. 15*s.* net. Volume of maps and appendices, 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

Beitrage zur Finanzkunde, Band 11. *Die englischen Rüstungsausgaben seit dem Weltkriege.* By Dr. Elsa Fiedler. Published by Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft M.B.H., Leipzig.

"Ypres—Outpost of the Channel Ports." By Beatrix Brice. Published by John Murray. 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

"The Coldstream Guards, 1885–1914." By Colonel Sir John Hall, Bart., C.B.E. Published by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 25*s.* net.

"With a Woman's Unit in Serbia, Salonika and Sebastopol." By I. Emslie Hutton, M.D. Published by Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

"Practical Horsemanship." By Capt. J. L. M. Barrett, 13/18th Hussars. Published by H. F. & G. Witherby. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

"The Indian States and Ruling Princes." By Sir Sidney Low. Published by Ernest Benn, Ltd. 6*d.*

"The Journal of the Royal Artillery." Vol. LVI, No. 1. Published by the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, S.E.18. 15*s.* net.

"India." Vol. II, No. 5. Published by "India" Publications, Ltd. 1*s.* monthly.

"The Crater of Mars." By Ferdinand Tuohy. Published by William Heinemann, Ltd. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

"League of Nations Armaments Year-Book." Published by Société des Nations, League of Nations Information Section, Room 197, Geneva.

"The Vicissitudes of Organized Power." By the Hon. Sir John Fortescue, LL.D., D.Litt. Published by The Oxford University Press. 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

"The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I." By the late Colonel Ramsay Weston Phipps, formerly of the Royal Artillery. Published by The Oxford University Press. 21*s.* net.

"The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle." Vol. XXXVI, January–December 1928. Published by Slatter & Rose.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Commons

Royal Air Force (Petrol).—On the 7th of March, in reply to a question by *Sir N. Grattan Doyle*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that the extra cost of petrol to the Royal Air Force consequent upon the recent increase of price was estimated at £640 per week.

Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill.—The Army and Air Force (Annual) Bill was considered in Committee on the 26th of March. A debate took place upon an amendment proposed by *Mr. R. Morrison* for the abolition of the death penalty in case of cowardice, which was defeated by 174 votes to 108.

War Payments to France.—On the 23rd of April, in reply to a question by *Mr. Sexton*, the *Chancellor of the Exchequer* stated that no payment was made for trenches in the battle area occupied by British troops in France; £25,500,000 were paid for the trans-

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port of British troops on French railways, of which £17,500,000 were paid to the railway companies through the French Government and £8,000,000 were set off, by a special agreement, against the French War Debt to this country. No payment was made for the land used for the burial of British soldiers killed in action, this land having been presented by the French Government to the Imperial War Graves Commission as a free gift.

CHEMICAL WAR (EXPERIMENTS).—On the 30th of April, in reply to a question by *Mr. Wellock*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that the number of animals and birds used for experimental purposes at the Porton chemical warfare experimental station from the 1st of November, 1926, to the 20th of April, 1929, was 1,184. Of these 440 were killed by the experiment. None had to be destroyed afterwards as a result of the experiment. The animals and birds used were rabbits 345, goats 7, guinea-pigs 525, cats 37, monkeys 1, mice 153, canaries 40, pigeons 46, fowls 30. No animals or birds were used for experimental purposes at the Sutton Oak Research Establishment during this period.

MEAT CONSUMPTION.—On the 30th of April, in reply to a question by *Mr. Thurtle*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the quantity of meat consumed by the Army at home during a period of six months was approximately 5,800 tons.

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BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY, 1930

Subject selected by the Army Council for the eighth Competition:

"It is accepted that the existence of the British Empire in war is dependent on the control of sea communications. The security of the ports constituting the terminal points of these communications is, therefore, of vital importance. These ports, which may be either naval or commercial, may be subjected to attacks by sea, air or land, either singly or combined. Consequently, the defence of ports has a three-fold aspect.

"Discuss this three-fold aspect, and describe what you consider should be the rôle of each of the three fighting Services in the defence of ports. State, also, your views on how the defence should be controlled and coordinated."

Rules of the Competition

1. The right to compete is limited to British subjects, who have served, or who are actually serving, as officers or in other ranks or ratings of His Majesty's forces.

2. The term "His Majesty's forces" includes the Navy and the Royal Marines, the Regular Army, the Special Reserve, the Territorial Army, the Militia, and the Royal Air Force, the New Armies which took part in the late war, and also the Naval, Military and Air forces of India, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies.

3. The essays submitted for the prize must not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate.

4. The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto typewritten on the outside and his name and address inside.

5. The title and page of any published or unpublished work, to which reference is made in any essay or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

6. The essays, which are to be addressed to the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*, must reach the office of the *Army Quarterly*, 94, Jermyn Street, London, S.W., not later than the 1st of March, 1930.

7. The essays will be judged by at least three referees—two to be appointed by the Army Council, the third to be one of the

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Editors of the *Army Quarterly*. The decision of the Referees, or of a majority of them, will be final.

8. The referees are fully empowered, if in their opinion, or in the opinion of the majority of them, no essay submitted to them comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence, not to award the prize; or they may, if they consider such a course desirable, divide the prize among two or more competitors.

9. The result of the Competition will be made known in the *Army Quarterly* in July, 1930, and the prize essay will be published in that number of the Review. In the event, however, of there being two or more prize essays, the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* reserve to themselves the right of deciding which of these essays they will publish.

10. The copyright in any essay which appears in the *Army Quarterly* belongs to the Proprietors of the Review.

11. Neither the Proprietors nor the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* are to be held responsible for the loss or return of any essay submitted for the Competition; nor do they incur any liability whatsoever in connection with the receipt of the essays, any dealings therewith, the judging thereof, or the reports thereon.

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